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Old 09-22-2009   #1
Westhawk
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Default The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

Brigadier General H.R. McMaster has sent to Small Wars Journal the latest draft of Army Capstone Concept version 2.7. McMaster leads a team at TRADOC that is charged with revising the Capstone Concept, which provides fundamental guidance to the Army’s doctrine and training efforts.

By December, McMaster and his team will complete their work on the Capstone Concept. Between now and then, he wants to hear from you. So please open this file, read it, and provide your comments, either here or at the Capstone Concept post at SWJ Blog. McMaster and his team will read these comments and use them to improve this important document.

(You will note that the Capstone Concept draft we received is marked “For Official Use Only.” I assure you that we received this document openly from the Army and for the purposes explained above. McMaster and his colleagues at TRADOC want Small Wars Journal’s readers to help them improve the Capstone Concept.)

Last edited by Westhawk; 09-24-2009 at 08:36 PM. Reason: Insert PDF file without "For Official Use Only" notation
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Old 09-22-2009   #2
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Default First Cut, Looks pretty good.

Attached is a Word document with some initial comments / recommendations.

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Old 09-23-2009   #3
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Default DoD Buzz Lends a Hand

Greg Grant at DoD Buzz has posted a long commentary on this effort titled Army Wants Ideas on Future Wars.
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Old 09-23-2009   #4
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Default An excellent exercise...

First, I will strongly second Ken's recommendation to add "Disrupt" (see his file, upthread).

Secondly, I will heartily commend the theme of "Complexity and Uncertainty" and the emphasis upon adaptive thinking.

Thirdly, my rec:

Re: IO, PSYOPS, PD, etc. in light of "uncertainty" and "complexity"

Adaptive response to uncertainty and changing conditions require that commanders have flexibility and autonomy. Generally, the amount of flexibility/autonomy they have is inverse to the amount of media attention their operations generate because media attention is a valuable currency that attracts political actors ( domestic and foreign, state and non-state).

The military has attempted to "manage" the media with limited success. The infosphere is now global, networked and viral and many major players (BBC, al Jazeera etc.) begin from a stance of critical hostility toward USG foreign policy/military objectives. The greater the degree that a US operation is the subject of media attention, the worse our strategic starting point is in terms of information. Under such conditions, trying to "spin" or court media influencers is like the Dutch boy putting fingers in the leaking dike.

The media in its varied forms but particularly major TV and print media have very finite resources. They can as a system, give one global crisis tight scrutiny but when the number of newsworthy events coincide, they quickly demonstrate the effects of exceeding "cognitive load". The volume of information cannot be effectively juggled or processed either by the media filters ( reporters, editors) or the audience. This has immediate policy implications.

Even in the simple media era of the early Cold War, simultaneous crisises degraded the ability of superpowers to respond effectively to either. Case in point, the Suez Crisis intersecting with the Soviet invasion of Hungary resulted in Dulles and Eisenhower waffling on Hungary and delivering a sharp elbow to France and Britain. Khrushchev, by contrast, had no realistic possibility of aiding Nasser had Ike sided with the British, Israelis and French. The number of officials in any great power who make key decisions on the use of force are too few to manage multiple intersecting calamities. If the amount of "noise" in the system is increased, their job becomes more difficult.

U.S. war planners need to conceive of campaigns in terms of a global "attention economy". The greater the number of competing stories that exist to suck up media attention during military operations, the wider the latitude that U.S. ground commanders will have to "adapt" to circumstances. The competing stories do not have to be another geopolitical crisis either - a sex scandal or death of a celebrity figure like Princess Diana or Michael Jackson serves just as well. The crux is that the story needs to be attractive to key media decision makers from a business standpoint.

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Old 09-24-2009   #5
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Default

Zen mate, not having a pop but...

Quote:
Originally Posted by zenpundit View Post
Adaptive response to uncertainty and changing conditions require that commanders have flexibility and autonomy. Generally, the amount of flexibility/autonomy they have is inverse to the amount of media attention their operations generate because media attention is a valuable currency that attracts political actors ( domestic and foreign, state and non-state).
ALL WAR has ALWAYS been uncertain and complex. Adaptation has ALWAYS been required. Media attention is utterly irrelevant unless commanders are taking their orders from the BBC. You conduct operations in line with political guidance from your chain on command. You do not modify a plan because you fear the media. You modify a plan so as it best gains the political objective you Commander in chief is seeking to achieve.

