Strategy in the 21st Century

[slapout9]

IMO The larger problem since we entered the nuclear age at the end of ww2 is that no one talks about the fact that strategy and policy have merged into a new and distinct entity! The world was changed forever that day, but our thinking and our framework concepts have not. So in the end our judgement is flawed......And we fail.

Just look at the nuclear proliferation that is all around us but we spend unbelievable amounts on so called counter terrorism. One of the primary directives of the Constitution is to preserve a "Future" for our next generation, that flat out requires some type of plan! Where is it? We have lost our since of priorities,which in someway is a key component to any future plan.

[Bill Moore]

IMO The larger problem since we entered the nuclear age at the end of ww2 is that no one talks about the fact that strategy and policy have merged into a new and distinct entity! The world was changed forever that day, but our thinking and our framework concepts have not. So in the end our judgement is flawed......And we fail.

Just look at the nuclear proliferation that is all around us but we spend unbelievable amounts on so called counter terrorism. One of the primary directives of the Constitution is to preserve a "Future" for our next generation, that flat out requires some type of plan! Where is it? We have lost our since of priorities,which in someway is a key component to any future plan.

We all tend to have negative views of the world based on the "if it bleeds, it leads" media news standard; however, I think we would be hard pressed to make a case that the U.S. has not relatively consistently improved the standard of living for its citizens since the end of WWII. There will of course be cyclic ups and downs in the economy, but the overall trend remains positive. Whether by plan or by chance we seem to be something right despite the bitter divides in our political system.

Critical to sustained improved standard of living for the next generation is revamping our education system, fixing the infrastructure that our economy is dependent upon, and forcing the extreme right and left elements in our political structure out of the system, so the real politicians can work on solving problems through the age old and tested compromising process that is the foundation of a democratic system.

The one issue we concern ourselves most with on SWJ is national security. I'm eager to see the final National Security Strategy, and the subordinate strategies developed to implement it. The new administration has hit the refresh button, but I do have concerns that it may be excessively focused on preparing to go to war with near peer state actors at the expense of other threats we face now and will face in the 21st Century.

You pointed out one, the proliferation of WMD. The proliferation of WMD probably can't be stopped any more than the illegal drug trade, but it can disrupted, degraded, delayed, or pick your other D word. The insurmountable problems are the expanding black, gray, and white globalized markets where the components of WMD systems can be purchased, and the inability to prevent WMD knowledge proliferation via the internet. Assuming I'm right, where does that leave us? On one hand, if we modernize our nuclear force, we can probably deter so called rational state actors from using WMD, just as they can deter us. On the other hand, it is unlikely that suicidal jihadist organizations can be deterred from using WMD, which will most likely be the use of chemical weapons in the near term. How do we adapt to manage that challenge?

Moving back to the threat of state actors challenging our interests globally. This threat undermines both our economic and security interests, but they are doing this now in the gray zone, so are we addressing the gray zone gap? While we certainly need a military that can prevail in a high end conflict in case we stumble into one, does it make any difference if we have a compelling conventional and nuclear military advantage if our adversaries are still achieving war like objectives short of war, and we have no idea of how to counter it? Are we hamstrung by outdated concepts and laws that do not hinder our adversaries? Do we have the wherewithal to change, or will we slowly retreat?

Back to your original point, we won't preserve a future for the next generation with outdated ideas and concepts. We have to adapt or strategy to deal with the world we have, not the one we want. We seem to want a world where a large conventional force can ward off the evils that threaten us. I for one, think that is an outdated idea that has already been proven to have no legs. It is one leg of a three legged stool at best.

You also point out the disconnect between policy and strategy, an argument I partly follow, but hope you can expand upon it a little to clarify. Another issue is we live in a world of programs and programming, and programs are what the services compete for, not war winning strategies. How do we fix this legacy mindset?

The good news is we're, at least in theory, an open society that is willing to identify, expose, and then fix our problems. That is a competitive advantage that is hard to beat when we come together as a nation to meet the challenge of the day. Hopefully we can do so before the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11 attack.

[davidbfpo]

I spotted this WoTR article awhile ago and kept it back: 'The War on Terrorism as Imperial Policing' by Joshua Rovner.

It struck me that it has application here, although the USA has been wary of being labelled an imperial power and following British practices - in this context the imperial era tactic of air policing.

Citing the last two paragraphs:

Great Britain’s imperial grand strategy ended when it could no longer afford an empire. Two world wars and a series of postwar economic disasters forced it to retrench. The United States is much wealthier than pre-war Britain, and its relative advantages are enduring, even after the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Moreover, there is little sustained domestic opposition to a strategy focused mainly on intelligence, special operations, and drone strikes. As long as there are no serious economic or political pressures to exercise restraint, we can expect more of the same: an imperial-style counterterrorism campaign waged by a country without imperial aspirations.

Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/th...rial-policing/

[Bill Moore]

The President released his National Security Strategy on 18 December 2017, and it is largely consistent with previous strategies with some key differences.

