The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

I was thinking of someone else, Ken.

The Bundeswehr has succumbed to an inflationary use of the word "Operationen" as well in the last decade, but a true Operation is still something above brigade level and no NCO will ever or has ever devised an order for that.

You're thinking of what I called "minor action".


The whole dissent may be about the poor current definition of "operation", though. The original operations long before the term inflation was corps-level or above; "Market Garden", "Torch", "Overlord", "Michael", ...


The fact that the term has been put in inflationary use and been applied to small unit tactical matters does not question the validity of an operational level of warfare concept (and that's what slapout did).

[Pete]

One of these days I'm going to need operations to ameliorate the Dupuytren's Contracture I have in my hands. I'll certainly listen to what Ken has to say but I want Tom Odom or Hacksaw to write the Opord.

[slapout9]

The whole dissent may be about the poor current definition of "operation", though. The original operations long before the term inflation was corps-level or above; "Market Garden", "Torch", "Overlord", "Michael", ...


The fact that the term has been put in inflationary use and been applied to small unit tactical matters does not question the validity of an operational level of warfare concept (and that's what slapout did).

That is "not" a level of war......it is a "level of organization" fighting the war. Thats like saying only Colonels and Generals fight wars, majors and captains and lieutenants dont do war. The whole thing is all "skint up and stuff."

[Taiko]

There's actually something of a debate right now as to where the idea of an "operational level came from."

I thought it was Edward Luttwak. He has written the most about the 'levels'.

Policy->Grand Strategy -> Strategy-> Operations-> Tactics-> Technical

[M.L.]

Not sure who coined the phrase, but Operational Art is generally thought to have emerged during the Napoleonic Wars.

[M.L.]

Always good to remember that Joint Doctrine, all doctrine, is not law, or somehow deemed smarter or better than any other position on a topic. It is merely the current institutional position on the topic as approved by one commander.

Doctrine is the start point for studying a topic, not the final argument.

Doctrine only applies at all to the organization that publishes it.

I think "Doctrine Man" captures the concept well in this sadly accurate cartoon. Classic.:

Thanks...but all I did was post what the book said. I didn't endorse it as the law, smarter, better, or even my own opinion.

[M.L.]

My final answers=

• Strategy is the balanced application of ends, ways, and means to achieve a political end state.
  
• The instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Economic, Military, and Information) can all be used to execute strategy
  
• Targeting is a small part of strategy.
  
• Strategy includes REMF things like budgeting, procurement, force structure, contracting, etc...
  
• On War's primary usefulness lies in the theoretical understanding of war, which can be used to construct a strategy. CvC's writings that address strategy directly are an artifact of his time period, and more closely resemble operational thought, rather than strategic thought.

So far I've seen nothing discussed that would sway my opinion on the above points.

I'm off to have a really crappy T-Giving dinner at my in-laws. See you all on the flip side....

[Ken White]

Except perhaps that last item and that's mostly an opinion so there will always be variances on that -- though I'm inclined to agree with the caveat that I believe the operational bit to be a European construct, with some applicability in a tight, densely populated European setting and not much in other locales. North America for example, like Asia, is way too large and underpopulated for a great deal of applicability. Island territories or nations do not lend themselves to it nor really does warfare in a jungle setting. Not that any of that changes current US doctrine...

Hope the meal turns out better than you expect...

[slapout9]

Not sure who coined the phrase, but Operational Art is generally thought to have emerged during the Napoleonic Wars.

Napoleonic...those guys are dead to

[William F. Owen]

CvC's writings that address strategy directly are an artifact of his time period, and more closely resemble operational thought, rather than strategic thought.

Really? Sorry that is not mine or many other peoples reading of CvC. In fact exactly the opposite would be the case. To me Clausewitz wrote about "Strategy."

Operational Thought = Conduct of Operations. Everyone does operations, from Coys to Corps. Operation Gothic Serpent was a Coy+. Operation Desert Storm was a Theatre.
Hamley's "Operations of War" (1909) makes it quite clear that the purpose of operations is to ensure that tactical action takes place and is prepared and sustained in a way that serves the military objective.
When the Soviets started to use the term "Operational" they meant Division and Corps Tactics.

[slapout9]

There is one doctrine document that goes against conventional wisdom and has a great deal of CvC in it. The Marine Doctrine Document on "Strategy" is a lot different than most of the others. Perhaps the most important is their model goes like this: Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy). Can be downloaded from the SWJ Library. Worth the read IMO.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps the most important is their model goes like this: Ends+Means= A Way (Strategy). Can be downloaded from the SWJ Library. Worth the read IMO.

