The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[pvebber]

Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...les/warden.htm

and

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...ttle/chp4.html

A synthesis of this "strategic paralysis" school of thought , combined with with Boyd's work is done in:

http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/AU_Press_...adok/fadok.pdf


The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.

There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/n...d-the-hive.ars

Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adsersary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actualy kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

[Ken White]

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so. (emphasis added / kw)

Two very important facts. Thanks for posting that.

Our desire for detailed instructions or a blueprint nowadays never ceases to amaze me. It's almost like people do not want to think...

[Fuchs]

Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).

All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.

Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).


I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?

Well, save for me, I think of myself as the great airpower strategist, of course. On the other hand, I thought I was a good driver until I wrecked my car without much outside help!

[Cliff]

Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).

What else is war about?

All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.

Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...

Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).

Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?

I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?

Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff

[Fuchs]

What else is war about?

Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.

Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...

It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.

Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?

He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.

Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.

None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff

There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)


Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?


The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

---------------------

Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.

[Cliff]

Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.

OK, but Warden is arguing that we should try to focus on the ultimate object... getting the enemy to do what we want - IE, "War is politics by other means" as CvC would say.

It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?

This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

Uhh, Warden is arguing for the direct approach as opposed to attacking fielded forces... how is this poorly aimed?

The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.

You are correct, the USAAF didn't have an adequate force until early 1944, and in early 1944 it was used on France and the intended areas of landing, not for strategic attack. Once it was unleashed on Germany mid 1944 it did some real damage. The Iraqi Air Force had 700 aircraft and was (for the time) a fairly credible Soviet-style force. I'm not saying they weren't outnumbered, they were. But the real key was in training, maintenance, technology, etc. You are essentially arguing that airpower was not effective because it worked too well...

He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.

Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.

None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.

Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.

There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

This is just silly, Fuchs. What would you recommend airpower doctrine change to? What do you see as the major flaws in the current system?

The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)

Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan? I think it has done more to enable the land forces than anything else. OBTW the drone program has been pretty effective. How would the Army/Marines have done with no airborne ISR, airlift, CAS, AAR, etc?

Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?

Very few targets have been missed. Warden is arguing that improvements can be made to make airpower more effective in COIN - you won't find me arguing with that. But you seem to think that past failures mean the concept is doomed. By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.

The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

Are you serious? You seem to have no familiarity with the way air campaigns are planned now... while brute force is a part of it (I suspect Wilf would argue that it must be part of any war!), the process is very tightly controlled.

---------------------
Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating. (See RAND report) This is not an airpower strategy issue- that is a grand/political strategy issue of going to war without the will to do what is neccessary- exactly what Warden is arguing against.

Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.

Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy. I would also submit that just being without power is unlikely to convince someone like Milosevic, especially when opposition to outsiders is the source of much of his power. But again, that's not an issue with airpower...

The problems that occured were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out. So I guess you basically agree with Warden!

V/R,

Cliff

[Fuchs]

Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?

The resources applied were in all the 1991-2011 examples out of proportion with the target. Show me contemporary air war strategy defeating a peer enemy in less than a half year anywhere and I'll buy that it's efficient enough.

Btw, the record for most rapid defeat of a Yugoslav government is an astonishing 11 days. The most powerful alliance ever took 78 days to force very limited demands.

Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.

The problem is merely that the whole 'rings' stuff is nonsense. The whole approach is just a bad idea. His writing is full of cluelessness with minimal inspiration. You need to get to the core if you want to break will, you need to look at psychology and preferences, not against an organisation complex.

Here's a problem, though.
Let's assume I think I have a better concept that the world-famous five rings crap.
Would you expect me to publish it in an internet forum?

I wouldn't even publish it in my blog.

Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.

... which was what he was told to propose, not what he proposed. There are certain people from that episode who do not hold him in high regard at all.

Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan?

It has been a failure because it was no success, especially in regard to strategy. Doing this and doing that does not count much when the real idea was to win, not to keep doing things.

By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.

By my methodology, Iraq would have been left alone since '97, for it had been disarmed as demanded in '96 and was no real-world problem any more.

Are you serious? (...), the process is very tightly controlled.

Yes, and I don't care about tight control.
There's no inspiration behind what's being done, just transpiration and the standard meme of throwing resources at a problem.
The 90's and 00's air wars followed the 8th AF approach of destroying this, then that - trial and error. We need something more close to Biafra air force, Flying Tigers or Luftwaffe May '40.
We need air forces which deliver a good strategic effect on small budget, accomplish their mission against the odds and which can focus on what's decisive.

Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating.

