Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[BrentWilliams]

Rather interesting article in the Washington Post. Ukraine seems to be continuing the ground offensive.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...6ed_story.html

Government troops were engaged in a pitched battle with rebels on Saturday just outside the separatist bastion of Donetsk and plan to advance next into the city that has been at the heart of the pro-Russian insurgency.

If the army succeeds in retaking Horlivka, a city of almost 300,000 people where fighting was fierce Saturday, they will be within a few miles of Donetsk. Rebels have held sway there since the spring, ruling what they call the Donetsk People’s Republic. Cars created roadblocks out of town Saturday, and the railway station was packed with people desperate to board the next train out.

It is looking increasenly likely that the Ukraine will succeed unless Russia directly intervenes on the ground. If they do, Europe and the United States is almost certain to respond with economic sanction that will cripple the Russian economy. The current outline of sanctions outlined after the Malaysian airlines flight would be vastly expanded. One would also think aid in weapons and training would be on the table. If Russia doesn't directly intervene, what is to stop the Ukraine from turing their attention to Crimea next?

[kaur]

Two interesting interceptions by SBU in Russian. In first one DPR leader Borodai is getting some instructions from former Russian presidentianl administration and United Russia party official Chesnakov. It seems that Borodai arrived from Russia with suitcases full of money and he asks for more. Chesnakov gives to Borodai instructions with what message should give interview Girkin/Strelkov ( Putin is Russkii Mir leader and i'm his subordinate). It seems that Chesnakov is back in administration with Surkov covering Ukraine. During second intercept Borodai's deputy is complaining how stupidly Girkin is acting in Donetsk.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-BdpHf7jg

[Shchors]

There have been few detailed descriptions in Western publications of the campaign by the Ukrainian Army to expel the Russian inspired separatists from East Ukraine. What first started in mid-April 2014 as a low level insurgency led by Russian GRU spetsnaz operatives that was centered in an urban bastion named Sloviansk, has since transformed into essentially a conventional war between 30,000 attacking Ukrainians against 10,000 defending Russians in an area 9,000 square miles in size, which encompasses numerous cities, one of them a one million plus metropolis - the City of Donetsk. From what I have been able to extrapolate from sketchy press releases from the Ukrainian armed forces and the more detailed but yet unverified situation reports from the Russian commanders, the Ukrainians, while tactically unsophisticated, have acquired enough combat experience to mount what, by all accounts is a rather elegant and nuanced campaign. The Ukrainians have initiated simultaneous battalion sized armored maneuvers on multiple fronts to spread out the defenders. The operation has also revealed attempts to control tempo and timing of sequential attacks. The Ukrainians also sent a brigade-sized mechanized column in a daring (and perhaps ill advised) flanking maneuver to try to seal off the Russian border. These troops are now trapped against the border for over two weeks but are still dug in and resupplied by parachute drop. (The Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff, General Muzychko, has decided to ignore the pleas of these troops for a relief offensive and has shifted reserves elsewhere) The Russians have proved to be the better infantry commanders (all are veterans of the Chechen Wars, Bosnia and Georgia) and have orchestrated a daring maneuver themselves when 1500 escaped from encirclement in Sloviansk at the very last moment. However, Ukrainian armor and artillery crews have gradually acquired competence and have buttressed their unreliable mech infantry with volunteer battalions, which make up for their lack of training with enthusiasm. (The mech infantry is comprised of recruits, while the specialists are contract soldiers) Throughout, the separatists have utilized state-of-the art MANPADS, with which they have downed some 10 attack helicopters and 6 attack warplanes. Despite the heavy losses, the small and outdated Ukrainian air force continues to fly 10-15 close air support sorties daily, with noticeable effect. Moreover, the Russians have used Kornet and Konkurs anti-tank missiles against Ukrainian tanks (upgraded old T-64s). The separatists have also acquired close to 100 T-64 and T-72 tanks themselves, with generous numbers of artillery and rockets, all smuggled over the border from Russia. As we all know, recently they even acquired BUK anti-air systems, with tragic results to passengers of Malaysian Airlines. Casualties so far amount to approximately 1,500 to 2,000 KIA and wounded on each side. As always, the big killer in the steppe is massed artillery. In fact, the Russians have fired artillery support from across the border. As of today, July 25, 2014, the Ukrainians appear to have turned the flank of a strong redoubt in Horlivka (which opens the way towards Donetsk from the north) and are close to seizing an important road junction at Debaltsevo, along a key supply line. All of these names would have been familiar to WWII era Red Army and Wehrmacht commanders, as bloody battles were fought to seize and to hold these locations in the Great Patriotic War. If Russia does not intervene directly or injects substantial irregular reinforcements soon (at least 5,000), the Ukrainians may have their first ever victorious campaign against Russia in history. (They won a few small battles in 1919 but never a war) One of the ironies of this entire struggle is that the people of Donetsk now realize that Putin never intended to liberate them and, to the contrary, has ruined their region economically for years to come. Ukraine looks like a better option and many are starting to see Kyiv as the lesser of two evils. Putin's adventures in Crimea and Donetsk have led to unintended consequences; (1) a Ukraine unified for the first time in its history, regardless of language (many of the Ukrainian fighters speak Russian; the orders in the Ukrainian army at the tactical level are issued in Russian);(2) the growth of national myths forged in a war with Russia that may develop into a true Ukrainian nationalism (and a break from Russia once and for all) and (3) disenchantment with Putin among nationalist voters in Russia proper (most of the blue collar population) which may threaten his hold on political power at the next election. There is some talk of Igor Strelkov, the Russian field commander in Donetsk, as a viable alternate candidate (unless Putin has him killed at the front). In any case, this war holds valuable lessons regarding the effectiveness of MANPADS against tactical air as well as the dynamics of a conventional war where neither side has air superiority. It offers a conflict involving urban warfare as well as broad mechanized maneuver and where artillery is still the king of battle.

