An Airborne Expeditionary Unit?

[Rifleman]

This was posted by Ken White on another thread:

I strongly agree with you the GP units can do much more than we ask of them; all that's required is proper training (and we do not yet have that right) for the job they're head for. That, as opposed to schools which should train to levels higher than the next job, is necessary due to unit turnover.. A decently trained Infantry Battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do -- and at far less cost; give any Battlion the training time, gear and money a Ranger Battalion has and he'll be close enough in capability for government work.

It caught my eye and started me wondering; however, I didn't want to hijack the thread it came from, so.....

Would creating a special mission task force from "regular" parachute infantry units have been a better long term option than the Ranger Battalions? I mean something similar to the Marine Corps MEU (SOC) concept for the Army: an Airborne Expeditionary Unit (Ranger Operations Capable), or whatever you'd choose to call it.

Would the capability to execute ranger-type missions have suffered if battalions from the 82nd had been detached from the division, assigned temporarily to a special task force headquarters, and trained up, tested, certified and put on standby to perform ranger-type operations?

After six months or so on standby they could stand down and another battalion could take over the role.

This would go way beyond the Division Ready Force that I remember. We weren't trained up and evaluated on a list of special operations missions before assuming DRF1 in my day.

It's sort of a pointless debate at this stage; it's not going to change now. It probably shouldn't change. After all, why disband a capability in one place only to re-create it in another form somewhere else? I'm just asking if this would have been a better option to begin with instead of forming the Ranger Battalions back in 1974?

[Norfolk]

Rifleman, I think that creating new Ranger Battalions was probably unnecessary; with Ranger-type training and adequate resources, any regular infantry battalion can do the same thing.

We'll have to wait and see how Ken clarifies this when he posts, but I think that Ken seems to mean something more along German/Commonwealth lines rather than U.S. lines in this regard. What I mean is what Lord Slim said about any special operation requiring units larger than 5-man parties, that any properly-trained regular infantry unit should and can perform such operations. Slim was in favour of Special Forces like the SAS/SBS; he consciously rejected Commando Forces like the Army and Royal Marine Commandos, the Rangers, and their kind, considering them to be both unnecessary and a drain on the regular infantry battalions. He even believed that Parachute Operations should be a routine task for regular infantry battalions.

In short, I think what Ken is saying is that all regular infantry battalions should maintain Ranger Battalion-level standards, not just a select few. It must also be said that small Armies are often compelled by their small size to ensure that their regular units are capable of many "special operations" that larger armies can afford to have separate units for.

During the Second World War, the Imperial General Staff surveyed the CO's of the British and Commonwealth Infantry Battalions in the ETO about the acceptability of regular infantryman for Airborne Forces. The conclusion of the Infantry CO survey was that 2/3 rds of regular infantrymen would successfully pass Airborne Forces standards. Those standards included a 10-mile battle march within 2 hours with full kit, and a 20 mile forced march within 4 hours with full kit, amongst others. By comparison, the regular infantry were required to perform a 5-mile forced march within 1 hour, and a 20-mile route march within 5 hours, 20 minutes, both with full kit.

By the 1970's, the regular infantry battalions in Commonwealth Armies had taken over most of the tasks that formerly been the preserves of the Airborne and Commando Forces. Since then, the latter have been somewhat "heavied-up" and are used as much as elite shock troops as they are in their original roles. Although the British Airborne Forces have tweaked their standards in recent decades, and are now much closer to the Royal Marines in many ways than they used to be, those standards are hardly inaccessible to regular infantry. In any case, a 6-month basic infantry syllabus would be sufficient to achieve such standards without taking any "shortcuts". A 3- or 4-week Basic Parachute Course could be tacked on at the end. Basic Air Assault and Amphibious Assault training would be part of the aforesaid six months' basic infantry training.

I maintain some doubt that the standards of the Commando Forces would be quite so accessible, but Slim wrote that his own regular troops in India and Burma had been trained to the same high standards. Many Royal Marines instructors are of the view that a 9-month basic infantry and commando syllabus is necessary to bring select recruits up to such standards without either cutting some corners or losing trainees to injuries because they're being pushed too far too fast.

My principle objection to going this far is not that I don't believe regular infantry battalions are capaable of the same tasks and missions as Airborne Forces (or the Marines) with proper leadership and training. My principle objection is that most infantry battalions are (at least in my own experience) seriously under-funded for men and resources. Most units get by with just the minimum, if that. It is more "economical" in the view of planners for a few "elite" units to get the resources and funding that would give most regular infantry battalions (provided that they were on a German-style Divisional System or at least a British-style Regimental System, rather than an "individual"-based system) with proper leadership and training, the same capabilities. Otherwise, if I am reading Ken correctly, I quite agree with him.

At the very least, other than lack of resources, I see no good reason why the Airborne and Air Assault Divisions aren't all RIP-qualified, dispensing with the need for separate Ranger Battalions altogether. Same for the Marine Divisions; other than lack of resources, there seems little good reason for Marine Infantry Battalions to not all be SOC-capable - even the Marine Corps offically agrees on this point, theoretically. So, other than Special Forces, practically all other regular infantry units should be capable of what Marine-MEU-SOC and Ranger Battalions are capable of now.

