The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

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Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.

Maybe, but it worked so good they did again in 1979 when Iran pulled bascially the same stunt.

In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory

Retreat! Hell we just got here.(I think some Marine said that) War is about AFFECTING Physical systems, you get 2 points for my poor choice of words.

Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.

Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place.

But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:

The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.

I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.

I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.

If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

[Marc]

If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

Slapout9,

that is indeed the sentence that closes Warden's circular reasoning. His exact phrasing is:

If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

In summary: airpower is the best way to win a war and if it is not, we should not go to war. Allow me to present one concrete example of the implications of this type of circular reasoning. As Warden concedes himself:

Offhand, I can think of only one thing that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: physically take people into custody.

This means that, if Warden had been President George W. Bush's strategist in 1989, Manuel A. Noriega would still be the dictator of Panama. To paraphrase Slapout9's statement: "when people say Airpower can not bring democracy to Panama what they really mean is that Military power can not bring democracy to Panama." Well, if you read a history book about Panama, I think you will have to admit that the facts contradict Warden's circular reasoning.

[pvebber]

War is about AFFECTING Physical systems

Affecting physical systems is but one WAY of conducting war. War, I'll say again, is about getting someone to do what you want, stop doing what you don't want, or simply revenge. It is waged against people, which is why "leadership" and not physical infrastructure is at the center of Warden's five rings.

Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place

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What if they didn't attack your country, but you require them to do something, or stop doing something? (We are Good guys so don't do the revenge thing...)

OR is your interpretation of Warden that we should only engage in war if we are physically attacked?

I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.

So is the Air Force remiss in conducting war games and exercises that address these things? I've been the Red Cell lead for the last 3 or 4 AFRL futures wargames and they addressed a remarkable array of things that airpower might do. Are these efforts somehow insufficient? Col. Warden has been involved as a guest speaker at at least one of these as I recall (one of the opportunities I got to chat with him). They are constantly "finding what they actually are".

Airpower has demonstrated that it has limits. That is a fact. Technology has acted over time to reduce those limits, but they have to demonstrate that they do so. Just as the advance of technology has removed limitations on land and seapower. Capabilities have to be proven, not taken as fact until disproven. We can't afford, particularly now, to do otherwise.

If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

This is a view that gives in to the "dark side" of tacticizing war. What I mean by that is the idea that achieving tactical objectives is necessary and sufficient to achieve operational objectives,and operational objectives are necessary and sufficient to achieve strategic objectives. In its most extreme form it denies the operational level and claims tactical objectives are necessary and sufficient to directly achieve strategic objectives.

The Viet Nam war, where the North lost nearly all tactical battles, yet won the war, serves as a counter example.

It tends to frame warfare (the ways of conducting war) in terms of picking targets and breaking them (or seizing them). Operational Art is not seen as necessary, because ,done quickly and pervasively enough, the strategic outcome can be achieved without the "enemy ever getting a turn".

This sounds a lot like Warden's view. And it suffers from myopia to the potential ways the adversary can 'take their turn' in ways that render airpower either irrelavant, or take advatage of over aggressive utilization of it.

The reality of modern war is that the cases where the adversary can be indiscriminately attacked to the point of paralysis are extremely rare. By international law, if you "break it you own it". You can't just cause a country to stop functioning and then just say "serves you right for pissing me off". You can get to the "mission accomplished" moment, but as we have seen, that doesn't mean you have achieved your war objectives.

[slapout9]

Marc and pvebber. I had a close encounter with the dentist yesterday not up to speed yet, so I will respond later.

[pvebber]

Hope you recover quickly!

Somethings to think about:


The limitations of systems thinking

a partial pdf (can't find the rest) slides 6 and 7 being the important ones

and

Dark side of systems thinking

and how potential adversaries look at strategy in very different terms than we do.

We play chess and football, they play Go and Soccer

[slapout9]

Dark side of systems thinking

Yes, there is a dark side mostly you can fall into the trap of trying to turn eveything into an IBM machine.....not good.

and how potential adversaries look at strategy in very different terms than we do.