[JMA]

Thanks Shchors, interesting perspective.

[mirhond]

separatists have also acquired close to 100 T-64 and T-72 tanks themselves, with generous numbers of artillery and rockets, all smuggled over the border from Russia.

if this document
isn't a fake, your statement is far from truth

in short: Ukrarmy lost dosens of combat vehicles and other military pieces to separatists

(1) a Ukraine unified for the first time in its history, regardless of language (many of the Ukrainian fighters speak Russian; the orders in the Ukrainian army at the tactical level are issued in Russian);(2) the growth of national myths forged in a war with Russia that may develop into a true Ukrainian nationalism (and a break from Russia once and for all)

I believe you just did'nt bothered to read Wikipedia article about Ukraine, that's why your post shows lack of historical knowledge.
In short: Ukraine once already was an independent state, for a short time after Russian revolution. Ukrainian exclusive nationalism has a long and glorious story.

зы. К чему эта маскировка под невежду, товарищ Щорс, вы же украинский коммунист и прекрасно знаете историю своей Родины, а так же всю ту хуиту, что происходит сейчас на Юго-Востоке

[OUTLAW 09]

[QUOTE=mirhond;159172]if this document
isn't a fake, your statement is far from truth

in short: Ukrarmy lost dosens of combat vehicles and other military pieces to separatists



I believe you just did'nt bothered to read Wikipedia article about Ukraine, that's why your post shows lack of historical knowledge.
In short: Ukraine once already was an independent state, for a short time after Russian revolution. Ukrainian exclusive nationalism has a long and glorious story.


So comrade non knowing expert mirhond---just what about those T64s that you once claimed here in SWJ were stolen from the Ukrainians which turned out to be registered to the Russian Army complete with former Russian military base numbers that somehow made it across that from Putin lied about "enhanced security border" that the famous FSB knows nothing about.

come on comrade mirhond get with the progam.

[Shchors]

You just attached a report from the military judge advocate in the Dnipropetrovsk military district regarding ongoing investigations into instances of Ukrainian armor falling into the hands of the Russian separatists on the territory of Ukraine (there is the suspicion that certain military personnel at arms depots allowed these losses without a fight) I agree that these pieces of equipment fall well short of 100. But what does that have to do with Russian armor sneaking across the border into the Donbas? Video evidence of such incursions are multiple and overwhelming. I fail to see your point. And why should I read anything in Wikepedia? By the way, thanks for attaching this document. If authentic, it is a valuable source for future citation.

