Moderator's Note: Eight historical threads on this complex and divisive issue, hence the thread being locked up. There are more contemporary threads on Iran & Israel. The title has been changed too.
Open thread...
Israel
The Palestinians
Two States
Neither, some other State or people rule.
Neither, mutual destruction.
One State, two peoples
One State, one people (intermarriage)
Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour...
Moderator's Note: Eight historical threads on this complex and divisive issue, hence the thread being locked up. There are more contemporary threads on Iran & Israel. The title has been changed too.
Open thread...
Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-31-2012 at 11:03 AM. Reason: Add Mod's Note
I'll Start...
Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran - US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph (Nov. 2005) by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson.
As Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe, Iran is likely to pose three threats.
First, Iran could dramatically up the price of oil by interfering with the free passage of vessels in and through the Persian Gulf as it did during the 1980s or by threatening to use terrorist proxies to target other states’ oil facilities.
Second, it could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States.
Finally, it could become a nuclear proliferation model for the world and its neighbors (including many states that otherwise would be more dependent on the United States for their security) by continuing to insist that it has a right to make nuclear fuel under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and then withdrawing once it decides to get a bomb.
To contain and deter Iran from posing such threats, the United States and its friends could take a number of steps: increasing military cooperation (particularly in the naval sphere) to deter Iranian naval interference; reducing the vulnerability of oil facilities in the Gulf outside of Iran to terrorist attacks, building and completing pipelines in the lower Gulf region that would allow most of the non-Iranian oil and gas in the Gulf to be exported without having to transit the Straits of Hormuz; diplomatically isolating Iran by calling for the demilitarization of the Straits and adjacent islands, creating country-neutral rules against Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state members who are suspected of violating the treaty from getting nuclear assistance from other state members and making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult; encouraging Israel to set the pace of nuclear restraint in the region by freezing its large reactor at Dimona and calling on all other states that have large nuclear reactors to follow suit; and getting the Europeans to back targeted economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to shut down its most sensitive nuclear activities.
Last edited by SWJED; 01-16-2006 at 05:20 PM.
CSIS, 11 Jan 06: Heading off an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capability
Iran’s January 9th decision to resume its uranium enrichment program creates an immediate international crisis. Iran’s move is a test of the international community’s resolve and ability to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. An inadequate response could leave Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon wide-open and could be a further, potentially fatal blow to the norm of nonproliferation. This, is turn, opens the prospect of future nuclear nations in the years to come. The Bush administration’s support for European negotiating efforts with Iran over the past year has laid the ground work for an international consensus on confronting Iran’s actions, but it remains to be seen if Russia and China are prepared to support such efforts.
Despite its resumption of nuclear research, it is important to remember that Tehran is not yet at the point where is can actually enrich uranium or produce nuclear weapons. That capability might still be years away. The presence of international inspectors, while not a guarantee against diversion, will provide an important resource in tracking Iran’s nuclear progress. But in rejecting international pressure – including coordinated letter of concern from all five veto wielding members of the UN Security Council - and restarting work at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, Iran has resumed its on again, off again march toward mastering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. There should be no question that Iran’s mastery of uranium enrichment – regardless of their stated intentions -- would also give Iran the ability to produce nuclear weapons...
An older article (12 Aug 04) from CNS/MIIS, but still worth the read:
A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences
At a time when Iraq and the war on terrorism tend to dominate the debate on international affairs, the possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has not been a major topic of discussion in the United States. There are reports, however, that the Bush administration has seriously considered this option but opted to put it on the back burner for the time being. Further, on May 6, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 398 in a 376-3 vote, calling on the U.S. government "to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons." If a similar resolution passes the Senate, it will give President Bush or any future administration the ability to launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities whenever this is deemed necessary.
In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit further; it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception. On November 11, 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran." Less than two weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession" and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites. This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel or the United States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action...
Google Earth(smile you're on candid camera)
Last edited by GorTex6; 01-16-2006 at 08:40 PM.
From the 14 Jan Economist: When the Soft Talk Has to Stop
A Shortlist of Options
The first step will be to convene an emergency meeting of the IAEA's board, likely later this month, to receive a formal report about what Iran has been up to. America has long pressed for Iran to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for its actions. Short of an about-face by Iran, the Europeans will now press hard for that outcome. A majority on the IAEA's board already favours referral. But for Iran to take notice, Russia, China and others will have to back the idea too. Both countries have been loth to lean hard on Iran in the past. But both are bitterly disappointed that its regime has upped the ante in this way.
Getting to the council is one thing; getting action from it is another. A presidential statement urging Iran to comply with inspectors' requests, and even assigning the IAEA wider investigative powers, might get through, since the point would be to strengthen the inspectors' hands, not take Iran's case away from them. Beyond that, other steps could include political sanctions, such as denial of visas for sporting teams or for members of Iran's regime (similar actions are thought to have helped in the past in dealing with the recalcitrant Serb government, for example). Unlike the North Koreans, who seem not to mind their isolation, Iranians take pride in their growing contacts around the world and are keen to be accorded the status and respect they feel their ancient civilisation deserves. That said, however, Iran's new president, eager to wipe Israel off the map, seems dangerously unfazed by world opinion (see article).
