The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[AmericanPride]

I do not think the article addresses whatsoever war as an abstract idea. Yeah, it pays tribute to Clausewitz, but it never really gets to talking about his ideas; so it's really just a different way in which Clausewitz's ideas may be 'expressed' in a particular circumstance.

Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why. So I'm not sure if I agree with the idea of "amplifiers" as defined by the MG and Beyerchen because they seem to rework the ways in which wars are defined. I think its a mistaken assumption to define wars in the first place by the perceived dominant factor of influence because that introduces a kind of "heirarchy" of eras in which we can say such and such war was different from this other war when it might not really be the case based on the political conditions of the conflict. It also suggests some kind of progression which also might not exist. I further dislike the idea of supposing some kind of "world war" as if any other (or every other) war which could take place at the same time would somehow have the same shape (how much of the proposals would be relevant in a war with North Korea, or a culturally homogeneous society in general? Even in WW2, the Nazis pursued different strategies in the West and East based on political conditions in the same world war). So, for example, while we can find comparison between "WWIV" and Caesar's conquest of Gaul based on the shrewd manipulation of the enemy's culture and identity politics, there's really no political comparison whatsoever and so it's very much difficult to assert at all that the "psycho-cultural war" actually exists as a type of war rather than a specific strategy suitable for specific conditions (which might not always exist). Was there actually any "evolution" between Caesar's day and now in war itself, or are the (perceived) changes simply reflective of the sophistication of warfighting? I think wars should be defined by their political causes, not the strategies employed in them; to do the latter turns the entire equation upside down. Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?

So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.

[William F. Owen]

There are some things in this that I really want to agree with, but the context he presents them in, causes me to be less than enthusiastic.

What I like, if I read it correctly, was the observation the military technology does not progress logically, but is basically the product of opinion, both faulty and accurate. Tanks are not products of physics. They are products of opinion.

Yes, armies would benefit greatly from "better" infantry and tactical forces. Yes a better understanding of the social sciences would help,

BUT...

The whole set up of US and NATO Armies is biased against creating "cross spectrum" tactical excellence as they have somehow elevated the so called "Operational Level" to near G@d like status. - if indeed it exits in the way folks say it do...

Currently, the military thought, so central to the Generals article, is in love with taking the back off the watch, rather than just telling the time.

What is more, when the social scientists turn up and ask, "why do you do this," most military men, will have no idea, as to why they do the things they do, and even when they do, they may well find that the reasoning is faulty. This is not true for all as the CARLS archive so amply shows. Thus I submit there is a limited role for social scientists to analyse the why and how. There is an ample role for the gifted members of the military. The truth really does set you free, but who tells you what is true makes a huge difference.

To take a not so extreme example, how do you practice "COIN" when the enemy is both insurgent, a regular army and special forces? - as in Vietnam. .. or even South Ossetia?

[Ken White]

Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why.

I didn't see it either; though it should be obvious. The lesser reason is political correctness and the kinder, gentler folks of today (mostly...) compared to their Grandparents. Note that no leading Nation has really started a war since the Argentina bit in the Falklands (and that was an aberration) except the US and just recently, Russia, neither of whom are now or ever have been particularly kind or gentle when provoked. The greater reason is the expense, conventional war in the 20 Century model has gotten too expensive for most nations.

Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?

Uh, because Hitler had a desire to fight on regardless and had a power structure to enforce his views plus a population that was broadly supportive and Khalid had none of those? I'll also point out that both were chemical 'wars' while the later one did transmute to physics as it went on.

So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.

I thought he did -- but was constrained by the fact that as Wilf said:

"Currently, the military thought, so central to the Generals article, is in love with taking the back off the watch, rather than just telling the time.

What is more, when the social scientists turn up and ask, "why do you do this," most military men, will have no idea, as to why they do the things they do, and even when they do, they may well find that the reasoning is faulty. This is not true for all as the CARLS archive so amply shows. Thus I submit there is a limited role for social scientists to analyse the why and how. There is an ample role for the gifted members of the military. The truth really does set you free, but who tells you what is true makes a huge difference.

To take a not so extreme example, how do you practice "COIN" when the enemy is both insurgent, a regular army and special forces? - as in Vietnam. .. or even South Ossetia?"

Trying to categorize warfare and put in a pigeon hole is quite dangerous. Also serves absolutely no useful function that I can see...

[AmericanPride]

because Hitler had a desire to fight on regardless and had a power structure to enforce his views plus a population that was broadly supportive and Khalid had none of those?