The NSS summary can be found at the following link:

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings...cas-interests/

Strategic confidence enables the United States to protect its vital national interests. The Strategy identifies four vital national interests, or “four pillars” as:

I. Protect the homeland, the American people, and American way of life;
II. Promote American prosperity;
III. Preserve peace through strength;
IV. Advance American influence.

The Strategy addresses key challenges and trends that affect our standing in the world, including:

•Revisionist powers, such as China and Russia, that use technology, propaganda, and coercion to shape a world antithetical to our interests and values;

•Regional dictators that spread terror, threaten their neighbors, and pursue weapons of mass destruction;

•Jihadist terrorists that foment hatred to incite violence against innocents in the name of a wicked ideology, and transnational criminal organizations that spill drugs and violence into our communities.

The entire NSS can be found at this link:

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-conten...017-0905-2.pdf

Somewhat surprising after the campaign rhetoric, the new NSS still upholds our values, and describes the increasingly competitive strategic environment as fundamentally contests between those who value human dignity and freedom and those who oppress individuals and enforce uniformity.

Will revisit this the NSS later.

[Bill Moore]

I spotted this WoTR article awhile ago and kept it back: 'The War on Terrorism as Imperial Policing' by Joshua Rovner.

It struck me that it has application here, although the USA has been wary of being labelled an imperial power and following British practices - in this context the imperial era tactic of air policing.

Citing the last two paragraphs:
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/th...rial-policing/

David,

Think the following paragraph contrasts the difference between the British and U.S. approach at the strategy level.

The air policing analogy is far from perfect. Great Britain was pursuing an imperial grand strategy, supported by an imperial service. The United States does not have imperial aims or an imperial constabulary. Instead, its grand strategy is meant to sustain a liberal international order backed by a conventional military capable of rapid power projection. Washington seeks to solidify its power position by spreading American values, especially free trade and democracy, while ensuring that it can respond quickly in the event of regional instability.

We focused on sustaining the liberal international order and spreading our values, while the Imperial British focused on sustaining its power by using air power as a weapon of terror. Regardless of how you use air power, the promises associated it have always proven to be false promises. Furthermore, employing air power today is not a cheap option, a single bomb could cost over a million dollars. The Air Forces has priced themselves out business in many respects.

To the author's point of the necessity of developing a sustainable approach to our war on terror, I agree strongly. We don't need to employ 2 and 3 star headquarters and the associated staff to manage these security challenges in most cases. We certainly don't need high end aircraft designed to fight against a peer competitor. However, the lighter approach comes with its own risks as we saw in Niger.

[davidbfpo]

Could the difficulty over strategy not also reflect public trust in the USA? I found this New Yorker article fascinating; it starts with and my emphasis added:

Gallup has been polling Americans annually about their confidence in their country’s institutions—the military, the Supreme Court, Congress, the Presidency, organized religion, the health-care establishment, and public schools, among others. Over all, the project describes a collapse in trust over time, even though the surveys started amid the disillusionment of Watergate and the failed war in Vietnam. In 1973, more than four in ten Americans had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress. This year, the figure was twelve per cent. Trust in churches and other religious institutions has fallen from sixty-five per cent to forty-one per cent in the same period. Confidence in public schools has dropped from fifty-eight per cent to thirty-six per cent. The loss of faith in the “medical system” has been particularly dramatic—a decline from eighty per cent in 1975 to thirty-seven per cent this year. There are a few exceptions to the broad slide. Confidence in the police has held steady at just above fifty per cent. Confidence in the military has increased, from fifty-eight per cent in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to seventy-two percent this year.

Link:https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily...p-relies-upon?

I had not seen such figures on the decline in trust in public and other institutions for the USA.

There is a recent opinion poll on trust in the professions here and that found 'Government Ministers and politicians are again the least trusted', with 19% trust Ministers and 17% trust politicians more generally. Alas the armed forces are not included and I would expect trust in them to be high.
Link:https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/politicians-remain-least-trusted-profession-britain

[Bill Moore]

I recently read two excellent books. The first was A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, by Richard Haass that provides a view on challenges to the World Order, and proposals for meeting that challenge. The second book, which is the topic of this post is The World America Made, by Robert Kagan. This book also provides a view deeply informed by history on the world order that America made, the challenges that order faces, and the risk associated with what follows. A lot of strategists have different views of what is most important when it comes to strategy, but I think all strategy is worthless if the nation doesn't have the political will to execute it. This book provides a well reasoned argument on why America must stay engaged in the world.

What follows are some key points in the book:

1. Every international order in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers and every order has changed when power shifted to others with different beliefs and interests. The better idea doesn't win just because it is the better idea, it requires great power to champion it.