We play chess and football, they play Go and Soccer

I read that paper when it came out but I will read it again, very interesting stuff by the way.

[Marc]

Marc and pvebber. I had a close encounter with the dentist yesterday not up to speed yet, so I will respond later.

Get well soon. All the best.

[Ken White]

It won't help but you won't care.

(Get well, Podner)

[slapout9]

It won't help but you won't care.

(Get well, Podner)

Best advice I ever recieved

[slapout9]

Affecting physical systems is but one WAY of conducting war. War, I'll say again, is about getting someone to do what you want, stop doing what you don't want, or simply revenge. It is waged against people, which is why "leadership" and not physical infrastructure is at the center of Warden's five rings.

I am not making myself clear. Everything in the rings is pysical including people, I am not just talking about ring 3 Infrastructure. Influence a physical leader is affecting a physical system.

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What if they didn't attack your country, but you require them to do something, or stop doing something? (We are Good guys so don't do the revenge thing...)

Interesting question....revenge or some would call it justice?

OR is your interpretation of Warden that we should only engage in war if we are physically attacked?

Yes, attacked or confirmed pending attack.

Col. Warden has been involved as a guest speaker at at least one of these as I recall (one of the opportunities I got to chat with him). They are constantly "finding what they actually are".

They are, that was actually one of Warden's jobs in the Air Force.

Airpower has demonstrated that it has limits. That is a fact. Technology has acted over time to reduce those limits, but they have to demonstrate that they do so. Just as the advance of technology has removed limitations on land and seapower. Capabilities have to be proven, not taken as fact until disproven. We can't afford, particularly now, to do otherwise.

Agree

By international law, if you "break it you own it". You can't just cause a country to stop functioning and then just say "serves you right for pissing me off".

This is kinda the point about physical systems....the fact is we can do that....we may choose not to but it is a choice on our part.It is just a physical fact of reality that at anytime we have that capability.

[slapout9]

In summary: airpower is the best way to win a war and if it is not, we should not go to war. Allow me to present one concrete example of the implications of this type of circular reasoning. As Warden concedes himself:

Marc, he says usually in the article not always.

This means that, if Warden had been President George W. Bush's strategist in 1989, Manuel A. Noriega would still be the dictator of Panama. To paraphrase Slapout9's statement: "when people say Airpower can not bring democracy to Panama what they really mean is that Military power can not bring democracy to Panama." Well, if you read a history book about Panama, I think you will have to admit that the facts contradict Warden's circular reasoning.

No, it doesn't. It means what he said that if you want to take someone into physical custody then you will need another type of military force besides Airpower.

Marc, a great deal of what Warden talks about is from the late 50's and early 60's. Parallel attack in Army speak is Distributed Operations. Planing back wards from the Future Picture picture is the same thing I learned and as Ken has pointed used to be taught as Back Planning in the Army. Warden will tell you himself that pretty much everything he has said has been around for a while, he is just bringing it back up as a way forward for our country. Having grown up in that era and seen some of the plans for what our country was going to be as opposed to what it has become I am a true believer. We have never truly exploited Air and Space Power like it could be done and the Army has nothing to fear from that.

General James M. Gavin used to say this "Never send a Soldier when you should send a guided missile." That is a simplified version of what Warden is saying, except now we are entering a world where we should be exploiting precision of impact and precision of effect. Again if you read some of the older Army Airborne Warfare theories you will find there are a lot of similarities and a few critical differences that if we exploited them we would end up being very complimentary forces.

[Marc]

Parallel attack in Army speak is Distributed Operations. Planing back wards from the Future Picture picture is the same thing I learned and as Ken has pointed used to be taught as Back Planning in the Army. Warden will tell you himself that pretty much everything he has said has been around for a while, he is just bringing it back up as a way forward for our country.

Slapout9,

Forgive me, but I will not be fooled by your statement that army operations are some kind of subset to Warden's five-ring/parallel attack strategy.

We have never truly exploited Air and Space Power like it could be done and the Army has nothing to fear from that.

