Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[jmm99]

2. Strategic Analysis vs Tactical Analysis

Amidon succinctly sums up the "worm's eye" tactical view vs. the "big picture" strategic view (pp.10-11):

Same Mission, Different Goals

The most stunning aspect of the Son Tay raid is the wide and subtle goal divergence that existed between the Pentagon and the White House. In the minds of the Pentagon military planners, the Son Tay raid was a high-risk tactical mission undertaken to rescue American POWs being held captive under harsh conditions in North Vietnam. Colonel Simons summed this viewpoint in his pre-mission speech to the raiders: “We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, at a camp called Son Tay. This is something that American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers.”[53] To the Pentagon planners, conflicting intelligence in the eleventh hour threatened the sole objective of the raid. No POWs, no raid.

President Nixon’s motives were far more complex and closely guarded. Although Nixon also sought to rescue POWs, the Son Tay raid provided an ideal vehicle to forward his emerging strategy of imposing pressure on the North Vietnamese and convincing them that the Administration was not to be trifled with. According to historian Jeffrey Kimball:

In his memoirs, Kissinger revealed the broader diplomatic and strategic reasons behind the November 1970 [Son Tay] air raids. Besides diverting North Vietnamese defenses from Son Tay, they were designed to retaliate for the abrupt rejection of our peace proposal; and to slow down the North Vietnamese dry-season supply effort in the South. Thus, besides its humanitarian and political purposes, the combined operation of rescue and bombing had military and psychological purposes - an adjective Nixon used in his memoirs. [Nixon] commented that “it revealed [to the North Vietnamese] their vulnerability to a kind of attack they had not experienced before. The rescue mission demonstrated that the US could get past North Vietnamese air defenses and operate in [their] rear. It was a true [rescue] activity but also designed to show” that Nixon’s threats should be taken seriously.[54]

Unlike those at the Pentagon who viewed the Son Tay raid as a POW rescue, President Nixon saw it as a combination of a rescue, a threat to the North Vietnamese, and a salvo against his domestic critics. At least one modern scholar has gone so far as to ask the question: “Was Son Tay a rescue mission or an attack on North Vietnam disguised as a rescue mission?”[55]

Numerous Pentagon officials expressed surprise at the White House’s indifference to the reports of decreased camp activity. Their concerns might have been far more muted had they understood the fundamentally different objectives of the White House and the Pentagon. Whereas the military’s launch decision hinged solely on rescuing POWs, the White House saw great opportunity in safely executing a raid into North Vietnam, even if no POWs were rescued. Those in the Pentagon believed they were recommending “go” on a tactical mission. The White House had long since approved a strategic mission.

53. Schemme, p. 198.
54. Kimball, p. 238.
55. eHistory, “The Son Tay Raid: A Study in Presidential Policy,” p. 6.

Mitchell (page 16) comes to the same conclusion:

IN CONCLUSION: A QUESTION TO CONSIDER

Having explored both the humanitarian and political origins of the raid, perhaps a final thought provoking question remains, was the Son Tay Raid a rescue mission or an attack? In the opinion of this researcher, it was both! A noble and honorable attempt had been made by a gallant force to relieve the suffering of their brothers-in-arms, but the raid also possessed the elements of a deliberate attack to carry out Presidential policy. Undoubtedly, had POWs been rescued at Son Tay, immediate success would have been acknowledged by all, perhaps even resulting in uniting a divided America. Yet, at the same time, but unfortunately out of public view, the raid was an immediate success because Hanoi quickly began direct negotiations and took rapid action to correct their past transgressions regarding the treatment of POWs. By linking military actions to strategic goals, as was demonstrated by the raid on Son Tay, it is evident that President Nixon emerged from the latest round of 'negotiations' as a winner, although not immediately recognized as such.

