MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[William F. Owen]

Read the report. It's not a document I would cite of feel comfortable doing so.

See my response to this very debate here, in article I was asked to right for RUSI

Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true.

[Bob's World]

In recent engagements the TB have a very high ratio of PKMs and RPGs to the size of force encountered. Meanwhile our guys are working through tighter and tighter restrictions on the use of heavy firepower, restrictions that are frankly necessary to implement the CG's guidance and change the tenor or the coalition approch in deed as well as word. I agree with what the commander is doing, but it is indeed forcing changes of the dynamics on the battlefield as well.

At this point it is new TTPs more than new rifles that our soldiers need, and as usual they must be developed in-stride. There may be more value in discussing the mix of weapons at the squad level rather than the caliber. (Though I know my uncles who carried M-1 Garrands as infantrymen in the very close fighting of the South Pacific loved the punch that a 30-06 provided...).

[Firn]

In recent engagements the TB have a very high ratio of PKMs and RPGs to the size of force encountered. Meanwhile our guys are working through tighter and tighter restrictions on the use of heavy firepower, restrictions that are frankly necessary to implement the CG's guidance and change the tenor or the coalition approch in deed as well as word. I agree with what the commander is doing, but it is indeed forcing changes of the dynamics on the battlefield as well.

The article by Major Ehrhardt raises very similar points:

Operations in Afghanistan have exposed weaknesses in our small arms capability, marksmanship training, and doctrine. After-action reviews and comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage U.S forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6,000 feet.59 Current equipment, training and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.

....

The modern infantryman is burdened with excessive weight in the form of protective gear, communications equipment and weapons systems. He is fighting an enemy conditioned to the elevation and terrain. The enemy travels light and employs supporting weapons from standoff, to include mortars and medium machineguns. Faced with these conditions, the modern infantry attempts to fix the enemy with direct fire and use supporting assets to kill the enemy. Supporting assets, such as close combat attack, close air support or indirect fire, are not always available. Further, their application is often restricted when collateral damage is possible, due to the enemy’s information operations and worldwide media access.

It seems to me that the TB try mostly rather hard to reduce the risks incurring when engaging coalition troops. They can usually initiate the contact on their terms, using terrain, ROE and distance to their advantage and seem to increasingly tailor their forces, as Bob said, to suit this conditions. All those factors buffer them against a "decisive" tactical defeat. This low-risk tactics seem to work well as part of their overall strategy, as it allows them to preserve their fighting forces and still greatly impact the ability of the coalition to fulfill their missions.

A very high ratio of crew-served weapons like GPMG, mortars and RPG could allow them to get a lot more out of their limited pool of better trained men while employing the rest more effectively in their support.


Firn

[JMA]

The article by Major Ehrhardt raises very similar points:



....




It seems to me that the TB try mostly rather hard to reduce the risks incurring when engaging coalition troops. They can usually initiate the contact on their terms, using terrain, ROE and distance to their advantage and seem to increasingly tailor their forces, as Bob said, to suit this conditions. All those factors buffer them against a "decisive" tactical defeat. This low-risk tactics seem to work well as part of their overall strategy, as it allows them to preserve their fighting forces and still greatly impact the ability of the coalition to fulfill their missions.

A very high ratio of crew-served weapons like GPMG, mortars and RPG could allow them to get a lot more out of their limited pool of better trained men while employing the rest more effectively in their support.


Firn

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges? Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover? Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place? I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

[jcustis]

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges? Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover? Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place? I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

by engaging at longer range (at least in the south) I suspect that they hope to get lucky every once in a while, or force us to maneuver and be susceptible to pressure plate IEDs along avenues of approach/withdrawal. I also suspect that they aren't comfortable closing the distance with us, where they can be susceptible to our 40mm HE fires.

[Firn]

By engaging at longer range (at least in the south) I suspect that they hope to get lucky every once in a while, or force us to maneuver and be susceptible to pressure plate IEDs along avenues of approach/withdrawal. I also suspect that they aren't comfortable closing the distance with us, where they can be susceptible to our 40mm HE fires.

