The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Ken White]

That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."

No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.

My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not. That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Such deviations will sometimes be determined on the ground, sometimes by higher echelons. Usually, they will work out well for all concerned, occasionally they will not. Sometimes that will be due to errors in the adaptations, sometimes due to other factors. The fact that it generally works out well is more important than the fact that it is not done by the book.

Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.

That's easy to answer, it's due to our far too strict adherence to the European model and a concomitant refusal to adapt our doctrine to our manpower predilections, insisting that the Troops must adapt to the model. The fact that they have never done so and unlikely to ever succumb is neatly overlooked by military 'scholars' as opposed to practitioners who adapt on the ground, generally successfully. Regrettably, the scholars write the books and are not about to let the unwashed review and change them...

As a possibly apocryphal story has it, the Germans in WW II were perplexed as they knew US Doctrine and sometimes had access to US plans but had to acknowledge "They never follow their doctrine or plan..."

I once complimented a Korean Officer for great performance by his unit. He said "Well, everything we do, you teach us. Why don't you do what you teach us to do?"

European Armies -- and the ROK Army -- are good and do what they should pretty well. The US Army is not too bad but it suffers from trying to emulate European TTP - the US soldier won't do much that European soldiers do automatically and will do some things rather differently. Our rather slavish adaptation of European military models means we use methods not always appropriate for the human material provided.

Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.

Of course it cannot. In the end analysis, errors are the responsibility of the level at which they are committed, so that portion of 'blame' remains there. However, the portion of 'blame' that accrues to the level of training and / or education of the persons involved most always defaults to ever higher levels. As does 'blame' for the culture of the Force -- are innovation and initiative encouraged or not? Sad answer for the US...

But...his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?

It is true there is an apparent lack of relevance but if you examine it, think for a second and know Soldiers -- as you obviously do -- then it becomes apparent some relevance lies in the fact that no such overruns have occurred has led to complacency and complacency leads to sloppy performance. His second point, re 'directives,' is a burden all Soldiers have borne for centuries. My comment on the "Sandbag Castles" is reflective of that complacency and sloppiness as my "desired or directed' comment agrees with 82redleg's second point. There's relaevance there -- shouldn't be but there is...

Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts...from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).

That was true then and still is today -- but only at some times and in some places. Afghanistan is too large, the enemy too varied and the rotation of Coalition troops (and their overshadowing of Afghan National Army troops) causes too many variations for any theme or seeming trend -- bad or good -- to be universally applicable.

[Fuchs]

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not.

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG. An example would be setting up a base on (relatively) low ground - until it's being harassed by fire from a higher position (I don't call it an assault if it's just fire).


There are also certain fighting positions known from photos and videos that were either never meant to be used as such or were the result of an extremely stupid (and eventually lucky because few get hurt in them) order.
I mean stone/sandbag walls over which the soldiers need to peek in order to return fire. No firing slits, no camo net concealment. The sophistication of these fighting positions was not only inferior to 15th century angle bastions, but even inferior to Hellenic Age fortifications! I don't mean materials (which are certainly an difficult to come by on an Afghan hill), but principles of construction.
A simple camo net can largely prevent aimed fire at defenders/guards, but I have yet to see it in use. Even the lesser alternative - setting up a background that looks just like the soldier - was not seen on published photos yet.

[Ken White]

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG.

True. Same thing happened in all the Armies involved in WW II -- and To the Caesars -- among many others...

Poor tactical employment and siting is not a new phenomenon nor is it likely to disappear in the future. Even superbly trained folks can do dumb things -- and no Army operating in Afghanistan today is superbly trained (though several have some units and / or SOF elements that come close).

[JMA]

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG. An example would be setting up a base on (relatively) low ground - until it's being harassed by fire from a higher position (I don't call it an assault if it's just fire).


There are also certain fighting positions known from photos and videos that were either never meant to be used as such or were the result of an extremely stupid (and eventually lucky because few get hurt in them) order.
I mean stone/sandbag walls over which the soldiers need to peek in order to return fire. No firing slits, no camo net concealment. The sophistication of these fighting positions was not only inferior to 15th century angle bastions, but even inferior to Hellenic Age fortifications! I don't mean materials (which are certainly an difficult to come by on an Afghan hill), but principles of construction.
A simple camo net can largely prevent aimed fire at defenders/guards, but I have yet to see it in use. Even the lesser alternative - setting up a background that looks just like the soldier - was not seen on published photos yet.

Well if the yardstick that justifies where these outposts are located and how their defenses are sited is whether any have been "overrun" then one can see why the tactical and defence-works standards are so low.

(I agree with your comment on camo nets)

[JMA]

No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.

OK so we have come full circle.

That you say the Principles of Defence "should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended" actually indicates that we agree.

Then your qualification in the next sentence seems to be in agreement with an extract which I posted from Brit doctrine pamphlets a while ago, "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement." Which again places us in agreement.

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not.

...but does that mean that one throws all existing doctrine out the window? Of course not what it means is that in siting such a position under a given set of circumstances (enemy capabilities or METT-TC) "military judgement" is applied to how best to site the position.

That said now please explain to me which of the Principle of Defence can be ignored:

Offensive Action
All Round Defence
Depth
Mutual Support
Concealment
Deception
Striking forces

That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Yes as I quoted: "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement." Still not sure of where we disagree (other than for the sake of it

[Ken White]

That you say the Principles of Defence "should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended" actually indicates that we agree.

Never said I disagreed with anything other than your assertion "That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used." I simply said my statement was what I meant, then agreed there should be considered in all things defensive or potentially so...

...but does that mean that one throws all existing doctrine out the window? Of course not what it means is that in siting such a position under a given set of circumstances (enemy capabilities or METT-TC) "military judgement" is applied to how best to site the position.

True.

That said now please explain to me which of the Principle of Defence can be ignored:

Offensive Action
All Round Defence
Depth
Mutual Support
Concealment
Deception
Striking forces

Give me the map, a troop list, the principal locations, the assessment of the enemy (broad based, don't need a detailed OB workup...), log and perstats -- all that OpOrd / METT-TC stuff and I'll be happy to do so.

Lacking that I'll quickly point out that in most COIN / FID situations, Depth (classic type) is neither available or required, Concealment may be undesirable or even directed to not be applied in some cases and mutual support is rarely achieved or available...