Quote:
The military has attempted to "manage" the media with limited success. The infosphere is now global, networked and viral and many major players (BBC, al Jazeera etc.) begin from a stance of critical hostility toward USG foreign policy/military objectives. The greater the degree that a US operation is the subject of media attention, the worse our strategic starting point is in terms of information.
You cannot "manage" anything in war. You either react to it, or force it to do your will, by what ever means (ask nicely, ask, tell, and then force )

Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.

Media is only relevant in terms of it's political effect - so Clausewitz applies. Martin Luther had no modern media, and the Nazis only had radio and print - all of which was used to "political" not Military effect.
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Old 09-24-2009   #6
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Default Wilf, I generally agree with you...

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You cannot "manage" anything in war. You either react to it, or force it to do your will, by what ever means (ask nicely, ask, tell, and then force )
and I totally agree with that.
Quote:
Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.
On this, though in reverse order -- I agree that modern war is no more complex. In fact all things considered, it's probably slightly less complex than it was a century ago due to better communication and broader knowledge.

On the media affecting war being evidence free, I agree. However, I think it does affect some, say about 10 to 20%, warfighters. The rub and the perception that media affects war can come from where in the chain of command representatives of that small percentage are found. A senior commander with a fear of adverse publicity can do strange things. I have seen good senior commanders who totally ignored the media and others, less good, who were quite concerned with their image...

Then, of course, there's the effect of media attention on Politicans. Those Squirrels tend to be quite media sensitive -- and they tend to have directive or budgetary authority...
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Old 09-24-2009   #7
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Default Hi Wilf

Always good to hear from you, Wilf and glad that you helped get this discussion flowing. Your views here on the media and warfare are neat, plausible and wrong

The media is not "irrelevant". If commanders find themselves eschewing perfectly legal and militarily efficient options because of how they would "look" under conditions of a panopticon battlefield, then the political effect of the media is one of the variables to which modern armies must adapt. If the adaptation is a continual circumscribing of military operations over time, then I submit that they are not being particularly creative in adapting.

Quote:
ALL WAR has ALWAYS been uncertain and complex. Adaptation has ALWAYS been required
Yes, but what matters here is to what degree?

Warfare has oscillated historically through periods of stability where tactics, weaponry, accepted rules of engagement and parley, treatment of prisoners went unchanged in significant ways for decades or even centuries. I agree with you that "adaption has always been required" but as institutions, militaries are often very conservative. It often takes many hard knocks for them to give up beloved but outdated practices, be they caste-based military systems, red coats, bronze cannon, horse cavalry or battleships.

This can be contrasted with periods of innovation where new ideas - for example, metal weapons, writing, the stirrup, gunpowder, close order drill, republican government, nationalism, industrial mass production, railroad timetables, atomic bombs - disrupted customary patterns of warfare. Some of these inventions amounted to game-changers for warfare.

The military that recognizes the need for adaption and executes it successfully wins a comparative advantage - for a time. The greater the number of innovations a military has to deal with at once, the more difficult that process becomes organizationally. Particularly, when the change is a societal one that is periphereal or indirect to immediate military concerns - like the information revolution.

Quote:
You conduct operations in line with political guidance from your chain on command. You do not modify a plan because you fear the media. You modify a plan so as it best gains the political objective you Commander in chief is seeking to achieve.
Wilf, what democratic government with a modern military conducting operations is not going to expect its military leaders to make an effort a priori to account for the possible political effects of global media in their planning?

This concern goes beyond the traditional political-psychological-morale effects we saw at, say, at Tet after Cronkite's infamous broadcast. In a globalized world, war news impacts "hot money" flows of currency in or out of national economies. By itself, this media-driven market reaction can have a strategic, even crippling, impact on a nation's war effort in a very short time frame.

Quote:
Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.

Media is only relevant in terms of it's political effect - so Clausewitz applies. Martin Luther had no modern media, and the Nazis only had radio and print - all of which was used to "political" not Military effect.
I do not see many examples of militaries these days successfully disaggregating political and military effects during combat, and a major reason for this is the ubiquity of media - professional and amateur.

