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Thread: The UK in Afghanistan

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, I certainly cannot argue with someone

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    That's right nobody counted the bodies because nobody got any where near where the bodies were supposed to be.
    who was there...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    who was there...
    ...maybe not even the Taliban.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    In the simplest terms by not using certain roads and using only those which are protected and cleared before use. As far as the anti-personnel types go very much the same applies. Only go where the TB go.
    None of these guys are dumb. Some have multiple tours. Believe you me, these chaps are taking every possible precaution, but all conflict is adversarial and lethal.
    What it does advance is that public support for the war is at an all time low. That impacts on any decision to pull troops out before the mission is accomplished. Domestic pressure whether you or I like it or not is material.
    Political problem. The Army cannot do anything about that. If you want to reduce casualties, reduce operations.
    The effect of IEDs in respect of casualties, killed and maimed, also has a deleterious effect on both civilian and military morale.
    So what you are saying is the IED casualties have MORE of an effect?
    When in doubt avoid the areas altogether as it is not like the TB and the locals will want to walk around in minefields either. I often wonder when I see foot patrols crossing open fields what exactly are they doing. Surely they don't expect the TB to be found sitting around armed in these open fields?
    What mine fields? If you know anything about IEDs you know very well that the locals are walking all over them and it's only when you walk over them, they get initiated.
    I understand that the doctrine says that one should dominate no-man's land with patrols but when you can dominate it by day from an OP and by night with thermal then whats the point of legging it around looking for a trip wire?
    Trip wire? There are no trip wires. There are no surface signs what so ever and the IED may well be built into a wall.

    With respect, I suggest you read into to the modern IED threat. It's not AP mines or VC-type booby-traps. It's a whole game up.
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    Quote Originally Posted by baboon6 View Post
    No it is not. Only a small percentage of the Chindits were volunteers. The majority of the men on both the 1943 and 1944 operations were members of normal British or Gurkha infantry battalions who were simply put under Wingate's command. While there was a fair amount of reorganisation regimental/battalion identities were retained.

    http://www.chindits.info/Units/Units.html
    My humble apologies I meant Merrill’s Marauders. Regret any confusion caused.

    But it would be more likely that something along the lines of the Chindits would be more likely to become a reality.

    Why do you need special units made up of volunteers to serve in Afghanistan? All British (and US, Canadian, Australian etc) soldiers are volunteers anyway and I'm sure the majority want to go to Afghanistan. However I don't think you're going to get too many takers for a unit that is permanently deployed. I do think certain advisors and liaison officers should be there on a long-term basis; I believe the US Army is trying to institute such a scheme.
    Exactly.

    OK lets start with what you term "certain advisors and liaison officers". What I am advocating is a permanent HQ in any given area. It could be Bde or Bn size subject to location, conditions etc... Because of the need for R&R for the foreigners (US/Brit/what have you) you may need to have more staff on strength than normal.

    Lets look at support. Artillery. Say Regiment X is to supply a battery on a permanent basis to area Y. The proviso would be that not more than 10-15% could be rotated at any one time. This would allow for continuity. How the Artillery regiment rotated its men would be their concern. The training of selected local forces would be slowly introduced.

    Lets look at Air. Lets say a sqn of Apaches were to be permanently stationed at a given point. The same type of rotation of air crew and tech staff would apply.

    Infantry units are a problem as the mind set certainly among the Brits is to get the 6 month tour over and done with and get back home. Can't see how getting a company for 6 months only to be replaced by raw new troops would work. I would off the top of my head suggest all volunteer companies where they have 5 platoons per company. Three on ops at any one time, one on R&R and one on training.

    6 month tours (Brits) have little value when the whole unit up and leaves on the same day. The US have a better idea with a year but spoil it all with complete unit rotations thereby losing continuity.

    Continuity, local knowledge and experience are key to success.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    My humble apologies I meant Merrill’s Marauders. Regret any confusion caused.

    But it would be more likely that something along the lines of the Chindits would be more likely to become a reality.



    Exactly.

    OK lets start with what you term "certain advisors and liaison officers". What I am advocating is a permanent HQ in any given area. It could be Bde or Bn size subject to location, conditions etc... Because of the need for R&R for the foreigners (US/Brit/what have you) you may need to have more staff on strength than normal.

