What is the "Surge?"

[Entropy]

I've been reading some politics lately (yes, that's my first mistake!) and it seems apparent to me that there is a huge difference in what people of different political stripes think is the "surge." This definitional difference seems to be at the heart of disagreements over whether it has "worked" or not. Those disagreements go on to buttress basic policy differences.

So, to the professionals here, many of which I'm sure were either involved in planning and/or executing the "surge," what does it mean to you? Is there a commonly-accepted definition? I've always considered it much more than the simple addition of more forces but have never been completely sure myself what is "surge" and what is not. Is the surge something the military should provide a precise definition for (assuming there isn't one already that I've somehow missed)? Am I an idiot for asking these probably loaded questions in this forum?

[Cavguy]

Interestingly, the article COL MacFarland and I wrote has become ground zero for the debate over recent comments by McCain/Obama campaigns.

Not where I like to be as a military officer - having our work being quoted in the middle of a political squabble over terms.

<sigh>

My blog post in February (well before the current hubub) amplifying it included this:

Likewise, the major actions that enabled the “Awakening” pre-date the execution of the surge, publication of FM 3-24, and the arrival of General Petraeus to Iraq. Attributing the success in Ramadi to the “surge” would be erroneous. However, the change to population centric tactics, patrol bases, and local security alliances that the Ready First and some other units had used in 2006 were systemically spread and adapted to local conditions throughout Iraq under the leadership of General Petraeus and General Odierno. The additional forces in the surge coupled with new tactics and doctrine enabled the transformation of Baghdad and several other provinces. The actions of the Ready First in Ramadi and 3d Armored Cavalry in Tal Afar were validation and prototypes for the change in tactics that accompanied the surge, and validated the principles that now embody FM 3-24.

I would offer that perhaps people are talking past each other - two events are being discussed - the "surge" as defined as the addition of extra BCT's to Iraq (announced Jan 07, and used in the example above), and apparently a definition of the "surge" that was the shift to better COIN tactics (pop security, COPs, nested lines of operations) that can be reasonably described as beginning somewhere in 2005, and were standardized country-wide in 2007 with GEN P/GEN O. The above quote specifically refers to the first definition. I can handle the second, but it probably is confusing. I would describe it as "better operations and tactics through organizational learning."

As far as the Awakening, the article has the dates of when things happened - I'll let others hash on its relation to the "surge" depending on which version of the above you accept. SEN McCain (plus SENs Snowe, Liebermann, and Graham) visitied us in Dec 06 and got a full brief from COL MacFarland on the emerging turnaround. I can see how McCain might have included this in his definition of the "surge", because it directly played into the political debate over whether success was possible in Iraq - and the choice between the Baker/Hamilton plan and the Kaplan/Keane "surge" that was all the rage in the media.

As a personal opinion, I doubt that we would have had the flexibility to break Baghdad's "cycle of violence" without the addition of extra troops, combined with a coherent and synchronized operational plan based off of organizational learning. The Awakening probably would have occurred in Anbar regardless, but I doubt it could have spread into the "Sons of Iraq" movement without the addition of troops to mitigate the sectarian cycle of violence combined with evolved COIN practices (the above plus things like gated communities in B'Dad).

That's as far as I'm willing to wade into this one. All personal opinions above. I am endorsing neither side's account/interpretation, only responding to some commentator/blogger's use of our article for political hay that I have seen.

[PhilR]

If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.

[Ron Humphrey]

If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.

It would seem that Phil has it right in that the greatest overall change took place in the perspectives of the people within Iraq, their leaders, and foreign interests; and what they were willing and ready to do about it.

The point at which the HN proactively begins to work towards change large scale will always be decisive. And General P with the surge forces and associated use of them was able to provide the conditions for that to happen.

Ultimately the locals have to win the local war and our soldiers helped and are helping to get them there.

Just my take ---

[Schmedlap]

This definitional difference seems to be at the heart of disagreements over whether it has "worked" or not. Those disagreements go on to buttress basic policy differences.

I think you got it backwards. Politicians start from a position and then seek ways justify the position.

Is the surge something the military should provide a precise definition for (assuming there isn't one already that I've somehow missed)?

