COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[slapout9]

But he pointed out what you did. If the troops go in too big, everybody scatters and its is down hill from there. Plus, their reasons for staying aloof and away are far deeper than in Iraq, so it takes more work.

Steve

Sure that is why the first step of UW is psychological preparation of the target. In my case the operation started with ONE MAN.....the A-Team leader literally was dropped out of a plan in the middle of the night and then had to go into the AO and make friends with the ruling elite, then he brought in the rest of the A-team and then began to raise and train the guerrilla force, the axillary and the underground. Even though it was training the realism was rather astounding.....no wonder the Big Army feels threatened. Even in training if you pick a local cause that people will support you can move mountains. A lot of what the Tea Party is doing is based on UW. A small group that is well funded and uses Psyops can create the appearance of being a majority when in fact they are not even close. It is one of the vulnerabilities of a Democracy.

[MikeF]

Slap, I found the rules to your mind map, and maybe reinforces Mike's point - see specifically rules on: elimination, and playing with out a ref.

Rob- so wrong, but so right. We need to STOP playing these small wars games and become the referee.

I'll provide an example to show Mike's game plan using Nuristan and Korengal Valley, and then y'all can critique it. If only SWC had a dry erase board, this would be much easier.

Concise History of Nuristan and Korengal Valley- the end of the road of modernization
- Marco Polo used this area as a crossing point into India.
- Some of the toughest Mujahadeen fought against the Russians live here in retirement.
- During the 1990's, AQ established training camps here due to the inhospitable terrain
- Some of the toughest battles of OEF were fought here to include COP Wanat, OP Bari Alai, COP Keating, and a Chinook down.

Current Situation:
- Denied area.
- Taliban controlled using coersive tactics.
- Tribal leaders ignored by gov't.
- Greg Mortenson built a high school there.
- Col. Kolenda, former BN CDR and AO owner, is working on the higher staff. He has connections with tribal elders.

Mission. X BN, as part of Afghan Surge, will conduct COIN operations in Nuristan Province IOT secure the populace and set conditions for transfer of authority to Gov't of Afghanstan.

COA ONE: Slap Based Warfare

Task: Clear, Clear, Clear. Hands across Nuristan to clear of all enemy forces and secure terrain.

Intent: Secure Terrain

Method: Direct- Employ mass to overwhelm and set conditions for Pop-Centric COIN

Scheme of Maneuver. Covertly infiltrate behind enemy lines to FIND enemy training camps. Main Body conducts combined ground and air unilateral assualts on key villages to FIX and FINISH. Blocking forces deploy to prevent enemy exfiltration. Small outpost will be left in place to hold ground. Once violence is mitigated, then stabilization and reconstruction operations can begin. Examples, Iraq Surge in Diyala Province and Baghdad.

Likely Outcome: High casualty rates with little success. Unintended consequences will result in perpetual violence as grievances increase exponentially.

COA TWO: Gant Based Warfare

Task: Develop coaltion of tribes to secure Nuristan.

Intent: Employ sphere of influence through social networks to overwhelm enemy

Method: Indirect- By, With, and Through Indigenous Forces.

Scheme of Maneuver. COL Kolenda and Greg Mortenson deploy as advanced reconnaissance element to broker jirga (meeting) with tribal elders. At jirga, negotiations are made on the design, equipment, and training of paramilitary forces, local tribal militias. Additionally, through the Central Asia Institute, plans are brokered to build schools in the area at a sufficient cost using local labor. Finally, communications plan is set in place to facilitate share of information. Once the deals are in place, coalition forces will supervise training and employment of militia groups. Moreover, CF will provide ISR, indirect fires, QRF, and Casevac to assist locals defending their villages. Over time, as more and more villages are secure, real progress is made.

Likely Outcome: Low cost, Low manpower will potential for huge return on investment.

COA THREE: Do Nothing. Abandon Nuristan and hope that the Taliban does not take over and re-establish AQ training camps.