    Lets look at support. Artillery. Say Regiment X is to supply a battery on a permanent basis to area Y. The proviso would be that not more than 10-15% could be rotated at any one time. This would allow for continuity. How the Artillery regiment rotated its men would be their concern. The training of selected local forces would be slowly introduced.

    Lets look at Air. Lets say a sqn of Apaches were to be permanently stationed at a given point. The same type of rotation of air crew and tech staff would apply.

    Infantry units are a problem as the mind set certainly among the Brits is to get the 6 month tour over and done with and get back home. Can't see how getting a company for 6 months only to be replaced by raw new troops would work. I would off the top of my head suggest all volunteer companies where they have 5 platoons per company. Three on ops at any one time, one on R&R and one on training.

    6 month tours (Brits) have little value when the whole unit up and leaves on the same day. The US have a better idea with a year but spoil it all with complete unit rotations thereby losing continuity.

    Continuity, local knowledge and experience are key to success.
    Some interesting ideas. I suppose the idea with unit rotations is that unit cohesion is considered important. I agree the problem of continuity is one that has yet to be resolved satisfactorily. As regards brigade/division HQ staff I agree they should stay longer than combat troops. The SA Army's system was to have brigade, sector and battalion HQs in the operational area mainly manned by permanent force personnel who would stay there for up to 2 years while coys/batteries/sqns made up mainly of national servicemen would be rotated in and out on 4 to 6 month tours.As the war went on though there was an increase in locally recruited, basically permanent force units from the South West Africa Territory Force such as 101 Battalion doing a lot of the fighting. How long would your notional 5-platoon coy's rotations for training and Rn'R be? As I stated above you are going to find few takers for almost continuous deployment.

    Relief in place does not take one day but usually several weeks and a few members of the unit being relieved will often stay on for a while to provide a degree of continuity but I agree with you it is far from ideal. "Raw new troops" is a bit of an exaggeration- many of the officers, most of the NCOs and quite a few of the private soldiers in a typical British Army unit will have served with that unit on operations before, most likely in Afghanistan too. Some units have now completed three tours and a few individuals more.

    It is the US Army which does 12-month tours, the US Marines do 7-month tours.

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    Quote Originally Posted by baboon6 View Post
    Some interesting ideas. I suppose the idea with unit rotations is that unit cohesion is considered important. I agree the problem of continuity is one that has yet to be resolved satisfactorily. As regards brigade/division HQ staff I agree they should stay longer than combat troops. The SA Army's system was to have brigade, sector and battalion HQs in the operational area mainly manned by permanent force personnel who would stay there for up to 2 years while coys/batteries/sqns made up mainly of national servicemen would be rotated in and out on 4 to 6 month tours.As the war went on though there was an increase in locally recruited, basically permanent force units from the South West Africa Territory Force such as 101 Battalion doing a lot of the fighting. How long would your notional 5-platoon coy's rotations for training and Rn'R be? As I stated above you are going to find few takers for almost continuous deployment.

    Relief in place does not take one day but usually several weeks and a few members of the unit being relieved will often stay on for a while to provide a degree of continuity but I agree with you it is far from ideal. "Raw new troops" is a bit of an exaggeration- many of the officers, most of the NCOs and quite a few of the private soldiers in a typical British Army unit will have served with that unit on operations before, most likely in Afghanistan too. Some units have now completed three tours and a few individuals more.

    It is the US Army which does 12-month tours, the US Marines do 7-month tours.
    Lets then accept the concept of of semi-permanent field HQs (without necessarily strictly following the SADF model). It allows for the commanders and their staff to be selected based on suitability for the specific role and function in that theater rather than just happening to be in the position of brigade or battalion commander as a stage in their careers.

    Yes local units would by necessity form part of any such structure. They would naturally have built in continuity.

    As to rotation. One would need at least a three platoon company and four company battalions in the field at any one time. At company level with 5 platoons rotating you would work a 3:2 system (which could be three months in and one on R&R and one on retraining). Or any other combination using those ratios. The distance to home base and the importance not to keep the troops in country too long so that they start to go "bush" is important. The mindset must be that they are in for the long haul and breaks are for R&R, leave, training etc.