I disagree with you twice.

FIRST, If you truly study Air and Space Power, you should do so with an open mind. This means that you have to be aware of the Air Power capabilities as well as its shortfalls. Warden's article demonstrates an unjustified optimism with regard to the former and a complete blindness for the latter. Read the quote below.

In other words, we should at least begin with the presumption that airpower can carry out any military task. If we fail to do so, we create a self-fulfilling prophecy and don’t even examine the possibilities because “everyone knows” we have always used bayonets guided by human beings as the preferred tool and that will “never change.” Offhand, I can think of only one thing that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: physically take people into custody.

Offhand, I can think of several things that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: nation building for instance, or conduct counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, or remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The most important thing Air Power cannot do is terminate conflict. Sorry, but I do not see how Air Power alone could have successfully concluded the conflicts in 1991 en 2003 in Iraq or the conflict in Panama in 1989.

SECOND, there is a strong tendency to turn this debate into an Air Force - Army pissing contest. Those opposed to Warden's arguments often hear things like "the Army has nothing to fear from Warden's strategy". Sorry, but the fact that the Army has something or nothing to fear from Warden is irrelevant. It does not increase or decrease the validity of his reasoning.

[pvebber]

...because he states his strategy in his Posture Statement to Congress not in terms of a "future picture" but as an "evolving posturing of forces" that is realtionship-centric:

USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).

The "future picture" strategy applies to situations akin to chess, where you are competing with an opponent to create a particluar endstate (the king being checkmated) it does not apply to Go where a player trying to achieve a predetermined end state will always lose to a competent player that works to maximize his shi or the potential opportunity implicit in his arrangement of stones (forces) and act upon those opportunities when it is most benficial, not in accordance with a particular timetable or to achieve "victory" in a particular area of the board.

Col Warden does not look at war as a game of Go, which is very dangerous as that is the game or primary adversary in the Pacific invented. Thankfully, Adm Willard appears to understand this.

Or is he falling victim to outdated thinking? Should he be stating what we want the Pacific security picture ot look like in the future and work back from it? Should he decide what that future picture might be? Can anybody or any group? If we can't state a desired future picture for a region like the Pacific, where does that leave the Warden strategic mandate?

[slapout9]

...because he states his strategy in his Posture Statement to Congress not in terms of a "future picture" but as an "evolving posturing of forces" that is realtionship-centric:

Finally got it downloaded, let me read it before I respond.

[pvebber]

Everything in the rings is pysical including people, I am not just talking about ring 3 Infrastructure. Influence a physical leader is affecting a physical system.

I think of war (and societal systems) in terms of physical, cognitive and information domains. The information domain mediates interaction between the physical and cognitive.

The Rings theory is an anthropomorphic construct - it treats nation and social systems as human analogues. The leader is the brain, processes are neural, endocrine, digestive, etc. Infrastructure is the musculature and skeletal systems, populations are various cellular structures and forces are the immune and regenerate systems.

This framework (I don't believe it is a model because it only categorizes components, offering no insight or explanation of function) has a "brain" but no "mind". This is not unexpected considering the stated desire to separate physical from "morale" (cognitive in the broader framework). If one turns this back into human terms, it says that you can compel the mind, by stunning or damaging the body.

That is a rather discomforting analogy.

Just as I don't think that physically attacking the body is an effective way to change someone's mind, I don't that that purely physical attacks will achieve strategic objectives of any sophistication. Breaking a body can prevent it from functioning, but will not necessarily get the mind to agree with you. It also is not a very good way to set conditions that will lead the person not harboring resentment against you after you "target their centers of gravity" to convince them to "give in" to you.

Its not "just physical" unless your objective is simple destruction. If you are trying to achieve a strategic goal other than destruction, then you MUST accept that you can't isolate the physical from the cognitive as no matter how "precise" you are, affecting the physical does not have a predictable result in the cognitive.

This is kinda the point about physical systems....the fact is we can do that....we may choose not to but it is a choice on our part.It is just a physical fact of reality that at anytime we have that capability.

