The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

You know, I think we have some of the same concerns gnawing at us .

1. This document serves no useful purpose, as it stands. Doing what it intended should have taken no more 2,500 words and/or 5 pages. Having claimed not to be telling the reader what to think, it then sets out to be telling the reader that the enemy “will do X,” as opposed to “might do X, given Y or Z circumstance, and context, A, B or C.” - and where is the dividing line between Doctrine and Concept?

As I understand it, and they do seem to be using US Army specific language here, the ACC is a model that they believe is best "rough cut" for the time period under consideration. Now, that I have no problems with, although I wish that they would use the same language as everyone else and call it a "model" or "theoretical model".

Where they start to move into the "will do X", is pretty much where I stopped commenting. If this were being produced as a model, then those would be illustrative examples of how the model would be applied to particular problems. However, I find that those sections in particular are way too prescriptive for my taste because they go against the supposed basis of the concept: uncertainty.

In a similar way, when you wonder if there is a "dividing line between Doctrine and Concept", I am wondering if they are making a dividing line between a model and the results of running the model.

2. The document lacks clear and precise descriptions, and uses un-clear and highly convoluted language, none of which is helpful. - why use "new terms?"

Sort of agreed; the terms that I believe are "new" - adaptability, complexity, uncertainty - all have precise meanings. What concerns me is that they do not appear to be using them with those meanings. And, to make matters worse, the use of prescriptive language actually goes against the exact meanings of complexity, uncertainty and adaptability.

Let me take up this issue of "clear and precise descriptions" for a bit, because it is a crucial one. When you are building a model, you need to define (at the minimum) states, flows and boundaries. That's for a simple, one-level, 2 dimensional model. When you look at a 3D model, you also have to define "levels", emergence conditions and level boundaries. When you move into a 4D model of socio-cultural action space, then you also have to add in definitions of "resonance functions" and chaotic boundaries (Believe me, you don't want me going into these two 'cause they make an absolute hash out of everything you think you know about space and time!).

What we have in this model is a fairly simplistic, 2D model that is trying to incorporate some of the concepts (used in the technical, not the Army, sense of the term) from 3D and 4D models. Let me take a couple of examples to illustrate what I mean, and some of the common problems with doing this.

First, the cyberspace issue that you and I "disagree" on. How cyberspace is conceptualized in the current ACC is a very good example of the two 4D concepts I was talking about: resonance functions and chaotic boundaries. Let me start with the latter. "Cyberspace", as a "terrain" (a 2D model), is only accessible via technological extension and mediation, and yet it can (and does) have direct, real world effects on people who are not and cannot access it. The simplest effects are in the Just In Time civilian economy that has developed around it, but there are a whole slew of other areas.

Now, how cyberspace is used and understood by people, is a resonance function: the language used to "describe" and "understand" the "terrain" resonates with other cultural (and biological) perception states (think of them as components of a narrative). I believe that the current version of "understanding" shown in this document is resonating with the "understandings" of "air" as a terrain circa 1914-1920 or so. You can see the similarities in the extremely "paranoid" perceptions displayed by language use (think Hobbes' Leviathan as the basis of perception for the "nature" of the terrain); a "kill or be killed", "hack or be hacked" type of understanding with no hope of "peace" except through absolute control and domination. For the analog, go back to the fiction from the 1920's to, say, early 1940's on the devastation of airpower (or, later, on nuclear weapons).

The second example comes with narratives, which are all based around different resonance functions, few of which appear to be understood and described cleanly in this document (an exception, BTW, is the "do what you say, say what you do" meme). The model clearly has no understanding of how resonance functions operate in "narrative space". There is a vague, almost intuitive, understanding that what happens in the real world resonates back into narrative space and vice versa, but no description of the mechanisms or other resonance functions. Put extremely simplistically, you can't fight in a terrain - narrative space - unless you understand the "natural laws" operating there, and that is what a model is supposed to do; give approximations of those natural laws.

3. Implicitly this document progresses a vision of conflict that the US Army wishes to fund, and not one based on history. It seems to serve a human and organisational need, rather than a foundation for teaching (Doctrine?).
4. The idea that the US was proficient as “old Warfare” and “new Warfare” is somehow “more complex” and more challenging is untrue, and evidence free.

Agreed on the first point, although I suspect that that is an artifact from its committee nature. We could get into quibbles on the second. I think it is more "complex" based solely on what I perceive to be the solid addition of a "new" terrain which now has more real world effects than ever before. I think the argument could go either way depending on how we use the term "complex".

5. The description is the 2006 Lebanon conflict is highly simplistic, inaccurate, selective and substantially un-true. It is what the US Army wants to believe instead of looking at the facts.