No. The positions have been staked out. All candidates will shift this way and that, but none will shift too far from where their base of support wants them to go. If the military were to attempt to clarify the definition, it would immediately be spun by both sides to rationalize some way that it bolsters their positions, making the military the unwitting tool for political nonsense (or is that a redundant term?). When objective facts are irrelevant to the outcome of an argument, it is pointless to inject them into it.

[Rank amateur]

I think you got it backwards. Politicians start from a position and then seek ways justify the position.

So do "bases." Surge has become one of those words like guns, abortion, etc. upon which no intelligent conversation is possible, because contrasting emotions have been attached to the word, and now the bases would rather yell at each other. It's too bad because COIN is expensive and the only people who can pay for it are the voters. Nothing good can come out of taxpayers not understanding what they're paying for.

To one side "surge" means winning: which is simplistic at best. To the other it means, obsession with Iraq, but obviously Iraq can't be completely ignored.

Normally, "winning" and "we need to take care of ourselves first" are both pretty popular with voters. Probably why the politicians aren't budging.

If I were running the Obama campaign I'd be trying to shift the left's meaning of surge from "It's not worth the causalities" - which is losing relevance - to "why does McCain want to rebuild Iraq while bridges are falling in America, and people are losing their homes." Selfish pocketbook issues swing voters, and it ties in with the meme that "four more years" will mess up the economy and the whole Katrina thing. Then again, they may have thought of that and it tested poorly in focus groups. (This spin doctor thing is trickier than it looks.)

[Schmedlap]

Are you implying that many voters hold views on issues that are ignorant or overly emotional and that politicians exploit that ignorance and excessive emoting by staking out positions that appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to win elections, rather than staking out positions that would be best for the country?

[Wildcat]

Are you implying that many voters hold views on issues that are ignorant or overly emotional and that politicians exploit that ignorance and excessive emoting by staking out positions that appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to win elections, rather than staking out positions that would be best for the country?

Stop the presses!

I agree with Rank Amateur that the Surge has become a hot-button issue that provokes some pretty heated responses from both sides of the issue. Most voter polls I've seen have phrased the question very simplistically: "Do you think the Surge has been a success?" Well, by what metric do we gauge success? Overall success in Iraq would be a stable, self-sufficient state with no great need of Coalition forces for security. But the Surge's aims, to me, seem more restrained: establishing security, so that political reconciliation may follow. That would be the watered down version. You can't have the latter before the former, in my opinion. And that is what I consider the Surge to be: not just an escalation of troops, or better operations through organizational learning, but mainly the stated aim that security be established before any other strategic objectives can be accomplished. In other words, more troops and better tactics are just the nuts and bolts of the Surge.

Now, I'm not a professional and I don't have any time in country, so my opinion matters little, if at all. But from what I've been seeing and hearing, we are slowly achieving that goal of establishing security. It's too early to call the Surge a success. I think it is succeeding. While I mentioned that its goal (establishing security) is narrower than the overall goal of turning Iraq into a healthy state, the Surge is, by necessity, tied to that larger goal. So we won't really be able to call it a success until Iraq itself is a success.

[MikeF]

Enthropy-
Excellent timing. We just had a thorough discussion on this in class (All services and SF/Seals represented). Many of us served as ground commanders throughout Iraq from late 2006 to summer of 2007.

Situation: Years of frequent policy shifts(Saddam, Interim IZ Gov’t, Civil War, Islamic State of Iraq) and the introduction of partisan forces and the evolution of radical Islamist Jihad (suicide bomber) deteriorated the social fabric of the Iraqi (self, family, tribe, religion, and state) leaving an acephalous society- confusion, lack of self-identity, loss of hope. The insertion of additional combat troops and COIN strategy colliding with internal Iraqi actions led to the perfect storm of “The Surge.”

First, my personal, emotional, and categorical answer- Combined with other components listed below, the decisive point of “The Surge” was Airborne, Strykers, Cavalry, and Marine units moving deep into denied areas taking the fight to the enemy. This action took away the enemy’s information advantage (terrorize the terrorist/denying safehaven). The increase in kinetics (facilitated by the AF, but triggered by the grunt) allowed us to control these areas. The psychological impact on the Sunni populace was exponential. After years of instability, the populace believed that we could secure them. Finally, we broke the enemy’s will to fight, and they turned away from AQI and began providing actionable intelligence.