Not if you want to achieve the sort of EXIT Warden talks about (ie one that sets conditions for a constructive peace, not instigating a cycle of violence.
If someone burns your house down to get you to comply (or just burns the 10 objects in it most dear to you), the fact they didn't kill your kids is not likely to endear them to you.

The British could have just killed Ghandi, or massacred his followers. Why didn't they? If you divide the physical from the morale, there is no reason not to employ force as efficiently as possible to achieve an end. Machiavelli would be down with that...

They are, that was actually one of Warden's jobs in the Air Force.

So I guess he must consider that he failed at it??? We have numerous processes in place that do this. Are they not working? If "treat airpower as limitless in applicability" is the solution, what is the problem? How do you implement that?

[slapout9]

Or is he falling victim to outdated thinking? Should he be stating what we want the Pacific security picture ot look like in the future and work back from it? Should he decide what that future picture might be? Can anybody or any group? If we can't state a desired future picture for a region like the Pacific, where does that leave the Warden strategic mandate?

In this case it is neither. The Admiral (very correctly) realizes he is reporting to a bunch of Politicos who's major concern is getting reelected. So the best thing to do is get all the hardware you can and try to be prepared for as many differnat situations as possible.

IMO, the solution(s) to the China (Pacific region) are Economic not military and we are very weak in that area and will probably remain so as long as we keep believing in this "Invisible Hand Economic Stuff."

[pvebber]

try to be prepared for as many differnat situations as possible.

So there are situations when working back from a single scenario is not the best strategy to use. Since the reason you give is political, this reinforces the idea that its unrealistic to expect that you can always work in military-centric vacuum, disassociated from politics.

That is why he calls it mapping the system. It is a map nothing more or less. Understanding function is a differant step.

Not according to this article. It is all part of step 2WHAT

At the highest level of analysis, we start this process by identifying the systems that need to change so that we can realize our future picture;
at the next level of analysis, we continue by identifying the centers of
gravity (the control or leverage points) against which to apply real resources to force needed system change.

The process by which the model of the system you are trying to abstract through the 5 Rings process is defined is not directly addressed. Since this modeling of functions (the first stage in application of systems theory - you have to understand the system in detail before you can simplify it) it lead to one of the criticisms of Wardens process - that it tries to jump directly to "simple" without a real understanding of the "complex". The real world attempts to do this (SOSA or system of systems analysis) lead to things like the much maligned powerpoint diagram of systems interactions in Afghanistan. The treatment of systems as essentially static by SOSA analysts and the inability to "know what you don't know" about a system lead to much of Gen Mattis' criticism of EBO - which centered in large measure on difficulties implementing SOSA in an way that sufficiently informed decision-makers (I saw this first hand in several JEFX's).

I can tell you from personal experience it works very well.....In LE we call them TASERS they take any will to fight right out of the person. We need Military level TASERS!

So you taser (tase?) somebody, and then they get up and get into the police car right? No the taser ENABLES you take him into custody. It doesn't convince him to get in the car, it just removes his ability to resist for a few minutes. If you don't exploit that opportunity, then he just gets up and runs away. In many ways we have military tasers. Our overwhelming superiority has "taken the fight" out of many potential adversaries, leading them to exploit non-military avenues to engage us. 9/11 taught us the a military is not required to attack us.

The Air Force may be able to provide tasers, but as Warden admits, it only enable ground forces ability to take the perps into custody.

That is exactly why you need to stay in physical area....you can't analyze someones intentions...it is impossible, he may lie to you.....but you can analyze CAPABILITIES and be prepared to disable,disrupt or destroy them

.

Like I demonstrate in wargames people bring me into, if you make a country's military irrelevant, it will oblige and use it as a red cape and goad you into military engagement that distracts you from the true political purpose. This is especially true when they have a command of social landscape and maneuver the US to solidify its social networking position by attacking its military on "good ground". In other words if you insist on divorcing the physical from the cognitive and social dimensions, then that will be your undoing. Wars are not "physical" but social phenomena. Physical interaction is simply one way to influence social dynamics. IF you use chess strategy and the adversary know you will, he will make the game Go and will win. You can of course just turn the juice up on the taser and kill the perp, but then you have to deal with the social consequences.

