Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[TheCurmudgeon]

One 'small thing' that sets them off was our overthrow of one system of govenrance and power to replace it with those who did not have the wherewithal to rise to power on their own.

Another 'small thing' was our occupation that increased in both size and violence as we increased our efforts from about 2005 forward to attempt to put down the revolution that kicked into high gear once we solidified that power change with the monopoly preserving constitution we helped the Northern Alliance push through. Our efforts against the revolution then sparked the growth of the resistance among the more apolitical elements of Afghan society that simply want to be left alone and for us to go home.

Two points. First (and again), you can't have it both ways: You can't say the population doesn't care and just want to be left alone AND that they are upset with the occupation and therefore are fighting us. If they wanted to fight us they would join the insurgency. I am not a believer in the idea that the Taliban has been working to place moles in the Afghan security forces just to kill one or two people while in fits of rage. You project your beliefs onto another culture in order to satisfy your own narrative.

Second, it is irrelevant to the question asked as I will explain below.

Certainly there are personal reasons that produce Green on Blue events; but those pale compared to the larger strategic ones.

Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.

[sean bastle]

Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.

Last CNA study I read put it at 6%, which is significant. Most of those are made up of advisors who are supposed to be getting more culture and language training than the average deployer. (The CNA report was unclas and is probably out there on their website.)

We're engaged in a lot of places around the world. I can't think of any where blue-green accounts for 6% of our casualties. I don't think it was even that high in Iraq, but I don't have the figures in front of me.

Saying the Blue on Green incidents are the result of "cultural misunderstandings" is helpful because in the short term it avoids any questions of the larger strategic and policy issues. But if we are sending people to advise Afghans, Afghans who have no mechanisms for conflict resolution other than going to the gun, then we either need to accept these blue-green incidents as a necessary part of our strategy there or rethink at least that component of the strategy.

[Bob's World]

Two points. First (and again), you can't have it both ways: You can't say the population doesn't care and just want to be left alone AND that they are upset with the occupation and therefore are fighting us. If they wanted to fight us they would join the insurgency. I am not a believer in the idea that the Taliban has been working to place moles in the Afghan security forces just to kill one or two people while in fits of rage. You project your beliefs onto another culture in order to satisfy your own narrative.

Second, it is irrelevant to the question asked as I will explain below.



Even if ten percent of the murders were caused by our misunderstanding of a cultural difference then they are worth studying for that reason alone. It is also arrogant to believe that this is just an Afghan problem. If, in fact, it is the result of our ignorance to understand a tribal culture then it is likely to be reproduced in any other similar culture under similar circumstances.

And you seem to believe that "the taliban" is some formal organization that one joins...odd. Insurgency is an informal business, and we label people by their actions, but I'd advise against thinking that our labels then convert into some actual formal organization.

"The Taliban" are in simplest terms those Afghans who resist against our presence or who revolt against the government of Afghanistan. Why would you assume that those Afghans who opt to join the security forces of Afghanistan at one point in their life might not some months later come to realize they made the wrong decision for them and decide to act in a manner that supports the insurgency??

I do not project Western beliefs or values on anyone, I simply look past what we wish the facts of some situation were to attempt to understand them for what they actually are.

So many of our programs intended to achieve COIN success produce reasonably positive tactical effects that we can measure, so we assume those programs to be moving us toward our strategic goals. Like adding tactical successes can ultimately get to strategic success. But what we ignore or don't understand is that many of those same actions that produce positive tactical effects also produce negative strategic effects due to how they are implemented. In those cases every action moves us closer to strategic failure at the same time that we delude ourselves that we are closing in on tactical success. Night Raids, Clear-Hold-Build operations, training ANSF, etc all fit in this category much of the time.

So, a man joins the ANSF in a belief that he is best served by supporting the current government. Then over time some mix of how he is treated by his foreign trainers, the types of operations he goes out on, etc combine to make him realize that in now believes he is better served by supporting change. This does not mean he was a "mole" planted by Taliban leadership, he could be, but he could have just been "radicalized" by his exposure to his trainers or the ANSF experience in general.

