Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): merged thread

[Rex Brynen]

The CRS report that Ted linked to provides multiple reasons for doubt to be cast on the ability of the IC to fully take advantage of OSINT. The history of Intelligence analysis is a spotted one, so I'm not clear as to why Ted or anyone would think that analysis and collection of OSINT cannot be outsourced for better effect. Since you agree with Ted, perhaps you'll share your reasons?

I should start by saying the role of OSINT in analysis, the sorts of OSINT we're talking about, the technical challenges of collection and analysis, and its relative weight in production, all vary dramatically depending on the sort of analysis that one is doing. I can really only reflect on its role in the kind of (political and strategic assessment) work that I've done.

Second, it should be noted that there is already a lot of OSINT collection and analysis built into the system on the government side: a good share of diplomatic reporting, for example, is essentially OSINT collection and analysis. That reporting, in turn, feeds into IC product.

My concern about too much outsourcing of OSINT analysis stems from the observation that it is sometimes access to the high end classified material that shapes the relevance of OSINT, and those without access to this aren't always in a good position to understand the significance of what they are seeing in the OSINT material. I must admit, I always like to see data as raw as possible, to determine that the analytical conclusions drawn by others are the same ones that I would also draw.

I'm also worried about a byproduct of too much OSINT outsourcing being the implicit development of a division of labour--"you do the OSINT, we'll do the COMINT/HUMINT/etc"--which runs counter to the fundamental need for analysts to use the full spectrum of material.

I should add that my concerns are much less applicable to the outsourcing of some aspects of collection (which, as noted, is already done), and "preanalysis" of this material of the "hey, this is especially interesting" flag, or the "this relates in interesting ways to previous material" flag.

I have to dash to a conference in 2 minutes, so this answer rambles far more than I would wish. I'm sure, in any event, that Ted will provide a far more thoughtful and coherent answer than I'm capable of!

[JeffC]

My concern about too much outsourcing of OSINT analysis stems from the observation that it is sometimes access to the high end classified material that shapes the relevance of OSINT, and those without access to this aren't always in a good position to understand the significance of what they are seeing in the OSINT material. I must admit, I always like to see data as raw as possible, to determine that the analytical conclusions drawn by others are the same ones that I would also draw.

--- In the private sector, this is a given. Evidence is sourced, and anyone who cares to can examine the original source. It's only in the IC that source data is closely guarded rather than shared. It's a good example of one of many flaws in the present system.

I'm also worried about a byproduct of too much OSINT outsourcing being the implicit development of a division of labour--"you do the OSINT, we'll do the COMINT/HUMINT/etc"--which runs counter to the fundamental need for analysts to use the full spectrum of material.

But the current system IS a division of labor. There are MASINT analysts, SIGINT analysts, IMINT analysts, etc., who like the fact that they're specialists and look down their noses at All-Source analysts as nothing more than writers. There's a MITRE study that explores this and recommends some changes be made, but as far as I know, those changes haven't happened yet, and they may never happen at all. Additonally, there are specialist agencies: NRO, NSA, NGA that only focus on certain types of INT collection and analysis.