SMALL WARS COUNCIL
Go Back   Small Wars Council > Small Wars Participants & Stakeholders > Historians

Historians The practice of history, and historical analysis. See FAQ for where to discuss history relevant to other forums.

Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
Old 03-07-2011   #21
Jim Hooper
Registered User
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Posts: 2
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
In the first post I mentioned the 1988 book Koevoet by Jim Hooper (a US photographer / journalist based in the UK, who had embedded with SW African COIN unit, in the conflict over nowadays Namibia).

Today I found his website: http://jimhooper.co.uk/ which has a mass of photos: http://jimhooper.co.uk/gallery3.html, three short video clips and other subjects covered.
In a moment of whimsy, I Googled the title of my first book and was surprised to see it mentioned here. My thanks go to DavidBFPO.I hope those who have read Koevoet or its American edition Beneath the Visiting Moon found the story of passing interest.

Another first-hand account of the unit will be published in July 2011 by Zebra Press, an imprint of Random House-Struik. Written by Arn 'Jim' Durand, one of my first mentors when I was embedded with Koevoet, Zulu, Zulu Golf covers his seven years of COIN operations on both sides of the Namibia-Angola border. My six months covering the bush war, during which I managed to get winged twice, pale by comparison with Durand's 120+ contacts.

In the meantime, if anyone has questions about the most effective COIN unit ever to have operated in Africa I'm happy to answer them as best I can.

Jim Hooper
www.jimhooper.co.uk

"There's no such thing as a small battle or tiny war at cockpit, squad or platoon level."
Colonel Jack L. Mullen
Road Runner 6

Last edited by Jim Hooper; 03-07-2011 at 07:06 PM. Reason: making it better
Jim Hooper is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-08-2011   #22
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by Jim Hooper View Post
In a moment of whimsy, I Googled the title of my first book and was surprised to see it mentioned here. My thanks go to DavidBFPO.I hope those who have read Koevoet or its American edition Beneath the Visiting Moon found the story of passing interest.

Another first-hand account of the unit will be published in July 2011 by Zebra Press, an imprint of Random House-Struik. Written by Arn 'Jim' Durand, one of my first mentors when I was embedded with Koevoet, Zulu, Zulu Golf covers his seven years of COIN operations on both sides of the Namibia-Angola border. My six months covering the bush war, during which I managed to get winged twice, pale by comparison with Durand's 120+ contacts.

In the meantime, if anyone has questions about the most effective COIN unit ever to have operated in Africa I'm happy to answer them as best I can.

Jim Hooper
www.jimhooper.co.uk

"There's no such thing as a small battle or tiny war at cockpit, squad or platoon level."
Colonel Jack L. Mullen
Road Runner 6
Hi Jim, welcome.

Any input you may have with regard to the Koevoet operations and tactics in northern SWA/Namibia would be useful and appreciated. The Koevoet operation was a unique concept successfully developed and used there. There are lessons to be learned from Koevoet specifically.

Regards
JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-09-2011   #23
Jim Hooper
Registered User
 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Posts: 2
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA View Post
In South West Africa (Namibia) the South Africans raised battalions from each of the ethnic groups and obviously the police recruited locals for their station areas for language, cultural awareness etc etc. Koevoet was about 25% white and together they fought against SWAPO / PLAN. That mix of black and white policemen achieved the best results of all forces in SWA/Namibia.

So if there is anything to take out of the Southern African wars that is worthy of study it is the Rhodesian Fire Force and the South West African Koetvoet operations.

