The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[KalWa]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

[William F. Owen]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

[Ski]

Utterly false. Lind has read Clausewitz in German and thinks very highly of his work.

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

[William F. Owen]

Utterly false. Lind has read Clausewitz in German and thinks very highly of his work.

Yes, knowing Bill Lind, I can attest he has read Clausewitz, yet he and I have very different understandings of what CvC wrote. 4GW flows from Van Creveld's "non-trinitarian War" thinking - so I find it hard to see how a 4GW thinker would regard Clausewitz in a good light.
Why, if you had deep understanding, or think highly of CvC would you construct 4GW? CvC deals with almost every aspect of the relevant arguments. If someone wants to tell me, that 4GW is "CvC for dummies" I'll think again.

[Fuchs]

Yes, knowing Bill Lind, I can attest he has read Clausewitz, yet he and I have very different understandings of what CvC wrote. 4GW flows from Van Creveld's "non-trinitarian War" thinking - so I find it hard to see how a 4GW thinker would regard Clausewitz in a good light.
Why, if you had deep understanding, or think highly of CvC would you construct 4GW? CvC deals with almost every aspect of the relevant arguments. If someone wants to tell me, that 4GW is "CvC for dummies" I'll think again.

CvC is a pool for interpretations, almost as inexhaustible as Master Tzu.
That adds considerably to a problem: The translation.


I am a German and still not sure that I can understand Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz's language because words and phrases can change their meaning and emphasis over the course of almost two centuries.

It's even worse; a German text is normally expected to be usually 25% longer than an English text of the same content. My translations of German to English are the opposite; about 25% longer English than German because it's very difficult to meet the meaning exactly and to eliminate the potential for misunderstandings. This can go up to +40% for short texts. (And even then I do only THINK, not KNOW that I wrote a good translation.)

Conclusion:
Everyone who reads "Vom Kriege" in English, French or whatever-is-not-German should not assume that he could potentially understand him through that translation by more than about 90%.

It's probably more close to 30-40% for Master Tzu's treatise on military affairs.

[William F. Owen]

CvC is a pool for interpretations, almost as inexhaustible as Master Tzu.
That adds considerably to a problem: The translation.

The translation is an issue if you take certain phrases or words in isolation. I submit it becomes far less of an issue when you consider the totality of the arguments he puts forth, and the remain coherent and valid when subject to scrutiny - see the works of HR Smith and Bridget Hauser for example.

[Bob's World]

Sadly the only possible explanation is that he never read Clausewitz, or of he did failed to understand it. The 4GW guys have never read Clausewitz either.

Almost 99% of Clausewitz critics have simply never read him, or tried to understand what he says, in an overall context. Thus they takes quotes out of context.

Sadly, 99% of Clausewitz proponents have simply never read him either.

Its just so damn hard to muddle ones way through his ramblings, and also to sort out what is an early thought on a topic, and what is his final assessment.

Is there any good, highly abridged with insightful commentary (both pro and con) version of CvC? Such a product would go a long way to clearing the air, and be far more helpful than tossing a 5 lb tome to a LT and asking him to read and understand what it ultimately means.

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, 99% of Clausewitz proponents have simply never read him either.

Maybe true, but they are generally less prone to attributing things to him, which he never said.

Its just so damn hard to muddle ones way through his ramblings, and also to sort out what is an early thought on a topic, and what is his final assessment.

Really? I know folks get easily put off, but I persevered because I knew it was important. Thank G*d I did, because from this, all else flows.
To my mind, the real problem is not actually understanding what he writes, but junking the baggage that stops most folks understanding it - eg: the hold overs from the abysmally low quality of modern military thought.

bIs there any good, highly abridged with insightful commentary (both pro and con) version of CvC? Such a product would go a long way to clearing the air, and be far more helpful than tossing a 5 lb tome to a LT and asking him to read and understand what it ultimately means.

Sure there are! Many. Some better than others, but here's a few.

Smith
Samida
Echevarria
Heuser
...and that's the short list!
I would also strongly recommend anything by Colin S. Gray as being one of the most useful demonstrators of CvC in practical terms and also a very good critic as to the things CvC simply never mentioned or just assumed.
Having that, I would argue that is actually a strength as well as a flaw - how's that for duality!!

