Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Steve Blair]

Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

Mechanized units can (and do) play a valuable role as reaction forces, but one of the major lessons not learned from Vietnam was that most of them needed more dismounted elements. The units in-country learned this, but the lesson faded quickly after the war was over. The paper does make passing reference to the 3rd ACR, but not in the depth the subject may have required.

[Cavguy]

I agree with Steve, I'm not sold. how do you explain that the two biggest COIN successes thus far in Iraq were accomplished by heavily Armored units - i.e. 3 ACR and 1/1 AD? Under this logic, the light units should have much better success records, but they don't, and in the case of some of them, much worse.

I think the personalities and leadership styles/philosophies of the CO's had much more to do with it than the tools employed. It also picks two easy examples - why not try 1AD in Baghdad, 3rd ID OIF 3, or 1st Cav OIF 2 and contrast....

The historical argument that lighter forces are more successful at coin over the long run is much stronger, IMO, but the Iraq argument doesn't seem to be nearly as strong.

[Ken White]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

" 'Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail.' - General George C. Marshall."

[J Wolfsberger]

There's also a large difference between an Abrams and a Stryker/LAV. On top of that, and this can be the source of a lot of confusion, there is a dramatic difference between MOUT and COIN. I won't get a chance to read the paper till this weekend - maybe some who have can shed light on whether the authors captured these distinctions.

[Merv Benson]

Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.

We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.

It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.

I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.

[Ski]

I'm not sure if mechanization leads to stalemate or defeat more often. I have to read the paper with more attention to detail when I have more free time.

I do understand that mechanized forces are far more expensive to operate and maintain, and that we are spending vast amounts of cash in order to achieve results that are mediocre on average.

A lot to chew on here - my gut feeling is that this is a piece to a much larger puzzle - that includes leadership, adaptability by individual and unit, tactics, cultural/religious/ethnic differences, and maybe a few other major criteria.

Until I get into the weeds, I'm certainly not sold on mechanization = defeat in COIN, but I;m not dismissing it completely.

[Tom Odom]

I will read it also. I have long thought there is a significant internal cultural difference between heavy and light forces when it comes to dealing with people and dealing with systems. Many heavy leaders are by their training and inclinations "systems" as in combat systems oriented. They think by nature of their training in map sheets not kilometers aand almost never in meters. Light leaders are prople oriented and all planning and think is human-centric and done one foot at a time. That makes many light leaders more adaptive (or accepting) of human-centric adaptations.

Now before RTK and CAVGuy shoot me, I used the term many and not most. It is always a question of leadership and some leaders are adaptive and some are not. But in a macro sense, I see this as a trend that has continued for some time. How it plays out in COIN is certainly debatable.

But I would also say that we do have to be careful in talking COIN in an urban environment versus a full-blown MOUT fight. No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

Best

Tom

[reed11b]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?
In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone? Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC. Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support. There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers. Cavguy can probably give some strong examples. Rob's example of the Strykers calling them "trucks" is a good start on how to avoid what you describe. The one thing I don't like about strykers is that they appear to be complicated to operate, i.e. need additional training. The IMV's that I like look and operate like a "truck". Now I have never served in an SBCT so my belief in there complexity may have no basis in reality, but there expense is certainly more then is required for a good IMV.
Reed

[Ken White]

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?

The assigned drivers for the 2 1/2s in the Airborne units. Now ask me who drove the Tracks from the APC Battalion in the 7th Inf Div (ROCID) in the late 50s. Or ask me who drove the tracks in the Mech Bde I was in in during my 75-76 tour in Korea. Answer's the same, the drivers -- what's your point? Mine is that vehicles need drivers (a person), usually some security (another person or two) or to leave the area. The real point was in a discussion of Mech or mounted units (i.e. assigned vehicles) units, not transported infantry.

In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone?

Because in addition to the driver (who as you point out, was not in your examples a member of the Platoon but of a support or another element...) with most modern vehicles you have to leave someone to man the gun. In the Bradley because of the capacity, you also have to leave a third guy behind to pass up additional 25mm to the gunner. So you're confronted with the fact that your seven dismounts (IF you have all of them) are reduced to five or six. You're also stuck with the fact that mounted troops are absolutely not going to get too far away from their vehicles under most circumstances. Recall again, the discussion is on units with assigned vehicles.

Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC.

There's that word again. if, indeed...

Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support.

No question about that. I however, have no clue how we ever won a fight without all that sruff...

There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers.

Sorry, don't understand that???

[William F. Owen]

Here are my conclusions on Infantry Mechanisation.

A.) The platoon ORBAT is/should be optimised to fight/operate dismounted. Mechanisation means picking up and transporting folks who are "Light Infantry."

B.) Driving and fighting almost any modern armoured military vehicle is a specialist skill requiring a good dedicated course of instruction. The vehicle crew (always 2 or 2+) does not have to be infantrymen.

C.) The vehicle crew should not be considered part of the section/squad or platoon. Personally, I can see great merit in having a Mech Platoon (14-16 vehicles , so 28-32 men) at the Company level. BN would have "Mech" companies.

D.) There is a world of difference between operating with an MRAP vehicle and a MICV. They are two entirely different doctrines.

MRAPS/JLTV and APCs are protected mobility for "Light Infantry". IMO, It is the minimum standard for all infantry!

MICVs are another thing entirely. Yes, I confess there is now a lot of cross-over between an MICV and some APCs, but my basic contention is that it is almost entirely to do with what you expect of the vehicle.

[reed11b]

you beat me too it. I agree w/ you Ken that Mechanization ; as in Bradlys or other IFVs, does reduce boots on the ground. At the same time it increases area reachable and range of operations. One way to reduce the loss of infantry skill would be to have the IFVs and there operators in a sepperate platoon. A Bradley requires a complex skill set that is very differnt from being an infantryman. There would still be less total troops in a Bradley company, but just as many available for dismount and they could focus on training on there dismount skill sets while bradley operators retained skills at fireing and driving a bradley.
As far as IMV's go, if they can be operated by anyone in the Bat. and you are using vehicles in "light" infantry ops anyway (becouse we and everyone else is too) how does making that mobility protected cost troops on the ground or infantry skills and abilities?
Reed
Sorry I know this could be clearer but it's late and I'm up past my nap time.

[Shek]

Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

[Granite_State]

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

That was my suspicion, that a heavily mechanized Army (probably unavoidable up to the present) reinforces some of the worst aspects of the "American Way of War." Especially given the current situation.

[Ken White]

Mech, to include Strykers doesn't do that. Mech has to protect their vehicles and Rob misunderstood my earlier comment; yes, Mech can put out a substantial force (particularly the SBCTS) but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles. There is also a comfort factor, the Mech guys I've know were reluctant to get too far from their vehicles. That may not be the case with SBCTs but I suspect it is with the Bradley guys...

Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...

That's not to take anything away from the re-roled guys who are doing better than expected or anyone who's over there busting their hump.

I agree that the mounted mentality adversely impacted our efforts in Iraq early on; that and I'll also restate my earlier point that the right Commander will do his METT-T thing and do well regardless of background or type of unit involved and the wrong one will err regardless of what type units available.

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,
good point:

but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles.

There is certainly a trade - if you give anybody the mobility of organic vehicles of any flavor - they now have to be protected and crewed. If you organic crews to the MTO&E it does not take away from your squads and platoons, but if you don't you have to get them from somewhere. If you have vehicles you have to either be willing to cut them loose - i.e put somebody in charge and tell them to return to a place out of contact (like getting dropped off), place them somewhere where organic TTP and vehicle weapon systems can handle the force pro, or limit your movement to where you can always cooperate - i.e. you can't just abandon them without compromising their force pro in an environment where an enemy on foot who blends in well with the population has a natural advantage. Any crew of any combat vehicle is going to have their attention split between seeing to the vehicle, and their other duties. Leadership has pretty much found the balance.

However, there are things you get by having the vehicle. Some I mentioned already - but you also get the powerful communications system - having a VRC with a power amp to get you through the interference found in a city is a good thing, a satellite based BFT or EPLRS FBCB2 with a crew to relay new information, or reach back to request combat multipliers - and bring them into range of dismounted comms allow CDRs to extend their AOR - and more flexibility in planning operations.

I've seen guys operating in sections - but always with at least three vehicles - that is pretty much the rule. The problem with using 1114s or other HMMWV variants for any organization is that it limits the number of people who can dismount. It means that to conduct dismounted operations in normal organic formations, teams, squads and platoons must first assemble at the dismount point. The folks that can retain their mobility in combat vehicles that allow for teams and squads to be dismounted as a unit have an advantage here - hopefully the type of MRAP vehicles which best account for this will find their way into the units which are tasked with doing patrols.

