Syria in 2017 (April-December)

[Azor]

And again here is what you simply are not getting...you can "defeat" IS on the ground...BUT again in Iraq I watched the US military claim they "defeated" AQI by 2008/2009...

Please read my comments fully before replying. I specifically and explicitly referred to defeating Daesh “on the battlefield”. If you have read my past comments, you will see that I have consistently asserted that Sunni Arab supremacism cannot be defeated by other ethnic and sectarian groups nor without resolving Sunni Arab grievances. I have also asserted that only Sunni Arab egalitarians, such as elements of the Free Syrian Army and Iraq’s Golden Division, can defeat Sunni Arab supremacists such as Al Qaeda and Daesh.

However, there must be the perception of victory over Daesh before Americans will countenance efforts to deal with the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

As a historical parallel, in 1944 Stalin delayed the Red Army’s drive towards Germany in order to conquer Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He did not have to justify this deviation, or his vision beyond Germany’s defeat. Yet what Briton would have tolerated Churchill pondering conflict with the Soviet Union, or Operation Unthinkable?

Thus, we need a publicity stunt so that the real work can begin. Who better to deliver on that then the current president?

I will remain on my soap box as long as US FP is operating under the Trump Principle of "Wag the Dog"...which is neither a strategy or a FP and simply uses any action to deflect and or direct attention away from a lack of a strategy and or FP...on anything!

Lister is pleased with the airstrike on Shayrat.

Regardless, millions of Americans now believe in a new lost cause: the “stolen” election of 2016. Prior to the campaign, I had considered the current president to be vain, vapid and venal. Now, I would say that his former opponent exhibits those qualities to a far worse degree.

Almost three weeks after the United States dropped its most powerful non-nuclear bomb in Eastern Afghanistan, the Islamic State group continues to show battlefield resilience as well as run its FM radio channel in the area.

And? One could question whether the MOAB is more powerful than the MOP. I didn’t realize that a single MOAB was supposed to defeat Daesh in Afghanistan. Why did Obama keep it in storage for so long, then?

Actually if one really does reread Mao and his writings on guerrilla warfare...IS is in a phase two actually possibly a full phase three and when pushed hard simply backs back down to a phase two and or phase one guerrilla war. If pushed harder.

Isn’t guerrilla warfare and subversion preferable to conventional mobile warfare?

AND here is the key in both Iraq and Syria...there will be a lot of disaffected Sunni's remembering the ethnically cleansing by Shia militias or sectarian genocide conducted by Shia's in general and West standing by doing nothing and they will then support quietly that new guerrilla war...

Curious. I would imagine that they would remember the bloody hands of Iran and Russia, to say nothing of China watching with disinterest, while the West at least made some effort. The leading Sunni Arab state is a U.S. ally, whereas Iran and Russia are adversaries.

[OUTLAW 09]

Please read my comments fully before replying. I specifically and explicitly referred to defeating Daesh “on the battlefield”. If you have read my past comments, you will see that I have consistently asserted that Sunni Arab supremacism cannot be defeated by other ethnic and sectarian groups nor without resolving Sunni Arab grievances. I have also asserted that only Sunni Arab egalitarians, such as elements of the Free Syrian Army and Iraq’s Golden Division, can defeat Sunni Arab supremacists such as Al Qaeda and Daesh.

However, there must be the perception of victory over Daesh before Americans will countenance efforts to deal with the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

As a historical parallel, in 1944 Stalin delayed the Red Army’s drive towards Germany in order to conquer Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He did not have to justify this deviation, or his vision beyond Germany’s defeat. Yet what Briton would have tolerated Churchill pondering conflict with the Soviet Union, or Operation Unthinkable?

Thus, we need a publicity stunt so that the real work can begin. Who better to deliver on that then the current president?



Lister is pleased with the airstrike on Shayrat.

Regardless, millions of Americans now believe in a new lost cause: the “stolen” election of 2016. Prior to the campaign, I had considered the current president to be vain, vapid and venal. Now, I would say that his former opponent exhibits those qualities to a far worse degree.



And? One could question whether the MOAB is more powerful than the MOP. I didn’t realize that a single MOAB was supposed to defeat Daesh in Afghanistan. Why did Obama keep it in storage for so long, then?



Isn’t guerrilla warfare and subversion preferable to conventional mobile warfare?



Curious. I would imagine that they would remember the bloody hands of Iran and Russia, to say nothing of China watching with disinterest, while the West at least made some effort. The leading Sunni Arab state is a U.S. ally, whereas Iran and Russia are adversaries.