Perhaps there will always be speculation concerning the raid. For example: Prior to the mission, did the NCA or any other planner/decision maker know that there were 'in fact' no POWs at Son Tay? Perhaps some did, but for unknown reasons elected to remain silent on the issue. Additionally, did Colonel Simons' raid group land at the secondary school on purpose and if so, who ordered it and why? Furthermore, when were the POWs actually moved from Son Tay? And finally, why were the POWs moved? All of these questions call for additional research.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue with positive results like those which occurred after the raid. Hanoi's response was to break off official peace negotiations in Paris and publicly denounce the U.S. for escalating the war. Unofficially, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union were shaken by the raid. All tightened security at their military compounds and other sensitive locations. Additionally, previously classified White House documents revealed that Hanoi began responding to official requests concerning POW issues as early as 26 November 1970, something they had rarely done before. Hanoi was also concerned that American public opinion was now focused on the POW/MIA issue, especially since confirming that many POWs had died in captivity. Hanoi finally got the message and began to fear a change in international and American public support for the war since the raid had highlighted such a sensitive issue. In light of these and other developments, the raid was an overwhelming success as both a rescue mission and an extension of policy. The President's decision to support his policy through military activity directly resulted in forcing Hanoi to treat POWs more humanely and forced Hanoi back to Paris in a more humble negotiating position.

Without a doubt, Hanoi now knew it was dealing with a new Administration determined to see an end to the war, but only in an honorable manner. On two occasions the President had shown Hanoi his resolve and to what lengths he would go to ensure that his style of diplomacy should not be misinterpreted. Hanoi knew it had better pay attention lest it risk waking a lethargic giant with a new attitude.

As Mitchell points out, there are some interesting tactical issues that remain open - the full story of the Secondary School being one of them !

Frying Adm. Moorer is NOT justified by the facts. He acted in accord with the NCA policy setting the strategic basis for the mission. That NCA policy happened in this instance to be sound.

Regards

Mike

fn 1. The Wiki for Operation Ivory Coast provides a framework for discussion, including the two sources linked above. Consider also 1972 Linebacker I and II linked in my last post.

[Ken White]

As always your research skills, speed and thoroughness are amazing and laudable.

Thus I laud...

I agree with your conclusion re: Moorer with the added note that Moorer, like every other CJCS was NOT in the chain of command. The CJCS is an adviser, of course his recommendations have weight but in the end the Chain was and is President - SecDef - overseas commander. In this case, as your research shows, the decision was in essence political and was by the President. Counter recommendations by the CJCS may or may not have affected that -- with Nixon, my bet would be no. Every former Lieutenant Commander relishes a chance to overrule a four star...

[JMA]

As always your research skills, speed and thoroughness are amazing and laudable.

Thus I laud...

I agree with your conclusion re: Moorer with the added note that Moorer, like every other CJCS was NOT in the chain of command. The CJCS is an adviser, of course his recommendations have weight but in the end the Chain was and is President - SecDef - overseas commander. In this case, as your research shows, the decision was in essence political and was by the President. Counter recommendations by the CJCS may or may not have affected that -- with Nixon, my bet would be no. Every former Lieutenant Commander relishes a chance to overrule a four star...

Ken, you didn't bother to read that stuff did you?

[slapout9]

Link to the Mayaguez Incident.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayaguez_incident

[JMA]

Link to the Mayaguez Incident.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayaguez_incident

Never heard of that one, thank you.

Summed up well with this I believe:

Vice Admiral George P. Steele, the Seventh Fleet commander later stated that: "The sad part of the Mayaguez is that we had sufficient force coming up with the Seventh Fleet, after it had been turned around from the evacuation of Vietnam stand down, to seize Southern Cambodia. I begged for another day or two, rather than commit forces piecemeal as we did .... The idea that we could use U.S. Air Force air police and Air Force helicopters as an assault force appears to me as ridiculous today as it did then."