Hey Shek,

However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

Another good point. The effects of technology can be so subtle that once you and everyone else are surrounded by it, it becomes normal. The same can be said with the doctrine and training we followed to put that technology to best effect and fulfill task and purpose. Tom had referred to the days when the MOUT site at Shugart-Gordon was different then it is now. We considered our MOUT sites as independent blocks or villages where when all was said and done, we just could not see visualize the impacts of the tactics we were using to seize or clear it - those were generally the tasks.

Now its hard not to consider those training sites without seeing them plugged into a much larger social system, full of people who have made their homes their for generations, who have no where else to go, families of families who have 6 or more kids all living in small rooms - where we were lucky to get a few folks to a building before (JRTC has come a long way since then).

There is also the problems with heavier vehicles operating on infrastructure that in some cases was built when trade traffic was light, and technology was limited - there have been more then one case where a M1 or M2/M3 crushed some subterranean sewage or water piece that led to further problems. However, those same Brads caught the AIF way off guard when they first appeared and using thermals and coaxial MGs dirupted quite a number of AIF IED complex ambushes to good effect.

Its a tough call, as COL Foresman pointed out in AFJ we have to be capable of full spectrum operations in the complete range of conditions. We want the best tech, but ideally we don't want to be constrained by it. We appreciate leaders who can negotiate and know when to use restraint and let the situation develop and get solved from the inside out, but we also recognize the need for those who can recognize when to kill without hesitation.

So overall I guess our doctrine, mindsets, national and service cultures, TTP, and technology did hinder us in conducting COIN at the outset. However it was the same set of predispositions which was needed to send a large force to the other side of the world, pursue multiple LOOs of division sized elements and sustain them through the fight with minimal casualties. Also worth remembering is the fight in Falluja - now some will say if we'd had the appropriate sized force at the outset, the conditions that gave rise to making that city an insurgent stronghold might never have occurred, but I believe its beside the point. Fog/Friction/Chance will always conspire to throw you a curve ball, and the enemy will always seek to disadvantage you - he gets a vote - the units that cleared Falluja fought a hard combined arms fight and did so to a determined enemy's disadvantage. Also worth considering are some of the other fights that have required a large scale jump up the lethal line - Mosul 11/11/2004, Ramadi in 2006, Baquba was just recently a serious fight, and there are certainly others. It brings me back to the "there are no easy answers, only compromises for the tough questions".

While we must get better at COIN - because I also believe that is probably the majority of the types of conditions we will find ourselves in over the next decade or two - we cannot afford to not be able to fight force on force and have the advantage in doing so (how much of an advantage is needed is debatable). If we divorce ourselves too much from our former selves, somebody else will fill that vacuum - and then one of our tools in bad neighbor behavior modification will be less a couple of teeth. If we want true specialization so we can be good at everything its going to require a much larger force (and allot more $$$) so we can have enough Schlitz to pass around for every occasion - otherwise we have to live with some kind of balance. My cautionary note comes as I more often hear "if all you have is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail" becoming a panacea cliche' to describe all doctrine & force structure solutions. In our business, some (not all) problems will remain nails - and if you have ever tried to drive a nail with a Gerber multi-tool I don't recommend it. We flat out have to be good (better then the other guy) at the full range of military operations.

Best to all, Rob

[slapout9]

In the back of the article he talks about the imaginative commanders of the 3RD ACR at Talafar and how they fought as Dragoons "corralled their horses" motor pooled their tanks and fought as dismounted infantry. He also mentions in the back a question about why were some mechanized units able to fight so well why others could not. It short it is the Cavalry Dragoon doctirne (mounted Infantry) is what he is talking about. I will comment more on this later at my day job.

[Rob Thornton]

This thread made me think about an Armor officer buddy of mine who remarked as he was reading "The Sling and the Stone", that he thought COIN was much harder then HIC - if you guys remember prior to that some of the high level thinking was that if you could do HIC well, the rest would follow.

Imagine though, if you were under the other premise, and your organization and doctrine, your training and acquisition priorities were similarly associated. How different would we have looked? Take it one step further and consider if threat was a Joint outlook?

We often take for granted why we are what we are because our concern for the present and immediate future alters the context of the decisions made in the past - this is the curse of the fortune teller I guess.