Indeed -- and that is my intended point. It's one thing to discuss how this or that war ended, but it really comes down to breaking the enemy's will regardless of how that's accomplished. That's why it irks me every time war is defined by the capabilities or strategies in use rather than the extent the belligerents are willing to pursue their desired objectives. I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics. Having looked through the article again, what I primarily dispute is (1) defining the wars by the capabilities in use which leads to a faulty, perhaps misleading, conception of war and its future; (2) asserting that "psycho-cultural war" is a kind of war instead of a particular strategy used in specific conditions; and (3) claiming said assertion is a revision of the nature of war itself (even if its an addition to the author's accepted idea of war rather than redefining it) rather than an "expression" of it in particular (political) circumstances which might not exist elsewhere or in the future.

[William F. Owen]

I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics. Having looked through the article again, what I primarily dispute is (1) defining the wars by the capabilities in use which leads to a faulty, perhaps misleading, conception of war and its future.

I think there are two things in play here and they are not the same thing. Military force is a political or diplomatic tool. Military force is applied as a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means.

The political will to employ and persist with military means is not one that should concern the military. What should concern the military is achieving the outcome the politicians want. (it may include loosing or not winning.) - as soldiers that's none of their business.

The expression of military capability, usually refers to a "want to do." This is not the same as a "can do." My guess is that a lot of folks are very reluctant to discuss why an ACR squadron, for example, cannot perform certain missions they are supposed to.

IMO, we have got to recover the idea that military force is only applied to military problems. Military force is primarily destructive and coercive. Its benefits come from actual or threatened harm. How you apply threaten or apply the harm is basically what defines how you work. Just an opinion, but why make it more complicated?

[wm]

IMO, we have got to recover the idea that military force is only applied to military problems. Military force is primarily destructive and coercive. Its benefits come from actual or threatened harm. How you apply threaten or apply the harm is basically what defines how you work. Just an opinion, but why make it more complicated?

Wilf,
I suspect that part of the confusion arises because we have folks wearing uniforms who do a lot things that are neither destructive nor coercive. A medic administering vaccinations to children in Afghanistan, a construction engineer working to build a new school in Iraq, and a wheeled vehicle mechanic fixing a local farmer's tractor in Djibouti are three easy examples. These are not examples of military force in the sense you apply the phrase, but they are examples of a type of force that just happens to be applied by military personnel (among many others).

Trying to categorize warfare and put in a pigeon hole is quite dangerous. Also serves absolutely no useful function that I can see...

Ken, it provides the economy with a lot of jobs for people who work in organizations that garner "lessons observed." Too bad we have yet to figure out a way to convert lessons observed effectivelt and efficiently into lesson learned. (No offense to folks like Tom Odom intended)

[William F. Owen]

I suspect that part of the confusion arises because we have folks wearing uniforms who do a lot things that are neither destructive nor coercive. A medic administering vaccinations to children in Afghanistan, a construction engineer working to build a new school in Iraq, and a wheeled vehicle mechanic fixing a local farmer's tractor in Djibouti are three easy examples. These are not examples of military force in the sense you apply the phrase, but they are examples of a type of force that just happens to be applied by military personnel (among many others).

Concur. They acts of kindness and are thus choices. The military does these things to help. They are humanitarian. It is "Military Humanitarian Aid" - and that has implications by itself!

If it "saves life and relieves suffering" I am all for it. I can little or no reason to build schools. I'd be genuinely interested in hearing the justification for why that is deemed important.

The militaries primary contribution should be the provision of security to the population and Government. The desired end state should be the level of security where non-military humanitarian aid can be provided. If 90% of the effort is not going in that direction, then I think there is a problem.

[wm]

Concur. They acts of kindness and are thus choices. The military does these things to help. They are humanitarian. It is "Military Humanitarian Aid" - and that has implications by itself!

If it "saves life and relieves suffering" I am all for it. I can little or no reason to build schools. I'd be genuinely interested in hearing the justification for why that is deemed important.

The militaries primary contribution should be the provision of security to the population and Government. The desired end state should be the level of security where non-military humanitarian aid can be provided. If 90% of the effort is not going in that direction, then I think there is a problem.

Spealking from the American perspective, I suggest that the reason the military is doing a lot of this work is because no one other element of our national government is willing or capable of stepping to the plate and taking the mission. We are apparently trying to plus up our capabilities in this area, but not too many folks who are not already wearing uniforms seem willing to place themselves in the harm's way that characterizes the current SWA operating environments in order to do the rest of the nation building work that might help stablize the countries there.

With regard to your last point, I wish it were as easy as, "make secure, then rebuild." I do not have a number/percent but your 90% of the effort in "pure" military work seems high to me. I suspect that part of the feeling of security comes from helping folks to have a better daily life. I'd be less likely to blow things up if I had a predictable supply of water, electricity and sewerage and my kids could get to a school that wasn't in danger of collapse or very far away.