    The current Brit system seems to be predicated on one six month tour followed by 18 months elsewhere before the next probable rotation. So to be quite honest by the time any return they will not be theater current and some will have had some active service and combat experience sometime in th past. The lack of continuity sucks. My experience is that if less than 50% have previous recent combat experience you will be playing catch up with the enemy who have no R&R for the duration of any short tour of say 6 months. Yes they will go back experienced and better off militarily but that will be wasted as the disappear back into a peacetime army.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    None of these guys are dumb. Some have multiple tours. Believe you me, these chaps are taking every possible precaution, but all conflict is adversarial and lethal.
    I would like to think that as well. It is the casualty rate which screams that they still have much to do.

    Political problem. The Army cannot do anything about that. If you want to reduce casualties, reduce operations.
    Yes the army can do something MORE about IED casualties. 20 odd per month so far this year is just too much.

    So what you are saying is the IED casualties have MORE of an effect?
    Yes indeed, psychologically IEDs play havoc with a soldier's morale.

    What mine fields? If you know anything about IEDs you know very well that the locals are walking all over them and it's only when you walk over them, they get initiated.
    A metaphor a very dangerous area with many IEDs

    Trip wire? There are no trip wires. There are no surface signs what so ever and the IED may well be built into a wall.
    A metaphor for getting ones self into a position where an IED can be detonated.

    With respect, I suggest you read into to the modern IED threat. It's not AP mines or VC-type booby-traps. It's a whole game up.
    Yes the nature of command detonated IEDs has made the Afghan battle field very lethal to all troops (and civilians it must be said.) There is no question that the Taliban are winning this part of the war even though our guys are "taking every possible precaution".

    The question needs to be asked again and again until somebody can provide an answer, how are we to wrest the IED initiative away from the Taliban? In the meantime just 'trying ones best' is simply not good enough.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Yes the army can do something MORE about IED casualties.
    Specifically what?
    What IED casualty rate is acceptable?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    JMA

    You may want to plug the words "Op Barma" and "Op Karla" Drills into Google and get up to speed on the current threat. The specifics of the Drills are classified, but a man of your experience should be able to read between the lines.

    Should have said this earlier.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Lets then accept the concept of of semi-permanent field HQs (without necessarily strictly following the SADF model). It allows for the commanders and their staff to be selected based on suitability for the specific role and function in that theater rather than just happening to be in the position of brigade or battalion commander as a stage in their careers.

    Yes local units would by necessity form part of any such structure. They would naturally have built in continuity.

    As to rotation. One would need at least a three platoon company and four company battalions in the field at any one time. At company level with 5 platoons rotating you would work a 3:2 system (which could be three months in and one on R&R and one on retraining). Or any other combination using those ratios. The distance to home base and the importance not to keep the troops in country too long so that they start to go "bush" is important. The mindset must be that they are in for the long haul and breaks are for R&R, leave, training etc.

    The current Brit system seems to be predicated on one six month tour followed by 18 months elsewhere before the next probable rotation. So to be quite honest by the time any return they will not be theater current and some will have had some active service and combat experience sometime in th past. The lack of continuity sucks. My experience is that if less than 50% have previous recent combat experience you will be playing catch up with the enemy who have no R&R for the duration of any short tour of say 6 months. Yes they will go back experienced and better off militarily but that will be wasted as the disappear back into a peacetime army.
    1. Most ISAF units have their ANA partner unit, which usually includes an ISAF OMLT (Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team). However the OMLT can only advise, sometimes very strongly, they can beg, plead, cajole and threaten, but they cannot actually make the Afghans do something. A possible solution would be something like the "loan service" scheme the British had with several Arab and other countries in the past, most recently in Sierra Leone. A few ISAF officers and SNCOs would be seconded to the ANA with command and disciplinary authority. However I am fairly sure that this is a political impossibility.

    2. How long would this 3:2 cycle last for a particular unit? Also you would have to increase unit strengths quite significantly, or carry out a major reorganisation into fewer but larger units.

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    Quote Originally Posted by baboon6 View Post
    1. Most ISAF units have their ANA partner unit, which usually includes an ISAF OMLT (Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team). However the OMLT can only advise, sometimes very strongly, they can beg, plead, cajole and threaten, but they cannot actually make the Afghans do something. A possible solution would be something like the "loan service" scheme the British had with several Arab and other countries in the past, most recently in Sierra Leone. A few ISAF officers and SNCOs would be seconded to the ANA with command and disciplinary authority. However I am fairly sure that this is a political impossibility.
    The local forces must be under direct operational command. If they just dump some bunch of dope smokers from another ethic group on you then you are wasting your time. Spending too much time worrying about these clowns than getting on with the war. With these local units it is always the officers and the NCOs who are the problem. So recruit your own locally.

