Should we destroy Al Qaeda?

[davidbfpo]

Slap (No.8) stated:

Exactamundo, when they figure out they (AQ) are not 10 feet tall and the price to pay will be death and bankruptcy, you will see a big change. Until then they will keep right on doing what they are doing.

I have asked in meetings where have all the jihadists gone? I mean the often cited tens of thousands who went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and to a lesser extent those who went to places like Bosnia and Kashmir. Yes, many are maybe dead, some integrated locally - often cited in the FATA, others returned home or to other places.

No-one seems to have a complete answer and I wonder if they have given up the Jihad.

So Slap perhaps AQ has already been affected? Death and bankrupt ideas methinks. (Apologies if I'm repeating myself here).

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Citing Mike F's initial post:

Mr. Casas makes a compelling case to keep them around.

All I can say a provocative article and far from realistic. Does he seriously think that the information that may become intelligence exists to undertake such close-in observation? We maybe good at restraining the flow of recruits, we are less good at money and other ingredients in the AQ mix. Yes attacks have been thwarted, others have succeeded.

In the UK I ask what would the UK have been like in July 2005, if the 7/7 bombs had gone off and the bombers escaped? Add in the 21/7 attacks too.

In the USA I am sure readers can imagine an equivalent scene. IIRC the CT adviser, Richard Clarke wrote an article a few years ago on future successful attacks and their impact (lost the link).

No, Mr Casas stay in your "groove".

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A review by an academic expert of a book The Third Alternative: Between Authoritarianism and Surrender (by an AQ author; NT Google):http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=24121

The book is the latest development in what can be called a second wave of modern Islamist de-radicalization.

The new body of literature, which is composed of more than 30 books, mainly deconstructs the eight major arguments of jihadism: al-hakimmiyya (God’s exclusive right to legislate), al-riddah (apostasy, mainly of ruling regimes), al-jihad/qital (fighting) for the Islamic state, jihad al-daf‘ (defensive jihad), ahkam al-diyar (rules of conduct in the “abode of Islam” and the “abode of infidelity”), methods for sociopolitical change, the inevitability of confrontation, and the “neo-crusader” arguments.

(Concludes}Most post-jihadist literature does not take a clear stance on democracy. But accepting the “other,” moderating rhetoric and behavior, and participating in electoral politics may be the only viable options for these groups if they want to remain politically significant. In other words, if jihadism heralded the inevitability of armed confrontation, post-jihadism might well entail the inevitable acceptance of democratization.

The review author has written on Ending Jihadism: the transformation of Armed Islamist Groups:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=23805

Will copy this to the 'What are you reading' thread.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

So Slap perhaps AQ has already been affected? Death and bankrupt ideas methinks. (Apologies if I'm repeating myself here).

davidbfpo

Yes David they have been hurt but we need to Kill Bill he is the Mojo, he started all this mess and he should have always been Target#1. Time to finish the job.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nl8La...eature=related

[davidbfpo]

An old thread I know, but after scanning an appropriate place to add this. Hat tip to CLS mailing, although I do read Leah Farrell's blogsite.

In the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs, Leah Farrall, a former Senior Counterterrorism Intelligence analyst with the Australian Federal Police, writes that “al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks.” Farrall argues that “[t]oday, [al Qaeda] has more members, greater geographic reach, and a level of ideological sophistication and influence it lacked ten years ago....[A]ccounts [of al Qaeda’s decline] treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them.”

Temporarily available on author's website:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com...l-qaeda-works/

Main link, alas behind a pay-wall:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...al-qaeda-works

Catching up on reading and the article is on the list to do.

[Bob's World]

Smart action in support of the oppressed populaces where these insurgent organizations have bought into the AQ franchise could co-opt or neutralize these groups that have a primary focus that is nationalist.

We do ourselves a disservice when we paint them all with a broad AQ brush merely because they have bought into the AQ message that breaking the support of western powers is an essential task in achieving change at home.

I think one thing we need to all keep in mind is that "Ideas cannot be contained, and Liberty cannot be denied."

Our current target fixation on the FATA buys into a belief that AQ can somehow be contained or defeated there. Even President Obama's guidance for Afghanistan (that the ISAF mission statement really does not match up well with, btw) focuses on this infeasible end “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

The most enduring way to render AQ moot is to rob them of their base of moderate support. The way to do that is to take on the challenge of helping the moderate majority address their reasonable concerns over the type of governance they receive at home, and the reasonable perceptions that those governments are more connected to Western powers than to their own populaces.

This does not mean a massive campaign of UW in the classic sense; but it does mean that CT heavy efforts against everyone wearing an AQ T-shirt are as likely to make the problem worse as better; and that massive nation building that seems bent on adding yet one more despot to our list of supported official malign actors is not going to get us where we need to be.

This is a foreign policy problem, not a military problem; and this demands a foreign policy solution rather than a military one as well. Certainly the military has a role, but is should be much tailored and refined from the current one, and subjugated to a supporting position.

[Dayuhan]

Smart action in support of the oppressed populaces where these insurgent organizations have bought into the AQ franchise could co-opt or neutralize these groups that have a primary focus that is nationalist.

What specific groups are we discussing here?

I think one thing we need to all keep in mind is that "Ideas cannot be contained, and Liberty cannot be denied."