Honestly, Wilf, I'll defer to your expertise on that; I don't know enough to critique it. I will say, however, that I was struck by how Hezbollah used a very simple organizational narrative that, in many ways, was very similar to what GEN Van Ripper used in Millennium Challenge.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

You know, I think we have some of the same concerns gnawing at us .

To quote Rabbi Ken White "Funny dat."

In a similar way, when you wonder if there is a "dividing line between Doctrine and Concept", I am wondering if they are making a dividing line between a model and the results of running the model.

...and that in and of itself is alarming for all the obvious reasons. It has implications for the intended purpose of the document.

• Let me take up this issue of "clear and precise descriptions" for a bit, because it is a crucial one. When you are building a model, you need to define (at the minimum) states, flows and boundaries......
  
• What we have in this model is a fairly simplistic, 2D model that is trying to incorporate some of the concepts (used in the technical, not the Army, sense of the term) from 3D and 4D models. Let me take a couple of examples to illustrate what I mean, and some of the common problems with doing this.
  
• "Cyberspace", as a "terrain" (a 2D model), is only accessible via technological extension and mediation, and yet it can (and does) have direct, real world effects on people who are not and cannot access it.

Yet read the military discussions of late 19th Century and you see how military men have got their heads around steam power, new weapons, railways, telegraph and most of everything else. They are applying what they know for certain and not attempting to hypothesise or guess at what they do not. What wrong foots everyone in 1914 is not the technology, but the vast scale of the endeavour both in numbers and duration - none of which could have been reasonably predicted.

Point being, what is it that we do no get or have evidence for? Why extrapolate beyond what we are certain of? "Just stop it!"

Honestly, Wilf, I'll defer to your expertise on that; I don't know enough to critique it. I will say, however, that I was struck by how Hezbollah used a very simple organizational narrative that, in many ways, was very similar to what GEN Van Ripper used in Millennium Challenge.

I would urge no deferring on any ones part. All the evidence is there, if you look for it. One of the key lessons of the Lebanon War - and one ALWAYS ignored - is how was it possible for the IDF to have such an extensive knowledge of Hezbollah - which they did - and not be able to employ that knowledge in a way that allowed effective preparation (lack of money/Leadership?) or for consistently successful operations once the fighting started. (EBO/SOD?)

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

Yet read the military discussions of late 19th Century and you see how military men have got their heads around steam power, new weapons, railways, telegraph and most of everything else. They are applying what they know for certain and not attempting to hypothesise or guess at what they do not. What wrong foots everyone in 1914 is not the technology, but the vast scale of the endeavour both in numbers and duration - none of which could have been reasonably predicted.

Bein' in a somewhat picky mood since the seminar I came up to the university for got cancelled with no notice, I do want to make a couple of observations.... Sorry, Wilf, it's just me taking out frustrations

Steam power - 1687 in England with the Newcomen Engine, 177r with the Watts;
"new" weapons - breechloaders, simple design first produced in 1774 (I think or thereabouts) and mass deployed by the Prussians in the 1860's.

Railways - 1827 in the UK

Telegraph - 1847 (I think; this is off the top of my head) with the first oceanic cable in 1857

If they bloody well didn't have it down by the end of the 19th century, they should have all been taken out and shot as hopeless incompetents!

Point being, what is it that we do no get or have evidence for? Why extrapolate beyond what we are certain of? "Just stop it!"

We have to extrapolate beyond "certainty" because the only thing certain is that we don't have it perfect - isn't that an old military saying ?

I choose airpower as the analog, but I could have also pointed to the armour debates on the 1920's as well, or the debates over crossbows and longbows back in the 14th century. The point I was trying to make with that analog was that it is at the start of the familiarity curve.

I would urge no deferring on any ones part. All the evidence is there, if you look for it. One of the key lessons of the Lebanon War - and one ALWAYS ignored - is how was it possible for the IDF to have such an extensive knowledge of Hezbollah - which they did - and not be able to employ that knowledge in a way that allowed effective preparation (lack of money/Leadership?) or for consistently successful operations once the fighting started. (EBO/SOD?)

So, knowledge without understanding? I think there is a really good warning lesson there .

[PhilR]

In looking at this as a document which is supposed to help the Army frame/prioritize what stuff to buy and how to educate and train soldiers, I found it less than useful. Knowing how the Pentagon works, there is a line in here for everyone. That, unfortunately, is how it will be used: as a source for quotes to support this or that program or initiative.

