100% agree with Ken and his friend.
100% agree with Ken and his friend.
"The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
-- Ken White
"With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap
"We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Let me add my voice to the chorus.
MRAPs do have some utility as specialized niche vehicles. As troop carriers, they represent the bankruptcy of our tactical thinking and the spinelessness of our senior leaders.
Hopefully most of them will end up as targets on our training ranges.
The MRAP story sounds a lot like the hard body armour plate story on steroids, doesn't it?
So then how should we transport soldiers to their AO without them getting blown up on the way there? Blackhawks are great for that...when available.
I'm sure its true that some units use them to conduct presence patrols instead of walking, but that falls on unit TTPs and the small unit leaders on the ground. How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?
Obviously MRAPs aren't indestructible. They are being destroyed by IEDs with more ferequency in Afghanistan now. But what's the alternative?
I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting. The MRAP is the same sort of response to a threat that has our soldiers chasing insurgents while weighed down with 100 pounds of gear and body armor. Moreover, MRAPs isolate soldiers from the population and the environment and this extends the war - meaning more casualties in the long run.
I'm sorry, but a brutal fact of war that we sometimes forget is that preservation of our soldier's lives is not the primary objective. Our senior leaders rarely talk about that, and the MRAP is an example of taking the easy way out rather than laying out the often harsh facts of life.
There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive. While TTPs are important, why can't they be married with force protection for a greater effect?
The second assumption is that MRAP isolates Soldiers from the environment. MRAP is an inanimate object. MRAPs don't formulate missions, orders, TTPs, or SOPs. That would be the responsibility of commanders and leaders. While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue.
Another issue I have with this comment is the comparison to 100 lbs worth of body armor. Certainly, there is a tipping point where too much force protection inhibits mission accomplishment. Excessive equipment weight would seem to be one of them. On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong.
Lastly, I'd be careful about that last argument. While casualties are a part of war, the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense. Soldiers are combat power. If you lose combat power, you lose your ability to accomplish the mission. Therefore, you must preserve your combat power.
This isn't an emotional appeal for the lives of young men. It is a time-tested tenet of tactics and strategy.
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
The article's full title is: Room to Live: Why Aren't Armoured Vehicles Surviving the Explosive Threat in Afghanistan?
Link:http://www.defenceiq.com/article.cfm?externalID=3500
On a quick read from my "armchair" it may supplement this thread.
davidbfpo
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