Watching the IDF (catch all)

[Tom Odom]

@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close

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Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Been there and watched it happen up close and personal.

Problems in Lebanon in 2006 have roots going back to 56, 67, and 73. EBO probably did have a dire influence. In the macro sense, the IDF's offensive based strategy has always been based on the idea that they could ultimately intimidate their opponents into quitting. It works in the short term; has distinct issues in the longer term.

Best

Tom

[Granite_State]

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Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Been there and watched it happen up close and personal.

Best

Tom

Would you say that COIN has to be based on a hearts-and-minds approach? Isn't "counter-insurgency" simply seeking to defeat the insurgents? What the Russians in Afghanistan or Israelis in the Territories did may have been brutal, and maybe ineffective, but how is it not COIN?

[Rex Brynen]

Would you say that COIN has to be based on a hearts-and-minds approach? Isn't "counter-insurgency" simply seeking to defeat the insurgents? What the Russians in Afghanistan or Israelis in the Territories did may have been brutal, and maybe ineffective, but how is it not COIN?

I think its a fair question, whether we define COIN as all military operations aimed against insurgencies, or whether we consider only FM 3-24-type operations to be COIN. I would use the broader definition.

That having been said, Tom points to an important characteristic of IDF operations in Lebanon on the 1980s: they were very much driven by a military security/deterrence/killing the opponent approach, and weren't anything that the modern US or British Army would consider appropriate. The actual, informal ROEs used by the IDF in south Lebanon were very loose indeed, a point that Jim Ron makes in both his academic book and in his op ed account of being an IDF paratrooper. Indeed, I believe that the IDF even shot at Tom on multiple occasions

Practice in the WBG has been rather more constrained for a variety of reasons (including more intense media coverage), and the nature of Israeli operations rather different. No one who has ever seen a checkpoint in operation or been at the back of a collective taxi as young men are hauled out for ID checks would consider it consider it akin to anything the British Army did to the general population in northern Ireland, however (although I'm sure that some elements of the RUC did to Catholics, on occasion--at considerable sectarian cost). Instead, it is all control/occupation, and no hearts-and-minds (which are, frankly, never likely to accept occupation). The few Israeli efforts to preserve, coopt, or cultivate a cooperative Palestinian elite (support for pro-Jordanian notables after 1967, the Village Leagues in the 1980s) were spectacular failures.

Perhaps, therefore, the best distinction is between colonial/foreign occupation-type COIN (where the locals will never really accept the legitimacy of your rule), and support-for-local-authorities type COIN (where a government may indeed be able to win genuine public support).

[William F. Owen]

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Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Don't be sorry. You missed my point. The Lebanon was not COIN. It was a straight fighting buffer zone stuff. That was exactly my point.

In the occupied territories it's a different story and I'd submit that definitely qualifies as COIN, at least in the IDF mindset.

[SWJED]

CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh

[William F. Owen]

CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh

Naveh has accurately characterised Hezbollah, and in a way I would agree with, but the rest of this article is, I suspect, about promoting his agendas - which appear fairly obvious and are in line the gossip doing the rounds in IDF military thought at the moment. EG- How were we so stupid as to buy into "Effects Based Operations?"

The idea that the IDF was "unprepared" - which it obviously was - does not, in my view validate his other opinions.

[MattC86]

CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh

Thanks for the link - this was a very eye-opening read. I was particularly interested in Naveh's analysis of Hezbollah, because I think the abilities and powers of nonstate actors, particularly in the Middle East, are going to continue to grow, and I'm not sure anyone has figured out an acceptable political endstate for a conflict with a Hezbollah or Hamas.

I was confused, however, by Naveh's claim that the original idea was to "create conditions which will force him to give up the militant [role of Hezbollah], to stop this duality," yet not focused on decapitation attacks or other forms of leader-elimination campaigns. How would this work? Does anybody have a better idea of what he's talking about? Or did I completely miss something?

Matt

[tequila]

I think the concept was to totally destroy Hizbullah's military wing on the battlefield, kill off the fighters and battlefield leadership, and essentially leave Nasrallah with nothing but politics as an option in the ongoing struggle in Lebanon. The Israelis are smart enough to know that killing Nasrallah, as charismatic as he is, or other Hizbullah senior leadership would not destroy Hizbullah as a movement because it has achieved the level of a genuine social movement/party within the Lebanese context as the overall representative of the Shi'i, especially the pious middle and lower classes.