[Firn]

Some corrections

a) France was arguably already the most prominent military power in Europe before the French Revolution

b) "The American Way of War" is in my humble optinion a misnomer. There are plenty of examples even before America was rediscovered of the concept of a nation. Switzerland may be the most famous one.

c) What changed with the French revolution was the scale of the recruitment united with a new fevor for to new form of government of the state and a more widespread sense of nation. Note that already in the medieval period quickly raised militias could prove to be an enthusiastic and steady force in defense of their homeland, and sometimes beyond it's borders. See the Battle of the Golden Spurs or the one of Sempach. Not only in such instances the will of the populance played a very great role. But as said before the scale and depth of it's importance was more present in the Napoleonic wars.

d) From the Peninsular War to the Invasion of Russia Europe witnessed many insurgencies and many instances of guerilla warfare. The Freikorps and the Tyrolean Uprisings were major events in the German-speaking areas. The influence of all of them can be seen in many parts of his work.


I already made most of my arguments in the post above. CvC discusses the concept of militias, popular uprising, their place in the overall concept of war and the strategy and tactics used in the small war (Kleinkrieg, Le petite guerre, Guerilla) only in the book of the defense. This is hardly surprising when you consider the political climate of his state.

While I have not enough time to answer in depth it seems to me that the employment of IEDs does handily fit CvC's conception as well as the general strategy of some of the insurgents in Afghanistan.

Just take a closer look at him.


Firn

[Taiko]

Any opinions about Van Creveld's "Transformation of War" vis-a-vis Clausewitz's "On War"?

To understand Creveld's work on the 'transformation of war, you should begin with his previous book 'The Rise and Decline of the State'. Creveld's main argument on the transformation of war derives from what I believe to be a false assumption that states are in decline or do not exist. I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

Creveld's critique of CvC and the so called 'post-CvC' warfare comes from his reading on CvC's theory of the conduct of war, not its nature. It is really a straw man argument. CvC wrote that the conduct of war will always correlate with its nature, so of course warfare is going to change, simply because of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the political motivations of the time. Creveld misreads CvC differentiation between the objective nature of war and its subjective characteristics. Confusing what is subjective with what is objective. He then bases his whole argument on the reversal of the pardoxical trinity. Claiming that CvC wrote that the relationship between the people, government and the military is a static one, when in fact CvC wrote that it was always dynamic and in flux. Like a magnet suspended between three magnets. CvC never argued that inter-state war is the only kind of warfare, he simply applied his theory on the nature of war to the wars of his time.

One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

[jmm99]

My added 2 farthings is that MvC may have been too influenced by the turmoil following WWII and the fall of the various colonial empires. The boundaries of the neo-colonial states were artificialities of the colonial systems. In addition, many of those new governments were frankly not ready to govern. It is one thing to be an insurgent; and quite another thing to be an incumbant.

[max161]

I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

......
One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

Taiko: That is probably the most brilliantly succinct explanation of the misunderstanding of Clausewitz I have seen. Your words should be repeated at every chance. Thanks for this.

Dave

[MikeF]

To understand Creveld's work on the 'transformation of war, you should begin with his previous book 'The Rise and Decline of the State'. Creveld's main argument on the transformation of war derives from what I believe to be a false assumption that states are in decline or do not exist. I think it is important to realise that he confuses CvC theory on the nature of war, with his writings on its conduct. They are different. CvC applied his theory on the nature of war to those being fought at the time. They so happened to be inter-state wars. CvC never wrote that this was, is, or will be the only kind of war, far from it. Afterall, he wrote a number of monographs on small wars and lectured about small wars to Prussian staff officers for five years. CvC argued that inter-state war had the potential for being the most violent and comes closest to reaching absolute war. He was correct.