You really need to rethink this comment...sorry but a conventional war one can in fact "militarily end" but guerrilla warfare....can take decades BTW...ask the US Army about VN experiences...

Isn’t guerrilla warfare and subversion preferable to conventional mobile warfare?

[OUTLAW 09]

Assad officially hands over Syrian army command / field troops/ to Iran, and he even signed it.

[CrowBat]

Assad officially hands over Syrian army command / field troops/ to Iran, and he even signed it.

Actually, that's the page 3 of a document stating the following:

Page 1:

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command for the Army and Armed Forces
Organization & Admin Branch
Organization and Arming Division
No. 1455
Date: / /1438 AH
Corresponding to 4 April 2017 CE
Memorandum
Dear Lieutenant General [/field marshal]: the general commander for the army and armed forces, president of the republic [Bashar al-Assad]:
- Implementing the decision of the brigadier general, the deputy general commander, deputy head of the council of ministers, minister of defence, on the memorandum of the leadership of the popular army- operations and training division- no. 45 on date 19 January 2017 guaranteeing the formation of a committee headed by the organization and administration branch in order to organize the forces working with the Iranian side within the organization and propriety of the local defence units in the provinces and put forward suggestions to your excellence.

- The committee specified by admin order no. 562/67 date 11 February 2017 held a number of meetings and studied and discussed the situation from different angles, including organization, leadership, combat and material guarantee, rights of the martyrs, wounded and disappeared, sorting out the affairs of those commissioned who have avoided obligatory and reserve service and deserters, and the civilians working with the Iranian side. And it culminated in the following suggestions:

1. Organizing the Syrian personnel (military and civilian) who are fighting with the Iranian side within the local defence units in the provinces according to the following table.

2. Sorting out the affairs of the military personnel (deserters) and those commissioned who have avoided obligatory and reserve service, and transferring them, appointing them, and modifying the party of their summoning to the local defence units in the provinces and including those personnel who have sorted out their affairs and are working with the Iranian side within the local defence units according to the following table:

Page 2

3. Organizing recruitment contracts for the interest of the armed forces- the people's army, for a period of two years for the civilians working with the Iranian side for whosoever desires, regardless of the conditions of recruitment implemented in the armed forces (permanent matter no. 1 and its modifications/recruitment) and renewing it by agreement of the two sides according to the following table:

4. Commissioning an administration of the affairs of the officers by sorting out of the affairs of session 69 of active officers and those who are working with the Iranian side currently in Aleppo province, their number being 1650.

5. The leadership of the local defence units in the provinces that work with the Iranian side remain affiliated with the Iranian side while coordinating with the general command for the army and armed forces until the end of the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, or issuing of a new decision.

6. Combat and material guarantee in all its types for Syrian military personnel and civilians working with the Iranian side on the shoulder of the Iranian side after organizing them into the local defence units in the provinces in coordination with the relevant parties.

7. Guaranteeing the material rights for the martyrs, wounded, and disappeared who have been working with the Iranian side since the beginning of the events, placed on the shoulder of the Iranian side. As for the rest of the determined rights for the martyrs, wounded and disappeared according to the systems and laws as follows:

a) Military personnel and those commissioned who have avoided obligatory service after sorting out of their affairs in principle.

b) Civilians in the framework of the comprehensive solution.

8. Issuing organization instructions guaranteeing implementation instructions for military personnel and civilians working with the Iranian side after organizing them into the local defence units in the provinces.
Attached is a table of the combat equipment handed to the Iranian side from the popular army and that which is present with it.
Please review and decide.

Brigadier General Adnan Mahraz Abdo

Head of the organization and administration branch.

. Opinion of the major general, head of the general chief of staff for the army and armed forces.

I agree to the suggestions: 5 April 2017

. Opinion of the major general, deputy general commander, deputy head of the council of ministers, minister of defence.

I agree to the suggestions: 5 April 2017.

. Decision of the lieutenant general [/field marshal], general commander for the army and armed forces.

Agreed- 11 April 2017.

Page 3

24 April 2017

To: the national security office, the intelligence branch [military intelligence], general intelligence administration, air intelligence administration, political security branch, criminal security administration, migration and passports administration, military police:

. Implementing the decision of the general, the general commander for the army and armed forces on our memorandum no. 1455, dated 4 April 2017, and the decision of the major general, the deputy general commander, deputy head of the council of ministers, the minister of defence on our memorandum no. 1681, dated 21 April 2017:

- You are asked not to obstruct or detain personnel working with the Iranian side who are carrying temporary cards for the local defence forces as long as their affairs are being sorted out.