Besides the reasons I and others already mentioned they might also want to give green local fighters a shot at the enemy without getting them killed too easily. This way the more experienced guys can observe their performance during their first taste of combat. It also raises morale and perhaps pay.

From their strategic point of view an indecisive firefight against Western soldiers could simply part of their delaying actions and their efforts to make our efforts more difficult, along the "you have the watches, we have the time" theme.


Firn

[Ken White]

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges?

Sometimes. They have the same issues with equipment and terrain we do. They did know however that most of our weapons were not terribly effective beyond 2-300m. The Marines changed that with their M16s, good for 3-400m and the Army changed it by issuing a lot 7.62 weapons. Thus what they did do and now do are slightly different.

Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover?

Sometimes to both. Usually not unless the friendly unit is really careless.

Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place?

Usually because there is no cover or concealment locally available. Check most of these pictures: (LINK).That and the occasional bout of carelessness.

I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

Not much to understand, the Afghans know the terrain and figured out early that a PKM or Enfield could allow them to pot at NATO patrols from beyond retaliation range. That got fixed.

What won't get fixed is their terrain knowledge versus that of most urban-suburban raised NATO troops and their eyesight which is better because they had to have great awareness to survive. The average Afghan will spot an ambush the average westerner will walk into or will with the naked eye spot a person on a distant hill that the westerner has difficulty discerning with binoculars.

That said, there is no "problem," per se just the same old kinds of factors everyone who fights has to deal with, just different enemy, different terrain...

As Jcustis said, they want to avoid closing if possible; they most always get creamed when they do that.

[qp4]

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges? Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover? Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place? I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

It's a lot easier to score when you got the drop on somebody. Initiating contact is for all intents and purposes taking a good bead on a target and firing when ready.

One of the most frustrating things we dealt with in OIF (and by we I mean the various units I was with in Iraq) is that nearly every time we had SAF contact it was reacting. By the time we got weapons up and ready to return fire it was gone. Now most of the time it was totally ineffective, but every now and then it wasn't. Keep adding that up over time and ineffective SAF turns into well placed harassing fire.

[GI Zhou]

From studies of guerilla warfare, and speaking to them (jungle warafre), harrassing fire is a good option, and booby traops a better one. Getting into a fire fight/brass up/ whatever term you use generally sees the professional army win, as they have the back up to destroy your means of escape.

Using harassisng fire or booby traps by the time the other professional units arrive; you have hidden your weapon and gone back to farmng, sleeping, doing whatever; left the arae, or hiding. Only the most highly trained units near an area that is booby trapped without pioneer/engineer support.

A marksman is even more effective but the beaten zone of a PK/PKM is not to be sneezed at.

[Ken White]

A marksman is even more effective but the beaten zone of a PK/PKM is not to be sneezed at.

are a master of understatement!

[Infanteer]

Read the report. It's not a document I would cite of feel comfortable doing so.

See my response to this very debate here, in article I was asked to right for RUSI

Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true.

Je suis d'accord.

Rifles just protect the guy carrying and extra belt for the GPMG or a mortar bomb. Infact I prefer the 5.56 as it is half the weight of the larger rounds and means soldiers are lighter and:

1. Soldiers are able to carry some (more) support weapon ammo; and
2. Soldiers have more mobility, making it easier to close with the enemy and force him to either stand and die or move into a beaten zone.

[Fuchs]

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

It's like the "The Boers shot at us at 800 m and did hit us (rarely)!" outcry of the early 1900's that was extremely misleading in regard to the REALLY important warfare that took place during 1912-1921 in Europe.

[William F. Owen]

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

If you mean me, you are right. I am assuming that the infantry do not choose when and where they fight - but have to be able to do it.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

That assumes terrain types are homogeneous. They're not. I live in a Middle-eastern town and I can see terrain well over 600-1000m, in every direction.