Thoughts?

Mike

[slapout9]

Mike, SBW doesn't do terrain......people cause crimes,wars and problems. They are also the solution. I may want to control certain types of Process Infrastructure but don't fight over ground fight over the people.

First thing to do is map the system with SBW 5 rings of UW (just invented this) to show the utility of systems thinking.

Ring1 Leadership
a) obvious all village leaders

Ring2 Processes
a) people who can recruit,train or finance guerrillas

Ring3 Infrastructure
a) in UW most infrastructure is dual use civilian stuff
b) find out WHO owns all the infrastructure

Ring4 Population
a) Family,Friends,Enemies

Ring5 Action units
a)guerrillas
b) axillary
c)underground

Now go save the country let them build it with our help IF they want it. All we want is for them not to support Terrorist Organizations that would attack USA.

[MikeF]

Mike, SBW doesn't do terrain......people cause crimes,wars and problems. They are also the solution. I may want to control certain types of Process Infrastructure but don't fight over ground fight over the people.

First thing to do is map the system with SBW 5 rings of UW (just invented this) to show the utility of systems thinking.

Ring1 Leadership
a) obvious all village leaders

Ring2 Processes
a) people who can recruit,train or finance guerrillas

Ring3 Infrastructure
a) in UW most infrastructure is dual use civilian stuff
b) find out WHO owns all the infrastructure

Ring4 Population
a) Family,Friends,Enemies

Ring5 Action units
a)guerrillas
b) axillary
c)underground

Now go save the country let them build it with our help IF they want it. All we want is for them not to support Terrorist Organizations that would attack USA.

Sorry Slap. Didn't mean to misrepresent SBW in my COA One. My post was off the cuff too. Looking back at both our responses, I think we're saying the same thing. It's a matter of HOW to do it. I've been looking for a low cost, high pay-off solution. Jim Gant offers "a way" of doing that.

Here's some additional assumptions driving my thinking:

-Bypass the populace and Influence the tribal leaders
1. Low national literacy rate.
2. Tribal Leaders have the power, and the people listen.
3. Nobody likes a plan that they didn't contribute to. So, if you covertly/unilaterally invade an area to secure the populace without first consulting those local leaders, then you're probably going to make more enemies than friends. (Look at the push-back in our own populace right now of Big Gov't trying to fix all the problems).

Mike

[slapout9]

Sorry Slap. Didn't mean to misrepresent SBW in my COA One. My post was off the cuff too. Looking back at both our responses, I think we're saying the same thing. It's a matter of HOW to do it. I've been looking for a low cost, high pay-off solution. Jim Gant offers "a way" of doing that.

Here's some additional assumptions driving my thinking:

-Bypass the populace and Influence the tribal leaders
1. Low national literacy rate.
2. Tribal Leaders have the power, and the people listen.
3. Nobody likes a plan that they didn't contribute to. So, if you covertly/unilaterally invade an area to secure the populace without first consulting those local leaders, then you're probably going to make more enemies than friends. (Look at the push-back in our own populace right now of Big Gov't trying to fix all the problems).

Mike

Mike, no need to be sorry it's all a good learning experience under the Twister Rule Set Besides you may have to do something like COA 1 when it comes to larger cities.....???? may have to clear,hold and bring em back after the shooting is over if you are dealing with hard core radicals. To a certain extent this is what happens when a gang takes over a neighborhood, you get a lot of displacement until you get rid of the bad guys.

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

You are getting dangerously close to creating a bottom-up cohesive strategy.

Need to watch your step?

Steve

[Bob's World]

Guys,

I won't make any substantive comments as to goings on here in Afghanistan for several obvious reasons, but I will offer a comment on how to think about framing your strategic thinking.

Step one: Step back. You can't look at a map of Afghanistan and develop a strategy for afghanistan. So step back until your area of operations is the entire greater middle east, and your area of influence/interest is the entire globe.

