What Are You Currently Reading? 2012

[carl]

I just finished We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People by Peter Van Buren.

He was part of an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2009 and 2010. His conclusion as expressed in the book was that the PRTs, or at least his, did absolutely nothing, nothing at all to improve the situation in Iraq. Nothing...except spend lots and lots of money to no purpose.

I remember when those things were just getting started and there was much earnest discussion on SWJ and other places on how they should be set up, run, administered, financed, judged etc. In the event, it was all useless. The object of the PRTs wasn't to actually do anything, it was to appear to have been doing something so reports could be generated and careers advanced; and that was done by spending money. Nothing had to show for it, it just had to be spent.

That took up about half of the book. The rest of it was just his impressions of FOB life and seeing Iraq from the inside of an MRAP. Those parts were ok but the value of the book was the depiction of the amoral attitude many people in both State and the Army took toward civil development. The Career Centric Small War.

[AmericanPride]

Just started Daniel Yergin's The Quest.

[JMA]

Interesting perspectives in this book. Would enjoy an in depth discussion on this content with interested parties. Either here in a separate thread or privately. Any interest?

[Backwards Observer]

From Third World To First - The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 by Lee Kuan Yew

We believed the long-term future for Singapore was to rejoin Malaya, so we merged with it to form Malaysia in September 1963. Within a year, in July 1964, we suffered Malay-Chinese race riots in Singapore. We were trapped in an intractable struggle with Malay extremists of the ruling party, United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), who were intent on a Malay-dominated Malaysia. To counter their use of communal riots to cow us, we rallied the non-Malays and Malays throughout Malaysia in the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to fight for a Malaysian Malaysia. By August 1965 we were given no choice but to leave.

The communal bullying and intimidation made our people willing to endure the hardships of going it alone. That traumatic experience of race riots also made my colleagues and me even more determined to build a multiracial society that would give equality to all citizens, regardless of race, language or religion. It was an article of faith which guided our policies. (from the Preface)

The line editor at HarperCollins, New York, has meticulously Americanized my English. She has also made me politically gender correct. Whenever I wrote "man", he has become "person" or "people". I thank her for making me appear less of a male chauvinist to Americans. (from the Acknowledgments)

From Third World To First - Amazon

[carl]

Interesting perspectives in this book. Would enjoy an in depth discussion on this content with interested parties. Either here in a separate thread or privately. Any interest?

I am. I read the book and liked it, but give me a few days to get to the library so I can review.

[carl]

Two books I recently read that I think were very good.

The Great Rifle Controversy: Search for the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War II Through Vietnam and Beyond, by E.C Ezell.

This book was written in 1982 and is probably known by most around here but I liked it and learned a lot about technical detail and bureaucratic dynamics. Two things, of many, stood out for me. First the author said American military rifle development was not a story of innovation, but mostly a story of incremental product improvement. He hoped that future decades would change that and see some real innovation. That was written in 1982 and the ensuing 30 years have seen...incremental product improvement.

The second thing was that I think the Senate committee that investigated the M-16 rifle introduction debacle concluded that there had been negligence rising to a criminal level but the program was structured so diffusely that no individual or small group of individuals could be held responsible. When I read that I realized how little things had changed in 50 years.

The other book is:

Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq by James R. Arnold.

The book is a study of 4 small wars, Philippine Insurrection, Algeria, Malaya and Vietnam. Mr. Arnold is an excellent writer and can use a sentence to convey an idea where others (like me) need paragraphs; so he has quite a lot of valuable things to say about these conflicts in not so many pages.

For example, he said that one of the primary reasons for the success of the much debated "Surge" in Iraq was that AQI overplayed its hand by its homicidal fanaticism. I haven't read that in too many other places and it is interesting to contemplate what would have happened if their political platform had extended much beyond maniacal killing.

[datroy]

For example, he said that one of the primary reasons for the success of the much debated "Surge" in Iraq was that AQI overplayed its hand by its homicidal fanaticism. I haven't read that in too many other places and it is interesting to contemplate what would have happened if their political platform had extended much beyond maniacal killing.

This isn't all that new - it is closely connected to the "Iraqi agency" argument that has picked up steam recently, but it really started at least as far back as Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who said the Anbar Awakening was the result of the Sunnis having to be the ones to make the decision that they had finally had enough.

This isn't wrong, but the problem with focusing specifically on this point, is that it is used to argue that an increase in US troops (called "the surge") was not responsible. The problem is that it considers each element of what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008 in isolation, trying to figure out which one was the cause of the reduction in violence. In reality, all of these things were connected, and without one you probably wouldn't have the other. Yes, the Iraqis had to make this decision for themselves, but it is not a coincidence that it also came at a time when the US finally was able to provide a viable alternative to AQI. Likewise, an increase in US forces was important, but more important was how those forces were used, and demonstrating to Iraqis that they had an alternative to al Qaeda that would keep them alive. "The Surge" was not just dumping additional bodies into Iraq and calling it a day. It was an ongoing, interconnected process in which the actions of the US, Iraqis, and al Qaeda all had an effect in reducing the violence at the time and weakening AQI.