[OUTLAW 09]

This is the 16th version released by the Russians today by RIA as they attempt to side track the accusations that the Russian mercenaries shot down the airliner.

Appears now that the US supports the Russia released version that it was the Ukrainians. Not sure how the Russians some how think the US indirectly admitted it--but again it was that unnamed Russian Defense Ministry guy.

Information was released to day by the black box analysis team---the plane was hit by a missile explosion that went completely through the aircraft.

MOSCOW, July 27 (RIA Novosti) – The United States has indirectly admitted that Kiev’s air defense systems were present near Donetsk when the Malaysia Airlines plane crashed, thus confirming the data of Russian satellites, a senior source in the Russian Defense Ministry told RIA Novosti on Sunday.

"In his statement, the White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest implicitly acknowledged that Ukraine’s air defense systems had been present in the Donetsk area, although he claimed they had not been operating," the source said, commenting on Earnest’s words that the missile that hit the flight MH17 was launched from the area controlled by the militia.

The source stressed that the United States thus confirmed the authenticity of the data, provided by the images from Russian satellites at a special briefing of the Russian Defense Ministry on July 21. It was stated during that briefing that Ukraine’s air defense forces had four Buk-M1 missile systems near the city of Donetsk.

[AmericanPride]

So Dayuhan---just what does this statement say from the highest thinker in the US military? It tends to support the concept of the new Russian military doctrine does it not with it's use in supporting political warfare.

My question is why (1) why did it take this long to formulate a response and (2) if Russia is such a threat, why do 20-year old war plans need to be 'dusted off'? Why aren't there current plans already in place? As I see it, U.S. foreign policy towards Russia (and in general) is (still) reactionary equipped without foresight.

What is a direction Russian intervention in your opinion? What isn't open-ended to this war, with the Crimea occupied by Russia and Russian men and Russian weapons reinforcing Russias shadow armies lead by Russian veterans with it's limited local support while the Russian army shells Ukrainian forces from Russia proper?

I look at Crimea and eastern Ukraine as separate conflicts - not because the belligerents are different but because I think Russia's goals are different; hence the different strategy for Crimea (direct occupation) and eastern Ukraine (proxy insurgency). There's a continuum of commitment and intervention, with no interference on one end and formal, overt military operations on the other. Though it strains credulity in the West, Russia can still claim a measure of deniability and that gives them the political space to push for a negotiated settlement. Outright occupation would raise a lot of questions about the end-state and place a great burden upon Russia's credibility as a great power (and yes, I would argue Russia is a great power, ranked #3 after the U.S. and China).

AP--this has been a battle of values and will be going forward much as the Cold War was about the battle of ideologies. By the way the US is an hegemon---via it's global economic power just check the current set of sanctions against Russia.

This isn't a battle about values. It's a battle about the future of a country that has for 20 years attempted to maintain a delicate balance between two competing power centers. Its economic crisis triggered a political one, sparking a security one. And no - the U.S. is not a hegemon, otherwise it would have imposed its interests in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. The U.S. is by far the world's most significant power, but it does not have the capabilities to impose its will on every single country or combination of countries. Those capabilities peaked in the 1990s and the Iraq War marked the start of relative decline.

A considerable problem of the Kremlin is of course that propaganda intended for Russian consumption, which is far to wild and crazy for almost all Western audience, still reaches across borders. In the case of MH17 it certainly hit the national news in Italy and Germany. In short the strategy is clear but the execution difficult and sometimes sloppy.

That'd be an interesting case study about blowback of information operations in the contemporary environment.

[OUTLAW 09]

My question is why (1) why did it take this long to formulate a response and (2) if Russia is such a threat, why do 20-year old war plans need to be 'dusted off'? Why aren't there current plans already in place? As I see it, U.S. foreign policy towards Russia (and in general) is (still) reactionary equipped without foresight.