Step two: Remember your task and purpose. Defeat AQ to Secure the Homeland (In that context, Afghanistan is a supporting operation at best, not existential to the survival of the US, let alone the task and purpose of the larger mission).

Step three: Develop a strategy for that larger mission, a plan to implement it, and then a supporting plan to address operations in Afghanistan within that context.

Lack of understanding of the true nature of the current surge in violent resistence to existing governance in communities around the globe; complicated with the politics of the many governments experiencing or dealling with the same has all compiled to push the full weight and blame for the problem into the farthest corner of the globe from their respective offices. Both are very natural tendencies, and should not surprise anyone, but should certainly be understood by everyone as well.

Step four: Remember that everyone who joins together is that farthest corner of the globe is sent there by, and is representing their repspective governments very different concerns and perspectives.

Step five: Develop a true empathy for the populace of that farthest corner of the globe, and be willing to subjugate your own selfish national concerns to those of the populace whose lives you are affecting so dramatically by your presence, and shape the objectives and the nature of your engagement to help enable a resolution that is best for them while also supporting your larger concerns from your many diverse national perspectives.

Lastly, while the flame that burns the brightest draws your undivided attention to the flames and provides a certain comfort, it also blinds you to what is going on in the dark around you. As a strategist, focus on what is going on in the dark, and how it affects the flame, not the other way around.

Just a few thoughts from the farthest corner of the globe...

[slapout9]

BW, that was some Strategic Stuff you just wrote All The Way,Sir

[Pete]

Last August Richard H. Sinnreich (Colonel, USA, Ret) cast some doubt on COIN doctrine in his column in the Lawton Constitution, Lawton, Oklahoma. He's a doctrine writer from way back but to the best of my knowledge he has not entered into the COIN debate in a major way.

In line with his view of counterinsurgency doctrine, McChrystal proposes to concentrate on protecting Afghanistan's populated areas rather than chasing after insurgents in the hinterlands. As he commented in a recent Los Angeles Times interview, "What I don't think you will see as much of is big unit sweeps or operations where you sweep them, then come out. Historically it doesn't work, but almost every counterinsurgency tries it and relearns the lesson."

Actually, he's only half right. He's right to conclude that insulating the Afghan population from insurgent intimidation and support is essential. He's wrong if he believes that it can be accomplished in any enduring way without offensive operations. On the contrary, even were NATO forces sufficiently reinforced to position troops wherever civilians are at risk - no small chore in itself - adopting such a purely defensive posture effectively would concede the initiative to the insurgents.

Nothing could be more dangerous, and in the long run less likely to succeed, especially against an enemy that already has demonstrated quite convincingly its ability to reconstitute after every local defeat.

His entire column can be read using the link below.

http://www.swoknews.com/main.asp?Sea...tionID=293&S=1

[William F. Owen]

Pick on the discussion here:-

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...s-sh/#comments

Which IMO, should be going on here, in the forum.

No secret where I stand. Focus on destroying the enemy, so that they have to resort to non-violent resolutions. Use Armed Force against Armed Force, and do so skilfully and decisively, in a way that sets forth the policy.

[JMA]

Pick on the discussion here:-

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...s-sh/#comments

Which IMO, should be going on here, in the forum.

No secret where I stand. Focus on destroying the enemy, so that they have to resort to non-violent resolutions. Use Armed Force against Armed Force, and do so skilfully and decisively, in a way that sets forth the policy.

Someone said there should be a balance.

Contrary to current popular opinion body count is important and if "they" have unlimited numbers them you just have to kill more and figure out how best to do this.

Yes there are most certainly actions which need to be taken with respect to the population. This effort should not be balanced with aggressive action but rather carried out in parallel.

When you have restricted resources for the killing part then you still have a chance if your military can show initiative an be innovative (Rhodesia) however if you have no money to throw at the "hearts and minds" part then you are onto a loser (Rhodesia).

