Tactical Jenga vs. The Strategic Stopwatch

[Eden]

This thread seems to have developed a split personality, so I'll try to hold up both ends.

First, on the stresses in the Army. I agree with Ken that the Army is over-officered and definitely over-generaled, but I worry more than he does about the quality of the officer corps. Promotion rates to major and lieutenant colonel have skyrocketed; I can't help but feel this will reduce the quality of our senior officer corps in the future as a larger percentage of drones survive into the ranks where decisions are made, rather than just implemented. I also worry that our younger officers are being short-changed as promotions accelerate and they have less time to learn their trade. Yes, they gain priceless combat experience and that is good, but I think that our future officer corps will have a very narrow set of well-developed skills and will lack that broad understanding of the institution required for intelligent leadership.

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

As for jenga and stopwatches: The problem with the stopwatch analogy is that it implies that there is a definable block of time available that is impervious to change. Performance on the ground and the resources expended affect - I might go so far as to say they determine - the time available for reaching your endstate. I believe that the American public can both be patient and accept casualties if they perceive that progress is being made. So we can extend the time available for action if we can demonstrate that sacrifices made are worthwhile.

It is also unhelpful that our desired endstate is not achievable given our current committment of resources. I am not a fan of Obama, but his question of Petraeus during the recent congressional testimony was spot-on: why have we set the bar so high? We are, in effect, trying to make Iraq more stable and safer than, say...Pakistan, or any number of other countries out there that have active terrorist cells, sectarian strife, and one or more smoldering insurgencies.

[wm]

why have we set the bar so high? We are, in effect, trying to make Iraq more stable and safer than, say...Pakistan, or any number of other countries out there that have active terrorist cells, sectarian strife, and one or more smoldering insurgencies.

I suspect that the answer to this question requires us to talk about the elephant in the room.

It will certainly be a little dificult to set up POMCUS sites and training areas like Graf and Hohenfels in an unstable environment. Forward basing for SACCENT/USARIZ (vice SACEUR/USAREUR) requires a very stable and safe environment.

[Ken White]

Eden, I share your concerns on the Officer corps but having seen the same accelerated promotions during Korea and Viet Nam, am probably slightly more comfortable that most -- not all -- of them will work out. Sigh. One of the penalties of being old...

This from you:

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

Is way too true. I have heard that efforts to change the organizational structure and the doctrinal systems are underway -- logically, the training and acquisition processes will follow. Worrisome is the fact that no one seems to be addressing the Per system.

WM, as 'Enery 'Iggins said, "I do believe you've got it!"

[wm]

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

This from you:Is way too true. I have heard that efforts to change the organizational structure and the doctrinal systems are underway -- logically, the training and acquisition processes will follow. Worrisome is the fact that no one seems to be addressing the Per system.

I suspect that the WWIII prep mentality is also why we seem to think we need that forward base at the head of the Persian Gulf. BTW be wary of applying logic to the DoD acquisition system. It is not all about getting the troops the right tools to do their jobs.

[WM, as 'Enery 'Iggins said, "I do believe you've got it!"

Thanks Ken. I wonder why we cannot be upfront about this as our objective. The story ought to be a fairly easy one to tell and can be sugarcoated enough so as to make the hosts not appear to be selling out on their political sovereignty

[Ken White]

I suspect that the WWIII prep mentality is also why we seem to think we need that forward base at the head of the Persian Gulf. BTW be wary of applying logic to the DoD acquisition system. It is not all about getting the troops the right tools to do their jobs.

I do see minor glimmers of improvement; one can only pray.

... I wonder why we cannot be upfront about this as our objective. The story ought to be a fairly easy one to tell and can be sugarcoated enough so as to make the hosts not appear to be selling out on their political sovereignty

Dunno. Good question; I agree it could've been sold and told and would likely have done far better with many than some of the cockamamie things they did put out. This is the worst administration I've seen for getting their message out. For a crew that's supposed to be on-message and controlling, they've really done poorly.