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Thread: Understanding Airpower: Bonfire of the Fallacies

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  1. #1
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Where in the world have you been...

    I was about to become worried enough to get a couple of Pats to come look for you...

  2. #2
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    Default Hell gets a bit colder...

    Just read the new issue of the Air and Space Power Journal and some more cows get slaughtered:

    To begin with is this interesting article arguing that the AF should make CAS it's basic function and not counter-air:

    Editorial Abstract: Today’s war on terror requires the Air Force to employ all of its varied weapons effects for engaging in this fight. To do so, the author suggests that the service must make the support of US ground forces its tactical thrust by ensuring availability of the effects of combined arms. He proposes that the Air Force can realize that goal by fielding mission-specialized equipment, using the appropriate aerial platform, properly organizing core units, and integrating training.
    The meat of the piece:

    The traditional mind-set with regard to Air Force missions is that air superiority enables all other missions. Without air superiority, other roles (e.g., interdiction, suppression of enemy air defenses [SEAD], or CAS) become difficult, if not impossible, to execute. Hence, the Air Force has emphasized the development and fielding of specialized air superiority fighters, most recently the F-15A, F-15C, and F-22A. The Air Force developed this group of aircraft and trained its pilots to do one thing: destroy enemy aircraft in aerial combat.

    All of the Air Force’s other fighter-based roles were levied on the other group of fighter aircraft. Although capable of using air-to-air weaponry, these platforms were expected to execute the other Air Force roles, such as interdiction, offensive counterair (OCA), SEAD, nuclear strike, FAC(A), and CAS. Aircraft in this second grouping often performed multiple roles. For example, the F-16C is, or was at one time, expected to perform all of the above functions.
    and

    I suggest a change to the Air Force’s mind-set. We should stop viewing air-to-air assets as the priority and focusing their capabilities on a single role while allowing other “nonspecialized” aircraft to handle all other fighter-based tactical roles. Instead, we should reverse the situation by elevating the CAS and FAC(A) (close-support) roles to paramount importance
    No surprise this was written by an A-10 pilot! I think he makes some very good points, but his overall analysis is flawed. The main problem is that I don't agree with the "either-or" nature of the argument. The implication is that one needs to gut dedicated fighters in order to ensure there is adequate dedicated CAS. Why can't the AF have a dedicated fighter and a dedicated CAS aircraft (an A-10 follow-on) and why can't the mindset change to where air superiority and CAS are coequal?

    Regardless, a very interesting read and good food for thought.

    Edit: Oh, and there's this article too, which calls for ending the aviator continuation pay bonus program! That's gonna make some people unhappy!
    Last edited by Entropy; 12-08-2008 at 02:12 PM.

  3. #3
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    I was about to become worried enough to get a couple of Pats to come look for you...
    I'm armed, dangerous, and have a beer fridge full of booze, and I'm not afraid to use it (the contents of said beer fridge that is...).

    Work, amongst other things (but on a break now - finally).

    Entropy wrote:

    Just read the new issue of the Air and Space Power Journal and some more cows get slaughtered:

    To begin with is this interesting article arguing that the AF should make CAS it's basic function and not counter-air:
    What that article is proposing is not just about slaughtering sacred cows; it's about turning the entire AF into hamburger. While I have to admit to a certain level of satisfaction with the author's observations and proposals (but, these feelings are wrong...), I have some doubts. In my dream world I would still like to see the Army taking over CAS, tactical air transport, and a few other things, and let the AF do the whole Air Defence bit (excepting tactical/low-level AD for the Army), strategic airlift, and the like. Intriguing article, though. Sort of fits in some ways with Gray's latest piece.
    Last edited by Norfolk; 12-08-2008 at 04:38 PM.

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