Modernity is relative, not absolute. Luther had the printing press and the Bible in the vernacular. For his time, that was "modernity" and it had an explosive political impact that transformed the military dynamic of the Holy Roman Empire by giving rise to Protestant powers. While the Kaiser lost control over the Imperial German Army to Ludendorff and Hindenburg, Hitler's use of the radio ensured his ultimate command and control over the army and state until his very last days on earth before committing suicide. Radio was "modern enough" to permit the national political leadership to decisively micromanage the affairs of theater and army command.

To conclude, what I'm arguing for really, is greater military adaption to the effects of a global media in a way that preserves the greatest latitude for commanders to carry out their mission.
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Old 09-24-2009   #8
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Default Wilf,

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Media is only relevant in terms of it's political effect - so Clausewitz applies. Martin Luther had no modern media, and the Nazis only had radio and print - all of which was used to "political" not Military effect.
Precisely. And since war is the continuation of politics by other means, if one side can use media to break the political will of their opponent, they win without firing a shot. (Or at any rate firing fewer.)

As an example, in Iraq the media was using the war as a cudgel to beat on a president of whom they disapproved. The result (intended or not) was to encourage our opponents while sapping public support. Even worse, the steady drum beat caused the administration to view ALL criticism of any aspect of the war as nothing more than domestic partisanship.

Add to that the difficulty partisan media hostility created in the area of Information Operations/Psychological Operations. Several attempts by the military to release favorable information, both domestically and in theater, were outed and (successfully) discredited - without regard to the impact on strategic objectives, let alone the verity of the information.

I took one of your points to be that commanders in the field can't conduct mission planning around media impact - and I agree. However, military and political leadership at national, strategic and possibly even operational levels must.
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Old 03-05-2010   #9
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Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Zen mate, not having a pop but...


ALL WAR has ALWAYS been uncertain and complex. Adaptation has ALWAYS been required. Media attention is utterly irrelevant unless commanders are taking their orders from the BBC. You conduct operations in line with political guidance from your chain on command. You do not modify a plan because you fear the media. You modify a plan so as it best gains the political objective you Commander in chief is seeking to achieve.


You cannot "manage" anything in war. You either react to it, or force it to do your will, by what ever means (ask nicely, ask, tell, and then force )

Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.

Media: I'm not sure the bombing of Dresden or Hamburg would possible today due to media influence. The Allies killed 200,000 people in 3 days (mostly all civilians). There's no way we could do that today. Do you think we could get away with bombing Tehran like we did Dresden or Tokyo?
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Old 09-23-2009   #10
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Default Change & complexity

As a civilian, and non-U.S. national, I am a tad wary of critiqueing a document that has obviously had so much care, consideration and professional effort put in to it, predominantly from people who clearly 'walk the walk'.

That said, my immediate impression is of an inconsistency between the individual parts and the whole. While the introductory section give a succinct picture of the problems associated with scientific precision and etheral war, parts of the draft (e.g. 2-2 Future Operating Environment) reiterate or reemphasise the same flawed thinking about our human environment that has led to the constant replication of mistakes and constant cycle of retranche, reanalysis, revision, and repetition. These flaws are two - our focus on change and our misunderstanding of complexity.

Change - while the intro does acknowledge continuity, sections like 2-2 over-egg the pudding with the use of language that overemphasises what will be different, and neglect to point out that a hell of a lot in human affairs will remain the same. I was recently re-reading a USAWC publication from 2000 on the decade ahead. It was full of techie jargon and concepts relating to cybernetics etc etc. The future war was all robotics, networks etc, and not the same crude encounters with home-made explosives, simple ambushcades, hostile populations that professional armies have faced for at least a couple of generations. The popularity of Galula etc in 2003+ was they were reminding us of the continuity in human affairs.

Complexity has become an ever-handy excuse for poor performance. Yes, we live in complex times, but so did Machiavelli (he talks about the complexity of his Italy in an early part of The Prince) or Caesar, or most probably in his own mind, Ugg our great cave-warrior-ancestor. The point is that human affairs have never been anything other than complex, humans just don't do simple! By constantly emphasising complexity and change, important documents like this can create the erroneous impression, among young emerging leaders especially, that because all in front is new, they have little to learn from the past, and engagement in history is only an act of homage, not tutulage.