[MattC86]

I think the concept was to totally destroy Hizbullah's military wing on the battlefield, kill off the fighters and battlefield leadership, and essentially leave Nasrallah with nothing but politics as an option in the ongoing struggle in Lebanon. The Israelis are smart enough to know that killing Nasrallah, as charismatic as he is, or other Hizbullah senior leadership would not destroy Hizbullah as a movement because it has achieved the level of a genuine social movement/party within the Lebanese context as the overall representative of the Shi'i, especially the pious middle and lower classes.

I know Hezbollah less resembles an insurgency movement than a nonstate, private army, but doesn't it enjoy popular legitimacy to the point where an effort to destroy their military wing is going to take on the hydra-killing characteristics of counterinsurgency? Or does Hezbollah resemble an army enough in its organization and fighting characteristics to make this a viable concept?

Matt

[Rank amateur]

I know Hezbollah less resembles an insurgency movement than a nonstate, private army, but doesn't it enjoy popular legitimacy to the point where an effort to destroy their military wing is going to take on the hydra-killing characteristics of counterinsurgency? Or does Hezbollah resemble an army enough in its organization and fighting characteristics to make this a viable concept?

Matt

The answer is a matter of opinion. I think it's the former. Israel hopes it's the later. We won't know for sure until someone tries.

[Rex Brynen]

Don't be sorry. You missed my point. The Lebanon was not COIN. It was a straight fighting buffer zone stuff. That was exactly my point.

I'm not entirely sure how one distinguishes between the two. After the failure of quite ambitious Israeli efforts to establish a compliant Lebanese government in 1982-83, they certainly gradually fell back to a buffer zone strategy in south lebanon.

However, that buffer zone strategy involved support for a local political-military ally, the South Lebanese Army. Surely combat operations in aimed at supporting the preservation and power of a local (albeit de facto rather than de jure) administration are COIN operations? It certainly involved everything from counter-guerilla operations to financial aid, engineering assistance, intelligence support, PSYOPS, economic integration strategies (the "Good Fence"), engagement (and intimidation) of community leaders, etc. Indeed, Israel was far more involved in the administrative functioning of south Lebanon than it is in contemporary Gaza (in which case, are the IDF's Gaza operations not COIN either?)

I'm not trying to see how many COIN definitions can dance on the head of a pin here. Rather, it seems to me that there are real challenges in learning lessons (or assessing effectiveness) if we can't be clear what cases count as relevant, or what the criteria for "success" are.

[William F. Owen]

@ I'm not entirely sure how one distinguishes between the two. After the failure of quite ambitious Israeli efforts to establish a compliant Lebanese government in 1982-83, they certainly gradually fell back to a buffer zone strategy in south lebanon. ....

@ I'm not trying to see how many COIN definitions can dance on the head of a pin here. Rather, it seems to me that there are real challenges in learning lessons (or assessing effectiveness) if we can't be clear what cases count as relevant, or what the criteria for "success" are.

I don't think you can. Your final point is exactly right. In my own writing COIN is a word or abbreviation I try and avoid using. I consider it expedient for conversing here, but also intellectually lazy - as I have said many times before, in relation to other bumper sticky definitions that cast about.

The only purpose of the invading and occupying the Lebanon was to make the state of Israel safer from armed aggression. That's it. Fact. It had no other purpose. Call it COIN, call it a better Fence, call it war. In IDF eyes, the desired end state is absolute and not negotiable, and that alone creates pressures and realities that most other armies know absolutely nothing of.

[William F. Owen]

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In the macro sense, the IDF's offensive based strategy has always been based on the idea that they could ultimately intimidate their opponents into quitting.

How is that not the essence of creating defeat? What other mechanism exists? It worked against for the UK in every war we ever fought, and won.

[Tom Odom]

How is that not the essence of creating defeat? What other mechanism exists? It worked against for the UK in every war we ever fought, and won.

Quite simply that the UK and or the US has had the option of disengagement as a course of action. In the case of Israel that option is not there. For years there was the territory for peace option and in some cases--Egypt for one--it worked albeit with a very large US checkbook for both sides.

The difficulty for Israel is that while it can win decisively in a large scale conflict, its options are strictly short term. The longer term solution as in the case of the 82 invasion proved unsustainable as indeed did the longer term occupation of southern Lebanon and the emergence of Hizballah.

So there is Israel's conundrum: decisive defeat ala 67 is very short-lived thing. Longer term solutions are cast in doubt by demographics. I liked the Israeli general's description of hizballah because he keyed on something most outsiders miss. Hizballah is a nationalist organization with a religious charter. That means that it often operates purely in what it sees as Lebanese interests. Where it really constitutes a threat to Israel is in its ability to absorb punishment and remain intact.