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)

Now, the challenge is how to put humpty dumpty back together again.

I probably missed a few components, but it’s a start. I look forward to hearing others views, feedback, and additions.

[Rank amateur]

Are you implying that many voters hold views on issues that are ignorant or overly emotional and that politicians exploit that ignorance and excessive emoting by staking out positions that appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to win elections, rather than staking out positions that would be best for the country?

And people like me get paid big bucks to help them.

I've often wounded about the effect on the military and military culture. If Republicans were saying, "failed to plan for stability operations" would we have adopted better tactics and a population centric strategy sooner?

[jmm99]

from RankAmateur
I've also longed maintained that the - to the schlep watching TV - was US casualties.

I'd suggest that US casualties (as an abstract number) have been the single most important metric to some schleps (def. 2) producing, announcing and punditting TV (who've used them to support their own political positions - "right" and "left" - without much if any shame).

I'd suggest that the person watching TV becomes concerned about US casualties (1) when that involves a relative, friend or neighbor; and / or (2) when US casualties do not seem to be resulting in what that person considers progress; or are (in that person's opinion) the result of a bad governmental policy decision to continue the war.

Vietnam (if you are of that generation) was the same thing

Iraq has been very much of a schlep (def. 1) - long and arduous, indeed; as attested by better men than I. So was Vietnam. As such, both include(d) surges, back and forth, forth and back. So, we saw and see Operation This or That (I, II and III, etc.).

So, what is the "Surge" ? Dammed if I really know; but it probably will be expressed differently next month from this month.

End Rant.

--------------------------------
BTW: weren't sure whether you meant the older meaning of "schlep" (still used by paleo-anthropolgists re: technique of bringing back the produce of the hunt):

schlep : to drag or haul (an object); to make a tedious journey (from Yiddish shlepn; cf. German schleppen) (OED, MW)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...Yiddish_origin

or, the more current slang meaning (last below)

schlep or schlepp also shlep (shlp) Slang
v. schlepped also shlepped, schlep·ping or schlepp·ing also shlep·ping, schleps or schlepps also shleps
v.tr.
To carry clumsily or with difficulty; lug: schlepped a shopping bag around town.
v.intr.
To move slowly or laboriously: schlepped around with the twins in a stroller.
n.
1. An arduous journey.
2. A clumsy or stupid person.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/schlep

[Ken White]

Most Americans concern for casualties is that there be an exchange or payback of some sort -- they'll tolerate casualties as long as they think something is being accomplished. Only if they see no successes at all do they get unduly perturbed. there are a few that want to make casualties an issue but they're a minority -- and most of them have no relatives or even anyone one they know in the service.

The body bag myth is just that-- a myth. As is all the foolishness about showing the coffins arriving at Dover. Every military funeral gets plentiful local coverage, so there's no cover up. Parents with serving kids like me are mostly content with the process as it now works and see nothing to be gained other than dipwad political points from showing arrivals at Dover.

[Rank amateur]

or, the more current slang meaning

Definitely 2, but more affectionately.

Most Americans concern for casualties is that there be an exchange or payback of some sort

IMO, a perfectly reasonable cost benefit analysis.

[Ken White]

IMO, a perfectly reasonable cost benefit analysis.

Though there are those who try to skew the process for political reasons, they are rarely successful.

[Steve Blair]

As I seem to recall, the "Surge" was defined at the time (read - this is what the media tended to express it as) as the flow of more combat troops into Iraq. Cav Guy, MikeF, and others have pointed out the more nuanced aspects of it, but most of that didn't make it into mainstream (or more generalized) discussions of it. The "Surge" simply came down to more boots on the ground.

Granted that's a massive oversimplification, but I do tend to think that's how ma and pa back on the couch watching TV saw it (or had it explained to them).

[Old Eagle]

The "surge" was a shorthand term designed by politicians for the media.

I'm not sure that I've heard serious theorists or practictioners use it in any other context. What evolved in Iraq beginning in fall 2006 cannot be described by simply counting BOG.

