Plowing Over the Taliban

[Dayuhan]

Again you respond to a post out of context. Do yourself a favour and go (carefully) read Wilf's paper.

I have read it. It makes sense within the parameters it sets, but those parameters are so limited that the conclusions he reaches bear little relevance to any real-world situation. For one thing, he approaches the issue of insurgency purely from a military perspective. Insurgency is in fact largely a political phenomenon and the political aspects of insurgency have to be addressed if the military effort is to achieve anything more than transient suppression of the insurgency. Of course the political aspects are not necessarily the concern of the military, but they are and must be the concern of any counterinsurgency effort.

Even more important, Wilf proceeds from the assumption that the the state is legitimate and the illegitimacy of any armed challenge to the state is beyond question. That assumption is arbitrary and insupportable, and no state involved in insurgency as a third party can afford to make it. A telling passage from Wilf:

The Soviets exercised near-genocidal levels of violence against the Afghan population, as did the Nazis in occupied Russia. Neither was attempting to create an environment where the rule of law prevailed. Control was sought via threat of harm to the civilian population. No one supports people who seek to harm them.

Does anyone seriously believe that the Government that the US and Britain (among others) are seeking to install in Afghanistan "attempting to create an environment where the rule of law prevails"?

Wilf is quite correct that "no one supports people who seek to harm them". What he apparently fails to consider is the possibility that people may be fighting the government precisely because they believe their government seeks to harm them. They may be right. We have to consider those possibilities, and we have to consider the possibility that the people fighting the government may have reasonable grievances that the Government may be able to resolve without violence.

Wilf goes on...

The British Army should provide an environment where law exists, because it is uncontested by another armed force.

That is not what the British or American armies are doing in Afghanistan. They're not trying to "provide an environment where law exists", they are trying to provide an environment where the GIRoA can impose its will in any way it chooses, which has little or nothing to do with the rule of law. If we try to pretend that we're backing good guys in white hats against bad guys in black hats, we're deceiving ourselves: we're backing one set of black hats against another.

Do you understand the concept of Military Support to the Civil Power?

Yes. Do you understand that if the Civil Power is the source of the problem, Military Support to the Civil Power is unlikely to resolve the problem?

Does it really make sense to apply Military Support to the Civil Power without first evaluating whether the Civil Power deserves support, or whether it's a liability?

Looking at the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2010 of the 168 countries covered there are 26 full democracies and 53 flawed democracies. So really there can be little or no reason in these 79 countries for any insurgency. Minorities do not have the right to place demands on the majority under threat of resorting to illegal action or armed insurrection. Wilf's article does not advocate shooting civilians willy nilly (so go read it)...

The Philippines is a flawed democracy (by EIU's definition) so it is difficult to see what can justify an armed insurrection in that country.

When the events referred to began we still had a good old US-supported dictator in place. We referred to him as a bastion against Communism. Strangely, when he took power the Communists had 250 armed men in 4 provinces; when he was finally driven out of power they had 40,000 armed men spread over the country and were rapidly approaching strategic parity. The insurgency has since been substantially degraded, not by killing insurgents but by (albeit sporadically and inconsistently) removing some of the motivations that drove people to join the insurgency in the first place.

With all due respect to those who apply designations like "flawed democracy", there are places in the Philippines - and in many other "flawed democracies - where I'd rebel in a heartbeat if I'd been born into the underclass. I suspect that you would too. Not surprisingly, these are typically the places where insurgency flourishes.

[jcustis]

As William Owen's article 'Killing Your Way to Control" has indeed been debated at length over at the SWJ Blog, let's bring the discussion back to the matter of this post, and the proposition (or is it question) that LtCol Haston has posed here.

We're getting a bit into the stratosphere with the discussion.

[Dayuhan]

As William Owen's article 'Killing Your Way to Control" has indeed been debated at length over at the SWJ Blog, let's bring the discussion back to the matter of this post, and the proposition (or is it question) that LtCol Haston has posed here.