It would be tougher to win widespread support at the UN for economic sanctions. Several key countries, including Russia (which also recently signed a $1 billion weapons contract with Iran), China, India and Japan have been reluctant to put their oil and gas contracts and their pipeline projects at risk. Yet such targeted sanctions might be the one thing that could get Iran's full attention. Its energy industry is dependent on foreign investment for future expansion and modernisation. Meanwhile, India is an important supplier of refined petrol to Iran.
The Europeans have already hinted that if sanctions are blocked at the UN, they will impose their own. They will also try to get others to join them, rather as America has orchestrated the Proliferation Security Initiative, an informal posse of countries prepared to take tough action to block shipments of illicit goods and materials around the world related to weapons of mass destruction.
The Last Resort
Might force be the answer? Mr Bush has always said that no option is off the table. Israel says Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and has suggested that, once Iran has mastered enrichment, perhaps as early as a few months from now, its nuclear programme will have passed “the point of no return”. Might either government be tempted to pre-empt the diplomacy with military strikes?
Israel's air force flattened Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. But Iran has learnt from that episode. It has dispersed, hidden and buried its numerous facilities; some sites, including Natanz, are up to 75 feet underground. Nor is sabotage much of an option. Ploys such as assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists or infecting Iranian computer systems with viruses would cause minimal damage. And yet there are military options, however imperfect and risky.
Only America could hope to demolish Iran's programme. The Iranians are believed to have, in addition to its main sites, at least a score with a role in the programme, and more than 100 sites suspected of having a role. To attack them all, with cruise missiles and fighter-bombers, would require an extended campaign and hundreds of sorties. Corridors would have to be cleared through Iran's air defences and the Iranian air force destroyed. Collateral damage, to Iranian civilians and cities, could be extensive.
A likelier alternative might be to launch an attritional campaign by attacking Natanz and Bushehr, recognising that the resulting damage would at best delay Iran's nuclear progress. This is certainly the most that Israel could contemplate unilaterally. Such an attack would be a declaration of a war which Israel could start but might not be able to finish without American protection. And Israeli fighter-bombers would find it hard to reach Iran without passing through American-controlled airspace.
To attack Iran this way would make sense only if it were thought likely that a friendlier Iranian regime would then emerge. But Iran has no obvious, friendly government-in-waiting. And Iran could strike back—by closing the oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz or hitting American or Israeli interests via proxies in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon and the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Israel is well within range of Iranian missiles. Diplomacy has not stopped Iran so far. But military action is by no means an attractive alternative.
The next small war in the Middle East is ...
one that's been waged for 3 generations: Palestinian people vs. Israel.
Who will win? That's the ultimate question for any discussion about war. Not who SHOULD win, or DESERVES to win, or who has the best soldiers, tactics, or equipment. Just the bottom line.
Here's one forecast, explicit with supporting logic:
"The Fate of Israel" by Fabius Maximus
Part two in a series of articles about grand strategy in a 4GW Era.
Demonstrates the difficultly of distinguishing strong from weak in 4GW,
and that choosing the wrong grand strategy can be terminal for a state.
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_fate_of_israel.htm
Palestinian Strategy
The Palestinians should adopt a strategy consistent with that which the west promotes, yet the Israelis find unacceptable in an attempt to demonstrate the reality of the conflict. If the Palestinians pursued a policy of "one man one vote" within the framework of a single-unfied Israel, they would surely win a substantial number of seats in the Knesset simply due to their large population in comparison to the Israelis. This would demonstrate their desire to seek peaceful resolution through the ballot box and representative government, something desirable to the west; however, unacceptable to the Israelis. This strategy would put increased pressure on the Israelis, and thus create a new enthusiasm to create a lasting peace.
I think both sides will continue to play out the eye-for-eye MAD strategy - each side becoming ever more intent on destroying the other. At best, a coexistence of perpetual war.
I agree with the Major that, if left to majority rule, the outcome might be different. But, I think the Israelis will never allow majority rule. Each new act from either side just feeds the hatred and it will not win unless one side decides to concede to the other - a scenario that is effectively impossible to conceive of.
Mark
Discuss at: The Irregulars Visit at: UW Review
"The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton
Palestinian population myths
There is substantial evidence that the Palestian Authority grossly fudgeed the numbers on the Palestinian census. The numbers may have been off by a factor of 2 million. Notwithstanding that, what the Major has suggested is actually Hamas's position on a Palestian state from the Jordon to the Ocean. Their problem is that they do not control much of that space and it is unlikely that the Israelis will give them that opportunity.
democracy
If democracy is truly our aim, then we cannot fail to recognize Hamas in Palestine, Dawa and SCIRI in Iraq, the MMA in Pakistan, potentially the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or Ahmedinejad in Iran. Our policy cannot be - "democracy as long as you elect who we want." Maybe we should start asking ourselves why these groups are so popular?
Vote-how will Iran respond if attacked?