Creveld's critique of CvC and the so called 'post-CvC' warfare comes from his reading on CvC's theory of the conduct of war, not its nature. It is really a straw man argument. CvC wrote that the conduct of war will always correlate with its nature, so of course warfare is going to change, simply because of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the political motivations of the time. Creveld misreads CvC differentiation between the objective nature of war and its subjective characteristics. Confusing what is subjective with what is objective. He then bases his whole argument on the reversal of the pardoxical trinity. Claiming that CvC wrote that the relationship between the people, government and the military is a static one, when in fact CvC wrote that it was always dynamic and in flux. Like a magnet suspended between three magnets. CvC never argued that inter-state war is the only kind of warfare, he simply applied his theory on the nature of war to the wars of his time.

One of the problems with Creveld's work is that a number of other theorists: Mary Kaldor, Rupet Smith, Kaveli Holsti etc all base their criticism of CvC and their arguments on 'post-CvC/post-trinitarian warfare' on Crevelds reading of CvC, not what CvC wrote himself. So Willf is correct, CvC is more often quoted than he is read. The problem is not so much that you can use CvC to argue anything. The important distinction to make is that you can take CvC out of context to argue anything. If you understand CvC theoretical methods it is very easy to indentify those who have taken him out of context to try and support their own argument/agenda.

Good post Taiko. I don't understand all of it, but keep writing.

v/r

Mike

[Firn]

I recently studied Clausewitz more closely, especially the chapters which are not very well known. Here is the chapter on "Volksbewaffnung" or "Arming the Nation". This chapter has to been seen as part of the strategic defence integrated in his overall concept of war. Given that the Prussian court and a great part of the establishment feared that arming the people could result in anti-royalist revolutions and Clauswitz pressed for such a strategy one should not be surprise that this influences the way he presents this topic. It didn't certainly prevent Lenin and Mao from learning.

The chapter is here


Given the political background, now wonder he starts like that.

A PEOPLE'S war in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its opponents: the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means, a state of anarchy declared lawful, which is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home; or on military grounds, conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of the nation's strength.

He continues and describes how warfare changed forever with the inclusion of the popular masses:

The first point does not concern us here, for we look upon a people's war merely as a means of fighting, therefore, in its connection with the enemy; but with regard to the latter point, we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day has made through its old formal limits; as an expansion and strengthening of the whole fermentation-process which we call war.

The requisition system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system, and the general liability to military service, the utilizing militia, are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point; and the levée en masse, or arming of the people, now lies also in the same direction.

If the first named of these new aids to war are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down; and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them, that the enemy has been carried along in the current, and obliged to adopt them likewise, this will be the case also with people-wars

Then he broadens it and explains why the people's war is a special case:

In the generality of cases, the people who make judicious use of this means, will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use. If this be so, then the only question is whether this modern intensification of the military element is, upon the whole, salutary for the interests of humanity or otherwise,—a question which it would be about as easy to answer as the question of war itself—we leave both to philosophers.

But the opinion may be advanced, that the resources swallowed up in people's wars might be more profitably employed, if used in providing other military means; no very deep investigation, however, is necessary to be convinced that these resources are for the most part not disposable, and cannot be utilized in an arbitrary manner at pleasure. One essential part that is the moral element, is not called into existence until this kind of employment for it arises.

Sic, keep in mind the various guerilla wars as in Spain, Napoleonic Russia, the Sovietunion in WWII, China during and after the WWII and Afghanistan. But so far it can still be still be seen in the prism of the industrial wars (WWI, WWII) to come. But as it is part of the book on defense, it increasingly focuses on the effects of the resistance of the agitated people against an invader.

We therefore do not ask again: how much does the resistance which the whole nation in arms is capable of making, cost that nation? but we ask: what is the effect which such a resistance can produce? What are its conditions, and how is it to be used?

It follows from the very nature of the thing that defensive means thus widely dispersed, are not suited to great blows requiring concentrated action in time and space. Its operation, like the process of evaporation in physical nature, is according to the surface. The greater that surface and the greater the contact with the enemy's army, consequently the more that army spreads itself out, so much the greater will be the effects of arming the nation.

