Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[Dayuhan]

I don't believe you understand the concept of 'clear, hold, build'.

(Take a look at FM 3-24, 5-50 to 5-80)

The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well. Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:

Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants.

That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.

[JMA]

The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well.

No it doesn't... but I guess you are going to try to apply a little spin to try to convince others with no military background (and yourself) that it does.

Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", ...

Yes and it means just that.

... but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

Nice try... but no. Why not just admit you got it wrong or just slink away to avoid further embarrassment?

The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:

Yes I know what it says... after all I drew your attention to that section.

That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Do you know the difference between strategic and tactical? You are over your head here man.

Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.

Again you clearly don't seem to understand the subject.

Perhaps if you want a soundbite then you should take this one - being what the holding force should strive to accomplish:

�� Protect the population from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals.
�� Eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure.
�� Improve essential services where possible.
�� Reinstate HN government presence.

You should really avoid the temptation to sound off on a subject about which you clearly have very little background/experience/knowledge.