Most analysts consider only the small question about such an attack:
Example: Rick Francona, former DIA analyst, describes 2 scenarios by which Israel can attack Iran's nuke facilities (hat tip to John Robb):
http://francona.blogspot.com/2006/03...e-options.html
The big question: what will Iran do in response to an attack by Israel or America -- perhaps helped passively or actively by Turkey or Saudi Arabia? Such an attack is, after all, an act of war against Iran. International Law allows Iran to reply against everyone who assisted.
As so often the case with war, the opening salvo is the most predictable. What comes afterwards is more interesting (survival is always interesting).
Vote, and post a note explaining your view!
Last edited by Fabius Maximus; 03-20-2006 at 12:29 AM.
Anybody who believes that Iran will not STRONGLY respond if attacked should adjust the dosage of his meds. They have many good options, and will certainly use some or all of them.
The only nations with sovereignty on this planet are those with nukes (bombs, not power plants). A superpower – autonomy and freedom of action – has both nukes and oil.
Iran has one and wants the other – that’s just good sense.
If Pakistan and North Korea can build nukes, Iran certainly can.
Get used to it.
This should be obvious to almost everyone. In ten years the nice suburban boys who write American military and geo-political journals will explain how obvious and predictable this was.
Last edited by Fabius Maximus; 03-20-2006 at 12:29 AM.
A much better look at that scenario is in the SSI pub Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran. The pub is actually a big collection of essays - the pdf volume is 322 pages total. The essay I'm referring to, Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel, begins on page 133.Originally Posted by Fabius Maximus
Jedburgh -- That is an superlative link. What's your forecast?
Here's the conclusion from the 322 page SSI study Jedburgh mentions links {above}.
Hence they recommend 7 alternative measures, which range from the quixotic to impossible.
Last edited by Fabius Maximus; 03-20-2006 at 12:33 AM.
Human waves of plastic key bearing Basij attacking in swarms of suicide bombings......
Last edited by GorTex6; 03-27-2006 at 06:12 PM.
I think that main response will be Iranian controlled special operations in southern Iraq, includning suicide bombings or similar attacks as well martime special operations . - attacking US-ships in Guf in similar manner like in 1988 but with more advanced weapons. advancd sea mines coluld be very dangerous for US Navy.
Iran has 4 Kilo class submarines. How they can be used?
Attacking Iran May Trigger Terrorism
2 April Washington Post - Attacking Iran May Trigger Terrorism.
As tensions increase between the United States and Iran, U.S. intelligence and terrorism experts say they believe Iran would respond to U.S. military strikes on its nuclear sites by deploying its intelligence operatives and Hezbollah teams to carry out terrorist attacks worldwide.
Iran would mount attacks against U.S. targets inside Iraq, where Iranian intelligence agents are already plentiful, predicted these experts. There is also a growing consensus that Iran's agents would target civilians in the United States, Europe and elsewhere, they said.
U.S. officials would not discuss what evidence they have indicating Iran would undertake terrorist action, but the matter "is consuming a lot of time" throughout the U.S. intelligence apparatus, one senior official said. "It's a huge issue," another said...
What would they expect to accomplish by attacking CONUS?
M
analysis or a WAG?
I believe it well known, at least by those who read about these things, that the Iranians have cased a number of potential targets worldwide for “potential” targeting later. Of course many countries do this, to include the U.S. (of course we target military targets instead of civilian airlines, night clubs, and embassies). The key is that knowledge and in some cases capability doesn’t equate to will. The scenario depicted by this think tank is a worst case scenario, but doubtful a realistic one. The Iranian government and crazy Mullahs also have to conduct a risk versus gain analysis, and if the risk is their destruction and thus loss of power, then their response maybe more limited than what this group is speculating.
However, let’s assume they execute the worst case in response to a preemptive attack against their Nuke facilities. They can't do it overnight, and we can assume if we decide to take action that our force protection status will increase, thus making our targets hard to hit. Not only that the host nations where we have facilities and lots of citizens will be obligated to clamp down on Iranian freedom of movement. I obviously can’t give an accurate estimate, but several of the Iranian planned attacks will fail, but some will be successful, so let’s put in perspective. Let’s assume they bomb an Embassy somewhere in Africa, blow up a popular night club that U.S. tourists frequent in Mexico, and successfully bomb a couple of our shopping malls in the U.S.; and maybe successfully blow up a U.S. airline. All of this is tragic, and of course the media will have a feeding frenzy for a couple of weeks, but it will subside. What they can do now pales in comparison to what the British endure in London in WWII. If need be we can take a couple of hits for the greater good. In our risk versus gain analysis we need to assess if it is better to let Iran acquire a nuclear weapon and potentially use it against us, or to strike now (assuming it is required to stop or delay their program).
In my opinion we can’t our mistakes in Iraq paralyze us from taking appropriate action against Iran “if” our leaders believe they are a credible threat. I think the majority of the world will separate the two issues, and if Iran does target civilians in return, they’ll further isolate themselves and give us a green light to decapitate their regime. Yes they can hurt us, but we can do much more than that to them. The first issue now is attempting to validate the intelligence that is making our nation have this discussion.
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