The only way to prevent that is for this document to become inculcated in the senior leadership. They must read, understand and support. The first paragraph of Gen Dempsey’s introduction states that “ideas matter”—yes they do, but not because they are written, but because they are believed and because they lead to action. Action in these terms is a prioritization of effort and resources. For me, the document didn’t give a clear sense of priority—while stating all the many things that the Army would be capable of, I didn’t get a sense of what was being left out, or left behind.

While I think that I understand the intent and emerging environment, etc., it really bothered me that a guiding document for the future of the US Army would place defeating enemies at the end of every list of key actions and capabilities. If that order is a defacto prioritization, I’m not sure if we are moving in the correct direction.

While I laud the focus on uncertainty and complexity, I was somewhat troubled by the phrasing, once again in Gen Dempsey’s cover, that spoke of “imposing order on chaos.” I’d recommend focusing that we take actions to achieve the mission or to impose our will on the enemy. However, chaos and uncertainly are just a natural part of the environment. Rather than focus on how we can’t change this, we must emphasize how we are going to use it to our advantage—leveraging chaos.

Within Chapter three—the meat of how the Army will design itself, I was confused about the differences between “supporting ideas” and “core operational actions.” Are they differentiated in some way by type, by priority? When it comes to racking and stacking, will a supporting idea get funded while a core action may not be? There needs to be more clarity on how these concepts relate to one another.

Following the same vein of my criticism, the Appendix of required capabilities seems pretty extensive. What I do not get a sense of is how much? This goes to the global operating environment. I can imagine building an Army that can do all of the things listed, but there are only four brigades when the cost is added up. The “how much” factor directly affects the what and capability factor.

All in all, I’d recommend a shorter and simpler document. If the fear is that by not mentioning something in this document, it will not be funded or pursued, then you will always end up with a document of lists. As its is, I still don’t have a clear picture of what the Army contained in this document will look like, or what real choices are being made.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[William F. Owen]

If they bloody well didn't have it down by the end of the 19th century, they should have all been taken out and shot as hopeless incompetents!

So given let us say 10-15 years from 1865 (US Civil War) to 1870 (Franco Prussian War) what is it we are still confused about RE: Cyber or the Internet, or Media - all of which we have some 20 years experience of? - and given quite a lot more conflict!

I submit that Steam and Telegraph has at least as substantial social and cultural effect, as the Internet, Computers and so-called modern media.

We have to extrapolate beyond "certainty" because the only thing certain is that we don't have it perfect - isn't that an old military saying ?

Yet no threat we see today was unknown or unknowable in 1991 - 18 years ago? More over, should a Capstone Concept aim at telling the future in the way this one tries? Why seek to predict things more than 5 years away?
Would a Capstone Concept of May 2001, been relevant in October 2001?

I don't think I am knit picking. The scope and aim of the document may be part of the problem.

So, knowledge without understanding? I think there is a really good warning lesson there .

Precisely. The threat was clearly known and understood, but people failed to use that to their advantage!

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

So given let us say 10-15 years from 1865 (US Civil War) to 1870 (Franco Prussian War) what is it we are still confused about RE: Cyber or the Internet, or Media - all of which we have some 20 years experience of?

I would say the the current version of the ACC is confused about the basic analog to use for cyberspace and, from that, all other problems flow.

I submit that Steam and Telegraph has at least as substantial social and cultural effect, as the Internet, Computers and so-called modern media - and given quite a lot more conflict!

Don't disagree with you on this at all ! Actually, what I use when I'm analyzing resonance functions is how we, as a species, "adapt" to new technologies, especially communicative ones. Steam power, both in its transport and productive modes, had an insanely huge effect on both society and culture, especially after the deployment of the Watt Engine. Projecting the analog forward, steam would be the rough analog of the transistor chip; it's that fundamental.

At the same time, it's actually harder for people to see the changes being wrought. It's pretty simple to see shifts with the introduction of a steam engine in, say, a cotton factory in Manchester. It's harder to see the changes, and get a gut feel for the interconnections, when we look at chips being embedded in appliances.

Oh well, I guess I'll just have to finish that damn essay off......

Yet no threat we see today was unknown or unknowable in 1991 - 18 years ago? More over, should a Capstone Concept aim at telling the future in the way this one tries? Why seek to predict things more than 5 years away?

Hmmm, you're quite right that it was "knowable". as for predicting 5+ years into the future, that's also a valid thing to do IFF the freakin' model contains QC feedback loops (which, BTW, this one doesn't appear to). But what is actually being predicted isn't the "unknowable" in the future, it is the growth vector of what we can currently perceive. The QC loops should be in place to cover the possibility (probability) of completely new things happening.

Cheers,

Marc