[Hacksaw]

Clearly its easy to get several different events confused (vis'a'vis chicken or egg)... In defference to the context in which this thread grew (political volleyball) the "Surge" is commonly perceived as an increase in troops (BOG)

Was Petraeus part of the "Surge"... no but he helped develop the concept, and he sold it as a necessary capability to enable the "new" strategy - create security conditions that enable the space for Iraqi political progress.

Was the "Surge" the critical element that enabled MNC-I to string together a series of tactical successes that resulted in operational/strategic effects - near total collapse of AQI? Mostly no, some yes... Biggest factor was that MNC-I Staff evolved its thinking in terms of correctly defining the problem and developed a strategy to operate a tempo inside AQI's ability to adapt. That said, the inflow of increased combat capability was crucial to their ability to implement the strategy

"Surge" relationship to Petraeus strategy and Anbar Awakening? Anbar was first by all accounts, but then again Mosel in 2003 preceeded Anbar (tomatoo - tomatoe that's what its all about). Point is pockets and pools of smart people can arrive at similar conclusions - significance is that "Surge" strategy (secure population - JSPs - etc) became the norm rather than the exception.

These and several other related factors (see MikeF posting earlier) has led to a better situation in Iraq.

So what does it all mean? I don't know, but let me take a shot....

- III Corps (MNC-I), by virtue of others experiences and their own, got it right in terms of understanding the problem and developing an operational approach that made sense.

- GEN Petraeus and Ordierno were the right leaders at the right time

- The shift to offensive operations (really taking it to AQI, militias and other bad guys) had the same type of disorienting effect on our opponents as we tend to see in well executed conventional fights, hmmm.... might be a lesson there

- Can't do all this without adequate BOG so that oeprational commanders have the tools to implement.

I shall now return to the dark corner and shut my eyes

Live well and row

[selil]

The "surge" was a shorthand term designed by politicians for the media.

I'm not sure that I've heard serious theorists or practictioners use it in any other context. What evolved in Iraq beginning in fall 2006 cannot be described by simply counting BOG.

I'd have to say that I agree. Further it short changes all the hard work everybody involved did. "The Surge" is a term that should be mocked.

[Alsultani]

I'm brand new to the board ( I posted in the introduction forum)

I look at the surge from the micro level. I was there, and extended for 4 months (16 total) due to the surge, as a team leader of a Tactical HUMINT Team. Serving in a Shia area owned by the Mahdi Army, the surge didn't mean much. I believe the surge is working militarily in the short term, but I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from. Last I knew, the Sadrist Current still has 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament. The Sadrist MP in our area has a PSD who were also members of JAM, involved in mafia activities. She provided political cover to an extent that the ISF in the province were paralyzed. Judges refused to issue warrants. JAM members could and did kill ISF and coalition forces with impunity, using Iranian trained and supplied action team members, who had official MOD identification cards, etc. JAM would murder a policeman in her city, and the next day the JAM commander would be publicly drinking Chai tea with the Chief of police at the station. I was in the room to hear a US state department rep say that this Sadrist MP had immunity because she's a politician. I observed the frustration of senior ISF at this statement; one of whom has since been assassinated by the very people he was prevented from going after. Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

[jmm99]

In early 2007, Fred Kagan published two reports setting out his "surge" vision.

Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq
Phase I Report
By Frederick W. Kagan
Posted: Friday, January 5, 2007
PAPERS AND STUDIES
AEI Online
Publication Date: January 5, 2007
link to .pdf file in link below

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubI...pub_detail.asp

Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq
Phase II Report
By Frederick W. Kagan
Posted: Wednesday, April 25, 2007
PAPERS AND STUDIES
AEI Online
Publication Date: April 25, 2007
link to .pdf file in link below

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubI...pub_detail.asp

The first of them (dealing with things military) caught most comment.

I'm interested in your comments (who's been der, done dat) on the second report (dealing with things political); to set the palette:

1. Were any of Kagan's recommendations initiated in your jurisdiction ("microlevel") ?

2. If initiated, were they carried through ?

3. Were they successful ?

4. If not, your thoughts on why not ?

5. Any other thoughts re: Kagan's second report ?

Above subject to all security caveats which apply to you - so, only to the extent you can.