(Spain seems now in his mind)

Like a slow gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy's army. As it requires time to produce its effects, therefore whilst the hostile elements are working on each other, there is a state of tension which either gradually wears out if the people's war is extinguished at some points, and burns slowly away at others, or leads to a crisis, if the flames of this general conflagration envelop the enemy's army, and compel it to evacuate the country to save itself from utter destruction

A very important part comes than:

In order that this result should be produced by a national war alone, we must suppose either a surface-extent of the dominions invaded, exceeding that of any country in Europe, except Russia, or suppose a disproportion between the strength of the invading army and the extent of the country, such as never occurs in reality.

Therefore, to avoid following a phantom, we must imagine a people-war always in combination, with a war carried on by a regular army, and both carried on according to a plan embracing the operations of the whole.

To which the politcal context - fear of popular revolution, similar the French one - influenced the last sentence is unknown. (As said before, CvC's idea of an militia was considered dangerous by Prussia's ruling class.) It is a very interesting statement and especially interesting when used to analyse the situation in Afghanistan. To which extent the safe tribal areas in Pakistan and the flow of ressources and money substitute the "regular army" is quite a question. Note also that Allies play a very important part in the strategic defense according to other Chapters.

Interestingly Mao warned the guerilla leaders in Latinamerica to accept his specific strategy, which relied to a great deal on the huge and difficult terrain of China and the support of the large rural majority as dogma.

While he limits the power of the unsupported "guerilla war" he then up with this.

The conditions under which alone the people's war can become effective are the following—

1. That the war is carried on in the heart of the country.

2. That it cannot be decided by a single catastrophe.

3. That the theatre of war embraces a considerable extent of country.

4. That the national character is favourable to the measure.

5. That the country is of a broken and difficult nature, either from being mountainous, or by reason of woods and marshes, or from the peculiar mode of cultivation in use.

Whether the population is dense or otherwise, is of little consequence, as there is less likelihood of a want of men than of anything else. Whether the inhabitants are rich or poor is also a point by no means decisive, at least it should not be; but it must be admitted that a poor population accustomed to hard work and privations usually shows itself more vigorous and better suited for war.

Very hard not to think about Afghanistan, or China in WWII, isn't it?

One peculiarity of country which greatly favors the action of war carried on by the people, is the scattered sites of the dwellings of the country people, such as is to be found in many parts of Germany. The country is thus more intersected and covered; the roads are worse, although more numerous; the lodgement of troops is attended with endless difficulties, but especially that peculiarity repeats itself on a small scale, which a people-war possesses on a great scale, namely that the principle of resistance exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible.

If the inhabitants are collected in villages, the most troublesome have troops quartered on them, or they are plundered as a punishment, and their houses burnt, etc, a system which could not be very easily carried out with a peasant community of Westphalia.

... or Afghanistan

What follows shows that the writer has experienced and studied guerilla war very carefully.

National levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be employed against the main body of the enemy's army, or even against any considerable corps of the same, they must not attempt to crack the nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders. They should rise in the provinces situated at one of the sides of the theatre of war, and in which the assailant does not appear in force, in order to withdraw these provinces entirely from his influence.

Where no enemy is to be found, there is no want of courage to oppose him, and at the example thus given, the mass of the neighboring population gradually takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and reaching at last that part of the surface of the soil on which the aggressor is based, it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by which his existence is supported.

Surly on of the most interesting descriptions written on the topic. Take away "National Levies and armed peasantry" and use "Insurgency" and it becomes rather "modern".

I will continue later to comment it.

[Firn]

For although we entertain no exaggerated ideas of the omnipotence of a people's war, such as that it is an inexhaustible, unconquerable element, over which the mere force of an army has as little control as the human will has over the wind or the rain; in short, although our opinion is not founded on flowery ephemeral literature, still we must admit that armed peasants are not to be driven before us in the same way as a body of soldiers who keep together like a herd of cattle, and usually follow their noses

The Soviet campaign came into my mind when reading the above and the following, "Bear went over the mountain" has just so many corrisponding examples and situations.

Armed peasants, on the contrary, when broken, disperse in all directions, for which no formal plan is required; through this circumstance, the march of every small body of troops in a mountainous, thickly wooded, or even broken country, becomes a service of a very dangerous character, for at any moment a combat may arise on the march; if in point of fact no armed bodies have even been seen for some time, yet the same peasants already driven off by the head of a column, may at any hour make their appearance in its rear.