[William F. Owen]

Someone said there should be a balance.

Concur. All war is political. The military instrument is but one instrument.

Contrary to current popular opinion body count is important and if "they" have unlimited numbers them you just have to kill more and figure out how best to do this.

Again, concur. It is about breaking will and killing does that better than anything else.

[Schmedlap]

There is the insurgency, as a movement, and the individual insurgents. I think whether your actions are taken to counter one or both depends on the situation - primarily what stage of development the insurgency is at. Some members of an insurgency are just disagreeable jerks who will always find reasons to militate against the established order. If they are the face of the movement and can be discredited early on, then the movement may die with their credibility. Clamp down on them too quickly and harshly and you risk turning them into martyrs whose faults are overshadowed by the perception of a disproportionate response.

I throw this out there as a general idea - not a solid proposition that I've thought long and hard about.

[JMA]

There is the insurgency, as a movement, and the individual insurgents. I think whether your actions are taken to counter one or both depends on the situation - primarily what stage of development the insurgency is at. Some members of an insurgency are just disagreeable jerks who will always find reasons to militate against the established order. If they are the face of the movement and can be discredited early on, then the movement may die with their credibility. Clamp down on them too quickly and harshly and you risk turning them into martyrs whose faults are overshadowed by the perception of a disproportionate response.

I throw this out there as a general idea - not a solid proposition that I've thought long and hard about.

By the time the military gets involved the political process is probably already out of hand. If there is an armed insurgency already on the go then the military must be relentless in tracking down every last one of any groups contacted. Let them have thousands of martyrs if thats what they want but just hope that the idiot politicians don't hold show trials and put the leaders in jail. That's when you get martyrs... remember the "Free Mandela" campaign.

My honest opinion is that yes let the USMC and others sweep through an area a few times to break the back of the military wing of the insurgency but thereafter they need to be replaced by forces not bound by the same ROE that are effectively emasculating the ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

[Greyhawk]

Contrary to current popular opinion body count is important...

ISAF apparently agrees. Or at least CJTF 82. FINAL UPDATE: 16 insurgents killed and 5 detained after a targeted attack against Bagram.

Or maybe some days they are more important than others?

[Fuchs]

Again, concur. It is about breaking will and killing does that better than anything else.

I know that "to break" is the official and historical version in this regard, but I think it's more useful to speak to "to break or to bend", for "to break" seems to imply total victory.

Few historical wars ended with total victories - in fact, governments/kings usually even survived losing a war.
Most wars meant merely that the loser lost some stretch of agricultural area or had to pay in gold.

The West has become used to think of wars in more absolute terms, as if war were about all-or-nothing. Sometimes it's better to achieve a compromise than to keep fighting till a much more expensive total victory was achieved.

"bending" the enemy's will seems to fit to the idea of a minor victory or compromise peace; "bend" their will to a point you can agree with an it's fine. There's no need to "break" their will (or even the whole enemy) completely in most cases.

I know that "to break" can be understood to meet the "compromise" case, but it's leading the thoughts towards total war/total victory thinking in my opinion.



Now about the "Counterinsurgency Ops Should 'Involve Countering the Insurgents' ":

Well, maybe. Maybe the path to a good peace doesn't require significant direct progress against the enemy, though.
I think that there's no general rule, "it depends".

I'm a minimalist in the case of Afghanistan. Assuming that we keep intervening there (and I would pull out if I was in command), I'd follow a minimalist strategy that merely keeps the enemy in the underground.
It's quite pointless to fight them in the underground with such a poor forceopulation ratio, and it's much easier and cheaper to focus on keeping them from overtly controlling areas than to hunt them down.
Let the Afghans handle the political and criminal aspects of the conflict and build up enough military might (warlord-style if necessary; no reason to build an army on the industrialised countries model).
The non-enemy Afghans can then proceed to break or bend the TB's will or whatever - it's their conflict then (and should always have been, save for the winter of 01/02).

