Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Fuchs]

Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!

I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".

I do especially object to

The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", (...)

Let me quote myself:

Ever since I've been irritated by the use of the term "center of gravity" (Schwerpunkt) in (American) English military theory writings. It's being used with the meaning of "critical vulnerability" instead of as "great accumulation of power for the best chance to win an important battle".

It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it. Most importantly, don't link your concept to a respected theorist because that's an illegitimate move that exploits that author's crediility.

Again and again I discussed these points with little effect. The new meaning of the term was long since established in English-language literature and people stubbornly kept linking it to von Clausewitz.


Well, it turned out to be a double surprise because my position was long since official doctrine - in the U.S.! The USMC acknowledged this in its FMFM-1 "Warfighting" field manual (1989):

"(...) Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war Clausewitz wrote (p.485): "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climatic test of strength against strength "by daring all to will all" (p. 596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz' historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability."

in a footnote that was in reference to

"Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability. Obviously, the more critical and vulnerable, the better."

The American CoG concept seeks an easy lever for victory, while CvC's "Schwerpunkt" was primarily about how to arrange the own forces without wasting potential.

[William F. Owen]

I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".

OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

Point being:
a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
b.) It can have force applied against it.

Am I missing something?

[Bob's World]

Am I missing something?

In a word? Yes.


First, COG as applied to warfare: While I largely consider the Wilf vs. Fuchs debate in the category of "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin," it really does not apply to the positions I am forwarding here. In warfare though, I would suggest that accurately understanding the enemy's COG is critical in knowing what must be defeated; but is probably not something that one wants to attack. Best to pit one's strength against their opponents weakness; thus why it is a very helpful construct to understand what are the requriements that are critical to the functioning of the COG; and then of those, which are also vulnerable to defeat. Attack the CVs; not the COG.

But for Insurgency all of that is rather moot. I do not want to defeat the COG, I want to outcompete the insurgent in the race to be perceived by the populace as the producer of the COG. He who provides Good Governance wins.

Now, if I am simply focused on counter insurgent operations, to go out and counter violence with violence and to wage a physical dual with the insurgent, using the warfare approach to COG could be helpful in winning that battle. Problem is that I have probably made the conditions of insurgency worse in the process.

But I don't write any of this to convince Wilf to change his "war is war" approach, nor to disabuse Fuchs of his notions that only Germans can understand CvC; I just want to toss out an alternative position for the SWJ community to consider as they wrestle with how to best deal insurgency.

[William F. Owen]

I just want to toss out an alternative position for the SWJ community to consider as they wrestle with how to best deal insurgency.

....a form of insurgency that does not use violence to redistribute political power?

Problem is that I have probably made the conditions of insurgency worse in the process.

Only if you are stupid, unskilled and not practised in warfare.

[Bob's World]

....a form of insurgency that does not use violence to redistribute political power?


Only if you are stupid, unskilled and not practised in warfare.

Point one: Not all violence to redistribue political power is warfare. If a bunch of thugs in 1870s NYC prevents certain segments of the popualce from voting through intimidation and violence it is not warfare, though it meets your definition.

Similarly when a segment of a populace within a state employs intimidation and violence to shape politics I do not believe it is helpful to resolving the problem to classify that as warfare either.

Again, not to change your mind, only to be clear that my point is valid. Though I suspect that the Colin Powell leadership principle of "Never get so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego falls with it." is applicable here.

Point two is that most counterinsurgencies have unfolded this way. I don't believe those officers were stupid for thinking of insurgency as warfare, that is what they were trained to think and do. I just don't think it was the fast track to success, and most COIN "victories" won in such fashion of re-emerged over and over and over and over.. as the underlying causation was never addressed.

[William F. Owen]

Point one: Not all violence to redistribue political power is warfare. If a bunch of thugs in 1870s NYC prevents certain segments of the popualce from voting through intimidation and violence it is not warfare, though it meets your definition.

Same was true in Northern Ireland, and the American Southern states. The point was the degree of violence falls below the threshold of War because it does not use military means and is not countered using military force. - see Pablo Escobar, once he moved into politics!

Similarly when a segment of a populace within a state employs intimidation and violence to shape politics I do not believe it is helpful to resolving the problem to classify that as warfare either.