As for the West Bank, the IDF does use limited responses but again what is the objective? They have been in the past to sustain Israeli settlements in the territories and limit Palestinian threats toward the settlements and Israel proper. COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government. The IDF has used a one-sided approach to intimidate and undercut Palestinian leadership for decades. To a certain degree that has worked in that the IDF still has the West Bank. On the other hand it faces a much more robust and threatening enemy.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

As for the West Bank, the IDF does use limited responses but again what is the objective? They have been in the past to sustain Israeli settlements in the territories and limit Palestinian threats toward the settlements and Israel proper. COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government. The IDF has used a one-sided approach to intimidate and undercut Palestinian leadership for decades. To a certain degree that has worked in that the IDF still has the West Bank. On the other hand it faces a much more robust and threatening enemy.

Territory for peace? Everywhere the IDF withdraws from becomes a base for attacking Israel.

The objective is essentially peace. Easy to say, almost impossible to do, and the goal posts in the occupied territories are pretty fast moving. It's to create an acceptable level of violence, so as other measures can work.

You would be perfectly safe driving around most of the West Bank today, indeed access to most of the West Bank is in no way restricted. Just don't climb over the Road Fence, and slow right down at checkpoint and open your windows.

...undercut the Palestinian Leadership? What Leadership? I agree there is a certain amount of pretty unproductive "divide and rule" but when the leadership is mostly corrupt and ineffective and cannot deliver on an agreement, then what else is there?

[Rex Brynen]

most of the West Bank is in no way restricted. Just don't climb over the Road Fence, and slow right down at checkpoint and open your windows.

This is hardly the case: every major Palestinian population center in the West Bank is ringed by checkpoints. Vehicular traffic is so restricted that the norm is to exit the taxi on one side, line up at the barrier, and grab another taxi on the other side (I've done it more times than I care to count). Good are rigorously searched. Access to Jerusalem is barred to most of the West Bank population.

There are Israeli-only roads in the West Bank, largely reserved to Jewish settlers. The local population can't use them. Indeed, in some areas (the Jordan Valley) there are movement and permit systems in place for local residents on all roads.

You'll find extensive information on the scope, nature, and impact of Israeli mobility restrictions in the West Bank at the UN OCHA website. World Bank analysis on the economic and social impact of these restrictions can be found here.

[William F. Owen]

This is hardly the case: every major Palestinian population center in the West Bank is ringed by checkpoints. [/URL].

Sure it is. I also drive around the West Bank, and specifically the Jordan Valley on a regular basis. Sure, Israeli number plates make a huge difference, and there are some areas off limits, but it is not Afghanistan or Iraq (or even Gaza!). If you know what you're doing, and you're there for the right reasons, then you are pretty safe. I feel a heck of a lot safer on the West Bank than I ever did in Algeria or Sierra Leone, during their security problems. There are parts of Thailand and the Philippines I'd stay the hell away from as well.

Yes, I've seen whole families of Arabs, standing in the winter rain, while their car is ripped apart and I read the Marsom Watch reports and I know members of that organisation, so I am in no way suggesting that there are not substantial problems. A lot of what is done is coercive, unjust and even cruel and unnecessary, but a certain amount contributes to security. How much? Give me a crystal ball, and I'll tell you.

[Rank amateur]

COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government.

At least some people want the Israeli government in control.

"It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed territories" to which both Israelis and Palestinians have claims."


Israel cannot be characterized as a "foreign occupier" with respect to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fundamental sources of international legality decide the question in Israel's favor. The last international legal allocation of territory that includes what is today the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred with the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which recognized Jewish national rights in the whole of the Mandated territory, including the sector east of the Jordan River

In some ways they are.

In 1967, Israel nationalized all West Bank water.

[Tom Odom]

At least some people want the Israeli government in control.

"It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed territories" to which both Israelis and Palestinians have claims."


Israel cannot be characterized as a "foreign occupier" with respect to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fundamental sources of international legality decide the question in Israel's favor. The last international legal allocation of territory that includes what is today the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred with the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which recognized Jewish national rights in the whole of the Mandated territory, including the sector east of the Jordan River

In some ways they are.

In 1967, Israel nationalized all West Bank water.

Yep

The Israelis considering the source of your post

The US government position is that the West Bank is occupied territory. That is why US policy was and still is againstthe settlement program.

In any case, the thread was IDF COIN.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

@ The US government position is that the West Bank is occupied territory.

@ That is why US policy was and still is againstthe settlement program.

I would also call Judea and Samaria, the occupied territories, and not Judea and Samaria. - and so would more Israelis than most US and UK media would ever want to admit.

Which settlement program? The illegal settlements are illegal. No debate, but there are Moshav, and Kibbutz which are perfectly legal. There are also Jewish Communities in the territories that have lived there 100's and even 1,000 of years