The intensity and pace of operations is an order of magnitude lower. The monthly KIA average in Northern Ireland was 1.67, for instance. The total number of people, civilians and combatants included, killed in NI over a thirty-year period is under 4,000 --- that would be a decent two-month stretch in Iraq.Operation Banner is the Army's longest continuous campaign in its history with more than 300,000 personnel serving and 763 directly killed by paramilitaries.
Your point about the order of magnitude is true, in absolute terms. However, I suspect that in relative terms (size of forces engaged, total populations, etc), the impact may be more comparable. Also, I suspect that using a monthly KIA average is misleading. Were one to plot British Army deaths over the 38 years, it would probably show a curve skewed to the left (i.e., many more deaths early on in the 38 years).Originally Posted by tequila
I'm sure you're right, but I still question what kind of value Northern Ireland holds in looking at Iraq. Fighting a terrorist group with sometimes barely 100 active members (Provisional IRA), an hour's flight from your capital, versus counter-insurgency/sectarian peace-keeping with 150,000 troops thousands of miles from home? Doesn't seem like much to draw on there, in a strategic sense anyway.
This is possibly true, but still I think Iraq represents a massively different sort of fight. The worst year in NI for the British was 1972, when 149 soldiers were killed out of a force of 30k or so. No other year comes close to this in NI, and this still represents a casualty rate below a similar year for the U.S. in Iraq.
Moreover, you never saw anything like this in Northern Ireland. Can you imagine 500-lb. bombs hitting snipers in Derry or British tanks firing main gun rounds in Belfast? Combat simply was never at that high of a level. The horrific Omagh bombing that finally put an end to violent Republicanism killed 29 people. 58 Iraqis were killed yesterday, pretty much without any news coverage at all because of the soccer win. The level of violence, both against U.S. forces and within the Iraqi population, is vastly different. The best evidence, beyond the daily body count, is in the size of refugee flows. AFAIK there never was any significant mass refugee flow out of NI. Compare that to over 4m Iraqi displaced, 2m outside of the country.
Again, no disputing your points. But, the devastation in SWA is half a world away, and the co-citizens of the military intervention force being killed in SWA tend to be contract help and reporters who largely have chosen to be there in order to fatten their wallets or their prestige--a freely chosen risk. In NI, everyday British citizens were unwilling targets in a location just a short boat ride or airplane flight away from the big island.
I also do not think that the "vote with your feet" position that results in refugees is germane in NI--most of the folks there were too committed to a lifestyle choice to be able to pick up and run to escape the violence.
I read something some time ago that essentially argued that a nation's public posed less of a problem for operations of a smaller scale with less PR despite the length. Does this sound familiar to anyone? I do not have more than a basic understanding of the NI operations, but does this ring true for the British? Perhaps this is a lesson we can take from it? Also, did the British employ more police-like tactics rather than all out combat tactics?
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
Seems like it to me. I think Max Boot made that point well in his The Savage Wars of Peace, about the many small wars America fought pre-WWII, mostly with Marines in Central America, and largely out of the public eye.
Whether this still holds true in the age of the internet and instant global media coverage is another question.
This has come up before, and I tend to believe you're correct, GS. Although there are other factors that can come into play as well (mainly politics). For example, if a popular leader sends troops into an area where only a few are killed over an extended period (and that leader enjoys the support of the press), the situation is manageable. If those conditions are not in place (as in media interest, lack of domestic popularity and/or a sudden spike in losses) then it's not so easy to maintain.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I highly doubt "lifestyle choice" was that great of a deterrent factor for potential Northern Irish refugees. I think it was the fact that the average NI citizen did not feel threatened enough by daily violence to make leaving worthwhile.
Everyday British citizens, while they did have to live with an ever-present Irish terror threat, never died at anywhere near the rate that American soldiers are dying in Iraq today.
Note also that the British ended by negotiating a settlement with the enemy, not defeating them.
LawVol, Jedburgh posted this a couple of weeks ago. It is full of details and their tactics. You might want to take a look.
http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/misc/opbanner.pdf
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