It was pointed out to me that the Army is often asked why it requires so much of a LOG tail when other services and allies do not. We (the Army) campaign - we come and we stay, and although we desire certain expeditionary capabilities, our ability to sustain a difficult and enduring land campaign is something that nobody else does like us. The Joint Force (and this is not to deny they have their own sustainment/LOG capabilities, or provide the means to bring it in and take it out) and allied forces heavily rely on US Army Logistics when campaigning on land - much of their (our Joint and allied) capability truly is expeditionary, and as such is built to get there quickly, but not necessarily to support an enduring campaign. I am still not entirely comfortable with including "campaign quality" and "expeditionary capabilities" in the same sentence -but it reflects the realities of today's requirements to remain "ready and relevant"

I'm not sure where the mean of pendulum should be. I know that if you have always had something, you tend to take it for granted, and its hard to conceive of the work that was required to build it to that point, or how seemingly minor changes can have secondary and tertiary consequences, or the work that would be required to fix it. Fortunately we are evolutionary, so I think we will find the right balance over time. We must be able to do it all, because within a major COIN campaign today there is likely to be times when the enemy will use very lethal, portable and available firepower to challenge us on his terms, and there is the also the very real possibility that we will be asked to destroy another's conventional means of making War.

Best Regards, Rob

[Jimbo]

I see from the post, that there are some "vintage" or "retro" perspectives out here. The biggest change I have seen during my time in Iraq, is that the light guys have come to see that the mech guys aren't really all that different. Whoever posted about the what is the difference between dismounting soldiers from an M1114 HumVee or a Bradley hit the nail on the head. Personally it is easier to dismount from a Bradley/Stryker because of the ramp, and you do not have to bleed off squad members to man the vehicles. A mech IN company has 9 rifle squads in it. So a mech company commander/platoon leader you are fighting squads and vehicles I never had a problem with sending squads out on patrols independent from the Bradley. During my time in Iraq, I have seen many armored vehicles patrolling/overwatching without Infantry squads on the ground. The advantage that he mech forces have is that the Bradley makes a very effective platform at supporting the Infantry.

As far as mindset, there are some differences. Before the war in Iraq, the biggest difference that I noticed was the concept of areas of operation. I remember light company commanders an PL's only needing a small section of the map based on their mobility while mech guys were operating across greater differences. The joke was that a light guy could get into trouble pretty fast, but that mech guys got into trouble at 40 miles an hour. Stryker units a something of hybrid between the two. They have a lot of benefits of both communities.

Comparing mech and light unit effectiveness in COIN. If you want to draw those conclusions, then one would have to look for an example where a mech unit and a light unit had operated in the same area of operation. As many have stated, Iraq is a mosaic. Each area has it own challeneges. You have to look at the security situation as far as the people who live there, the physical terrain (especially how much you own), and how many troops you have available. When those factors are similar, then you can draw a fairly accurate comparison.

[Cavguy]

Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...

Ken,

I don't necessairly disagree with you, but will make two observations from Iraq experience:

1) Your dismounted, vehicle unsupported squad is attacked by 5-10 AIF. Your soldiers return fire and the enemy begins to displace. Your soldiers give chase, but are unable to move quickly enough to catch them because he is weighted down with 25 lbs of armor plus his weapons, ammo, etc. Being able to rapidly mount, maneuver, and disembark a team in urban warfare is key to getting the insurgents. Secondairly, if you get pinned down, joint patrolling near your vehicle provides cover, firepower, and rapid CASEVAC.

2) In my Sa'ad neighborhood efforts in Tal Afar, my infantry platoon patrolled exclusively dismounted. We began to discover more and more small IED's hidden that were only effective against dismounted troops. While reacting to a mortar attack against the patrol base, one of these IED's killed one and wounded two more of my soldiers in what I believe was a baited ambush. The IED was a remote controlled IED, which a HMMWV with countermeasures following the squad would have interdicted.

I completely agree that COIN must be done dismounted and interacting with the people, but in urban warfare getting too far away from your supporting vehicles can be dangerous, in my experience.

(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

But I think we agree in principle.

[Ken White]

Ken,
. . .
. . .
. . .
(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

But I think we agree in principle.

agree in principle. Sorta boils down to METT-T

With the all three 'Ts' being a big factor in how who does what and where...