    If that doesn't work out so well initially then live with it until it improves. And local must mean local... born and bred in that exact same operational area. This can work either on the model of how the Brits raised battalions of colonial troops or like irregulars were raised like Renamo (in Mozambique) or most likely a balance between the two.

    2. How long would this 3:2 cycle last for a particular unit? Also you would have to increase unit strengths quite significantly, or carry out a major reorganisation into fewer but larger units.
    The aim of the exercise is to ensure long term continuity. People will come and people will go but as long as changes/rotations at any time are no more than 20% of the force level and at no time is a brand new platoon or company brought in on its own. A platoon can be rotated as long as when it comes back at least 80% of those returning were there on the last deployment (don't use the word tour). If for some reason a returning platoon comes back with less than 80% old hands then there would be inter platoon transfers to sort that out.

    How best to work the cycle? 3:2 works for a five platoon company. It all about sustainability. We used to deploy for 6 weeks then out on ops then 10 ten days back on R&R (but that was because the war was a few hours drive from home). There is a cost factor and there is a fatigue factor. After three years of that the officers were moved on, NCOs had breaks when they went on courses, the national servicemen did their year then left. It was the regular soldier other ranks who took strain. He was a private soldier or L/Cpl with no greater potential, you had to watch these guys as after 3 or 4 years of that they would be howling like dogs at night and crawling up the walls... totally 'bush'.

    Best to work this out on the ground as too little action and the troops would die of boredom and too much action and they would get worn out.
    Last edited by JMA; 04-28-2010 at 11:42 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The local forces must be under direct operational command. If they just dump some bunch of dope smokers from another ethic group on you then you are wasting your time. Spending too much time worrying about these clowns than getting on with the war. With these local units it is always the officers and the NCOs who are the problem. So recruit your own locally.

    If that doesn't work out so well initially then live with it until it improves. And local must mean local... born and bred in that exact same operational area. This can work either on the model of how the Brits raised battalions of colonial troops or like irregulars were raised like Renamo (in Mozambique) or most likely a balance between the two.



    The aim of the exercise is to ensure long term continuity. People will come and people will go but as long as changes/rotations at any time are no more than 20% of the force level and at no time is a brand new platoon or company brought in on its own. A platoon can be rotated as long as when it comes back at least 80% of those returning were there on the last deployment (don't use the word tour). If for some reason a returning platoon comes back with less than 80% old hands then there would be inter platoon transfers to sort that out.

    How best to work the cycle? 3:2 works for a five platoon company. It all about sustainability. We used to deploy for 6 weeks then out on ops then 10 ten days back on R&R (but that was because the war was a few hours drive from home). There is a cost factor and there is a fatigue factor. After three years of that the officers were moved on, NCOs had breaks when they went on courses, the national servicemen did their year then left. It was the regular soldier other ranks who took strain. He was a private soldier or L/Cpl with no greater potential, you had to watch these guys as after 3 or 4 years of that they would be howling like dogs at night and crawling up the walls... totally 'bush'.

    Best to work this out on the ground as too little action and the troops would die of boredom and too much action and they would get worn out.
    1. Recruiting your own locals in AFG? I just don't see the Afghan government allowing it. Which is why I suggested the "loan service" idea, which has been done with sovereign countries in the past. Even though I don't that would be acceptable either.

    2. Yes it's bit different when the guys can get home every 6 weeks, see the family, get drunk, get laid, whatever. Very difficult in the expeditionary wars of today.

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    Quote Originally Posted by baboon6 View Post
    1. Recruiting your own locals in AFG? I just don't see the Afghan government allowing it. Which is why I suggested the "loan service" idea, which has been done with sovereign countries in the past. Even though I don't that would be acceptable either.
    I am not familiar with the 'loan service' idea but must say that any idea is better than being forced to work with 'independent' Afghan forces of whom are probably texting the TB of your every move. Better to have nothing.

    2. Yes it's bit different when the guys can get home every 6 weeks, see the family, get drunk, get laid, whatever. Very difficult in the expeditionary wars of today.
    Currently for the Brits its a six month turnaround for a full battalion. So every six months they have the costs of moving a battalion worth of people and some equipment back and forth (one in, one out). So theoretically there you have your transport budget. The permutations are endless. And yes that is what R&R is for. Things are as difficult as they are today because we choose to make them so. Keep forcing square pegs into round holes.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Specifically what?
    What IED casualty rate is acceptable?
    Came across this other thread here:

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8062

    I think the article referred to gives a good example of what I am saying must be avoided at all costs.