To get back to the topic of the thread though, I just finished Execute Against Japan: The US Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. I am reading Gunther Rothenberg's The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon. After that will be John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic: Motivations and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France.

[JMA]

I am. I read the book and liked it, but give me a few days to get to the library so I can review.

Give us a heads up when you have

[Firn]

Blitzkrieg legend

The best book I have read on the operation. BTW: Found an intersting interview of the author regarding a German wandernden Kessel/wandering kettle/moving pocket



Truppenführung

There has been written so much about the second book, especially the timeless chapters that I don't want to repeat them. However Appendix E, a German analysis of FM 100-5 (the 1944 issue, I guess) done in 1952 was a bit of a surprise

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Mark @ Zenpundit for a reminder this classic book is now in paperback and cheaper to buy:http://www.amazon.com/Human-Face-War...9259943&sr=8-1

With two highly rated reviews and one by Fuchs here:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Human-Face-W...9392849&sr=1-1

Taken from Fuchs:

..I still rate it as one of the most impressive military books of the last decades..

Mark's short review:

I am intruding on Scott’s post to add my strong endorsement. If you are serious about strategy, particularly if you are a member of the armed forces with responsibility for operational planning or unit leadership, The Human Face of War by Colonel Storr is on the short list of must-read books. It no longer costs a zillion dollars, so go buy it.

Link to Zenpundit's reviews:http://zenpundit.com/?p=5397

I too baulked at buying the hardback and borrowed a library copy. In places it is a hard read, generally it flows and abounds with examples to satisfy. So I'll get a paperback copy one day soon and read again, plus add markers so I can ask Jim what he meant.

[Uboat509]

I just picked up An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith and The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes on Nook. I have been meaning to read both for some time. I probably need to read Friedman as well.

[Infanteer]

I too baulked at buying the hardback and borrowed a library copy. In places it is a hard read, generally it flows and abounds with examples to satisfy. So I'll get a paperback copy one day soon and read again, plus add markers so I can ask Jim what he meant.

I admit to being a fan of Storr's writings. I paid a right leg to get a copy when it first came out and have piqued the author's brain on a few things.

Right now, I am reading Fukuyama's The Rise of Political Order. It should be required reading for anyone who puts a uniform on.

[JMA]

I am. I read the book and liked it, but give me a few days to get to the library so I can review.

Never got round to this Carl. Perhaps better that way as I doubt this is the place for such a discussion.

Another book worthy of study is (not necessarily in the way the author want):

Company Commander - Major Russell Lewis (Author)

[kstatefan40]

I've been looking back on the early years of the war in Afghanistan lately with a few good books:

I just finished reading The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service. It covers a variety of issues from the CIA's CTC in the buildup to September 11 to lessons learned from the first few years of war, but what I found most interesting was the author's description of his experience serving in Africa. Based on current events in Libya, I found this information to be timely and informative.

I've moved on to a book the previous author recommends, First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan . This covers the JAWBREAKER team's entry into Afghanistan and their challenges in the opening days of the war. Very interesting so far.

[Firn]

In the last couple of months:

Thinking, Fast and Slow - Brilliant book. It is not surprising that it already has been discussed here. Regression to the mean and the law of small numbers surprised even me, despite having studied statistics at the uni. But then again, if we consider the base rate of those who failed, it is not surprising at all that I was among them.

Ironically the Marshmallow Study which is cited in the book has a clear shortcoming, which can at least partly be explained by other chapters of the book.

For the past four decades, the "marshmallow test" has served as a classic experimental measure of children's self-control: will a preschooler eat one of the fluffy white confections now or hold out for two later?

Now a new study demonstrates that being able to delay gratification is influenced as much by the environment as by innate ability. Children who experienced reliable interactions immediately before the marshmallow task waited on average four times longer—12 versus three minutes—than youngsters in similar but unreliable situations.

The Checklist Manifesto: It doesn't has the grand span of Thinking, Fast and slow but it made its manifesto very well. It shows how hard but important it is to do consistently the right things in the right way and order. Discipline forced by something like a good checklist can empower initiative and thinking, making a big difference in performance.

Wages of Destruction: The best economic book I have read about the WWII, from an author which actually studied macroeconomics. This often basic economic knowledge was sometimes obviously missing in Why the Allies won and even more so in Freedoms Forge.

It always amazed me that such basic and thus key elements like ressources, capital, labour, productivity, monetary policy were not yet investigated with similar scientific rigour before, at least not in a widely available (and cheap) book. Even more so if we consider the amount of ink spent on this period.


Freedoms Forge: A nice book with good stories but it suffers greatly compared to Wages of Destruction. It is written by somebody who has no professional education in economics and it really tells. If it just had sticked to the stories, maybe with a bit less drama about heroic men and American exceptionalism it would sill be a great book. But the black-and-white description of business and labour and the fact- and senseless attacks on the New Deal of New Dealers often broke the flow. Critic is important but it should be based on facts and those were just not there. This narrow ideological approach does weaken the whole book. And this comes from a convinced capitalist.