True enough, but how is this related to AQ? Aq certainly isn't fighting for liberty, nor are they broadly perceived to be fighting for liberty.

The most enduring way to render AQ moot is to rob them of their base of moderate support. The way to do that is to take on the challenge of helping the moderate majority address their reasonable concerns over the type of governance they receive at home, and the reasonable perceptions that those governments are more connected to Western powers than to their own populaces.

I've seen no credible evidence suggesting that moderate support for AQ derives from "reasonable concerns over the type of governance they receive at home". AQ gets support because there's a huge amount of generic resentment toward foreign military intrusion in genereal and western meddling specifically in the Muslim world, and any Muslim group that sticks it to the western meddlers is going to gain a great deal of affection and support. AQ's attempts to rally support against Muslim governments have generally gone nowhere, not because those governmets are loved but because AQ is not seen as a viable alternative. AQ has only ever really succeeded with the "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative. They've tried others, but without much success.

If we want to reduce AQ, we need to focus not on everything they say, but on countering the narratives that have actually worked for them.

[Bob's World]

"What specific groups are we discussing here?"

Every group that has an "AQ" added as a prefix is made up on nationalist insurgents that have bought into the AQ message and franchise. These groups in turn have roots that reach into the perceptions of poor governance and western manipulation within the respective populaces they emerge from. Help those populaces address their reasonable concerns, target and manage those perceptions, and one begins to disempower the AQ agents conducting UW, and also the more radical members of the nationalist groups who are more committed to their personal goals than the overall good to the populace.

"True enough, but how is this related to AQ? AQ certainly isn't fighting for liberty, nor are they broadly perceived to be fighting for liberty."

By whose perception? AQ has a regional agenda, which is why they are a non-state UW headquarters rather than an insurgent organization. Sure, they specifically want to depose the Saudi family and specifically want to humble the US, but all of that also contributes to a larger goal of leading and leveraging the distinct quests for liberty among a wide range of oppressed Muslim populaces across the Arab world. Now, if AQ ends up in some sort of leadership role over all of these liberated states in a union that somehow does conform to traditional "Caliphates" of eras past, then no, I do not think there will be much "liberty" in that for the affected populaces. But if that is the case, then AQ loses their non-state sanctuary, they become the counterinsurgent rather than the UW instigator, and become very vulnerable to both outside state action as well as internal insurgent action. But I do believe that a regional liberty from western influence and western supported oppression is very much a part of their platform.

"I've seen no credible evidence"

For years Saudi-based charities, who draw contributions from across the populace base, have supported this movement. Every liberty-seeking movement is typically such, where the vast majority of the base of support is largely passive and beneath the surface. One can only assess the size of that base by other indicators.

The current rash of popular uprising in the face of certain consequence is such an indicator.

[Dayuhan]

"What specific groups are we discussing here?"

Every group that has an "AQ" added as a prefix is made up on nationalist insurgents that have bought into the AQ message and franchise.

Specifically, who? It would be easier to address the point if we named some of the actual groups we're concerned with.

These groups in turn have roots that reach into the perceptions of poor governance and western manipulation within the respective populaces they emerge from. Help those populaces address their reasonable concerns, target and manage those perceptions,

How do we do that without interfering in the internal affairs of other nations... recalling as we go that foreign interference in the internal affairs of Muslim nations fuels AQ more than anything else?

Sure, they specifically want to depose the Saudi family and specifically want to humble the US, but all of that also contributes to a larger goal of leading and leveraging the distinct quests for liberty among a wide range of oppressed Muslim populaces across the Arab world.

They have that goal, yes, but they've never come close to success: AQ has not been able to successfully leverage quests for liberty from domestic oppression. They have been able to successfully leverage resentment at foreign intervention in Muslim lands. If we want to reduce AQ's influence we have to address the factors and the narratives that they have been able to successfully leverage, not the ones that they have never had success with. AQ may have tried to appoint themselves champion of populaces fighting domestic oppression, but they have not succeeded. Neither would we. They have succeeded in rallying support for the defence of Muslim land against foreign invasion, and of course we've given them plenty of that.

Now, if AQ ends up in some sort of leadership role over all of these liberated states in a union that somehow does conform to traditional "Caliphates" of eras past, then no, I do not think there will be much "liberty" in that for the affected populaces.

I don't think so either, but it's too remote a prospect to be worrying much about.

But I do believe that a regional liberty from western influence and western supported oppression is very much a part of their platform.

Possibly part of their platform... but again, the only platform that's really worked for them involves resistance to foreign military intervention. I don't see that we need to worry about every part of their platform. We'd be better off concerning ourselves with the platform that has actually worked for them.

For years Saudi-based charities, who draw contributions from across the populace base, have supported this movement. Every liberty-seeking movement is typically such, where the vast majority of the base of support is largely passive and beneath the surface. One can only assess the size of that base by other indicators.

What movement are we talking about here, and what has it to do with seeking liberty? Saudi charities have certainly supported the spread of Wahhabi Islam abroad, and have certainly supported AQ's jihad against foreign intervention in Muslim lands. They've been a lot less engaged in supporting domestic action against Arab governments.

Once again, it seems to me that you're conflating AQ's fight against foreign military intervention with domestic resistance to authoritarian government in the Arab world to a greater extent than is supported by evidence.