Clint,

As the main thread on the Yemen has referred to IIRC the Yemen has used the AQ threat to secure US support, when in fact AQAP was not a substantive threat to the Yemen:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12784

Your paper clearly shows there is an AQAP threat beyond the Yemen, notably to the USA and others from a very small cell within AQAP. For a host of reasons this high value target group we have assumed are located in the empty spaces or lightly populated areas. Will an ungoverned / failing Yemen state (not society) expand those sanctuaries?

My own "armchair" suspicion is that the target group will remain in the empty spaces. If they move to the towns your policy option is out, simply due to potential collateral damage IMO.

How much of AQAP is in fact Yemeni, Saudi and others?

The USA needs to have a far better information operations campaign in the Yemen to enable such a policy option of drones and SOF. Most Yemeni appear focussed on regime change and not AQAP's presence. How does such a campaign work in that society. It appears to be "We're AQAP hunting with all our resources, but are reluctant to help regime change".

Clearly drones and SOF action can go wrong, e.g. hitting a tribal wedding. How will the local population respond? A prompt apology and damage payments may help - elsewhere something the USA has been reluctant to do.

The important objective is to reduce the AQAP target group as they pose an external threat and not lose Yemeni neutrality or support.

As for your wider question that will have to wait and has been the subject of several threads methinks:
We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.