We're getting a bit into the stratosphere with the discussion.

Valid point. When I first read this from the OP...

My boss added that subsidizing soybeans would deny them the cornfields as cover.

... a few questions came to mind.

Do Afghans eat soybeans? Is there any market for soybeans? Would the US have to buy and export the soybeans, then import corn to substitute for the corn that had been displaced by the soybeans (assuming that it's grown for local consumption)?

That of course is just the beginning. In traditional agricultural societies farming habits are deeply entrenched and an integral part of community practice and identity. Changing them, especially by decree, is not easy and will generate resistance. I think it's a little optimistic to conclude that "the farmers would love us". Drop into almost any farming area, anywhere, and tell the locals that you've decided what they're going to grow and how, and see how much love you get.

In short, it's really easy to fly over a place in a helicopter, look down, and conclude that what you're doing would be a lot easier if everybody down there was planting soybeans instead of corn and there were no canals or hedgerows. Those observations are of course correct: it would be a lot easier if everybody down there was planting soybeans instead of corn and there were no canals or hedgerows. Actually making such a thing happen is a long way from easy, especially if you're not governing the place, you don't have dictatorial powers, and you're even vaguely concerned about getting along with the people doing the farming.

[jcustis]

We could probably subsidize a lot of soybean seed, and find it back out in the market the next week, if the right balance of market and weather conditions are not worked out.

Some of the thickest vegetation-based "concealment" doesn't even come from corn, but marijuana grows. We're not going to be able to buy that out with soybeans.

[JMA]

... a few questions came to mind.

Do Afghans eat soybeans? Is there any market for soybeans? Would the US have to buy and export the soybeans, then import corn to substitute for the corn that had been displaced by the soybeans (assuming that it's grown for local consumption)?

What do you think was being suggested by the soybean crop substitution? Would a low growing substitute for a high growing, cover providing maize crop sound reasonable to you? You have an alternative suggestion?

Now as to the potential of being cozy with the locals I certainly hope that neither you nor any other person around here still entertains the idiotic notion that the 'hearts and minds' of the people of Helmand is still up for grabs after five odd years of throwing zillions of dollars at them and countless hours/days/months/years of groveling butt-licking by assorted ISAF forces and the promise of leaving in three years?

[Bob's World]

"Hearts and Minds" is a phrase hijacked and much abused by nouveau COINdinistas preaching the unproven power of "effectiveness" and "development" as a counter to the equally unproven power of military domination.

One can force a populace to submit to any government, but one cannot make them like and accept that same government through such force. Similarly one can attempt bribe a populace into not actively resisting a government being forced upon them, but that too cannot make a populace accept a government they find unacceptable.

"Hearts and Minds" means creating a government that the populace finds to be acceptable. It is molding the government to the populace, not bribing, building or killing the populace into submitting to the government.

But this thread is about how to best force a government deemed to be unacceptable and illegitimate by the majority of Afghans. How to minimize casualties among the foreign and domestic military forces sent out to force the populace to submit. Cut down their trees, knock down their walls, fill in their irrigation ditches and Karzez systems. Give them soy beans and irrigation pipes instead, that they cannot use for cover and concealment in their efforts to resist this situation they find unacceptable.

"Tactics without strategy" is indeed "the noise before defeat." (Sun Tzu)

The Noorzai tribe is a force to be reckoned with. 4.5 Million on the Afghan side of the border, 1 Million on the Pakistan side. Dispossessed of much of their wealth, power and influence by the US elevation of the Northern Alliance into power over all of Afghanistan they choose to resist. No amount of violence will make them (and other similarly affected groups) accept this situation, no amount of development either. What price dignity? What price honor? We find certain people to be inconvenient, so we attempt to push them aside or kill them if they don't push. We find their homes and the mechanisms of their very livelihood inconvenient as well, so now we discuss how to best push that aside as well?

