Carl,

Actually I don't disagree with your assertion that we don't do COIN, or more accurately small wars, well at the tactical level. My point is even if we did do it well in accordance with our COIN doctrine it wouldn't make a difference in the outcome if the strategy is flawed.

I agree with your statements about the tactical essentials of denying safe haven, frequent patrolling, protecting the population, etc. Failure to be more aggressive in the initial years and excessive use of fire power was due to a risk adverse mentality that infected the force. None the less, the major cause of failure were our nave policy goals. Even with tactical excellence we wouldn't have achieved those ends, but we would have taken few casualties by being more aggressive towards the fighters and less aggressive towards the population (excessive aerial bombings, etc.).

People will always question whether Syria would have turned out differently if we intervened in the early years. No one will know, but I suspect that is wishful thinking on our part. The same groups fighting now were always there. Al-Qaeda had a presence in Syria ever since they established a presence in Iraq to counter our occupation. The Iranians and Russians were supporting Bashir before we would have intervened and they would most likely increased their support if we supported the adversaries.