I submit that if they use military means, then it is useful and necessary to term it warfare. Look at Southern Thailand. Once the violence is escalated beyond the capacities of the Police, you have warfare.

Again, not to change your mind, only to be clear that my point is valid.

Well at least we are clear what we are disagreeing about!

[Fuchs]

OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

Point being:
a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
b.) It can have force applied against it.

Am I missing something?

"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.

The Schwerpunkt is mostly about concentrating your power (and leave only token, "economy of force" units elsewhere) in order to have the maximum probability of success in battle. Only militarily weak powers can have a different Schwerpunkt (and this is then a political/strategic concept, nto a military one anymore), such as a capital or something related to allies (more about that later).
"source of strength" and "from which the enemy draws his strength ..." push a reader into a wrong direction.

The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.
A Heer that moved in separate corps and unites for a battle like Sedan or Königgratz forms a Schwerpunkt in order to be strong enough for a monumental battle.
A Heer than focuses almost all its armor divisions at the decisive location of the Camaping and adds maximum CAS once the surprise is lost - such a Heer forms a Schwerpunkt in order to succeed with its most critical task of a campaign.



CvC IV/11
"Die Hauptschlacht ist daher als der konzentrierte Krieg, als der Schwerpunkt des ganzen Krieges oder Feldzuges anzusehen."

my translation:
"The main battle is therefore to be seen as the concentrated war, as the Schwerpunkt of the whole war of campaign."

CvC IV/11
"Darum ist eine beabsichtigte Hauptschlacht nach ihren Verhältnissen mehr oder weniger, in gewissen Graden aber immer als der vorläufige Mittel- und Schwerpunkt des ganzen Systems zu betrachten."

My translation:
"Therefore is an intentional main battle by its conditions more or less, in a certain degree always to be considered as the preliminary central point or Schwerpunkt of the whole system."

CvC VI/25:
"Der Wirkungskreis eines Sieges wird natürlich abhängen von der Größe des Sieges und diese von der Masse der besiegten Truppen. Also gegen den Teil, wo die meisten feindlichen Streitkräfte beisammen sind, wird derjenige Stoß geschehen können, dessen glückliche Wirkungen am weitesten reichen; und wir werden dieses Erfolges am meisten gewiß sein, je größer die Masse der eigenen Streitkräfte ist, die wir zu diesem Stoß verwenden. (...)

So wie sich der Schwerpunkt immer da findet, wo die meiste Masse beisammen ist, und wie jeder Stoß gegen den Schwerpunkt der Last am wirksamsten ist, wie ferner der stärkste Stoß mit dem Schwerpunkt der Kraft erhalten wird, so ist es auch im Kriege. "

This is the most important part, so I'll translate it despite the length. The grammar is terrible because his grammar was complicated and I'll stick close to the original.

"The range or the effect of a victory will naturally depend on the size of the victory and this one on the quantity of defeated troops. Therefore against that part where the most enemy forces are united will be the thrust possible whose advantageous effects will have the greatest consequences (or: longest range); and we will be most sure about this success, the greater the mass of the own forces, that we employ for this thrust. (...)

Just as the Schwerpunkt (physics' center of gravity) is to be found where the most mass is close to each other, and just as every thrust against the Schwerpunkt of a load the most effective, and as furthermore the strongest thrust with the Schwerpunkt of a force is being maintained, so is it as well in war."

CVC VII/4 (a book that was especially unfinished)
"Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl XII., Friedrich der Große hatten ihren Schwerpunkt in ihrem Heer, wäre dies zertrümmert worden, so würden sie ihre Rolle schlecht ausgespielt haben; bei Staaten, die durch innere Parteiungen zerrissen sind, liegt er meistens in der Hauptstadt; bei kleinen Staaten, die sich an mächtige stützen, liegt er im Heer dieser Bundesgenossen; bei Bündnissen liegt er in der Einheit des Interesses; bei Volksbewaffnung in der Person der Hauptführer und in der öffentlichen Meinung."

"Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl VII, Frederick the great had their Schwerpunkt in their army, would this have been shattered, so they would have played their role poorly; with states that are disunited by internal partisanship, lies it most often in the capital; with small states that rest on powerful ones, does it lie in the army of their ally; in alliances does it lie in the unity of interests, in (improvised militias) in the person of the main leader and in the public opinion."

