Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Bob's World]

I guess the supposed need for armour tends to indicate that the insurgency is moving to Phase 3 where the insurgents are holding ground and launching counter offensives. Maybe it means things are not going so well for the Marines in Helmand?

Actually, I suspect it reflects the restrictions on the use of close air, attack air, and indirect fires; the very real need to minimize innocent casualties; and the insurgent tactic of occupying and fighting from compounds where such innocent parties reside.

The tank provides a very effective way to deal with such problems short of ordering a squad to conduct fire and maneuver across 100 yards of knee deep much in an open field; or to try to move an MRAP down a narrow IED laden roadway.

This insurgency fluctuates with the season and by location, but it is no where near phase III; nor would I expect the Taliban to even attempt surging to Phase III tactics so long as the coalition is present. Phase I and II tactics are far more effective against effective Phase III forces like ours.

Plus, it is always wise to remember that the insurgent can prevail in any phase, and flows up and down between them as best suits his purposes. There is no requirement to progress, but such progression is natural in certain circumstances. (I.e., the Taliban is not intellectually burdened by dogmatic adherence to doctrine like some western military personnel/organizations can tend to be. They simply fight the fight before them.)


The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.

Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.

[Cavguy]

The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.

Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.

Bob,

Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.

In a Stryker unit now, training heavily to operate with and without them. We expect to do both, as have the previous two stryker units. A Stryker IN company is basically same as an Airborne IN Company when you subtract the vehicles.

As Ken would say, METT-TC rules. Problem is the vehicles bring unique capabilities (protection, long range comms, digital connectivity, advanced sights, mobility) you lose when you separate from them.

Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.

[Bob's World]

Niel,

I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.

My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.

Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...

[Cavguy]

Niel,

I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.

My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.

Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...

Agree all. As someone commented - this is a tactical solution to a tactical problem, nothing more. The coax is also precision to 1100m, which is useful.

I think those who see this as something other than a solution to a problem in one particularly brutal area are over-reaching.

[JMA]

Bob,

Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.

Don't see the point in this.

When you have enough problems with the quality of infantry training what (for crying out aloud) is the point of taking armour trained soldiers all the way to a foreign theatre to act in the infantry role?

If there is a need for a handful of tanks in Afghanistan then deploy them and leave the rest of the regiment at home.

It just gets stranger and stranger.

[Cavguy]

Don't see the point in this.

When you have enough problems with the quality of infantry training what (for crying out aloud) is the point of taking armour trained soldiers all the way to a foreign theatre to act in the infantry role?

If there is a need for a handful of tanks in Afghanistan then deploy them and leave the rest of the regiment at home.

It just gets stranger and stranger.

Simple - necessity. We can't afford to leave the rest at home.

Simple fact is we didn't have enough infantry/dismounts to support repeated Iraq rotations, and therefore routinely have converted tankers, artillery, and sometimes engineers into ad hoc infantrymen. They did pretty well too - at a cost to their core skillsets which are beginning to get rebuilt.

None of it is ideal. We did this from the occupation phase of OIF 1 forward because of the decision to go in with a "light footprint". My Stryker CAV squadron will fundamentally act as infantrymen in Afghanistan next year. The cavalry hasn't trained actual recon in about 5 years, but have served as another infantry unit.

[Graycap]

Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.

Just like the Russian concept of bronegruppa? I refer to the soviet tactical use of their mechanised items like reported in Lester Grau books.

Cheers