Strategy
The US has no vital national interests in Afghanistan or Pakistan that are well served by our presence or our current approaches in that region.

Afghanistan and Pakistan has little geostrategic value to the US as well. We are a maritime nation not of that continent. Our commerce and resources flow freely around and never cross this region nor can they be impacted from it.

Reality
The only way the US can "lose" in Afghanistan is if it commits itself to stay and attempt to "win" in Afghanistan. Solve this tactical problem of cover and concealment in the green zones and another equally problematic tactical problem will emerge. Solve the strategic problem and all of that is moot. The essence of this thread is moot.

[jcustis]

Everyone concerned,

Infractions have been issued out for posts that do not meet the standard of decorum that the moderators are responsible for upholding.

Please endeavor to keep posts relevant to the topic, and avoid getting into a discussion or debate which would be more appropriate to any of the dozens of more appropriate threads at the SWC.

Carry on.

[ganulv]

Am I incorrect in assuming that if a plan to clear the canal edges of their secondary growth were announced (and even if it were not I am sure word would go out on Radio Bemba) that the ACM would start an aggressive IED-laying effort in said environment? In the absence of a USDA ordnance disposal program no such plan is going to come about without the commitment of military assets. Even if an operation like that could be accomplished with zero casualties is the best judgment still that those resources aren’t of better use elsewhere?

[Dayuhan]

What do you think was being suggested by the soybean crop substitution? Would a low growing substitute for a high growing, cover providing maize crop sound reasonable to you? You have an alternative suggestion?

Now as to the potential of being cozy with the locals I certainly hope that neither you nor any other person around here still entertains the idiotic notion that the 'hearts and minds' of the people of Helmand is still up for grabs after five odd years of throwing zillions of dollars at them and countless hours/days/months/years of groveling butt-licking by assorted ISAF forces and the promise of leaving in three years?

Substituting a low crop for a high one sounds like a wonderful solution. Bringing in a bunch of USDA technical people to introduce new crops and replace canals with piped irrigation sounds like a wonderful solution. Then you think about what you'd have to do to make that happen, and it sounds less wonderful.

Your troops are being shot at from cultivated areas and from cover provided by agricultural infrastructure. That's a problem. The proposed "solution" involves bringing in a large technical staff with zero local knowledge, finding and training local counterparts (how many USDA technical people speak Pashto?), hiring a large labor force, and trying to impose a total and immediate change in agricultural practice on a heavily armed populace that hates you, loathes your idea, and will do anything in their power to sabotage the project.

Now guess who gets the privilege of trying to secure and protect all the widely dispersed civilian managers, laborers, and equipment involved in this? Have you solved your problem or replaced it with a bigger one?

It's not about winning hearts and minds, it's about not shooting yourself in the putz.

[JMA]

As William Owen's article 'Killing Your Way to Control" has indeed been debated at length over at the SWJ Blog, let's bring the discussion back to the matter of this post, and the proposition (or is it question) that LtCol Haston has posed here.

We're getting a bit into the stratosphere with the discussion.

By all means split this thread into two if you so wish.

However, there needs to be the understanding that a rag tag under resourced, drug funded, mercenary militia, known as the Taliban, continue to tie down 100,000+ of supposedly the best soldiers in the world due to an increasingly bumbling and inept "management" (being an interesting and telling way in which the "command" is termed).

As such the simple issue of clearing areas of thick cover becomes a major point of discussion and contention (even though it remains unaddressed since 2006).

[jcustis]

Then talk about cover and concealment, and stop talking about a William Owen article. It is that simple. If you want to continue a larger discussion about the details of the Owen article, go back to the Blog post or start a different post.

[JMA]

Then talk about cover and concealment, and stop talking about a William Owen article. It is that simple. If you want to continue a larger discussion about the details of the Owen article, go back to the Blog post or start a different post.

Should I have snapped to attention, major? Sorry about that.