And for either of these concepts to have any potential value for Afghanistan it needs some like a Hans Dreyer (who knows Afghanistan) to study both concepts in detail and come up some hybrid that would be useful in Afghanistan.
In the last few years I have been approached by a number of Ph.D. candidates whose theses centre on the use of private military companies (PMCs). I confess that they eventually come to me because their first choices succumbed to interviewee fatigue long ago and now decline such requests. My supposed expertise is limited to having written the first books on both Koevoet and Executive Outcomes, the former police unit comprising an important element of the latter company. The success of both has led some academics to believe they could be equally effective anywhere in the world. However, a critical analysis of what made them so successful suggests otherwise. The latest PH.D. student is convinced that EO-like PMCs are the answer to a First World country’s internal political divisions over involvement in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In hope of generating debate, I’m sharing part of my latest email to him:

************************************************** ******************

Dear Mr ……, I believe your thesis on the role of PMCs is fatally flawed. First, Executive Outcomes was an anomaly, a phenomenon that is unlikely ever to be repeated. Its success was the result of black and white Africans - professional soldiers and airmen who had already worked together for 15 to 30 years - in Africa. They understood the culture and spoke the lingua franca - Portuguese in Angola, English in Sierra Leone. Were EO still in existence today and operating in Iraq or Afghanistan, they would not enjoy the same success; their military skills would be the same, but the local culture would be incomprehensible to them and they could not function without interpreters (who, due to tribal loyalties and various cultural imperatives, can never be relied on completely, especially in the chaos of combat); and without supporting arms such as artillery, fighter bombers and intelligence-gathering, their effectiveness in an offensive role would be close to zero in comparison to well-integrated state armies.

[Break-break for SWC readers: Michael F’s question in the COIN case: LRA thread, and Tom Odom’s eminently sensible answer lead to the perfect role for the now-retired EO.]

Second, your focus on jus in bello suggests to me that you see PMC employees as less ethical and less sensitive than state armies to their own losses and civilian deaths. From my experience, this perception is profoundly wrong. Remember that they learned their professions as members of Western military/police structures imbued with Judeo-Christian values and working in accordance with national and international law. To think that they will abandon those values when they exchange a state uniform for a PMC uniform is illogical. Equally illogical is to think that war can ever - or should - be risk free. War is defined by the possibility of death, and taking that risk is one of the greatest psychological motivations for young men who volunteer for military service.

No modern state is going to hire PMCs to conduct offensive operations in order to minimise own-force casualties. Doing so would call into question the state's investment in training, command and control, combat and logistics capabilities, and ethics. Nor will it dedicate artillery, close air support, precision guided munitions, aerial surveillance, sigint and a multitude of necessary specialists for the benefit of PMCs. The cost of providing those assets for both its own forces and PMCs (already better paid than its own personnel) would be astronomical. Do you really believe the US Congress, British Parliament, German Bundestag, French Assemblée Nationale, or Israeli Knesset - all legislatures representing countries that admire their nations' military prowess - would authorise such a radical departure from convention? It would be a damning self-indictment with huge political implications, both domestically and internationally. A comparison to 3rd and 4th Century Rome would be inescapable.

The only politically acceptable offensive role for PMCs is anti-piracy operations. Pirates are themselves mercenaries operating outside international law. They are universally seen as dangerous criminals who represent a clear and present danger to a law-abiding merchant fleet on which a large part of the world's economy is dependent. Compared to the manpower and materiel requirements for effective ground operations, the necessary assets to counter pirates are minimal and not financially burdensome: a few fastboats with radar, secure communications, automatic weapons no heavier than 20mm, a few relatively inexpensive UAVs data-linked to the boats and central command post, and a long-range helicopter capability for medical evacuation. And there are ample historical precedents for issuing letters of marque giving maritime PMCs a legal basis for their actions.

ENDS

Last edited by Jim Hooper; 03-09-2011 at 03:32 PM. Reason: writers are obsessive self-editors
Jim Hooper is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-14-2011   #24
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default A Russian view on the Angolan War

For those interested the book IGOR ZHDARKIN - WE DID NOT SEE IT EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN is worth a read to see events through the eyes of a Russian translator/advisor during the Angolan war. (Above the photo of the book cover is a link to a word doc - We did not see it even in Afghanistan.doc - website is in Russian.)