[Dayuhan]

If you're talking only about the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, then yes, it's solely about using armed force against armed force, finding and killing insurgents, etc. I would suggest, though, that looking only at the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, is completely pointless.

Three things you have to know before walking into an insurgency...

Know your enemy. Why are these people insurging? Are they fighting for something they want, or are they defending themselves against a perceived threat? What motivates the leadership? What motivates the individuals with the guns? What's their desired end state? What do they want?

Know your ally. If you're American and fighting an insurgency, you're fighting on behalf of an allied government. You have to assess that government honestly: what are their capacities, their weaknesses. Can they govern? How are they perceived by their own supporters? By those who support the insurgents? By the neutrals? Do you really want to commit yourself to supporting these people?

Know yourself. Why are you going into this fight? What interests are at stake? What's your goal, what's your desired end state? Is that goal realistically achievable with the resources and within the time frame at your disposal? Do you have the political support on the home front to sustain the fight once you commit to it?

If you've been through all of these, honestly and realistically, you can begin to devise a combination of military and non-military tactics to support your goal. That combination will be different for every situation.

Knowing those three things doesn't assure success, but not knowing any of them is an excellent first step on the road to failure.

[JMA]

If you're talking only about the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, then yes, it's solely about using armed force against armed force, finding and killing insurgents, etc. I would suggest, though, that looking only at the military aspect of counterinsurgency, without considering the political goals or the political environment, is completely pointless.

Three things you have to know before walking into an insurgency...

Know your enemy. Why are these people insurging? Are they fighting for something they want, or are they defending themselves against a perceived threat? What motivates the leadership? What motivates the individuals with the guns? What's their desired end state? What do they want?

Know your ally. If you're American and fighting an insurgency, you're fighting on behalf of an allied government. You have to assess that government honestly: what are their capacities, their weaknesses. Can they govern? How are they perceived by their own supporters? By those who support the insurgents? By the neutrals? Do you really want to commit yourself to supporting these people?

Know yourself. Why are you going into this fight? What interests are at stake? What's your goal, what's your desired end state? Is that goal realistically achievable with the resources and within the time frame at your disposal? Do you have the political support on the home front to sustain the fight once you commit to it?

If you've been through all of these, honestly and realistically, you can begin to devise a combination of military and non-military tactics to support your goal. That combination will be different for every situation.

Knowing those three things doesn't assure success, but not knowing any of them is an excellent first step on the road to failure.

What level are you talking about? Not too many soldiers get to make an input into the decision whether to get involved or not. Most soldiers would decline getting involved in an insurgency where the ROE make the whole thing a sick joke. Afghanistan is getting close to that. The decision there is how to neutralise the potential threat out of Afghanistan while managing to coexist with a corrupt and incompetent and now unelected government. The Afghan army is a joke so the need irregular forces who can operate without the restrictions of the current US imposed ROE is vital to setting the scene for a withdrawal by US and NATO forces.

[jmm99]

What are you proposing here:

from JMA
The Afghan army is a joke so the need [for ?] irregular forces who can operate without the restrictions of the current US imposed ROE is vital to setting the scene for a withdrawal by US and NATO forces.

What is the outline for the "irregular forces" and their ROEs ? Another of my oddball interests.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

I know that "to break" is the official and historical version in this regard, but I think it's more useful to speak to "to break or to bend", for "to break" seems to imply total victory.

Well yes, this is imprecise language, but for me, "break" means get the other side to halt armed action. - the the politics kicks in. Political outcomes are the only outcomes that count. That has always been the way.

Generally, and never absolutely, the quickest and most assured way of breaking any ones will to persist in armed action is to kill folks. Generally speaking, it is a factions tolerance to casualties that defines their will to persist in combat. The reasons for that tolerance are many and varied and may change over time.