Wilf's article is germane to this topic and it was Bob who first realised that and posted about the true nature of the problem which is not just tree cover for insurgents. Surprised you failed to read the big picture.

Perhaps you are able to explain to me how that despite the much vaunted surge ISAF forces have failed to clear Helmand's green zone of Taliban?

[82redleg]

However, there needs to be the understanding that a rag tag under resourced, drug funded, mercenary militia, known as the Taliban, continue to tie down 100,000+ of supposedly the best soldiers in the world due to an increasingly bumbling and inept "management" (being an interesting and telling way in which the "command" is termed).

Yes- you have identified the problem. Now propose a solution- it must be feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Ideas that cannot be implemented within the political constraints imposed by the civilian authorities that our military authorities are responsible to are meaningless. So are ideas that create more problems than they solve (see point about forcibly changing the pattern of life in farming communities). Do we even know that soybeans would grow? I come from a farming community, and if you tried a similar stunt at home, you'd have a full on fight on your hands that would make Helmand look tame. And the only way you'd win would be to kill everyone- something that we are incapable of doing. Accept it, move on, and lets talk about something that (1) is within the realm of the possible, and (2) makes sense.

As such the simple issue of clearing areas of thick cover becomes a major point of discussion and contention (even though it remains unaddressed since 2006).

A couple of individuals, none of whom have been on the ground in this AO, have stated that this is a major point. A few more individuals, at least one of whom HAS been on the ground in this AO, has stated that this isn't a major point. Helmand is not Rhodesia, everything doesn't transfer. *Snipped due to lack of relevance to the topic**. The connection with reality in early 2000s was limited, at best.

[Dayuhan]

I don't have experience in Afghanistan, but I do have experience with crop substitution projects, and I can say with some confidence that if you want to replace one crop with another and you want that transition to be fast, comprehensive, and voluntary, you're barking at the moon. It won't happen, no matter what incentives you put up. You might get a few farmers to plant a few plots, to try it out. If they get decent yields and find a market for the product, a few more might come in. Over a span of several years - likely quite a few - you can work your new crop into the local mix, if everything goes well.

If you want to make that happen fast enough and over a wide enough area to have an immediate impact on military operations, you're going to have to do it by decree and force people to comply... and as several people have pointed out, that's likely to raise a whole new set of problems.

[JMA]

Yes- you have identified the problem.

Yes, its been obvious for some years now.

Now propose a solution- it must be feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Ideas that cannot be implemented within the political constraints imposed by the civilian authorities that our military authorities are responsible to are meaningless.

The problem was clearly stated so the solution is obvious. You mean you were unable to connect the dots?

So are ideas that create more problems than they solve (see point about forcibly changing the pattern of life in farming communities). Do we even know that soybeans would grow? I come from a farming community, and if you tried a similar stunt at home, you'd have a full on fight on your hands that would make Helmand look tame. And the only way you'd win would be to kill everyone- something that we are incapable of doing. Accept it, move on, and lets talk about something that (1) is within the realm of the possible, and (2) makes sense.

There are smart Americans and there are smart Brits. One just wonders why they don't get sent out to Afghanistan? The green zone has been a problem for some five years. Yet no one has been able to figure out solutions to even the most basic problems. Makes one think.

Now the originator of this thread could connect the dots where many thousands who passed through Helmand before him could not. He said:

Where the green was thin, I didn't get shot at. Where it was really thick, I got shot at 90% of the time...

Now one would have thought that simple experience would have been shared by many thousands of airmen or foot soldiers before him, yes? So it is indeed embarrassing when after a few months in-country someone asks a question that never entered the minds of those who had done full tours through there before.

OK lets talk reality then. How is the US going to be able to cut and run from Afghanistan (having failed to suppress the Taliban) and still save face? Have you any ideas for the politicians and military brass?

A couple of individuals, none of whom have been on the ground in this AO, have stated that this is a major point. A few more individuals, at least one of whom HAS been on the ground in this AO, has stated that this isn't a major point.