There is a review to be found here

Two quotes from the review:

Quote:
"As the author relates, even the Russians who had served in Afghanistan had never experienced such “horrors” as the barrage of SADF artillery across the Lomba River. Under fire from the G-6 guns and the Mirage and Buccaneer aircraft, FAPLA brigades panicked and deserted the field in flight, leaving behind their Soviet equipment in a graveyard of tanks, trucks, ammunition, and other materiel. "

and

"As for the Angolan soldiers, they were “unsuitable for war.” Not only were they “afraid to take part in combat actions,” they were also unwilling to follow the “reasonable advice” of their Soviet advisors (p. 341). Consequently, it was necessary for the advisors to tell the Angolans that they were wrong and beat them up accordingly."
Fabulous stuff... the Keystone Cops in Africa.

Note: The G-6 is a 155mm SELF-PROPELLED GUN-HOWITZER

JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-16-2011   #25
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default Flying Columns in Small Wars: An OMFTS Model

The following thesis was produced by (then) Major Michael F. Morris, USMC on CSC 2000

An extract from the executive summary:

Quote:
The study also illustrates the utility of battalion and brigade level MAGTFs at the operational level by analyzing a case study, Operation Modular. In 1987 in southeastern Angola the South African Defense Force employed a three thousand man mobile strike force to defeat a combined Angolan / Cuban division size force intent on destroying the UNITA resistance movement. The campaign's military outcome convinced the Soviets and Cubans to settle the twenty-three year Angolan border war and the political future of Namibia in a diplomatic venue rather than by force of arms. Operation Modular highlights the potential of small, mobile, hard-hitting fighting columns in a small war environment.
Download here
JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-16-2011   #26
davidbfpo
Council Member
 
davidbfpo's Avatar
 
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: UK
Posts: 11,056
Default Lesson id'd, lesson overlooked?

JMA,

A good catch and reading through it I found this - note written in 2000 by a USMC officer:
Quote:
Given the proliferation of mines throughout the Third World, all future U.S. military vehicles should incorporate similar mine protection features as a priority force protection issue.
See pgs.52-53.
__________________
davidbfpo
davidbfpo is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-16-2011   #27
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
JMA,

A good catch and reading through it I found this - note written in 2000 by a USMC officer:

See pgs.52-53.Given the proliferation of mines throughout the Third World, all future U.S. military vehicles should incorporate similar mine protection features as a priority force protection issue.
Yes and what did they do? They ignored him... and the rest is history.

Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-16-2011 at 05:08 PM. Reason: Fix quotes
JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-16-2011   #28
Ken White
Council Member
 
Ken White's Avatar
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,060
Default The knowledge was there -- to no avail...

The US Army bought some CASSPIR Mk IIs in 1999 as a result of a Foreign Articles Test statute that had taken years to get through Congress (who are very much into a "Buy American" attitude regardless of the fact that other people make good or better stuff)...

IIRC, they had earlier -- in the early 80s -- bought a Nyala and wanted to buy some Buffels but the combination of Track-centric Armot Officers and Congressionally beloved and sponsored contractors defeated the idea of producing any here. Until...

The knowledge of need was there, it got sat upon.
Ken White is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-16-2011   #29
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
The US Army bought some CASSPIR Mk IIs in 1999 as a result of a Foreign Articles Test statute that had taken years to get through Congress (who are very much into a "Buy American" attitude regardless of the fact that other people make good or better stuff)...

IIRC, they had earlier -- in the early 80s -- bought a Nyala and wanted to buy some Buffels but the combination of Track-centric Armot Officers and Congressionally beloved and sponsored contractors defeated the idea of producing any here. Until...

The knowledge of need was there, it got sat upon.
You can't beat the procurement system. There are too many vested interests and...

I think we touched on this before. It should have been done at local (Afghanistan) level where a workshop could have been set up to do the work locally. Civvies or military who cares but what you need is some staff (foreman/welders/mechanics/etc) some armour plate (roqtuf or equivalent) and the appropriate chassis or drive train if you settle on a monocoque design) and some of that cash the US is throwing around all over Afghanistan and you are in business.

Had this started in 2006/7 then by now there would have been a improvements so lets say Mark 1 to say Mark 5. You set up a rotation to allow vehicles to be recalled for an upgrade to the latest Mark as improvements are signed off.