If it is an object to destroy roads or to block up a defile; the means which outposts or detachments from an army can apply to that purpose, bear about the same relation to those furnished by a body of insurgent peasants, as the action of an automaton does to that of a human being. The enemy has no other means to oppose to the action of national levies except that of detaching numerous parties to furnish escorts for convoys to occupy military stations, defiles, bridges, etc.

In proportion as the first efforts of the national levies are small, so the detachments sent out will be weak in numbers, from the repugnance to a great dispersion of forces; it is on these weak bodies that the fire of the national war usually first properly kindles itself, they are overpowered by numbers at some points, courage rises, the love of fighting gains strength, and the intensity of this struggle increases until the crisis approaches which is to decide the issue.

Then, once again I'm surprised how well CvC puts his words.

According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the people.

Still, however, on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth.

These points are chiefly on the flanks of the enemy's theatre of war, as already observed. There the armament of the people should be organised into greater and more systematic bodies, supported by a small force of regular troops, so as to give it the appearance of a regular force and fit it to venture upon enterprises on a larger scale.

From these points, the irregular character in the organisation of these bodies should diminish in proportion as they are to be employed more in the direction of the rear of the enemy, where he is exposed to their hardest blows. These better organised masses, are for the purpose of falling upon the larger garrisons which the enemy leaves behind him.

Besides, they serve to create a feeling of uneasiness and dread, and increase the moral impression of the whole, without them the total action would be wanting in force, and the situation of the enemy upon the whole would not be made sufficiently uncomfortable.

Mao seems to have take the whole last page out and slightly modified it when he described his three phases of the revolution. Not unlikely, given that he read Lenin's take on it and the (badly) translated work.


I will follow it up with the second part of the chapter in which he also talks about the paradox that rapid tactical attacks are the mainstay of the people's war in the strategic defence.

[UrsaMaior]

What was beyond CvC's reach was obvious to MvC. WMDs, people's war at its best and globalization. These all contribute to the decline of the nation state (because of the decline of nationalism as its basic principle). I will write a paper on it if I have the time.

CvC basic assumptions are valid (center of gravities, war is a continuation of politics etc.) and will be valid as long as we accept the definition: war is organised violence.

MvC might be a bit too much for some, yet he has valid points about declining states and about who and why fights.

Don't think only of western hemisphere. See Katanga e.g. a state was turned upside down by a mining company. IMHO Tom Odom can give us quazillion examples of VNSAs way before AQ and Hizbullah.

[Firn]

What was beyond CvC's reach was obvious to MvC. WMDs, people's war at its best and globalization. These all contribute to the decline of the nation state (because of the decline of nationalism as its basic principle). I will write a paper on it if I have the time.

I would advise you to read Taiko's excellent post - just like him I do not agree with the simplistic assumption of the "decline of the nation state" on which a good part of MvC theory is grounded. While there is change, the state is still by far the most dominating form and actor of the will and interests it's people. Not that this adds or takes away from the work CvC.

[Bob's World]

I recently studied Clausewitz more closely, especially the chapters which are not very well known. Here is the chapter on "Volksbewaffnung" or "Arming the Nation". This chapter has to been seen as part of the strategic defence integrated in his overall concept of war. Given that the Prussian court and a great part of the establishment feared that arming the people could result in anti-royalist revolutions and Clauswitz pressed for such a strategy one should not be surprise that this influences the way he presents this topic. It didn't certainly prevent Lenin and Mao from learning.

The chapter is here


Given the political background, now wonder he starts like that.




He continues and describes how warfare changed forever with the inclusion of the popular masses:




Then he broadens it and explains why the people's war is a special case:




Sic, keep in mind the various guerilla wars as in Spain, Napoleonic Russia, the Sovietunion in WWII, China during and after the WWII and Afghanistan. But so far it can still be still be seen in the prism of the industrial wars (WWI, WWII) to come. But as it is part of the book on defense, it increasingly focuses on the effects of the resistance of the agitated people against an invader.