I look at Crimea and eastern Ukraine as separate conflicts - not because the belligerents are different but because I think Russia's goals are different; hence the different strategy for Crimea (direct occupation) and eastern Ukraine (proxy insurgency). There's a continuum of commitment and intervention, with no interference on one end and formal, overt military operations on the other. Though it strains credulity in the West, Russia can still claim a measure of deniability and that gives them the political space to push for a negotiated settlement. Outright occupation would raise a lot of questions about the end-state and place a great burden upon Russia's credibility as a great power (and yes, I would argue Russia is a great power, ranked #3 after the U.S. and China).



This isn't a battle about values. It's a battle about the future of a country that has for 20 years attempted to maintain a delicate balance between two competing power centers. Its economic crisis triggered a political one, sparking a security one. And no - the U.S. is not a hegemon, otherwise it would have imposed its interests in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. The U.S. is by far the world's most significant power, but it does not have the capabilities to impose its will on every single country or combination of countries. Those capabilities peaked in the 1990s and the Iraq War marked the start of relative decline.



That'd be an interesting case study about blowback of information operations in the contemporary environment.

AP---not to go leftist on you but you really do not think that the economic power wheeled by the US government is not hegemon in nature.

Let's see what would foreign banks that have been hit by US fines for hundreds of millions of dollars for embargo violations say to your statements especially since they do not do business in the US--but in the end pay if they want to not be cut out of the USD clearing house process in NYC or to float loans in NYC.

Ask all the major participants of WW1 who financed the war to include Russia?

[JMA]

My question is why (1) why did it take this long to formulate a response and (2) if Russia is such a threat, why do 20-year old war plans need to be 'dusted off'? Why aren't there current plans already in place? As I see it, U.S. foreign policy towards Russia (and in general) is (still) reactionary equipped without foresight.

Its the gutless politicians...

The US military may have many shortcomings but they will have workable contingencies for just about every scenario... world wide.

Once the politicians have finished pulling everything apart and modifying it all the plan is guaranteed to be unworkable.

That's your system... its broken.

[OUTLAW 09]

David---moves make sense to me.

[AmericanPride]

It is looking increasenly likely that the Ukraine will succeed unless Russia directly intervenes on the ground. If they do, Europe and the United States is almost certain to respond with economic sanction that will cripple the Russian economy. The current outline of sanctions outlined after the Malaysian airlines flight would be vastly expanded. One would also think aid in weapons and training would be on the table. If Russia doesn't directly intervene, what is to stop the Ukraine from turing their attention to Crimea next?

That appears to be the case at the moment. The Ukrainian advance has proceeded surprisingly well given their initial poor performance at the outset of the conflict. I doubt Russia will intervene directly in the east - not out of fear of U.S. sanctions, but because of the uncertainty that lies in an open-ended conflict with Ukraine. Russia's most notable military successes since 1991 have been rapid, decisive campaigns with clearly defined political objectives. I don't think there's a clear political outcome that could emerge from Russian intervention in the east - the first sign of that was Moscow's refusal to extend annexation after the Donetsk referendum though it accepted the Crimean one. The Russians do not want to be involved any more than they have to be.

I also don't think the Ukrainians will push into Crimea. That's already occupied territory and formally annexed by Russia. Attacking Crimea would compel the Russians to further escalate the conflict to protect its own credibility and would give the pretext for the 30,000 Russian soldiers on Ukraine's border to come streaming across.

The resignation of the Yatsenyuk government is a clear indicator that even with military victory, Kiev still faces many internal challenges. Defeating the insurgents militarily will alone not solve Ukraine's fundamental political problem. Yatsenyuk claimed that the coalition collapsed because his allies did not want to take part in the painful political process of imposing austerity measures on the Ukrainian economy (especially in a time of insecurity). That's not a surprise, since the origin of this crisis in the first place was Yanukovych's inability (or unwillingness) to resolve that problem too.

[Firn]

I doubt Russia will intervene directly in the east - not out of fear of U.S. sanctions, but because of the uncertainty that lies in an open-ended conflict with Ukraine.

I actually agree mostly, but I want to ask: What is a direction Russian intervention in your opinion? What isn't open-ended to this war, with the Crimea occupied by Russia and Russian men and Russian weapons reinforcing Russias shadow armies lead by Russian veterans with it's limited local support while the Russian army shells Ukrainian forces from Russia proper?