The extension of the Schwerpunkt idea into the realm of policy seems to have been a later idea than the original thought about campaigning (operational art). He also struggled a bit with wars against multiple enemies that had not one big army, bur several ones.
It's probably the root for the re-interpretation in American literature.

Ironically, his understanding of Newtonian physics was very crappy.
And yes, his original writing is this complicated and chaotic.

[William F. Owen]

"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.

So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.

Concur. I subscribe to the CvC view, because it is clear and I understand it.

[Fuchs]

So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

Tell me book, chapter and a longer quote and I'll try to find it in the original to check.

[Dayuhan]

I think the Jones model is an excellent tool for understanding what might be called "classic insurgency", where a populace or portion thereof rises up against its government. One limitation is that the term "insurgency" (and again I feel the discussion suffers for want of a definition) is widely used to describe other circumstances. For example, many here use the term "insurgency" to describe irregular resistance to foreign occupation, a circumstance in which the quality of governance is not the core issue driving the conflict.

A similar situation might arise in a diverse populace in which government is dominated by one subset (ethnic, religious, whatever), and another subset is resisting domination by that government. An observer working from the Jones model might be tempted to interpret the core narrative of the conflict as "they are governing us badly", when in fact it is "we refuse to be governed by them".

Another limitation is that no matter how often we repeat that it is the populace's perception of governance, not ours, that matters, we will always evaluate governance according to our own standards, and we will always project our own preferences onto our assumptions of what the populace is thinking. We are, after all, human.

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Models are useful, but they can also create assumptions that color and distort our ability to interpret core narratives. On the local level, a commander trained with the Jones model might be inclined to look to quality of governance as the core narrative of the local insurgent, and overlook issues with the source of governance.

On the macro strategy level there's a greater risk. The 1970s and 80s taught us that we can no longer go around installing dictators to run other countries for us. The current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be teaching us a similar lesson, and I'm concerned that the model in question might lead us to look past it. In short, we might be inclined to assume that it's ok for us to go around removing governments and installing new ones, as long as the governments we install are "good". If we make that assumption we end up asking ourselves how we can provide others with good governance, instead of asking the rather more important question of whether or not we should be trying to establish governments in other countries at all. Under certain interpretations the Jones model could be used to justify intervention in places where intervention can have serious unintended and undesirable consequences.

I also feel like the Jones model overlooks two key factors, one an important vulnerability in many insurgencies, the other an important weakness common among governments facing insurgents.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

The key weakness I see in our COIN/FID efforts lies in our relationship with host governments, and in the reasons why bad governance exists in the first place. We don't fight insurgents in our own country, we haven't any. We fight them in other countries, often countries with traditions of governance that don't exactly appeal to us or to the populace being governed. In these cases we can talk all we want about good governance, but we have to recognize that the governing elites we're dealing with cannot implement our recommendations without compromising their own power and prerogatives, which they will not do. Bad governance exists because somebody finds it very profitable, generally somebody in power... and that somebody is going to do all in their power to resist changes to the status quo. Recommending change in such circumstances is like talking at a wall. Of course we have the option to withdraw support, but that can mean sacrificing the strategic objectives that brought us into the picture in the first place. A bit of a quandary, and there's no good solution, but to manage those situations we have to first acknowledge that they exist, and that in many of the cases we seek to influence our capacity to influence may be very limited.

All meant as constructive comment; this post is already way too long to be discussing areas of agreement.

[Bob's World]

I think the Jones model is an excellent tool for understanding what might be called "classic insurgency", where a populace or portion thereof rises up against its government. One limitation is that the term "insurgency" (and again I feel the discussion suffers for want of a definition) is widely used to describe other circumstances. For example, many here use the term "insurgency" to describe irregular resistance to foreign occupation, a circumstance in which the quality of governance is not the core issue driving the conflict.

A similar situation might arise in a diverse populace in which government is dominated by one subset (ethnic, religious, whatever), and another subset is resisting domination by that government. An observer working from the Jones model might be tempted to interpret the core narrative of the conflict as "they are governing us badly", when in fact it is "we refuse to be governed by them".

Another limitation is that no matter how often we repeat that it is the populace's perception of governance, not ours, that matters, we will always evaluate governance according to our own standards, and we will always project our own preferences onto our assumptions of what the populace is thinking. We are, after all, human.