That is important. It's completely wrong. Policy must be able to be expressed in tactics, but HOW that is done or how they are linked is the subject of strategy.

[slapout9]

Policy must be able to be expressed in tactics

Yes, it has to come out as a perceptual concrete, you cant just throw out an abstract conceptual idea and say this is Policy or Strategy because nobody will ever understand what you mean. Which seems to be one of our major problems today. President Kennedys speech on our Policy towards an attack form Cuba is a classic. Nobody had any doubt about what he meant, which is/was critical in situations like that.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W50RN...4B091&index=40

[jmm99]

and why ?

I'm positing that we are discussing the manual cited by Slap, which would be USMC MCDP 1-1, Strategy. Three relevant (and seemingly to me, material) quotes from that publication, dealing with "Ends" and "Means", are these ....

p.40 pdf:

Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product — that is, the strategy — is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus both a process and a product. Any discussion of ends and means in war must begin with two basic points. First, as we have observed, war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party waging war — even though those goals may be social, economic, religious, or ideological in nature — are by definition political goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities that have unique characteristics and often very dissimilar goals and resources. In order to understand any conflict, we must appreciate the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.

and p.46-47 pdf:

MEANS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

In the purest sense, the means in war is combat — physically attacking the enemy or defending against his attacks upon us. However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, military means are only one element used to implement a national strategy. The relative importance placed on the military element of the national strategy varies greatly depending on the nature and the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the instruments of power — diplomatic, economic, military, and informational — must be brought to bear and exploited to the fullest in war.

and p.54 pdf

ADAPTING ENDS TO MEANS, AND VICE VERSA

When discussing strategy in the abstract, we often treat means and ends as fixed. In practice, however, we frequently adjust both. The occurrences of war — successes and failures, lessons learned, new ideas, the entry of new combatants — may cause us to shift both our means and our goals. As our resources increase, as we gain confidence in our abilities, and as we find
our enemy more vulnerable than we had imagined, we tend to expand our goals.

Where are the grave[*] errors and heresies in the above ? Please enlighten, so I can get back to my hamster joust.

[*] One can quibble about whether there are three DIE (diplomatic, informational, economic) elements or more - all of these (3 or more) non-military elements being part of the "politiical struggle" in my eyes.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I'm guessing it's "wrong" because it is not found within the "four squares" of CvC. Mike you might need to bring him along on implied terms...

[jmm99]

and definitely no legalisms.

From MCDP 1-1, Strategy (pp.9-10 pdf):

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, stresses that war is fundamentally political in character and that war must serve policy. What matters ultimately in war is strategic success: attainment of our political aims and the protection of our national interests. History shows that national leaders, both political and military, who fail to understand this relationship sow the seeds for ultimate failure — even when their armed forces achieve initial battlefield success. Battlefield brilliance seldom rescues a bad strategy.
.....
MCDP 1-1 focuses on military strategy in its most fundamental sense, exploring the question “How do military means relate to political ends?” It provides a conceptual basis to help us to understand both our own and our enemies’ political and military objectives, the relationships among them, and the nature of any particular situation in which military means might be used. It explores how political entities integrate military means with the other elements of their power in order to attain their political ends. A common conceptual understanding of these matters helps Marines develop the adaptability that our warfighting philosophy demands.

and the first quote from MCDP 1, Warfighting ("primacy" as we say in the trade) (p.9 pdf):

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” [1] — Carl von Clausewitz

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. This unfinished classic is arguably the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war. All Marine officers should consider this book essential reading.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

Before you military intellectuals get too carried away, it's only fair to point out that the average Deutsche Soldat thinks much more often about sex than he does about abstract military theory. Here's the proof:

Vor der Kaserne
Vor dem großen Tor
Stand eine Laterne
Und steht sie noch davor
So woll'n wir uns da wieder seh'n
Bei der Laterne wollen wir steh'n
Wie einst Lili Marleen.

[Fuchs]

Show me a nation where the "average soldier" thinks more about military theory than about sex.

Even I think more about (of) sex than about military theory.

[jmm99]

over$exed ba$tards, here are 18 versions of Lili Marleen, and more, at The Official Lili Marleen Page, including Dietrich's version (best in my ears) - and a Finnish version from 1942. Remember to shoot straight.

Cheers

Mike

[Pete]

Even I think more about (of) sex than about military theory.

Well, whatever you do don't wave it around in public. Some people still have vivid memories of their previous experiences with the German armed forces.