- Attached is a copy of our memorandum no. 1455 date 4 April 2017 and our memorandum no. 1681 dated 21 April 2017.

Major General Ali Abdullah Ayoub

Head of the General Chief of Staff and the Armed Forces.

With the mandate of:

Brigadier General Adnan Mahraz Abdo

Head of the branch of organization and administration.

****

In essence, this gives a 'carte blanche' to the IRGC to continue organizing Shi'a militias in Syria as it likes: these are to be considered 'SAA', and the IRGC's work is not to be obstructed.

[CrowBat]

...and here the source of that copy, and the story: Administrative Decisions on Local Defence Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis.

Mind: the author of that article, has a giant problem understanding what he's got. And, sadly, that's meanwhile no exception in his work, but a rule.

Namely, the author - Aymen Jawad at-Tamimi, somebody who became quite 'famous' for works of this kind - is not only failing to understand and explain the paper he's got, he's also not aware of its importance.

1.) Tamimi can't put together a story and simply explain facts: when reading his work, I've all the time got a feeling he's circling around the actual topic like a cat around a mug of hot milk. The only exception from this rule was hit 'critique' of Guttman's recent article of the PKK.

2.) He also seems not to understand the simple brutality of the Assad regime. Or is he intentionally downplaying the importance of networks of patronage and crime...?

In this case he starts 'wondering loud':

...As a result, there has been widespread evasion of compulsory and reserve service, along with desertion from the army ranks. Fear of arrest for these offences would also prevent many people from venturing too far beyond their hometown or area, on account of the risk of encountering a security checkpoint that might have their names on a wanted list.

Instead, militias may be seen as offering a better alternative, as the salaries are often higher than those of army conscripts.
...

Actually, the principle is simple: the regime pays next to nothing to the SAA; SAA has no other choice but to defect and is thus criminalized; there come the 'saviours' of some militia, offer amnesty; and the ex-SAA should not only be 'happy', but indeed is 'in debt' with 'merciful regime' that gave his life a new sense...

And now, with this document, the IRGC is offered a carte blanche in regards of related work. :roll:

3.) Tamimi has also got an immense problem with drawing simple conclusions about the NDF and the LDF. Surely enough, the Russians are trying to change the situation lately, but essentially, both of these are nothing else but an attempt to formalize all the sorts of militias and PMCs, with the LDF usually standing for different 'units' of Hezbollah/Syria.

4.) And, he's paying too much attention at the purported 'symbology': sure, it's nice to have some unit crest explained, but what some insignia stands for or should depict is one thing, while the actual nature and purpose of the unit in question is another. The fact the regime lets militias recruit and pay better means not the resulting unit is 'SAA', just for example.

Therefore, it is not - or it should not be - the least surprising the LDF 'exists beyond Aleppo' (like it is for Tamimi): in essence, the LDF might be wherever the regime decides to call one of IRGC's local surrogates that way - or whatever local gangs prefer to call themselves.

What a 'surprise' then: what the regime considers 'LDF of Mhrada' for example, is calling itself 'Mhrada NDF'.

Overall, the piece is informative in regards of existence of few of armed groups in question. But, Tamimi's narrative and failures to understand the nature of the regime, and the purpose of the NDF/LDF legend, is severely smudging the picture.

BTW, and to make sure, the IRGC is not the only one to get such permissions. The Russians are meanwhile neck-deep into repeating IRGC's example:

A #Russia|n delegation was allegedly in #Suweida today & proposed the creation of a local militia. Pic via Suweida24. #Syria
-> Members would get $200 a month, some health care, and have their status regularized :!: (for those who missed service)...

Russians 'proposing the creation of a local militia' in Suweida is silly: the area already has some 5-6 own militias - all Druze. Actually, this is indicating the Russians are trying to recruit some of these to fight for them, i.e. for Assad.

[OUTLAW 09]

CrowBat....my compliments on a rather good translation....did not notice it was page 3 but the significance is still massive and YOU wonder if CENTCOM/Trump and the SOF community "will get it".

BUT I seriously doubt it....

IMHO this clearly indicates that Syria is now fully under Iranian IRGC control and no longer a "so called sphere of influence zone" that Obama/Rhodes were pushing for in the end........