[Stan]

JMA,
Actually, it has been studied and pounded to death in the form of thesis material in almost all the NCO academies and CGSCs since Christ was a Corporal in the Corps

However, it seems this was a war of politics where political expediency took priority over military necessity. (Go Figure)

In my feeble and near ancient military hindsight, moral courage of even king kong would not have changed Nixon's mind yet alone the American public bent on getting out of Vietnam.

How foxtrotingly strange that a shoe repair shop owner would be responsible for expanding Armistice Day to celebrate all 24.9 million veterans, but a decorated flag officer's opinion meant little

Happy belated Vet's Day you old pirate

The Son Tay Raid together with the Bay of Pigs and Operation Eagles Claw (and others) should be studied in detail at staff colleges around the world as case studies in command disfunction at the highest levels.

EDIT: BTW, it's still known today as Operation Ivory Coast - and decades later another botched political load of Bravo Sierra !

[JMA]

JMA,
Actually, it has been studied and pounded to death in the form of thesis material in almost all the NCO academies and CGSCs since Christ was a Corporal in the Corps

However, it seems this was a war of politics where political expediency took priority over military necessity. (Go Figure)

In my feeble and near ancient military hindsight, moral courage of even king kong would not have changed Nixon's mind yet alone the American public bent on getting out of Vietnam.

How foxtrotingly strange that a shoe repair shop owner would be responsible for expanding Armistice Day to celebrate all 24.9 million veterans, but a decorated flag officer's opinion meant little

Happy belated Vet's Day you old pirate

EDIT: BTW, it's still known today as Operation Ivory Coast - and decades later another botched political load of Bravo Sierra !

Stan, I was in London late September for the RLI 50 year reunion and remembrance service and just last week-end attended the (Rhodesian) SAS Remembrance service here in Durban. This week end we fit in with the general Armistice Day proceedings in our areas.

As I age these moments become more poignant as one considers the fallen and their families. In our case it all happened 40 odd years ago. It doesn't get any easier.

Together then one more time:

They went with songs to the battle, they were young.
Straight of limb, true of eyes, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
They fell with their faces to the foe.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning,
We will remember them.

Right... back to business then. Let no officer, no matter how senior be allowed to be frivolous with soldiers lives and get away with it (that includes protecting the lives of their soldiers from the idiot ideas of politicians as well).

Happy Vet's day to you and your fellow Congo vets, I bet you all still miss the place

[JMA]

[B]Frying Adm. Moorer is NOT justified by the facts. He acted in accord with the NCA policy setting the strategic basis for the mission. That NCA policy happened in this instance to be sound.

... and so the Moorer defense team rests it case.

(Those who want to believe that will do so without even bothering to read your sources. Blind loyalty can be taken for granted in many cases.)

Where in any of the quotes you provided did it prove that Moorer acted in accordance with the applicable NCA policy and if so how does absolve him from his duty as the top advisor to the White House and his duty of care towards his troops?

The key to the Amidon article was the confirmation from Admiral Train, Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer:

In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”

Moorer, at the interface between the Pentagon and the White House, failed to display the moral courage to tell he White House that the camp was empty and to insist that the raid was called off. Moorer has no place to hide, the man was a moral coward.

I hope this matter is now settled (which it will be all other than for the blindly loyal).

Blackburn and Bennet should of course not be allowed to get off scott free either.

And as far as the White House one (sadly) expects no better from politicians.

Another very tragic aspect to this is that the very same Groupthink which had led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was still alive and well in the US system.

The Son Tay Raid together with the Bay of Pigs and Operation Eagles Claw (and others) should be studied in detail at staff colleges around the world as case studies in command disfunction at the highest levels.

[Ken White]

Moorer has no place to hide, the man was a moral coward.

Misperception based sweeping judgements a specialty?

I hope this matter is now settled (which it will be all other than for the blindly loyal).

We knew it was settled in your mind before this sub thread gathered steam. No one had any idea of changing that. -- or any desire to do so.