I have a pretty hard time to draw a line...

@davidpfbo: There might also be considerable differences from city to city, area to area with the larger cities giving a better idea then the smaller ones in which extremes are more likely to be observed. All in all the local support for the shadowy Russian invasion isn't certainly as big as the Kremlin would have hoped. Weapons are certainly not the bottleneck.

@Shchors: Maybe you could open a new thread about the strictly military aspect of the conflict. This thread contains already so many strands. Thanks anyway.

[BrentWilliams]

That appears to be the case at the moment. The Ukrainian advance has proceeded surprisingly well given their initial poor performance at the outset of the conflict. I doubt Russia will intervene directly in the east - not out of fear of U.S. sanctions, but because of the uncertainty that lies in an open-ended conflict with Ukraine. Russia's most notable military successes since 1991 have been rapid, decisive campaigns with clearly defined political objectives. I don't think there's a clear political outcome that could emerge from Russian intervention in the east - the first sign of that was Moscow's refusal to extend annexation after the Donetsk referendum though it accepted the Crimean one. The Russians do not want to be involved any more than they have to be.

I also don't think the Ukrainians will push into Crimea. That's already occupied territory and formally annexed by Russia. Attacking Crimea would compel the Russians to further escalate the conflict to protect its own credibility and would give the pretext for the 30,000 Russian soldiers on Ukraine's border to come streaming across.

The resignation of the Yatsenyuk government is a clear indicator that even with military victory, Kiev still faces many internal challenges. Defeating the insurgents militarily will alone not solve Ukraine's fundamental political problem. Yatsenyuk claimed that the coalition collapsed because his allies did not want to take part in the painful political process of imposing austerity measures on the Ukrainian economy (especially in a time of insecurity). That's not a surprise, since the origin of this crisis in the first place was Yanukovych's inability (or unwillingness) to resolve that problem too.

If the only variable in the equation for Putin is the military variable, this is an easy win. It is very doubtful that the population in Eastern Ukraine would resist Russia directly taking control of the area. All things being equal, I doubt they would vote for it and would rather stay part of Ukraine, but if Russia moved decisively into eastern Ukraine, I doubt you are going to have much resistance from the local population.

Given that, what is constraining Russia from acting? It isn't an armed threat from the west. Again, I don't see the west directly becoming involved in the conflict. At the most, they could start to provide weapons and training. However, until Russia crosses a boarder with a NATO country, I couldn't imagine anything else.


I would suggest the one factor constraining Russia is that it is virtually dependent on the economy of Europe while Russia could only inflict some economic pain on Europe. Yes Russian energy is important. But it is also important for Russia to sell that energy and Europe is rich enough to allow the market to adjust to get energy from other places. Russia's biggest export partner by far is the European Union. If Europe gains the will to enact real sanctions, the Russian economy is destroyed. Europe will feel some pain but it won't last as the markets adjust.

We like to have these preconceived notions. We aren't doing anything, etc. I would suggest, in this situation, the United States perfectly doing what it should. Allow Putin to hang himself with his BS. Russia has every reason to fear real political will coming from Europe.

[Firn]

According to Interpretermag live-blog and rather responsive map guys at wikipedia there has been a big Ukrainian offensive. A northern thrust, bypassing Horlivka furhter east, and southern thrust have almost cut off the Donetsk area from Luhansk one. It is of course important to remain sceptical, and wait for confirmations. If the offensive succedes and the gains get consolidated this would be a heavy blow for the Russian ambitions, especially around Donetsk.

The (Pro)Russian spokesmen are denying the extent of the recent gains, we will see. Lots of confusion, as so often and a considerable fog of war.

[OUTLAW 09]

According to Interpretermag live-blog and rather responsive map guys at wikipedia there has been a big Ukrainian offensive. A northern thrust, bypassing Horlivka furhter east, and southern thrust have almost cut off the Donetsk area from Luhansk one. It is of course important to remain sceptical, and wait for confirmations. If the offensive succedes and the gains get consolidated this would be a heavy blow for the Russian ambitions, especially around Donetsk.