The ANA and ANP can be cut in on the deal and when ISAF force levels reduce the vehicle can be refurbished and then reissued to ANA/ANP.

It is easier than it appears. All you need to find one of those hard-charging officers who won't take no for an answer

JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-16-2011   #30
Ken White
Council Member
 
Ken White's Avatar
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,060
Default Cabbages and Kings of the Road...

Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA View Post
You can't beat the procurement system. There are too many vested interests and...Had this started in 2006/7 then by now there would have been a improvements so lets say Mark 1 to say Mark 5. You set up a rotation to allow vehicles to be recalled for an upgrade to the latest Mark as improvements are signed off.
I certainly agree I'm pretty sure we could and would do that in an existential situation. As you probably know, it was done, ad hoc, and on a unit by unit thus small scale in both theaters to an extent much as was done on a far larger scale in Viet Nam (LINK). Though the buried IED problem existed in VN, it was not as pervasive, thus no significant mine protection. Not many urban areas nor even much Bush so not that much close-in and heavyside protection either.

Still, today, I'll have to defend the Troops by mentioning the overwhelming, cumbersome US Army bureaucracy -- most of which is Congressionally induced -- is too unwieldy to do that lacking more cause than was extant in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Quote:
It is easier than it appears. All you need to find one of those hard-charging officers who won't take no for an answer
Easier provided someone not risk averse has the authority to turn on the money spigot and fifty people are not looking over a shoulder to make sure it's spent 'properly.' This after all is the nation where a then sitting President, asked about a tax cut in a booming economy said "We'd give it back to you if we knew you'd spend it right..."

As to the hard chargers. Hmmm. Worked for several of those. Often lot of flash and dash, brave to a fault, aggressive, forward thinkers, some good guys, some arrogant ar$#'oles...

Gotta watch 'em all though, the long and the short and the tall -- good, bad and those in between. If you do not, they tend to get a lot of people killed -- unnecessarily.
Ken White is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-17-2011   #31
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
I certainly agree I'm pretty sure we could and would do that in an existential situation. As you probably know, it was done, ad hoc, and on a unit by unit thus small scale in both theaters to an extent much as was done on a far larger scale in Viet Nam (LINK). Though the buried IED problem existed in VN, it was not as pervasive, thus no significant mine protection. Not many urban areas nor even much Bush so not that much close-in and heavyside protection either.

Still, today, I'll have to defend the Troops by mentioning the overwhelming, cumbersome US Army bureaucracy -- most of which is Congressionally induced -- is too unwieldy to do that lacking more cause than was extant in Afghanistan or Iraq. Easier provided someone not risk averse has the authority to turn on the money spigot and fifty people are not looking over a shoulder to make sure it's spent 'properly.' This after all is the nation where a then sitting President, asked about a tax cut in a booming economy said "We'd give it back to you if we knew you'd spend it right..."

As to the hard chargers. Hmmm. Worked for several of those. Often lot of flash and dash, brave to a fault, aggressive, forward thinkers, some good guys, some arrogant ar$#'oles...

Gotta watch 'em all though, the long and the short and the tall -- good, bad and those in between. If you do not, they tend to get a lot of people killed -- unnecessarily.
I feel I need to emphasise that this local solution (being the local construction of mine and ambush protected vehicles) is really pretty simple and does not require national existential circumstances.

Like with IEDs one needs to accept that they will learn and adapt to what you do and in turn you need to respond by modifying the vehicles in double quick time. Its a no brainer that Kabul or Kandahar are the places where this should be carried out. Modify/adapt/fix/improve/upgrade the vehicles fast. What other way can this be done other than in-country?

The solution is obvious given that these vehicles would be developed for local Afghan circumstances and not exported along with the troop draw-down (but rather handed over to the ANP/ANA).

The only problem (probably insurmountable) is how to side-step the formidable procurement machine the the commercial lobbyists who would see control and profits slipping through their fingers. The lives of soldiers have never been more important than "the process" or a juicy government procurement contract.
JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-17-2011   #32
Ken White
Council Member
 
Ken White's Avatar
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,060
Default Ask not for whom the bell tolls...

Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA View Post
I feel I need to emphasise that this local solution (being the local construction of mine and ambush protected vehicles) is really pretty simple and does not require national existential circumstances.
And I obviously need to emphasize that you have not dealt with the ponderous, inflexible bureaucracy that is the US government of which the US Army is a heirarchial, excessively conformity oriented extension.
Quote:
The solution is obvious given that these vehicles would be developed for local Afghan circumstances and not exported along with the troop draw-down (but rather handed over to the ANP/ANA).
I totally agree -- you don't have to convince me. You could probably work on convincing those members of the US Congress (and they are many...) who think the US should NOT be in Afghanistan at all and try to hobble efforts there in any way they can to include reinforcing that conformity thing... .

You may also need to work on those members of the US Armed Forces (all ranks...) who are there but either do not want to be or do not agree with their mission and are not about to risk their 'careers' by being innovative in an organization that too often punishes innovation and initiative.

That kind of stuff is perfectly normal in most nations in peacetime. Only in an existential conflict do those chafing, foolish problems get significantly reduced -- they do not ever go away; they are human failings and we had them to a minor extent in WW II (which wasn't really existential for us though it was at least partly treated as such and thus was big enough to eliminate some of that idiocy...).
Quote:
The only problem (probably insurmountable) is how to side-step the formidable procurement machine the the commercial lobbyists who would see control and profits slipping through their fingers. The lives of soldiers have never been more important than "the process" or a juicy government procurement contract.
Yes. You answered your own objections.
Ken White is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-18-2011   #33
Pete
Council Member
 
Pete's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2009
Location: North Mountain, West Virginia
Posts: 990
Default Combat and Materiel Developments

In theory at least it is the "combat developments" community that writes the requirements for future military systems and products. Those elements are part of the branch schoolhouses -- U.S. Army Infantry School, Armor School, etc. The combat developers write the system requirements documents which then have to be staffed and approved by a half-dozen echelons within the TRADOC/DA bureaucracy.

It is the "materiel developers" who cut metal and develop prototypes. Those organizations belong to Army Materiel Command, except for those of the Medics and parts of the crypto Signal community.

Even after the Soviets collapsed we continued developing weapons for Fulda Gap threats until the "Transformation" net-centric initiative started. The rest is fairly recent history.
Pete is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-18-2011   #34
Firn
Council Member
 
Firn's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2009
Posts: 1,281
Default

I enjoyed the article in question very much, and he put the whole operation well into the strategic context of the time and the 20th brigade into the military historic one.

I read once a very good article by Breytenback about the formation and operation of the Buffalo Battalion, IIRC it had also a good deal of information about the transformation and 'up-gunning' for Modular.

And the article reminded me once again that the current TO&E of many/most Italian brigades (in fact the whole army structure) should really just be seen as peacetime bureaucracy.

Last edited by Firn; 07-18-2011 at 05:13 PM.
Firn is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-18-2011   #35
Pete
Council Member
 
Pete's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2009
Location: North Mountain, West Virginia
Posts: 990
Default

The topic of DoD and Army policy for research and development is far removed from South African Army operations and the study of military history. It deserves its own thread rather than being here. Therefore I'll try to be brief.

When I began working in U.S. Army medical materiel development in 1986 I began reading the various directives and regulations that govern it. The impression I got is that all this policy guidance grew during the 1950s and 1960s in an effort to prevent various SNAFUs -- cost overruns, scandals, and failed weapons systems -- from ever happening again. In effect it was the bureaucratic equivalent of slamming the barn door shut after the horse had escaped.

Though all these regulations, directives and management procedures were implemented with the best of intentions by well-meaning officers, one step at a time DoD and the military services managed to create an impenetrable thicket of policy guidance and a veritable bureaucratic maze, the American equivalent of the Soviet Five Year Plans for the management of their economy. Piles and piles of paperwork were created, to the extent that only 10 percent of those in DoD R&D are doers who make things happen. The other 90 percent are staff weenies and their Highway Helpers who review the documents and sharpshoot from the sidelines. It's consulting firms who write most of those piles of DoD documentation, billing by the hour, like I once did.