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

What kills and suppresses the Taliban in 2010 did the same to anyone and everyone in 1944.

It's like the "The Boers shot at us at 800 m and did hit us (rarely)!" outcry of the early 1900's that was extremely misleading in regard to the REALLY important warfare that took place during 1912-1921 in Europe.

Sure. Terrain, threat, tactics, and policy.

[kaur]

In the beginning Norwegians had in Afganistan G3 rifles, then they got HK416, but they didn't get rid of G3's. Why? Maybe this is best mix for them, just like US got M14 from warehouses to add long range fire to M4-equipped soldiers.

[William F. Owen]

So many things odd and wrong with that picture, I just do no know where to begin!
The world gets stranger and stranger!

[kaur]

PS Wilf, I was reading your RUSI article and was hoping that you say something about HK MP7. I'm little bit disappointed

[Fuchs]

If you mean me, you are right. I am assuming that the infantry do not choose when and where they fight - but have to be able to do it.

We don't have enough of em to waste em in wrong tactical employments once we get into a great war.

That assumes terrain types are homogeneous. They're not. I live in a Middle-eastern town and I can see terrain well over 600-1000m, in every direction.

This is entirely irrelevant, and you should be aware of it. It's not relevant how far you can see, but how well the terrain can be used for cover & concealment. I can see down the road for hundreds of metres, yet someone could easily sneak up to me into hand grenade range without giving me a chance to see (much less identify) him.

What kills and suppresses the Taliban in 2010 did the same to anyone and everyone in 1944.

Except that most of it wouldn't work against a high end opponent, of course. OEF-A and ISAF forces would be slaughtered mercilessly if they used their tactics against the Russians, Chinese or any other halfway effective infantry force.
The behaviour observed in AFG is outright suicidal in modern army-on-army warfare.
The ratio of CAS to ground forces (platoons being able to call in CAS!) is the exception of the rule, as is the 99.9% lack of fire support on the red team.
A few bullet near misses may suppress a real soldier as well as a Taliban - but the chance to score these near misses drops considerably if you face real soldiers because they would kill your battalion in a day at a rate that the whole TB doesn't match in a year, much less with small arms and grenades.

A tripod machine gun team on open terrain would be killed ASAP with mortars and alternatively by a sniper in a European-style war. Alternating concealed and if possible flanking MMG positions are practical, MMG employment as done in AFG is rather not ... against a competent opponent.

Let's face it; the conditions are so extremely different and the competency and capability of the TB is so marginal that almost nothing from AFG will serve us in the next great war. Much will hurt us, though.

About your example "1944"; even 1944 Finns or Germans would easily multiply the losses of ISAF and OEF-A if they replaced TB 1:1. A finnish sniper killed more Russians during the winter '39/'40 than the TB kill Western+Pakistani soldiers in a whole year. The TB are ridiculously harmless and incompetent. German bus drivers are a greater threat.

.

[Infanteer]

Good to know I'm a suicidal incompetent....

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

Well, I've been roaming around grapefields, wadis and villages for the last 5 months, and I think your assessment is wrong. Just because Kandahar is "desert" on the map doesn't mean that the terrain isn't varied.

An insurgent bullet will kill just as good as some Russian conscript's. Although I don't give the insurgents here credit for much, they do know how to use complex terrain (their home turf) to their advantage and understand kill zones.

Please enlighten me on our poor behaviours here - I employ techniques that would work equally well against Russian conscripts and insurgents; they're nothing more than the basics and we use them because they reduce our vulnerability and allow us to bring the right weapons to bear.

[Fuchs]

Give an example and I'll tell you what could have gone wrong if you had faced a powerful opponent.

[Infanteer]

Give an example and I'll tell you what could have gone wrong if you had faced a powerful opponent.

Since you're making the assertion that we are tactically inept, and I am out here daily generally seeing the opposite, I think the onus is on you to prove it.

Define "a powerful opponent" - enfilading fire from a PKM kills, regardless of what the guy firing it is wearing.