Two cents worth from NZ. In case you haven't seen these images Stateside, follow the link for some scary environmental images from Aussie. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news...lery_id=107575 Just another environmental incident to add to the debate about the changing nature of human security.
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Old 09-23-2009   #11
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Default Modularity in TRADOC

I'm curious to know why there isn't modularity in TRADOC. Instead of having TRADOC as a separate command; why not dissolve TRADOC and integrate it into the operational Army's G-3 and S-3 offices. Each theater in the operational Army will have a training component responsible for training soldiers for all occupations in that theater. That way, soldiers get training more specific to their assigned theater. This also allows for not only top-down management, but also bottom-up management as the units (that the soldiers eventually get assigned to) will provide feedback. input, and direction over training.

This arrangement also allows for more flexibility that allows Brigades and Divisions to adapt to change. Under the current system, TRADOC is separate from the operational Army and is unable to adapt and keep up with changes in the operational Army.

Does this idea make sense?

Comments and feedback are welcome....

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Old 10-03-2009   #12
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Default The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

Quote:
Originally Posted by EmmetM View Post
That said, my immediate impression is of an inconsistency between the individual parts and the whole. While the introductory section give a succinct picture of the problems associated with scientific precision and etheral war, parts of the draft (e.g. 2-2 Future Operating Environment) reiterate or reemphasise the same flawed thinking about our human environment that has led to the constant replication of mistakes and constant cycle of retranche, reanalysis, revision, and repetition. These flaws are two - our focus on change and our misunderstanding of complexity.
This capstone document is refreshing in its break from the decades of US Military doctrine which have focused almost exclusively on high intensity conflict. Many of us had experienced personal frustration with this mindset while planning and executing “other than combat” operations in Iraq (2003). Since then, it has been remarkable to observe just how slowly the institution adapts in response to visible and current evidence that war is more about dealing with a whole range of actors to influence decisions, as opposed to killing every last enemy combatant. I find it refreshing and encouraging, for example, to see substantial discussion about partnerships, including NGOs and private sector.

In his foreward, General Dempsey does an outstanding job, laying out the concept and vision, including key concepts of decentralization, adaptability and the interacting elements of physical and psychological control. There are a few weaknesses, however, in the ensuing discussion, which is intended to develop those concepts.

Wm makes an important point that we need to look ahead and not expect to fight the last war.
Quote:
If you look at the scenarios in the ACC, they are all things that we currently plan for based on what has already happened in the past. There are no new scenarios.
What happens to the Army if it is faced with something its never seen before? For example: a "coalition of the willing" decides it no longer wants a world that lets the US to play the role of global defender; or the US is just left out of the conversation so to speak --nations choose not to trade with us anymore, for example. Suppose Saudi Arabia stopped selling oil to the US and Canada stopped piping in natural gas, both selling the former US share to China instead.
I also agree with Dr C. that you need to have a foot in the present and be thoughtful in projecting the future.
Quote:
A focus on what works today isn't to be stagnant. It's to ground the future propositions in examples of what has worked. The future propositions should innovate. The process involves envisioning what might be, and writing affirmative statements that describe the idealized future, applying "what if."
What worked in the last war? Adaptive people working in established teams. In Iraq, small units conducting operations outside their core mission set on a daily basis: artillery soldiers providing convoy security or negotiating with tribal leaders. Sadaam was captured by some engineer solders who clearly were not busy building anything or clearing minefields at the time. These Americans succeeded to the degree that they could adapt and work together under urgent conditions.

How will future trends affect the operating environment? One glaring omission from the Capstone paper is effective consideration of globalization and concurrent shifts in political and economic power (e.g., Section 2-3). China is producing more engineers than we have people; they are building an unprecedented high tech (even green!) industrial capacity and are aggressively establishing strategic, international partnerships. World petroleum reserves, which carry with them economic and political power, are increasingly in the hands of less stable nations, or those with little or no alignment with US security agendas. Clearly, we will operate with significantly less autonomy or freedom of maneuver (not just geographic, but in the human/political dimensions). The authors should shorten discussions of historical events such as Iraq and Lebanon in favor of some recognition of significant and relevant world trends.