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Models are useful, but they can also create assumptions that color and distort our ability to interpret core narratives. On the local level, a commander trained with the Jones model might be inclined to look to quality of governance as the core narrative of the local insurgent, and overlook issues with the source of governance.

On the macro strategy level there's a greater risk. The 1970s and 80s taught us that we can no longer go around installing dictators to run other countries for us. The current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be teaching us a similar lesson, and I'm concerned that the model in question might lead us to look past it. In short, we might be inclined to assume that it's ok for us to go around removing governments and installing new ones, as long as the governments we install are "good". If we make that assumption we end up asking ourselves how we can provide others with good governance, instead of asking the rather more important question of whether or not we should be trying to establish governments in other countries at all. Under certain interpretations the Jones model could be used to justify intervention in places where intervention can have serious unintended and undesirable consequences.

I also feel like the Jones model overlooks two key factors, one an important vulnerability in many insurgencies, the other an important weakness common among governments facing insurgents.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

The key weakness I see in our COIN/FID efforts lies in our relationship with host governments, and in the reasons why bad governance exists in the first place. We don't fight insurgents in our own country, we haven't any. We fight them in other countries, often countries with traditions of governance that don't exactly appeal to us or to the populace being governed. In these cases we can talk all we want about good governance, but we have to recognize that the governing elites we're dealing with cannot implement our recommendations without compromising their own power and prerogatives, which they will not do. Bad governance exists because somebody finds it very profitable, generally somebody in power... and that somebody is going to do all in their power to resist changes to the status quo. Recommending change in such circumstances is like talking at a wall. Of course we have the option to withdraw support, but that can mean sacrificing the strategic objectives that brought us into the picture in the first place. A bit of a quandary, and there's no good solution, but to manage those situations we have to first acknowledge that they exist, and that in many of the cases we seek to influence our capacity to influence may be very limited.

All meant as constructive comment; this post is already way too long to be discussing areas of agreement.

Point one is that "the source of governance" as well as how governance is sustained in power are the keys to the critical causal factor of "Legitimacy." If the populace does not recognize either one you are on the fast track to insurgency. When Regime change by a foreign power occurs their is a presumption of illegitimacy that is virtually possible to overcome.

Point two. Insurgent leaders are not "ideologically driven"; they are politically driven and use ideology to motivate and drive the masses to support their political goals. Not saying their ideology is not often very important to them, it just isn't what drives them.

[Chris jM]

So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

Apologies to the last few posters, as this is a small (and hopefully quick and painless) divergence back to the CoG issue.

The following article contains some discussion of the H-Paget translation of CvC: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

The article makes some good points for the first few pages and then promptly descends into effects-based discussion, making my brain spin.

Noted that this thread isn't about CoG, so I'll be quiet now.

[William F. Owen]

Noted that this thread isn't about CoG, so I'll be quiet now.

No it's not, but words matter. Now off to drink "molten steel"! - my new word for coffee, or tea, or orange juice.

[Entropy]

Col. Jones,

I will need to mull this over for a while (I'm a slow thinker), but here are some initial impressions:

As a generic model, it makes sense. However, the example used to demonstrate the model is problematic and rests on a few questionable assumptions, so "operationalizing" the model is where I see problems:

The biggest flaw begins with this: "In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything." That condition is the completely normal result of independent bureaucracies with independent resources and independent agendas. Your example first assumes they are all working on "COIN" and further assumes they can be brought together in the context of that COIN work towards a common objective. Then there is the assumption that this can be accomplished simply by "showing them the light" on what the principle concern in the area is.

That is wishful thinking IMO. First of all, it's not obvious that they are actually working toward "COIN" despite what they main believe/claim. Secondly, independent organizations cannot be made to reliably work together without some kind of unified command with the authority to force competing bureaucracies and interests to play nice. Third, independent organizations are not going to work together based on a survey, no matter how comprehensive and rigorous. In short, you can't assume that those organizations will see things your way and rearrange their priorities toward the goal you've identified as central in priority.

Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.

To summarize my argument, how are you going to keep those bosses from putting the plan in the circular file?

I like the model, but, like any model, one must consider if can be reasonably implemented in a given set of circumstances.