    We lost 17 KIA in one incident when a Puma chopper was shot down. Strangely we could handle that as it comes with the territory when you are flying into action. Could have lost a Dak loaded with paras to on any given day.

    But deaths by IED are exasperating because of the lack of a physical enemy force to make contact with. It is clearly seriously psychologically damaging to the troops in the field. That is why more emphasis must be placed on the whole IED situation.

    He highlights what I have been complaining about around here in the last few weeks and that is the amount of road movemnt and the resources tioed down to that end.

    'Due to the pitiful numbers of support helicopters and Apaches needed to escort them, every day troops on the ground are forced to expend an enormous amount of hours and manpower just standing still. They sacrifice their reserves of energy, motivation and willpower securing and picketing routes for the never-ending vehicle convoys that have to keep happening in order to resupply the patchy spread of patrol bases with water, ammo and rations; as well as recovering the vehicles that invariably go into ditches and securing helicopter landing-sites for the evacuation of casualties from improvised explosive device strikes'.

    There is a desperate urgency in this matter and it appears we are seeing a super tanker trying to turn around in high seas.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-01-2010 at 08:00 PM. Reason: minor

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    But deaths by IED are exasperating because of the lack of a physical enemy force to make contact with. It is clearly seriously psychologically damaging to the troops in the field. That is why more emphasis must be placed on the whole IED situation.
    I'm pretty much stuck to see how deaths from IEDs can be more tragic than any form of KIA/WIA. I don't remember any IED hit in Ireland (including Warren Point) as being any more demoralising apart from the numbers involved.

    ...but the point is not "IEDs". The point is criminally small numbers of Support Helicopters and too few troops deployed. The lack of resources is the issue. The IED hits are just the one of the symptom...... and more helo is not going to save you from the bomb planted in the wall of an alley, command detonated by string.
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    Although troops to task is a good factor in IEDs, I've seen insurgents get IEDs emplaced right under the noses of friendly forces. They are pretty crafty.

    I find the claim of support helicopters to be a bit of a red herring. IEDs aren't necessarily confined to highways where Coalition vehicles move - a large percentage of IEDs I witnessed (first or second hand) targeted dismounted patrols. Unless a Chinook is going to drop me off 800 meters from the COP to the village, I don't think it's going to make a huge dent in IED casualties.

    Veterans of Northern Ireland should be real familiar with this....

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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    I find the claim of support helicopters to be a bit of a red herring. IEDs aren't necessarily confined to highways where Coalition vehicles move - a large percentage of IEDs I witnessed (first or second hand) targeted dismounted patrols.
    Well aware, but I submit that on route IEDs and all the personnel and efforts assigned to securing them, might be better used if 90% of tactical and administrative movement was done by helicopter. In the eyes of most of the men I talk to, lack of Support Helicopters is a very significant issue.
    Veterans of Northern Ireland should be real familiar with this....
    In South Armagh, in the 1980's 90% of tactical and administrative moves were done by Support Helicopter. Yes IEDs still threatened dismounted patrols, but it made the bad guys life very much harder.
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    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    In South Armagh, in the 1980's 90% of tactical and administrative moves were done by Support Helicopter. Yes IEDs still threatened dismounted patrols, but it made the bad guys life very much harder.
    Just a thought. If there was to be a radical shift towards this 90% is it than not likely that the TB would react by dropping focus on IEDs, and RPG-ing the odd helicopter in a more target rich sky? Just the odd one (relative to a great number in the air) would possibly equal or exceed the casualty rate currently inflicted by IEDs. I think again of “Blackhawk Down” and the large number of helicopters lost in Vietnam. Those two Blackhawks were near enough empty; they could have had half a platoon on board. And the choppers in Nam were smaller than what we typically use today.

    We’ll probably never find out though, because those chopper will indeed not likely become available at those rates.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
    Just a thought. If there was to be a radical shift towards this 90% is it than not likely that the TB would react by dropping focus on IEDs, and RPG-ing the odd helicopter in a more target rich sky?
    It's entirely possible that they might try. Enemies do adapt, which is not news to anyone that reads books.....

    But, yes, your point is well made. However, flying to the threat would mitigate some of the risk.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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