These emerging shifts sharpen the importance of another historic American weakness, our ingrained narcissism. Even as we recognize that we now must consider “the people” (in addition to “us” and “them”), the Capstone document does not really capture the point that Steve the Planner and others have made in this discussion – that “the people” are not just some benign set of neutral bystanders. Section 1-6b, for example, treats “others” as sort of minor complications – mentioning, for example, the seemingly simple need for “. . . flexibility to secure populations and organizations.”

In fact, “the people” are a diverse set of actors with different agendas (independent of our own), but with whom we must form a full range of relationships. This is a critical concept to understand constructs such as narco-terrorism, where the various actors work together with complementary but very different agendas. Afghani contractors who sell us pipe or dig wells need not to be American patriots. Iraqi communities work with us to rebuild schools because we share a value of education – not because they want their town to be occupied by US forces.

In order to succeed in the future operating environment, information is perhaps the most critical tool. We rarely win wars by decimating the enemy – today, we probably would not stop al Qaeda or the Muslim extremist movement by killing Osama. Section 3-2c is woefully inadequate in conveying this concept. The bottom line is not that “Russians and Chinese believe that information warfare is a way of resolving conflict in their favor.” It is that we win wars through decisions, which are based substantially upon information. While cyber warfare is important, it does not warrant dominating the discussion space allocated to Information Warfare; this again reflects the American fascination with technology.

Finally, we still struggle to think beyond geographical boundaries and established government structures. The Capstone document is littered with evidence that we are stuck in the paradigm that operations equal combat in an area defined by geographic (3-D) space. Section 2-2 includes several references to conflict being constrained to space (incorrectly, by the way, suggesting terrorists and criminals operate primarily in lawless spaces – like New York, Chicago, Miami, London and Bogata?). Section 3-4a. misses an opportunity to set the stage for discussion of the “Military Solution” through a more expansive description of “operational area” to clearly include human and information dimensions.

Military operations are all about soldiers on the ground. However, we need to expand our thinking in terms of what those soldiers do.
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Old 10-03-2009   #13
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Default Systemic Operational Design

I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf

Quote:
"Sacred cows make the best hamburgers. The Aristotelian box includes the uncritically accepted article of faith -- which we take for granted -- that revolves around reasoning about means and ends. The logic of this type of reasoning has burgeoned over the centuries (at an accelerating rate recently) in the form of "problem-solving" enshrined as a sacred principle. . . . Strategy is not about problem-solving" (p. 21).
The author discusses Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and I pointed this article out because of his perspective on problem-solving as a framework.

I think the capstone document would be stronger if a framework other than "problem-solution" was used. I've probably reached my word limit for how many times I can write that in one discussion thread.

I doubt if I'm the only person who will read the capstone and take issue with the framework and how the authors arrived at their solutions. I'm trying to be helpful and suggest how to build a stronger position.
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Old 10-03-2009   #14
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Michelle:

Agree that we are probably reaching a word (and concept) limit without further input.

By now, I suspect we are debating an early draft that has already cleaned up a lot.

I'm actually looking to understand more about how it deals with the future.

Unspoken in a lot of the discussion is, in fact, how much we are seeking to adapt past solutions to current and future problems. It is both a human and organizational foundation.

My best guess is that when we are in a place with a confused mission, we are always vulnerable. No matter how big or how many resources are committed.

The one question which I feel confident about as a future scenario is neither winning nor losing in long-term festering problems that we, as a nation, will not commit so abundantly to as to pursue a definitive end, but for which we have some minimum objectives that do not fully encompass controlling the people, land and resources, psychologically or physically.

Is that a realistic scenario for the future, and how does the Army prepare for that?

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Old 10-03-2009   #15
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Dr. C View Post
I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf



The author discusses Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and I pointed this article out because of his perspective on problem-solving as a framework.

I think the capstone document would be stronger if a framework other than "problem-solution" was used. I've probably reached my word limit for how many times I can write that in one discussion thread.

