MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[JMA]

derring do, no question -- but on balance, they were only marginally effective militarily and what little they did achieve was at excessive cost. I've talked to several former members and most were and are quite proud of their service but have little good to say about the efforts overall effectiveness.

Sadly it seems the same will be written about most of the forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Different time. While daring action occurs on a small scale and locally today, it is not broadly tolerated in the west. Those days are gone, they were killed off by the politically correct movements of the 70s and are highly unlikely to return short of a major, existential war. Risk avoidance is all too prevalent today, a societal (and thus quite difficult to reverse), not a military impact.

So exactly is the point of going into action in Afghanistan then?

[Ken White]

Sadly it seems the same will be written about most of the forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Probably not but it today is, as I said, a different time, different even to your and my wars, much less Burma in WW II.

So exactly is the point of going into action in Afghanistan then?

I'm the wrong guy to ask. You'll need to ask G. W. Bush who made the determination to stay there or B. H. Obama who made the decision to continue the effort there. I agreed with going and toppling the Taliban. I did not agree with staying. I do now believe we cannot leave to precipitously but neither can we stay indefinitely (which has always been true and is why I didn't and don't agree with the decision to stay...). No win situation -- it always was.

[sapperfitz82]

I am also in favor of a punitive raid, but if we had funded and led a successful insurgency in Iraq as well (opposed to a conventional war) would those two actions have not put enormous pressure on Iran (which I contend is the true target of GWOT in SW Asia)?

[JMA]

...on balance, they were only marginally effective militarily and what little they did achieve was at excessive cost.

Is this not accurate of the current forces in Afghanistan?

[Ken White]

Is this not accurate of the current forces in Afghanistan?

of three factors which in order of impact are:

Policy, Quality of training, Personnel polices.

None of those the fault of the troops, all effect the quality of their efforts. I'd be very leery of making such a judgment based on media reports and with a lack of direct personal knowledge...

[jmm99]

from JMA

re: jmm99
...While the campaign exemplified bravery and courage under impossible conditions, its long-term strategic goals never came close to being realized - and a lot of good men were killed for little lasting purpose.

How close it this to an accurate description of the situation in Afghanistan?

I saw the reasonable purpose of OEF as neutralization (kill, capture or convert; of which, kill seemed the most likely probability) of key AQ leadership as retribution for 9/11 and specific deterrence of them from leading future attacks. We came close at Tora Bora.

I still see that as a reasonable long-term strategy, but not at the cost of engagement in "state-building" ("nation-building" seems to be somewhat out of favor, and flavor, this year ), and involvement in South Asian and Roof of the World politics, in which we have no existential interest - and only a diluted "vital" interest.

The UN-NATO-ISAF strategy (as it appears to me; e.g., today's news) is not one that I endorse; but not being on anyone's staff or advisory panel, my opinion is worth spit.

Cheers

Mike