It depends on WHO's house you burn down....the rest of the population may love for doing just that!

Ahhh! not so fast - you just changes the boundary around the system! Another fundamental problem with Warden's use of systems theory. He arbitrarily places convenient boundaries around the "system". I was not trying to influence the broader population. If you don't understand the social as well as the physical network you could also push a large contingent into your adversary's camp by heavy handed "physical" action.

Once again, you can't just draw a boundary around the physical components of an adversary system and ignore the cognitive and social effects of "effecting" the physical parts.

He was a smart guy. But that is really Warden's ultimate point War is the final option never the first,second or even the third. It is only justifiable when you need to eliminate a threat to your survival.

Then he is arguing to fundamentally change the "American Way of War" which is that we employ military forces worldwide as the stick behind or diplomatic and economic carrots. It also begs the question of what constitutes a "threat to our survival"? Was WWII really a threat to OUR survival? WWI certainly wasn't. None of the wars since have been.

What if our survival is not threatened, but our position of economic leadership in the world? If China established a "Pacific NATO" that declared its goal to be not threatening our survival, but systematically degrading our economic might until there was a "level playing field" in their opinion and we no longer constituted a superpower? How do you utilize military force forward in the world, if your stated policy is not to use it unless your national survival is threatened. If an LCS that is inconveniently placed is sunk, what do you do? A Carrier Strike group? THe belligent says "go home and we have no beef with you". That is not a threat to your survival, but emasculates you on the world stage.

If you are only going to war against existential threats why not just maintain a an ICBM force and tell the world, any country that threatens my existence goes away. You then don't need an Air Force.

I really don't think that is what Warden has in mind.

I think he was transferred to another job before he finished.

Which doesn't answer the question of what is broken with the current system? And why it is better to assume the Air Force can do everything and rule things out, rather than look at the joint force as a whole, and decide which service is most effective and efficient at providing desired capabilities?

Nicky is smart, and understands the dangers of dividing the physical from the social and focusing on the wrong one:

But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.

http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince17.htm

[slapout9]

Forgive me, but I will not be fooled by your statement that army operations are some kind of subset to Warden's five-ring/parallel attack strategy.

I don't expect you to be fooled. And no it isn't a subset, it is the same set, just by another name.

FIRST, If you truly study Air and Space Power, you should do so with an open mind. This means that you have to be aware of the Air Power capabilities as well as its shortfalls. Warden's article demonstrates an unjustified optimism with regard to the former and a complete blindness for the latter. Read the quote below.

I have a very open mind, perhaps you should open your's to some Army Aviation history. Link is posted below.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpFg9...eature=related

The first part is overall summary and description of capabilities of the time period, about 1958 I think. At around the 19 minute mark things will start to get interesting. Some of the quotes from this section. The goal was to create an "Air Task Force completley independant of the ground." "The Army Commander will no longer be attached to the ground." "Flying Soldiers moving in all 3 dimensions."

Offhand, I can think of several things that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: nation building for instance, or conduct counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, or remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The most important thing Air Power cannot do is terminate conflict. Sorry, but I do not see how Air Power alone could have successfully concluded the conflicts in 1991 en 2003 in Iraq or the conflict in Panama in 1989.

Airpower alone couldn't have and Warden would not argue that it could have, but in the future that may not be the case. The Air Force could be better at nation building (as far as the physical aspect) than a lot of people believe. They did extensive studies in the 1950's on how to rapidly rebuild a nation after a nuclear attack.

SECOND, there is a strong tendency to turn this debate into an Air Force - Army pissing contest. Those opposed to Warden's arguments often hear things like "the Army has nothing to fear from Warden's strategy". Sorry, but the fact that the Army has something or nothing to fear from Warden is irrelevant. It does not increase or decrease the validity of his reasoning.

I certanly agree on that. It's supposed to be a discussion/debate not a contest.