I'll translate this for you:

The original strategy didn't work, a new set of targets was opened up and that strategy didn't work either, another set of targets was opened up and that strategy was still failing until finally the hero knight in shining armour arrived and rescued us all from the total strategic embarrassment: The Russian prime minister who convinced Milosevic that Russia would not intervene.

Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy.

Hardly. We bombed a small power for 78 days. Not elegant at all.

The problems that occurred were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out.

Most of all, it leads to additional wars because
a) there were already too many hundreds of billions spent on the AF bureaucracy and its toys (and politicians never fail to hit the sunk costs fallacy!).
b) air power offers a fantasy of a war (or bullying) on the cheap, without much negative effects of relevance

The Kosovo air war remains a strategic disaster on too many levels - it's astonishing how well this has been kept out of the public perception.
* technical failure of DEAD attempts
* technical failure of F-117
* tactical failure of way too inept mission planning (such as no variance in French UAV routing and predictable Tomahawk flight routes)
* tactical/technical failure of BDA from the air
* intelligence failure on colossal scope before the war
* political failure: lies about the reasons for war
* intelligence failure: BDA
* top HQ failure to teach politicians about what air power can achieve
* top HQ failure to understand that the short bombing around Sarajevo is NOT a good analogy
* political failure: opposition instead of cooperation with Russia
* logistical failure: Race to Pristina airport
* readiness and deployability failure: TF Hawk
* strategic failure: poor understanding of the purpose of destruction
* PR failure: slowed down train bombing video was a lie
* reconnaissance failure: aerial imagery misinterpretation on colossal scale
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: way too many decoys were engaged
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: deployed ground forces were barely scratched despite being targeted
* strategic failure: way too long campaign in light of the disparity between NATO and Yugoslavia
* political failure: Greece was not convinced to make bases available
* logistical failure: use of North Italian instead of South Italian bases was idiotic
* political failure: many countries provided small packages of combat aircraft instead of the alliance tailoring a force of only the best for the job
* political failure: no gains for us
* political failure: we're stills tuck in there with blue helmets
* political failure: a few thousand criminal insurgents fooled us into fighting their war
* political failure: said thugs are now operating the organised crime hub of Europe under our protection
* political failure: we came to end an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars that did not really exist and then we didn't really keep the Kosovars from cleaning most of Kosovo ethnically from Serbs


The whole thing was a huge embarrassment, and the air war component contributed a lot to the embarrassment. Only so-called "victory" prevented that the whole world laughed about us.


Last but not least: Always keep in mind RAND is writing for its customers; the air force, the navy ...
Any paper that quotes Michael O'Hanlon is by default already at least 50% disqualified in my opinion.

[Cliff]

Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:

pvebber-

Col Warden's point is only partially to re-hash his theory, but to point out that airpower (as Slap pointed out, this doesn't just mean the Air Force) can be used in "complex" situations as you call it.

The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.

There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"

So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not. As Warden says in the article:

Opponents are complicated things with many moving and static parts, but we can simplify our analysis by seeing them as a system, which means that they function in some reasonably connected manner.

In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?

Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adversary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actually kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any appreciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

An organism is any living system, or the highest level of cell organization (Nation Institute of Health). So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

This is the point of Warden's article - that airpower is not being used as effectively as it could be because the accepted wisdom is that it is "too hard" to use it in complex systems, and that "everyone knows airpower won't work" in situation x (say COIN). He argues that this is because of our terminology and past history. He believes we can find ways to make it work if we try. Warden is arguing that we should try to make sure we keep our desired end state in mind. He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.

Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.

Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

pvebber can answer for himself but, for your consideration:

So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not.

True, however there are two problems that must be addresssed -- and Warden and many smart guys who defend him do not bother to address them. First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. As yousaid above:

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.

In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?

I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.

...So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.

Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.

He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.

That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses...

Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.

Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?

In reverse order:

Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well.

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time...

[Steve Blair]

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... In reverse order:

Warden is also terrible when it comes to using historical examples to "prove" his points. His "The Air Campaign" is riddled with poor examples and things massaged to fit. His guide is flawed in that he really doesn't admit that airpower has any limitations and totally ignores the "soft" aspect of airpower (where I think it can have a greater impact, especially in wars that fall below the "toe to toe nuclear combat with the Ruskies" level). I use his book as a class textbook simply because it's one of the few accessible works out there, but it generates good discussion every time.

[Cliff]

First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.

True, but we have to try to understand it somehow. Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?

I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.

I agree that it is hard. Warden is arguing that we should acknowledge when things are difficult, but not let that make us think they are impossible.

Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

Agreed... again, Warden isn't saying there aren't limitations, he's just saying that we shouldn't let current limitations make us stop trying to overcome them.

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.

Valid point, I would re-iterate my point above on Warden's intent.

That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses...

Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right?

Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well.

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time...

Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.

My next paper is going to be on ways to try and improve our strategic process...

Anyway, good points Ken, I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...

V/R,

Cliff

[Marc]

Cliff,

There is one more thing missing in Warden's article: the effect of his strategy on OUR OWN leadership. This lacuna is a bit odd, because this effect was at the heart of his original article (see John A. Warden, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century”):

All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political leaders.

The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.

[Cliff]

The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.

I agree that Israel mis-used Wardens model in Lebanon, and certainly discrimination is important. IMHO, one of the big problems with Israel's efforts is that they didn't discriminate adequately between Lebanon and Hezbollah when they did their systems analysis... and so ended up hitting targets that were used by Lebanese civilians. I think that Warden would argue that they failed to adequately find and target the leadership ring, and ended up hitting fielded forces and infrastructure too hard.

As Warden points out, the big issue is time... the quicker a war, the less likely there is to be civilian casualties and the less likely public outrage is. Certainly the "baby milk factory" in Desert Storm and the Chinese Embassy in OAF cost us in the court of public opinion. I think that the actual effects of public outrage are somewhat overrated, however, due to the media and politicians views of them.

This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there... politicians like G.W. Bush (whatever you think of him otherwise) who are willing to throw away their careers to do what they think is the right thing are few and far between.

Again, I'm not arguing that Warden's model is the end-all be-all, but that he is misunderstood because people focus on the 5 rings as a prescriptive solution and ignore the other points he is trying to make.

V/R,

Cliff

[Marc]

This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there.

I am afraid you put the cart before the horse. It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

[pvebber]

Cliff,

Great points. I hope to be more responsive to them this evening, but to make sure I don't put words in your mouth or build a strawman, what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

What I argree with him on are:

Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.

This is true almost by the definition of strategy. The issue becomes what is the best approach to strategy and comes down to Jomini vs Clauswitz which at its root gets back to Plato vs Aristotle...

The objective of a conflict is to achieve a future picture, not to kill and destroy.

One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.

As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.

Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...


What I disagree on:

The best approach to strategy starts with a future picture, determines the systems and centers of gravity that must change to realize that picture, takes into account the impact of time, and preplans an exit.

We should focus on direct, strategic centers of gravity to the maximum extent possible.

Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.

Our conflict vocabulary flows from ancient times and traps us mentally and physically into concepts that no longer make sense, so our vocabulary must change.

How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.

If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.

Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?

Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.

There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.

“Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict.

If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

And this leads to the ultimate hubris:

It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

and no mention of the "5 rings"

[Ken White]

Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right?

I railed about that stupidity by the Army while I was in it for over 27 years and while working for it for another 18. I did not rail about Marine parochialism during my four years as a Marine -- my excuse; I started that at age 16 and didn't know better -- by the time I got to the Army I saw how terribly counterproductive and stifling that excessive loyalty could be. It also crushes initiative and innovation. Parochialism by all the services -- and by the communities within the services is absolutely stupid. It is also absolutely embedded. It needs a firm hand to rid the institutions of a wasteful emotion.

I also frequently rail about it here -- and on an equal opportunity basis.

Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.

Hmm. You said that four times...

I don't think anyone is saying that, at least no one here. The issue to me seems to apply the correct solution to a given situation, not to give up -- and applying on solution to all situations is likely to be problematic...

Then there is this:

Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?

Cannot speak for others but IMO (an opinion shared by quite a few folks I've been around over the years...) is that the interplay of others with your goals and in response to your actions will cause you to have to modify your strategy on a almost constant basis. This will give the appearance in some cases of a trial and error approach, in others, that is exactly what it will be. In still others, both the actuality and the appearance are avoided and it will seem that the Gods smiled.

That latter will generally be due to a fortuitous personage being at the right place at the right time. I will note that the US has in the past produced some of those types and that over the years all three variants have been evident in our 'strategeries.' I will also note that today, the system almost seems to conspire against great competence and that IMO doies not bode well.

...I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...

Yes...

[slapout9]

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

pvebber,
I don't know where you got the idea(you are not alone,many people believe that) that warden believes in predicting things as his chart on the Time Value of Action points out it is about "probabilities."

He has always warned about war being the most dangerous activity there is because of the unpredictability, it goes all the way back to his original publication of "The Air Campaign." Below is a link to a 2004 presentation warning about trying to predict the future.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joi...Warden-PPT.pdf