About 20 years ago DoD standardized its systems development policy with its "DoD 5000" series of directives. It superceded the service-unique regulations and policies. Now we have standard life cycle names, terminology and acronyms. But the big-bureaucracy thing in military R&D endures.
Pete is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-19-2011   #36
Pete
Council Member
 
Pete's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2009
Location: North Mountain, West Virginia
Posts: 990
Default

One aspect of this systems development thing is a subject that Ken White has harped upon eloquently over the years, the personnel system. In the Army the hard-chargers are selected for the command and operations track at the major or lieutenant colonel level. Those non-selected for battalion command have to find a new way to earn a living in their alternate specialty so they can do the big two-zero.

(That is not to say that all of the guys on the command list should have been there, or that all of the non-selected ones shouldn't have been there. I crashed and burned as a captain so with all of these broken windows in my house I'm reluctant to be the one to throw stones.)

In any event, in the Army at the rank of major you often have to find a new niche -- it may be personnel, logistics, contract management, or perhaps systems development.

In DoD systems development the only programs that exist are those being conducted under an approved requirements document by a military service and that have the required funding, which usually takes at least four years to obtain by going through the POM/PPBES process. Everything else, including ideas from those in the field with mud or dust on their boots, is neither here nor there. I'm not trying to justify or make excuses for these basic facts of life, I'm just trying to explain them to those who have not been there.
Pete is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-19-2011   #37
Firn
Council Member
 
Firn's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2009
Posts: 1,281
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA View Post
The following thesis was produced by (then) Major Michael F. Morris, USMC on CSC 2000

An extract from the executive summary:

Download here
Certainly the SADF knew the vital importance of massive firepower linked by radio to many watchful eyes against a greatly superior foe with a far stronger and (technically) advanced airforce. And the value of infantry and AA protection as well as of good camouflage, basic counter-counter-battery tactics and artful deception to keep that important firepower alive. The ammo supply obviously proved to be difficult.

What surprised me is the high survivability of the RPVs under those high-threat conditions. I really would like to know more about how they were employed. Flying usually low in close cooperation with all those ground-based assets, I guess:

Quote:
Organic collection assets were limited to [various] recce teams augmented by forwardobservers and liaison personnel [UNITA], and electronic intelligence (ELINT).
That ELINT proved to be unvaluable doesn't surprise me that much. It is easy to be sloppy in that regard, and the enemy all too often listens and has also often the codes. At least WWII provides countless examples of that, and in the heat of battle people tend to throw even good rulebooks away. Sometimes, as this example shows it can even be completely unforced errors. Making the ELINT business harder for the enemy (and easier for yourself) should really be an important task for training and technology.

[text] is mine.

Last edited by Firn; 07-19-2011 at 06:45 PM.
Firn is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-20-2011   #38
JMA
Banned
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Durban, South Africa
Posts: 3,902
Default

A mine and ambush protected school bus in northern SWA/Nambia during the border war.



If it is considered important... the money will be found.
JMA is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-20-2011   #39
Ken White
Council Member
 
Ken White's Avatar
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,060
Default Quoth the Owl...

Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA View Post
If it is considered important... the money will be found.
Always true -- the problem is who considers what important, isn't it...

Thanks for posting that picture. It will let many see how good and easy we in the US have had it for about 200 years.
Ken White is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-21-2011   #40
carl
Council Member
 
carl's Avatar
 
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Denver on occasion
Posts: 2,459
Default

I hope this isn't too far off topic but didn't some of the old tanks, M-48s etc have rounded bottom hulls the intention of which was protection against anti-tank mines? I think Bradleys and Abrams have flat bottom hulls. Is this a case of forgetting?
__________________
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
carl is offline   Reply With Quote
Reply

Bookmarks

Tags
special forces

Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump


All times are GMT. The time now is 04:32 AM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.9. ©2000 - 2017, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Registered Users are solely responsible for their messages.
Operated by, and site design © 2005-2009, Small Wars Foundation