The Halo Effect: It is in its scope similar to the Checklist Manifesto. It limits itself, in this case to a strong attack on the way we often think and write about business, managers and success. This simple, fact-based approach makes the book powerful.

[ganulv]

Have you tried this one, Firn?

[carl]

Another book worthy of study is (not necessarily in the way the author want):

Company Commander - Major Russell Lewis (Author)

How do you mean? I just finished The Wrong War, Little America and Losing Small Wars. All had much to say about the British effort in Helmand and Little American and Losing Small Wars were not complimentary.

[Mike in Hilo]

Owen West,The Snake Eaters....I highly recommend this book.

I had as much difficulty putting this one down as I did Owen's father Bing's The Village. Like The Village in an Iraqi context, the theme is advisers being most effective by fighting alongside their host country counterparts. The key to what is essentially a territorial security role is shown to be aggressive patrolling to seek out and engage the enemy. In The Snake Eaters, as engagements are won, the populace begins to shift their allegiance toward the winner, generating important momentum.

[From what I was privileged to observe, momentum--I mean generating and maintaining it--is a critical principle for both insurgents and COIN forces: So out of curiosity, a question: Did von Clausewitz speak to "momentum?" I looked for it in English and German versions and found nothing....]

Cheers,
Mike.

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

I agree momentum is a beautiful thing, but unless it can be advantaged to the point of culmination, the effects on the enemy are normally transient, especially if the insurgent has a safe haven across a border where they can regroup. In Afghanistan we have only been able to leverage momentum up to tactical and operational level victories, not strategic.

Clausewitz addressed this from conventional stand point, but it applies to some extent to irregular warfare.

http://books.google.com/books?id=xym...mentum&f=false

The situation is completely different when a defeated army is being pursued. Resistance becomes difficult, indeed sometimes impossible, as a consequence of battle casualties, loss of order and of courage, and anxiety about the retreat.

Skip a couple of lines to talking about the pursuer:

The faster his pace, the greater the speed with which events will run along their predtermined course: this is the primary area where psychological forces will increase and multiply without being rigidly bound to weights and measures of the material world.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.amazon.com/In-Ruins-Empir.../dp/0375509151

In the Ruins of Empire, The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia, by Ronald Spector

I think this book is a must read for anyone interested in Small Wars and the recent and very relevant history of the Asia-Pacific. I also read Spector's "Eagle Against the Sun" and highly recommend it also. Back to the Ruins of Empire, this short excerpt from the NYT review sums it nicely:

With access to recently available firsthand accounts by Chinese, Japanese, British, and American witnesses and previously top secret U.S. intelligence records, Spector tells for the first time the fascinating story of the deadly confrontations that broke out–or merely continued–in Asia after peace was proclaimed at the end of World War II. Under occupation by the victorious Allies, this part of the world was plunged into new power struggles or back into old feuds that in some ways were worse than the war itself. In the Ruins of Empire also shows how the U.S. and Soviet governments, as they secretly vied for influence in liberated lands, were soon at odds.

At the time of the peace declaration, international suspicions were still strong. Joseph Stalin warned that “crazy cutthroats” might disrupt the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay. Die-hard Japanese officers plotted to seize the emperor’s palace to prevent an announcement of surrender, and clandestine relief forces were sent to rescue thousands of Allied POWs to prevent their being massacred.

In the Ruins of Empire paints a vivid picture of the postwar intrigues and violence. In Manchuria, Russian “liberators” looted, raped, and killed innocent civilians, and a fratricidal rivalry continued between Chiang Kai-shek’s regime and Mao’s revolutionaries. Communist resistance forces in Malaya settled old scores and terrorized the indigenous population, while mujahideen holy warriors staged reprisals and terror killings against the Chinese–hundreds of innocent civilians were killed on both sides. In Indochina, a nativist political movement rose up to oppose the resumption of French colonial rule; one of the factions that struggled for supremacy was the Communist Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh. Korea became a powder keg with the Russians and Americans entangled in its north and south. And in Java, as the Indonesian novelist Idrus wrote, people brutalized by years of Japanese occupation “worshipped a new God in the form of bombs, submachine guns, and mortars.”

Through impeccable research and provocative analysis, as well as compelling accounts of American, British, Indian, and Australian soldiers charged with overseeing the surrender and repatriation of millions of Japanese in the heart of dangerous territory, Spector casts new and startling light on this pivotal time–and sets the record straight about this contested and important period in history.

I worked in this part of the world for a long time and felt like a novice after reading this book. I won't go as far to say the book offers lessons for post decisive operations in Iraq, but it does provide historical insights on previous efforts where a U.S. led coalition struggled with post war occupation and policy issues. As the author points out, in many countries more people were killed after Japan's surrender than during the actual war.