I doubt if I'm the only person who will read the capstone and take issue with the framework and how the authors arrived at their solutions. I'm trying to be helpful and suggest how to build a stronger position.
I posted that article when it first came out because of his discussion of action theory although he says the theory is not well known any Cop will tell you the motive comes first....even crazy people have a motive. He discusses some of the drawbacks of thinking of Strategy as Ends,Ways and Means. Really Good Stuff in there.
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Old 10-04-2009   #16
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Dr. C View Post
I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf
There are so many things wrong with that article, I hardly know where to begin. Prominent among the errors is the assertion that the Luftwaffe bombed London to force a capitulation. - Completely untrue.

The author also says,
Quote:
We can avoid the logical error of instrumentalism (that which may work in practice, but not in theory) only by disclosing our paper trail of reasoning.
WHAT? If he seriously believes that, then how does he define the purpose of Strategy? Surely Strategy is INSTRUMENTAL! - It is used to get something done!
If the secret of SOD is merely holding reasoning and assumption to rigour, then why not say that. Theory you cannot put into effective practice or use to inform practice is utterly useless.
The role of "theory" in military thought is to check the relationships between intentions, practices and actions. The primary source of useful military theory is history. - which SOD seems mostly to ignore.

1.) There is no evidence that SOD is any better or more valid an idea than Manoeuvre Warfare or EBO - there is simply no reason (body of evidence) to believe this.

2.) I hate to rain on the author's parade, but there is substantial evidence that the flow down effects of SOD were very much responsible for problems in the Lebanon. He talks of "Israeli SOD Theorists" - I know of only one, and his standing is not high, except in the US SOD commercial consultant world.

3.) There are no "ethics" in military theory. The ethical dimension is merely how well or poorly a course of action sets forth the policy! Killing civilians generally undermines political objectives. - More over this is a bizarrely "White Christian" view of the world. Many many folks in the world consider killing civilians to be the heart of their strategy.

So yes, the article is nice convoluted wordy romp through various philosophy and theory, but so what?
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Old 10-15-2009   #17
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From page 16: "Consistent Messages and Actions. Because future operation will occur in and among the people, under the unblinking eye of the media, and against threats savvy enough to present competing narratives, Army actions and messages must be congruent with and consistent with policy and objectives."

Redundant because the Army should be acting within policy and objectives in the first place (commander's intent?).

Confusing because it addresses the obvious with an air of presenting a unique solution.

When was the last time the Army presented a congruent and consistent message in a timeframe useful to the maneuver commander that didn't take thousands of staff hours to produce, let alone in an environment where there is an enemy actively trying to kill them?

Recommend fixing the title to something less wordy. Perhaps, "War."

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Old 10-28-2009   #18
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I just finished working my way through the draft. I hope that it is as has been said previously an early draft that has been polished up since. It definitely reads like a document that has a number of drafters who have worked in isolation and then complied the document. While I believe that the intent for this capstone publication is admirable, from it's current form it still has a long way to go.

If there is one single recommendation, I would make, it is that it needs to be placed in the hands of someone who really knows how to write. Its written structure is horrible with massive sentences and paragraphs that mix ideas and concepts in a most unuser-friendly manner. There is some great content in it but extracting it is just too hard - as it is I doubt you could get too many troops reading a publication that should be as well-thumbed by junior leaders as by senior ones.

My notes file is too big to upload here so will forward it back via our TRADOC LNO.
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Old 12-02-2009   #19
Bill Jakola
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Default A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army (ALDS)

In furthering the Army's emphasis on developing leaders to succeed in the complexities of the operational environment, now and in the future, TRADOC produced a strategy that DA officially released, on 25 November. I wanted to ensure you all received this Leader Development Strategy. Additionally, we will publish an annex to this strategy for each cohort—NCO, warrant officer, and officer—in a portfolio of initiatives that will provide specific implementation detail. What do you all think about this strategy?
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Last edited by Bill Jakola; 12-02-2009 at 07:33 PM.
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Old 12-08-2009   #20
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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola View Post
In furthering the Army's emphasis on developing leaders to succeed in the complexities of the operational environment, now and in the future, TRADOC produced a strategy that DA officially released, on 25 November. I wanted to ensure you all received this Leader Development Strategy. Additionally, we will publish an annex to this strategy for each cohort—NCO, warrant officer, and officer—in a portfolio of initiatives that will provide specific implementation detail. What do you all think about this strategy?
Where is this officially posted? Thanks.
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