Naw, calicos are way tougher.Can tell you that the perfect training for this type of work would be "Siamese Cat Herder".
Seriously, I see the problem with the whole article in that it confuses/conflates information/knowledge management with intelligence. The first can support or cripple the latter but it cannot replace reall intelligence--especially in the realm of intelligence analysis.
Tom
Concur wholeheartedly. What seems to be described is little more than an advanced form of near-real time targeting folders. That is a subspecies of the entire realm of intelligence operations.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Just because one has spiffy systems for filing and retrieving a bunch of data in a lot of different ways, one cannot therefore conclude that one has good intelligence. Among other things, one needs to be able to structure queries in appropriate ways to extract data from the storage and retrieval systems. One also needs to be able to look at the results of those queries, decide if they contain gaps, and decide what additional queries may be needed to fill in the gaps in the initial returns. And, IMHO, most important, one needs to be able to do the "so what" piece. In other words, to have intelligence, one needs to be able to answer the question, "What does all of the data returned by the queries allow me to infer about what is going to happen next and with how much confidence?"--
By analogy--When you try to get directions from Google Maps, you need to tell it were you want to go, when, and which type of route you want to take. The system doesn't know that first.
Tom, I read the article a bit differently. My perception was the he was focused on an information management concept as a tool for analysis, not the analysis itself. What I saw as severely lacking was any understanding of the complexities of collection by the various disciplines, as well as reporting by tactical units, and how all of that raw intel feeds into analysis. That is where the false analogy of the market comes into play - because he doesn't truly understand how the spectrum of collection assets are tasked and raw intel is fed to analysts his concept of information management falls a bit flat.
wm, I don't believe CPT Hsia claims in his piece that more efficient filing translates to good intelligence. My take on his concept was that, if you trim out all the extraneous narrative, he is basically stating that by having all the data geo-coded it would facilitate more efficient pattern/trend analysis.
As I stated in my rambling bit above, I concur with that at a fundamental level. The incident map / coordinates register is without question an extremely useful tool for analysis in the unconventional warfare environment. But it is just that - a tool. One of many.
Commentary from Kent's Imperative:
Via the incomparable Small Wars Journal, we note a currently serving officer’s contribution to the literature in the form of articulated longing for the solutions that can help end his ongoing frustrations with the intelligence system as it is now structured.....
....We empathize with his frustrations, although we do not know that another “central” portal system or new repository is necessarily the answer to the ever expanding complexity of classified holdings and networks. The captain’s pain, we think, would better be served by a situated software application – a portal or other tool that could create, for his unit and those like his serving throughout the far reaches of the Long War, the functional appearance of centralization, at least insofar as this means the kind of “one stop shopping” for products in support of ongoing operations that seems to be needed. Frankly, we believe that the creation and maintenance of such a portal is a clear role for a reachback function – if such an element can identify and stay current with the constantly shifting needs of those on the ground.....
They can tweak all the databases or systems they want. Unfortunately, until an intel analyst is able to turn the information and data into something insightful, it will still be difficult to operationalize the content to a usable product. As we jam data into the meat grinding funnel that is pushed down for the intel user, context of the information still remains lost (in many cases). The more complex the churn is-- the more experienced the intel analyst must be. I'm still seeing weakness on the human side. I'm also still seeing push intel that does not related to the initial PIRs. Sad, but it is cooler to buy and play with more toys than fix an HR problem.
Agree and that is what I was targeting in my earlier comments. The blender only mixes what get's put into it; it does not determine quality.
Tom
True to a certain degree. I've spoken on the board several times before regarding the quantity vs quality issue for the HUMINT side. But this applies to analysts a bit differently.
In the Army at least, the Intelligence Analyst MOS has always been the largest one in the MI field. The problem isn't numbers, its training. Like everyone else in the Big Army, training was always focused on conventional maneuver warfare. This has shifted significantly in the past couple of years, but the main weakness of training remains an over-reliance on systems and a failure to adequately focus on critical thinking skills. The new FM 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis actually goes into quite a bit of detail on critical thinking, the reasoning process and analytic pitfalls. But from what I've seen in the field, little of that is impressed into the heads of the cherry analysts at the schoolhouse and the focus is on using the spectrum of available tech tools instead. The smart ones with natural talent do rise to the occasion, but that is not an acceptable method for developing enough capable analysts to support current ops.
I'll never forget the time in Afghanistan, when I asked the NCOIC of the terrain team at Bagram for analytic products for certain key locations in-country I was in the process of assessing. He offered me some great overhead imagery, with key points clearly demarcated and a nice glossy unit logo on it. But when I pressed and asked again for an analytic terrain product, he just looked at me like I had something growing out of my forehead.
Jedburgh, isn't one of the standing principles that intelligence analysis is a lossful process? You take a large volume of data and distil it into a subset of high value data and that becomes a work product as a deliverable to a specific audience. So, is it that the deliverable needs to have specific rules or methods for the audience to manipulate the rules?
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
The Human Factor in HUMINT
As I reflect on just how many reports I read, corrected, opined on and contributed to, one thing still sticks in my mind today; the analysts and desk officers at home replying with either ‘of significant intelligence value’ or ‘of no intelligence value’.
The often-overlooked common denominator was the source’s spin on the report. Typical OB for example is in and of itself boring, especially to an individual who has never been to country X, or perhaps barely understands why all those numbers are relevant today, but weren’t a week ago.
I would be very concerned about openly sharing ‘raw or analyzed intel’ when the user is Joe the ordinary soldier, with no skills in comprehending or applying said in a country and/or culture he/she doesn’t fully understand in the first place.
Fully agree. The source's spin is huge but so is the collectors reference of atmospherics in the transmission. How the information was derived clarifies the response. If the individual was in a group setting, who was in the group, who could observe and influence the group, was the person under duress, alone, scared, having cha, trying to gain favor, ...
The disposition of the setting will twist what was said in multiple directions.
This anecdote captures almost perfectly what was in essence the point in my earlier post. Annotated data is just that--annotated data--not intelligence. High quality logic and critical thinking skills are not a given in people--they have to be groomed, and as with race horses, all the grooming in the world may not produce a Derby Winner.
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