[OUTLAW 09]

Hama Battle: #Iran announced death of #IRGC Brigadier General Mahab Ali Farsi, veteran of Iran-Iraq war. Killed by Rebels 2 days ago.

[CrowBat]

CrowBat....my compliments on a rather good translation....did not notice it was page 3 but the significance is still massive and YOU wonder if CENTCOM/Trump and the SOF community "will get it".

Thanks, but that translation is not mine: it's Taimimi's (see the link to his article I've posted above).

The importance of his 'find' is as follows:

1.) It's a definite confirmation that the Assadists are running the policy of letting the IRGC do whatever it wants to do in parts of Syria that are nominally 'regime controlled'. I.e. the parts of Syria in question - even those directly controlled by nominal 'regime forces' - are actually not under control of the same. The regime actually has no say at its own home turf: even at the time it's so short on troops like never before, it must let the IRGC recruit and establish militias as it likes.

And that's 'official'.

2.) The official nomenclature of 'National Defence Forces' and 'Local Defence Forces' is a farce; a big PR-show, and nothing else.

3.) Assad-Regime knows very well what the IRGC is doing, but has no other choice but to make it its official policy to let the IRGC do whatever it wants to do in Syria.

For Trump, Pentagon etc. there should be no clearer message than this: if they are so eager to confront Iranians, and as eager to do so in Yemen... then why to hell do they miss all the Iranians are doing in Syria?

Like you, though, I strongly doubt Washington will be doing anything about this. Namely: development of this kind is playing directly into the hands of Israel (free along the motto 'the IRGC in Syria is mortal danger' etc.).

[Azor]

You really need to rethink this comment...sorry but a conventional war one can in fact "militarily end" but guerrilla warfare....can take decades BTW...ask the US Army about VN experiences...

Outlaw,

What is there to reconsider?

The Army would doubtless agree that aside from Operation Desert Storm, subversion and guerrilla warfare would have been far preferable to conventional mobile and siege warfare.

As for Vietnam, the Communists paid an absolutely terrible price for harassing U.S. forces. Even including ARVN fatalities, the NLF and NVA experience was akin to the Red Army's experience on the Eastern Front.

The Korean War was a hideous conflict and the risk of a U.S. military defeat was far higher. Indeed, Eisenhower basically had to threaten to use the bomb in order to secure an armistice. Yet this is regarded as a decisive victory...

The issue is one of perception, not objective reality.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw,

What is there to reconsider?

The Army would doubtless agree that aside from Operation Desert Storm, subversion and guerrilla warfare would have been far preferable to conventional mobile and siege warfare.

As for Vietnam, the Communists paid an absolutely terrible price for harassing U.S. forces. Even including ARVN fatalities, the NLF and NVA experience was akin to the Red Army's experience on the Eastern Front.

The Korean War was a hideous conflict and the risk of a U.S. military defeat was far higher. Indeed, Eisenhower basically had to threaten to use the bomb in order to secure an armistice. Yet this is regarded as a decisive victory...

The issue is one of perception, not objective reality.

There is a very old battlefield saying...the last one standing on that field is the "winner".....

Ask the NVA and the North Koreans....they were the last one's standing.

Kuwait does not count as the Saddam army was not prepared to withstand a full scale US Army rolling thunder full TWO Corps armored attack fully patterned on a possible NATO/Soviet war.

[Azor]

There is a very old battlefield saying...the last one standing on that field is the "winner".....

Ask the NVA and the North Koreans....they were the last one's standing.

Kuwait does not count as the Saddam army was not prepared to withstand a full scale US Army rolling thunder full TWO Corps armored attack fully patterned on a possible NATO/Soviet war.

Hanoi had a strategic and Pyrrhic victory over along with a tactical defeat to the U.S.

Beijing and Pyongyang suffered strategic defeats.

Operation Desert Storm does count amigo, because no one knew exactly how effective the Second Offset/AirLand Battle would be, and various members of Bush's NSC were suggesting that tactical nuclear weapons be considered for use.

[OUTLAW 09]

Hanoi had a strategic and Pyrrhic victory over along with a tactical defeat to the U.S.

Beijing and Pyongyang suffered strategic defeats.

Operation Desert Storm does count amigo, because no one knew exactly how effective the Second Offset/AirLand Battle would be, and various members of Bush's NSC were suggesting that tactical nuclear weapons be considered for use.

But you still do not get it...they walked away as "winners".....as they were in fact willing to take the massive loses as they knew the West could not absorb the same loses..it was a game of staying power and they "stayed..we left"....