So one is only allowed to comment if one has been on the ground in Helmand then? Even if that person is only a six month wonder?

Helmand is not Rhodesia, everything doesn't transfer.

I was a South African who went to Rhodesia. I remain in awe of how the Rhodesians adapted to a virtually unwinable situation with intelligence and initiative and the military kept on thinking, adapting and developing right up to the end. Remarkable. On my return to SA I found that apart from four units the military mindset was stagnant and locked in the peacetime mode.

In the thirty years since then I find that there are those thinking Rhodesians who have drawn on the Rhodesian experience in terms of what worked well and what not, what should have been done and what not and so on. They have ideas based on often hard experience. There is probably nothing tactically that could be simply be "cut-and-paste" out of Rhodesia without significant adaption to local conditions.

But certainly what could be learned from the Rhodesian experience is how to allow intelligent people to apply their minds in circumstances of severe resource restrictions and political restraints and come up with solutions. What is obvious from Afghanistan (from all that has been written and all that can be found on Youtube) is that the quality and standard of soldiering (not necessarily the potential ability of individual soldiers) and the intellect (or the ability to apply it) of senior officers has declined over the years by a significant multiple.

Take the lessons from the past and learn from them. The current crop of US and Brit commanders show no ability to do so and that is very sad. To be defeated by the Taliban must surely be the final humiliation for any army.

[JMA]

I have read it. It makes sense within the parameters it sets, but those parameters are so limited that the conclusions he reaches bear little relevance to any real-world situation. For one thing, he approaches the issue of insurgency purely from a military perspective. Insurgency is in fact largely a political phenomenon and the political aspects of insurgency have to be addressed if the military effort is to achieve anything more than transient suppression of the insurgency. Of course the political aspects are not necessarily the concern of the military, but they are and must be the concern of any counterinsurgency effort.

Even more important, Wilf proceeds from the assumption that the the state is legitimate and the illegitimacy of any armed challenge to the state is beyond question. That assumption is arbitrary and insupportable, and no state involved in insurgency as a third party can afford to make it. A telling passage from Wilf:



Does anyone seriously believe that the Government that the US and Britain (among others) are seeking to install in Afghanistan "attempting to create an environment where the rule of law prevails"?

Wilf is quite correct that "no one supports people who seek to harm them". What he apparently fails to consider is the possibility that people may be fighting the government precisely because they believe their government seeks to harm them. They may be right. We have to consider those possibilities, and we have to consider the possibility that the people fighting the government may have reasonable grievances that the Government may be able to resolve without violence.

Wilf goes on...



That is not what the British or American armies are doing in Afghanistan. They're not trying to "provide an environment where law exists", they are trying to provide an environment where the GIRoA can impose its will in any way it chooses, which has little or nothing to do with the rule of law. If we try to pretend that we're backing good guys in white hats against bad guys in black hats, we're deceiving ourselves: we're backing one set of black hats against another.



Yes. Do you understand that if the Civil Power is the source of the problem, Military Support to the Civil Power is unlikely to resolve the problem?

Does it really make sense to apply Military Support to the Civil Power without first evaluating whether the Civil Power deserves support, or whether it's a liability?



When the events referred to began we still had a good old US-supported dictator in place. We referred to him as a bastion against Communism. Strangely, when he took power the Communists had 250 armed men in 4 provinces; when he was finally driven out of power they had 40,000 armed men spread over the country and were rapidly approaching strategic parity. The insurgency has since been substantially degraded, not by killing insurgents but by (albeit sporadically and inconsistently) removing some of the motivations that drove people to join the insurgency in the first place.

With all due respect to those who apply designations like "flawed democracy", there are places in the Philippines - and in many other "flawed democracies - where I'd rebel in a heartbeat if I'd been born into the underclass. I suspect that you would too. Not surprisingly, these are typically the places where insurgency flourishes.

For the record I choose to pass on replying to this nonsense.