[Ken White]

"A decently trained Infantry Battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do -- and at far less cost; give any Battalion the training time, gear and money a Ranger Battalion has and he'll be close enough in capability for government work." (emphasis added / kw)

Your cite of Slim is apropos -- and that comment by him is one of the reasons I named him in my list on the Great Generals thread. Slim 'got it' -- pity about some of the others...

Only thing I'd add to your excellent post is that while some airborne capability is needed, most missions do not require that capability; what they do require are just well trained and competent units that are trusted to do missions without over supervision. The MEU(SOC) was a good start...

[Norfolk]

Only thing I'd add to your excellent post is that while some airborne capability is needed, most missions do not require that capability; what they do require are just well trained and competent units that are trusted to do missions without over supervision. The MEU(SOC) was a good start...

Would it be fair to say then, Ken, that for strictly practical purposes, a smaller Commando Forces element (say Brigade Group/Separate Brigade-sized) would be (theoretically) more efficient than a pair of Airborne/Air Assault Divisions and a Ranger Regiment for Parachute Operations, and leave all the other conventional and special operations (excepting of course those that adhere to Slim's rule) to regular infantry formations and units?

[slapout9]

Before the Ranger battalions were reformed the 82nd was already able to do those missions and a few others to boot. I am of the opinion that many of the so called special operations capabilities are nothing but good infantry training.

[Norfolk]

Before the Ranger battalions were reformed the 82nd was already able to do those missions and a few others to boot. I am of the opinion that many of the so called special operations capabilities are nothing but good infantry training.

Totally agree slapout, and so true.

[Ken White]

Would it be fair to say then, Ken, that for strictly practical purposes, a smaller Commando Forces element (say Brigade Group/Separate Brigade-sized) would be (theoretically) more efficient than a pair of Airborne/Air Assault Divisions and a Ranger Regiment for Parachute Operations, and leave all the other conventional and special operations (excepting of course those that adhere to Slim's rule) to regular infantry formations and units?

Heh. I can only give my opinion and not a definitive answer (obviously ). slapout has an excellent point -- the Eighty Twice did in fact train for and perform those missions -- as did the 101st when they were still on jump status. Units in Alaska, Panama and Germany or later, Italy, also trained for them. Got pretty good at them, too. The 1st Ranger Bn was activated because training two Divisions and three Bde sized elements to do those missions was deemed too expensive. The other two Bns were activated because one was not enough.

I'm not a fan of the Division, any Division, I think they're an anachronism retained to justify GO slots -- of whom we have too many -- but given the current state of the world, I'd be inclined to go with six Separate parachute Bdes answering to an Airborne Corps for most -- which is what we now have. However, I'd up them to three Inf Bns plus the Cav Sqn.

The remaining Light Inf (12 Bdes) would get the same training less the parachute and all 18 Bdes would be on the ground -- and for most missions -- totally interchangeable.

Nor am I a fan of the Ranger Regiment (with all due apologies to denizens thereof, including Jorge and a few other friends... ). In fact, if you took those guys and spread them around...

One caveat -- We need a SOCOM or something similar and their direct action capability and they need a significant deployable Intel and backup element. IMO, that should all be a joint operation and removed from the services -- who also need a direct action capability but on an operational rather than a strategic scale. Tactical DA capability should be at Corps level, OpCon to Bdes as required. I'm inclined to think the SF Gps should revert to the Army and concentrate on the UW / ID missions but some form of effort with that SOCOM would certainly be necessary -- that needs some thought and study. not by me, I can't affect anything; by the Army and SOCOM..

That'll probably fire up some people who'll say I don't understand. I do, been there done that. All of it -- the issue is political and parochial whereas it should be nothing but effectiveness. Sadly, my perception is that is not the case.

[Rifleman]

[QUOTE=Ken White;29872]

I'm not a fan of the Division, any Division, I think they're an anachronism retained to justify GO slots -- of whom we have too many -- but given the current state of the world, I'd be inclined to go with six Separate parachute Bdes answering to an Airborne Corps for most -- which is what we now have. However, I'd up them to three Inf Bns plus the Cav Sqn.

I think that's Col. MacGregor's idea. That's way above the level I knew anything about (the way things worked just got sort of hazy for a young E-5 when you got above battalion level ) but I think he makes a sensible argument. He certainly articulates his position well.

Nor am I a fan of the Ranger Regiment (with all due apologies to denizens thereof, including Jorge and a few other friends... ). In fact, if you took those guys and spread them around...

I think your former Marineness is showing. Wasn't that the reason Raider Battalions were disbanded?

One caveat -- We need a SOCOM or something similar and their direct action capability and they need a significant deployable Intel and backup element. IMO, that should all be a joint operation and removed from the services --

CIA controlled perhaps?

I'm inclined to think the SF Gps should revert to the Army and concentrate on the UW / ID missions but some form of effort with that SOCOM would certainly be necessary -- that needs some thought and study. not by me, I can't affect anything; by the Army and SOCOM..

Again, it occurs to me that not all WWII OSS operatives were Army. Some were civilians. Should the CIA take over/handle all UW?