The intent was merely to set the record straight for observers and not let ignorance, misperceptions and / or bias rule. That's been done.

Another very tragic aspect to this is that the very same Groupthink which had led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was still alive and well in the US system.

Sadly, that factor still exists here and elsewhere in the world. Thank you for finally acknowledging that there is indeed such a politically induced and bureaucratic phenomenon and that it does significantly affect military operations. That principle is correct even if you did, as often occurs, get the specifics rather badly wrong on this particular incident.

[JMA]

Thank you for finally acknowledging that there is indeed such a politically induced and bureaucratic phenomenon and that it does significantly affect military operations. That principle is correct even if you did, as often occurs, get the specifics rather badly wrong on this particular incident.

Two comments on this then I'll let you have the last word.

Moorer was at the civil/military interface in this instance. He was in a position to put in the block but he failed in this duty to the military to do so. I would like to believe that this was caused by a (hitherto undetected) lack of moral courage rather than through craven fawning submission to his political masters.

You are in denial Ken. They knew that the camp was empty at least 12 hours before the raid. They could have and should have aborted the mission. Moorer should have put in that block. The buck must stop with Moorer.

Over to you.

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

I want to second Ken's comments, great job on the Son Tay Raid research. I sat through a couple of briefs on the tactical operation presented by those who were actually on the raid, but your quick summary was the best I have seen on the strategy aspect.

I think President Nixon got it right, and it didn't matter strategically if the POWs weren't there. This is hard for me to say, but perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message. If I recall correctly Pres Nixon immediately made a public announcement after the raid was executed (what we would now call strategic communications), so it seems the messaging may have been the primary goal all along, and based on what I read the raid had a positive impact in influencing NV behavior and boosting the morale of our PWs (and higher morale increases survival rates in capativity, when one loses hope they lose the will to live).

Have to disagree with JMA on this one, it was the right decision to execute.

[JMA]

Have to disagree with JMA on this one, it was the right decision to execute.

That's fine Bill.

Then maybe the scenario should have run something like this:

* CJCS approaches Laird - tells him the evidence is that the camp is empty and insists that the Son Tay raid is aborted and a new 'live' target selected.

* Laird then says (something like this): "Admiral, I apologise if you thought the mission was to effect the release of POWs. The real mission is to send a clear mission to the North Vietnamese government that we can strike anywhere at any time with a side benefit that the POWs, their families and other troops will get a lift by knowing that we will try to rescue them."

* The CJCS would then reply (something like this): "Well then Mr Secretary the risk to our troops will be minimal and the chance of 'success' remains above 95%."

* As the CJCS is leaving Laird would say (something like this): "Oh Admiral, I don't think we should trouble Col Simons with what we have discussed. As far a she and his men are concerned they should believe the camp is occupied."

* CJCS: "Yes, Mister Secretary."


==========================

Here's an extract of an interview between Mitchell and the lying *'# Laird:

6. Question: Did you know at anytime prior to the Raid that no POWs were at Son Tay?

Answer: No. All the intelligence we had indicated that POWs were at the camp. I had been involved in this intelligence collection for quite some time and I had seen several other camps which we had been looking at for a long time. Son Tay gave no indication that POWs were not there. We knew the camp was active and had been for several years. The decision to execute was based on this intelligence. However, we knew that there was a possibility that no POWs were there. After all, we had no hard evidence of their presence, only indications from camps known to house POWs that were similar to the conditions and activity found at Son Tay. The raid force knew of this possibility also. Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.

7. Question: Did you brief the President on the Hanoi source information?

Answer: No. The decision to go had already been made. Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.

*

[JMA]

Pfft, invent your own thread, guys!

Take it easy Fuchs... this is a discussion about 'when is a raid not a raid?'

It is when a a propaganda stunt is dressed up as a raid to confuse the North Vietnamese and concoct a message for POW and local consumption... and then everyone gets medals