To start with I believe this article has some merit (in the broadest terms).Originally Posted by Rex Brynen
By grouping tanks with MRAP vehicles it becomes somewhat unsuck. The Marines have indicated a requirement for 14 tanks. Yes this may just be the thin edge of the edge but one must assume there are good, solid operational reasons behind their stated need for a handful of tanks.
(My first response to the tank deployment was surprise that tanks would be preferred over additional helicopter gunship effort. On reflection my thinking was that tanks were a means of defeating the ROE limitations on the use of CAS. And good to see some debate on this matter.)
The word helicopter was never mentioned in the article. He said:When I went on and on about the IED threat some months back my position was that when faced with a "road-side bomb" threat then stay away from the road-side as far as possible. Despite the Brits having largely neutralised the Northern Ireland IED (road-side bomb) threat through the intelligent use of helicopters they did not carry this success over to Afghanistan and them and the US seemed in a state of tactical paralysis as they sat back and took alarming and largely unnecessary casualties. I included IEDs aimed at foot patrols then but they do not fall under of the subject of this thread."we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate."
He gets a little further off course when he writes:Sure the "well how would you do it?" is the first response from those who haven't got the faintest idea of how to deal with the IED threat both to vehicles and foot patrols. (The same question was asked of me here by the equally clueless.)"When I raised such points in planning meetings, my coalition colleagues often asked how then I proposed to "defeat" the IED. My initial response was that the question was wrong: We should not be trying to defeat the IED. Rather, we should be working to defeat the insurgency that plants them."
His answer was clever in a sense but did not address the then current tactical threat if IEDs. So he really needed to supply his answer as the long term goal but be prepared to provide some idea of a solution in the immediate term. He may not have in the meeting he speaks of but he ends his article as follows:
To make IEDs irrelevant you avoid them. To avoid "road-side bombs" you avoid roads (as far as possible and when faced with no other alternative use MRAP vehicles with the necessary support to respond aggressively to any ambush.)We may not be able to "defeat" the IED, but we can make it irrelevant. To do so will require us to rely upon the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the junior leaders who are most in tune with the local dynamics and terrain, not on technology or defensive-minded mandates designed to prevent casualties at all costs. Marginalizing the IED will also require higher commanders to accept greater risk and allow their subordinates to sometimes make mistakes -- even deadly ones. But that's the only way to start connecting with the Afghan people, who are the ones who will defeat the Taliban in the end. It's time to start playing to win instead of trying to avoid losing.
I learned during officer training that if during an assault of an enemy objective you find your platoon crossing a mine field (of the 1 mine per metre of frontage type) you continue to press on with your assault and accept 10% casualties. Now the Brits believe in many areas of Afghanistan they are in fact patrolling in a "medium minefield". My response is well then don't do it... avoid such areas.
How to avoid IEDs while still getting the job done? Well ask these junior commanders what they believe will do the trick. If he can't give you an answer put him on the next flight home (not reassigned... OUT!) Force these often complaining junior commanders to use their initiative or get lost.
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