As one involved on Desert Storm tact nukes were never discussed nor even in the AOR....nor were the handlers of tact nukes ever placed on alert and move status...

Secondly, what is far more interesting is did Bush actually sucker the US and Saddam into the war.....US intel assets inside the Indications and Warnings divisions repeatedly warned Bush of Saddam's invasion moves...and you know things are serious with you pick up tank commanders talking 600 meters from the Kuwait border and you warn the President physically of an impending invasion AND YET that President does nothing but wait for the crossing to happen....

Saddam/we got suckered...simple as that...

BTW...hate to disappoint you but everyone knew Air/Land Battle would work...go back and reread the Soviet MoD comments on it...Kuwait just allowed them to array two full Corps on the ground...which one could never exercise in Germany...as an arrayed Corp takes up a lot of space....the German defense and attack model did not foresee an arrayed Corp but several attack fronts once the Soviets came to a stand still...

[Azor]

But you still do not get it...they walked away as "winners".....as they were in fact willing to take the massive loses as they knew the West could not absorb the same loses...it was a game of staying power and they "stayed...we left"...

Are you referring solely to the NLF/NVA? Yes they did.

The U.S. campaign in Vietnam was doomed because of:

• Poor intelligence and therefore understanding of the conflict i.e. not Korea redux
• An overly ambitious objective i.e. a strong and friendly state in South Vietnam
• A restricted commitment in order to placate Beijing and Moscow on the one hand, and the American electorate on the other

Imagine if the U.S. had simply denied the Communists control of Vietnam, relying upon anti-Communist insurgents, small special forces/intelligence teams, and airpower…

Yet returning to the issue of comparing conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare and subversion, every strictly conventional war that the U.S. has fought with major ground forces has been far more costly to those soldiers than the counter-insurgencies in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (*).

As one involved on Desert Storm tact nukes were never discussed nor even in the AOR....nor were the handlers of tact nukes ever placed on alert and move status...

BTW...hate to disappoint you but everyone knew Air/Land Battle would work...go back and reread the Soviet MoD comments on it...Kuwait just allowed them to array two full Corps on the ground...which one could never exercise in Germany...as an arrayed Corp takes up a lot of space....the German defense and attack model did not foresee an arrayed Corp but several attack fronts once the Soviets came to a stand-still...

On the contrary, according to Khalizad and Bush himself, Cheney among others, advocating using tactical nuclear weapons. Bush, of course, was strongly opposed, but the mere suggestion indicates the anxiety over Iraq’s conventional capabilities. Indeed, the U.S. forces committed at the beginning of 1991 indicate a major overreaction to the possibility of war.

The threat that the U.S. faced from Iraq in 1991 was the Soviet one, in miniature, and although a U.S. victory was assured, there was anxiety over how costly that victory would be. Would quality overcome quantity, and to what degree? If liberating Kuwait was hard-fought then the ramifications would be felt by NATO forces in Germany opposite the crumbling Warsaw Pact and the still formidable Soviet Union, as well as the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific facing North Korea and China.

If you are intending to claim that “everyone” knew that AirLand Battle would work as advertised, then why did Hussein not back down?

Moreover, why did the Soviets express surprise at the effectiveness of U.S. doctrine and technology in action as the following sources indicate?

• Glantz: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rs-storm.htm
• DIA: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1...military-force
• CIA: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingr...0000266048.pdf

In 1990, 39% of the total U.S. combat aircraft inventory was deployed to Desert Storm, whereas 30% was deployed to Iraqi Freedom, and elements of the latter were already in theater supporting the ongoing NFZ/NDZ in Iraq and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Secondly, what is far more interesting is did Bush actually sucker the US and Saddam into the war.....US intel assets inside the Indications and Warnings divisions repeatedly warned Bush of Saddam's invasion moves...and you know things are serious with you pick up tank commanders talking 600 meters from the Kuwait border and you warn the President physically of an impending invasion AND YET that President does nothing but wait for the crossing to happen...Saddam/we got suckered...simple as that...

So because it’s rainy in Berlin, you’re using tinfoil to stay dry while on your soap box? :P

Hussein had more than five months to withdraw from Kuwait and refused to do so despite the Desert Shield build up in Saudi Arabia and the UNSCR authorizing force to expel Iraqi forces. If those gathering Desert Storm clouds – pun intended – did not convince Hussein, how could Bush have done so in 1990?




* Referring to the Civil War, World War I, World War II and the Korean War