A very important part comes than:



To which the politcal context - fear of popular revolution, similar the French one - influenced the last sentence is unknown. (As said before, CvC's idea of an militia was considered dangerous by Prussia's ruling class.) It is a very interesting statement and especially interesting when used to analyse the situation in Afghanistan. To which extent the safe tribal areas in Pakistan and the flow of ressources and money substitute the "regular army" is quite a question. Note also that Allies play a very important part in the strategic defense according to other Chapters.

Interestingly Mao warned the guerilla leaders in Latinamerica to accept his specific strategy, which relied to a great deal on the huge and difficult terrain of China and the support of the large rural majority as dogma.

While he limits the power of the unsupported "guerilla war" he then up with this.




Very hard not to think about Afghanistan, or China in WWII, isn't it?




... or Afghanistan

What follows shows that the writer has experienced and studied guerilla war very carefully.




Surly on of the most interesting descriptions written on the topic. Take away "National Levies and armed peasantry" and use "Insurgency" and it becomes rather "modern".

I will continue later to comment it.

What he is talking about goes far more to what is commonly called "The American Way of War." Europe for centuries had been fighting wars between Kingdoms, where victory or defeat was in either capturing a King, his capital, or his purse by killing expensive soldiers or sinking expensive ships. Then came the American and French Revolutions, and Napoleon really capitalized on what I call wars by/between nations. Now capturing a King, his capital, or his purse may win it for you, but only if you had also defeated the will of a national populace. This changed warfare in a major way, Napoleon capitalized on it to make France the dominant NATION on the continent. Later, in the American Civil War, I believe Grant was the first General to understand strategcially that in a war between nations it was critical to target and defeat the national will of ones opponent.

There are related phenomena in Insurgency, but I don't believe he was talking to insurgency. But then I freely admit, I am one of the 99% who have never endured an extensive study of CvC.

[William F. Owen]

Europe for centuries had been fighting wars between Kingdoms, where victory or defeat was in either capturing a King, his capital, or his purse by killing expensive soldiers or sinking expensive ships.

That's not true. Wars were concluded for exactly the ways CvC describes wars being concluded.

This changed warfare in a major way, Napoleon capitalized on it to make France the dominant NATION on the continent.

Changed Warfare or War?

Later, in the American Civil War, I believe Grant was the first General to understand strategcially that in a war between nations it was critical to target and defeat the national will of ones opponent.

So he managed to do what Hannibal had tried to do and failed to do to Rome - which had no King, by the way - and citizen based Army. Grant was doing nothing new. He was treading a well worn road.

There are related phenomena in Insurgency, but I don't believe he was talking to insurgency.

Why did he need to? How are so-called "Insurgencies" different from Rebellions? Why differentiate when it comes to War. (not warfare!) It's all about the same thing.

But then I freely admit, I am one of the 99% who have never endured an extensive study of CvC.

The evidence supports your assertion as being correct.

[M-A Lagrange]

a) France was arguably already the most prominent military power in Europe before the French Revolution

France was the most populus country in Europe before the revolution and after. Napoleon used to say: A night of Paris will cover my losses... That does play a large role into the "game". Especially at that time.

Originally Posted by Bob's World
Europe for centuries had been fighting wars between Kingdoms, where victory or defeat was in either capturing a King, his capital, or his purse by killing expensive soldiers or sinking expensive ships.

That's not true. Wars were concluded for exactly the ways CvC describes wars being concluded.

For once I agree with Wilf. What Napoleon changed or introduced (with the Tsar of Russia if I am not mistaking) is the Westpalian Consensus.
After defeat borders would remain and countries still exist despite being conquered. Before, kings could be killed or alive, it was their kingdoms which died by being integrated into another country. Poland is a good example of that. There was a king of Poland without country and even less kingdom.

I can see where Bob is coming from. The independance war in America and the opposition between France and UK. Louis 16 heritated from the past glory and power from Louis 15 and specially Louis 14.
In somehow, Louis 16 was in advance, he delocalised war from Europe to America and was looking into reducing UK power by a war of economical exhaustion. (And it's France he brought financially to her knees)
But still, he was looking to impose by force a peace at his profite to his ennemy. Just like CvC stated.