[Dayuhan]

So, a man joins the ANSF in a belief that he is best served by supporting the current government.

I'm not sure it's safe to assume that everyone who joins the ANSF believes that he is best served by supporting the government. Might there not be cases where people who aren't particularly supportive of the government join the ANSF for a paycheck, or for personal security? I suspect that taking sides is often more closely related to personal factors than to any particular belief about what's best for the country.

In parts of the Philippines it's still common for clans to place some of their young men in the military and police, just to have contacts there down the line. No idea if that's done in Afghanistan, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Just saying I don't think it's safe to assume that those in the ANSF are or ever have been supporters of the government.

Has there been any effort to break these killings down into efforts to kill any American, generically, and those targeting a specific American?

[Fuchs]

I'm not sure it's safe to assume that everyone who joins the ANSF believes that he is best served by supporting the government. Might there not be cases where people who aren't particularly supportive of the government join the ANSF for a paycheck, or for personal security? I suspect that taking sides is often more closely related to personal factors (..)

I meant to write something similar, but then I concluded that this is actually included in what he wrote.

[sean bastle]

Has there been any effort to break these killings down into efforts to kill any American, generically, and those targeting a specific American?

There has been, but its hard to get good data because in so many cases the "shooter," is killed themselves. But the thought is that in most cases the perp is just trying to kill any American. Or, perhaps more appropriately, as many Americans as possible.

[Bob's World]

I'm not sure it's safe to assume that everyone who joins the ANSF believes that he is best served by supporting the government. Might there not be cases where people who aren't particularly supportive of the government join the ANSF for a paycheck, or for personal security? I suspect that taking sides is often more closely related to personal factors than to any particular belief about what's best for the country.

In parts of the Philippines it's still common for clans to place some of their young men in the military and police, just to have contacts there down the line. No idea if that's done in Afghanistan, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Just saying I don't think it's safe to assume that those in the ANSF are or ever have been supporters of the government.

Has there been any effort to break these killings down into efforts to kill any American, generically, and those targeting a specific American?

Dayuhan, Curmudgen - neither one of you needed to make this point in response to my post, as I had already made it as a cornerstone position OF my post

"So, a man joins the ANSF in a belief that he is best served by supporting the current government"

(Key phrase being "a belief that he is best served." I never said that these were all patriots who joined on some partriotic agenda to make GIRoA work. Some certainly are, but I never even implied that most were anything but individuals trying to do what they see is best for them. Same is true when they opt to act in a manner that supports the insurgency.)

[J Wolfsberger]

Can anyone point me to any sort of survey that attempts to quantify Afghan attitudes (preferably by tribal affiliation) toward the Afghan government, US troops or the US in general?

I don't mean the type of "opinion" polls we're currently getting inundated with in the US during the presidential election season. I mean the kind of internal polls the campaigns conduct where they don't dare lie to themselves.

If we don't understand how or what the Afghans really think of their own government and us, it seems like we're flying blind trying to understand what prompts this type of violence.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Can anyone point me to any sort of survey that attempts to quantify Afghan attitudes (preferably by tribal affiliation) toward the Afghan government, US troops or the US in general?

I don't mean the type of "opinion" polls we're currently getting inundated with in the US during the presidential election season. I mean the kind of internal polls the campaigns conduct where they don't dare lie to themselves.

If we don't understand how or what the Afghans really think of their own government and us, it seems like we're flying blind trying to understand what prompts this type of violence.

Carl posted this some time back:

A crisis of trust and cultural incompatibility

It is limited to ANSF attitudes, as opposed to the general population, and it has a relatively small sample. Still, it is pretty good.

[davidbfpo]

A very different place, but useful here and I emphasis the question mark. An account by an Israeli Defence Force soldier deployed to checkpoint duties:

the checkpoints’ primary mission is to demonstrate presence, to exhibit the army’s constant surveillance and its overwhelming force. Because the checkpoints are pervasive and involve intense interaction with the civilian population, they have become the clearest expression of the IDF’s dual message to West Bank Palestinians: you cannot hide and you cannot fight; Israel is both omnipresent and omnipotent.

Link:http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/o...occupation.php