2. He provided historical examples when democracy rose and fell as a prevailing political idea, emphasizing that orders are not self-sustaining. What has enabled the prolonged success of democratization the last quarter was the world's greatest power reflected this norm. The U.S. didn't pursue a persistent policy of promoting democracy, in reality the military was employed out principle only twice to install democratic governments (Panama and Haiti). Rather it was the norms that America established. The strategic, economic, political, and ideological were inseparable. If nations wanted to be part of NATO, and later the EU, they had to present democratic credentials.

3. A Chinese strategist argues that the U.S. created “an institutionalized system of hegemony” by “establishing international norms” according to U.S. principles of behavior. Once these norms are accepted by the majority of countries, U.S. hegemony becomes legitimized. Of course we did this while the Chinese were killing millions of their own country men, and putting the rest of them in reeducation camps. If you want a voice in the world, don't be excessively stupid.

4. Kagan warns that we are dazzled by democratization, globalization, and interdependence. We tend to believe these developments have made our world so different. But these trends have been flowing for more than a century, and they have not prevented catastrophic wars. He reminds us that prior to WWI, economic interdependence and the belief that no one would go to war over land prevailed. The outbreak of WWI revealed failed imagination. Today we suffer from similar lack of imagination. Even the arguments are the same.

5. All great powers respond to opportunities and constraints in the international system. It is remarkable (unprecedented) that the U.S. superpower, for all its flaws, its excesses, and its failures has been accepted and tolerated by much of the world to such a degree. It has been more than tolerated, others have encouraged it, joined it, in formal and less formal agreements.

6. International order is no an evolution; it is an imposition.

7. He reminds us of the limits of our power, and when he puts it in historical context, we're really not as weak as we tend to believe. He writes, it is true the U.S. is not able to get what it wants much of the time. But then, it never could. Our image of the past is an illusion. For every great accomplishment during the Cold War, there was at least one equally fundamental set back. Mao winning China, N. Korea's attack on the South, couldn’t stop European allies from recognizing China. Our foreign policy created hatred for the U.S. As a result of 3d world animosity, and the U.S. steadily lost influence in the UN after 1960 (read The Brothers if you want to understand this point, the CIA and its unnecessary unconventional warfare efforts were occasionally successful operationally, but a major strategic failure). Late 60s, Kissinger wrote, “increased fragmentation of power, the greater diffusion of political activity, and the more complicated patterns of international conflict and alignment had sharply reduced the capacity of both superpowers to influence.

The point of all this is we don't see a trend until it is in our rear view mirror, so the new we're dealing with has been around for some time.

8. Many countries looked to the U.S. for leadership and protection throughout the Cold War and in the 1990s. The point is the U.S. was the predominant power in the world, it wielded enormous influence, and it accomplished much, but it was NOT omnipotent—far from it.

Continued

[Bill Moore]

9. How can we measure if the U.S. is in decline? To compare American influence today with a mythical past of overwhelming dominance can only mislead us. While the U.S. government can exercise more influence on the behavior of more actors with respect to more issues than any other government can, it does not mean it can determine all other nations’ behavior on all issues or even on most issues.

10. The measure of the order’s success is not whether the U.S. can tell everyone what to do. It is whether the order itself—expansion of democracy, prosperity, and security is sustained. The greater freedom and independence of Brazil in foreign policy, although they disagree with us, can be a sign of the order’s success. The greater freedom of Iran to build a nuke can be a harbinger of its failure.

11. This point was made toward of the end of the book, but in my opinion it was the motivation for the author writing the book. If Americans had a clearer picture of what might come after the American world order, they would be more inclined to continue struggling to preserve the order they made, or at least ensure changes to the system to not undermine the order from which they, and others, have so greatly benefited. (He writes earlier in the book, fighting to sustain the current order as is will be an act of futility, but we need to lead and shape the emerging order).

What happens when autocracies shape the international order? We see China sustaining dictatorships in Burma and North Korea, and Russia’s obstruction of democratic pressures on regimes in Belarus, Armenia, and Central Asia. Since this is true today, in a world dominated by democracies, imagine a world in which the autocratic powers were stronger than the democratic powers. It might be enough to reverse liberal democratic order again.

He adds, one key element of the liberal economic order over the past two centuries has been control over the seas. What if the U.S. ceased to carry this burden? China is using its growing naval power not top open, but to close international waters offers a glimpse into the future where the U.S. Navy is no longer dominant.

12. What has made America most attractive to much of the world has not been its culture, its wisdom, or even its ideals alone. At times these have played a part; at times they were irrelevant. More consistent has been the attraction of America’s power, the manner in which it uses it, and the ends for which it has been used. What is true since the time of Rome remains true today; there can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace.

13. He closes with thoughts on change and continuity. In the international realm, the distribution of power among nations, and between nations and non-state actors, is constantly in flux. It is both foolish and futile to try to hold to the past and to believe that the old ways are always going to be sufficient to meet new circumstances. However, we cannot be so entranced by change, that we fail to recognize some fundamental and enduring truths about power, about human nature, and about the way beliefs and power interact to shape a world order.

Continued