The (Pro)Russian spokesmen are denying the extent of the recent gains, we will see. Lots of confusion, as so often and a considerable fog of war.

firn---appears to confirm your comments---the UA is now fighting night and day ops and are on a roll even with losses being absorbed they seem to sense the fighting is shifting.

Their attitude is summed up in the last two sentences from the reporting journalist.

Noticed it is their airborne, SF, and ex alpha units that are carrying the fight forward.

There was an article yesterday out of the Ukraine that a lot of the privately funded and supported independent fighting units are gaining a lot of new members as the Ukrainian government is indicating that after it is all over they must rebuild the police, security, and military and those that have fought will have priority chances in joining the new organizations.


From today kyivpost.com

The anti-terrorist Forces move towards the border with Russia. Shakhtersk, Torez, Snizhne. Journalist Petro Shuklinov wrote about it on his Facebook page.

«This is only one direction. All details of the forced march tonight after the operation has finished. Dozens of bodies of militants on the side of the roads. «We are going to our guys», — SMS. By the end of the day the territory of the militants will be cleared. If we will manage to hold to it — excellent. However, with such course of military operations there will be many losses.

We are moving to a phase where our Forces directly engage with terrorists. In addition to that they will need to fight on both side inside the corridor, but we have enough forces to widen the corridor every day. It will be very difficult, but there is no time to wait. We need victory. We need to save our guys on the border. We need to finish this war.»

[kaur]

Previously mentioned DPR Russia premier Borodai and Kremlin guy Chesnakov telephone conversation.

Borodai “The biggest problem I have now is that I’m running out of dough,” he says. “Out of the 150 I took with me, they’re basically all gone, because I gave 50 to Zakhar, a million hryvnia [$85,000] to Igor [Strelkov], plus all the other expenses.” It is not clear what currency the rest of the money discussed is in.
“The money’s in place, but we’ll actually have it in two weeks,” the man continues. “We’ll have it if this situation holds out for two weeks. You see, if nothing changes militarily, this situation isn’t going to hold out those two weeks.”
“If it doesn’t hold out, it doesn’t hold out,” the other man says. “Sasha, don’t burden me with this crap. We agreed about the 180 — take it. The rest we’re going to have to try and work out. If there’s not going to be a flow, then we’ll organize more through the same channel.”
The man alleged to be Chesnakov then conveys what he says is a request from Archmandrite Tikhon, a senior priest in the Russian Orthodox Church widely rumored to be Putin’s confessor, to help rein in Strelkov, who is lionized in pro-Kremlin quarters but widely seen as a loose cannon after he abandoned his stronghold of Slovyansk for Donetsk, the provincial capital, earlier this month.
The man says that Strelkov should give an interview to make clear that his “commander-in-chief” is Putin to dispel notions of a split between the rebels on the ground and their ostensible patrons in Moscow. “‘At the present time I’m understandably not carrying out his direct orders, because I’m in a different country, but I have the utmost respect for him and believe him to be the most brilliant leader of modern times, thanks to whom Russia rose from its knees, and we all look at him with hope,’” the man says, putting words in Strelkov’s mouth.
“‘But not in the sense of “come on already, how long can this go on,” but in the sense that we love him, believe in him, he is our ideal and whatever decisions he takes, we’ll carry out any decisions he takes. Because we think that he is the wise and experienced leader of the Russian world.’”

http://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/uk...ebels-who-shot

[OUTLAW 09]

kaur---two things;

1. the intercepts seem to indicate that they think they may not hold out longer than two weeks-- might be shorter after the UA broke through to the border yesterday near the MH17 crash site.

2. here is a Russian border guard ----this time posting the fact that he is crossing through the Ukrainian border crossing point.

They just cannot stop their internet postings. They really do need a short class on operational security.

http://sprotyv.info/en/news/2379-rus...trates-ukraine

[OUTLAW 09]

Previously mentioned DPR Russia premier Borodai and Kremlin guy Chesnakov telephone conversation.



http://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/uk...ebels-who-shot

kaur--not so sure they should be pushing Strelkov as their face of the revolt if the charges that he participated in war crimes in Bosnia and that could led to the International Courts charges. Just as now he tended to leave photos of myself that have now resurfaced.