Airforce may be be going out of business

[SteveMetz]

I remember my grandfather, a WWII Navy vet, calling the USAF the "junior birdmen" in reference to Tom Lehrer dubbing "Up in the Air Junior Birdman" the USAF official song. . .

Gads!! I remember that song. Sometimes I feel as old as Odom looks.

[Tom Odom]

Sometimes I feel as old as Odom looks.

Sad to say then you must really feel old...

[LawVol]

I don't see most of this as piling on at all, LawVol

"joke /dʒoʊk/ noun, verb, joked, jok·ing.
- a matter that need not be taken very seriously; trifling matter"

It's all good. A company gunny once told me that Marines aren't happy unless they're complaining about something. I guess it's true for Soldiers as well. My wife says it's still true for me.

Hey, LawVol. How about some help here. I feel outnumbered.

Carl, you're beating your head against a wall. They love us. They just think we live in opulence (damn, I just spilled my latte). If it's good for the AF, it's good for America!

[MattC86]

In the case of the F/A-18Cs, I would guess it is because they are replacing them with FA-18Es and Fs, and F-35 if they can get them.

The F/A-18E is replacing the F-14 only, I thought. It's far too expensive to replace the F/A-18Cs (right?) One of the goals of the F-35 program, back when it was the JSF was to get the per-unit cost down to something around the F-15/F-14 range ($30-40M a pop) rather than at the F-22 or F/A-18E's $100-200M.

Since F/A-18Cs make up 3 out of the four squadrons of strike fighters in a CVW, I would assume this is a problem.

Matt

[Ken White]

. . .
As for inviting him to invade, too strong a word, Ken. Gallespie screwed up by leaving the door open instead of slamming it in his face. She did not invite him.

Best

Tom

Miz April's offhand comment was only one factor and a small one at that. Aside from the fact that, culturally in the ME, if one admires / asks for something, the proper response is to offer it up to the requestor which she inadvertently did, there were other earlier clues both to his desire and our willingness to placate, certainly starting with Kuwait's upping of its oil production in '89 and all our touchy feely responses during the subsequent negotiation and bluster haggling phase...

You and others caught the signs. Your Boss and other's of his ilk ignored the signs through IMO ego and hubris; the net result is that we were unprepared thus my "...was not foreseen, it should have been..." As usual, the working guys got it right and the Flags screwed it up.

I know one guy who postulated it in DC early in the spring of '90 but was told it was "not in our lane" by his Boss. Stovepiping and excessive concern for turf is stupid.

Regards,
Ken

[MattC86]

"joke /dʒoʊk/ noun, verb, joked, jok·ing.
- a matter that need not be taken very seriously; trifling matter"

Touche, indeed. . .

Matt

[Stan]

Touche, indeed. . .

Matt

Heh ! Back at ya !

FLIGHT RISK - Used to describe troops who are suspected of planning to retire or separate from the service soon. Alternatively, any O-6 or above that gets behind the controls of an airplane.

GENERICA - Features of the Air Force landscape that are exactly the same no matter which base one is at, such as Burger King, Robin Hood, the BX, and AMC terminal. Used as in "We were so lost in generica that I forgot what base we were at."

OHNOSECOND - That minuscule fraction of time after hitting the "enter" key or clicking "ok" in which you realize that you've just made a BIG mistake.

SALMON DAY - The experience of spending an entire day swimming upstream only to get screwed and die in
the end.

more at the llink

[Tom Odom]

You and others caught the signs. Your Boss and other's of his ilk ignored the signs through IMO ego and hubris; the net result is that we were unprepared thus my "...was not foreseen, it should have been..." As usual, the working guys got it right and the Flags screwed it up.

I know one guy who postulated it in DC early in the spring of '90 but was told it was "not in our lane" by his Boss. Stovepiping and excessive concern for turf is stupid.

Regards,
Ken

Agreed on stove pipes. I wrote a piece called "rumors of war" that centered on the tensions in the region as a whole but emphasizing Iraq and Iraqi efforts to field its SCUDs in the west against Israel. I got called on the carpet and dressed down by a 2-star who told me he could not imagine war in the ME for the next five years. His boss was the 3 star who had removed Iraq from the threat list. 6 months after castigating me for the warning piece, the 2 star was in the desert. Funny how often analysts get "shut the F%$& up" later get told we had "failed".

Indeed after Desert Storm, the 3 star wanted an AAR on how we had failed; my immediate boss was an O6 who put that on the table and asked for a response. I told him that "we" had not missed anything and laid my warning article on the table in front of him. He told me I was going to have to come off of that position. I told him then he had all the input he was going to get from me on the subject. somehow the AAR never got done..

On reading each other, I really like the JFCOM's report on how the Iraqis read us and how we read them. Saddam really thought we would strike hard when the Iraqi Exocet missile hit our ship in the tanker war. Of course we did not and one can look at interpretations and misinterpretations as a cascade of steps and misteps. Funny though, I would have to say that the Kuwaitis really the worst at understanding their neighbor to the north. They mistakenly believed that they could keep buying him off when he only got hungrier after each feeding.

But back to the thread, I agree that we should not be hasty in surrendering the edge we have in airpower. We are unlikely to ever develop a crystal ball in foreseeing future threats. Even when we get it right at certain levels, the "shut the F#$%k up" syndrome kicks in hard when such warnings butt heads with senior-level agendas. A good friend of mine and I debated via Parameters about the likelihood of large scale armor formations ever charging across another desert after Desert Storm. His position was that such warfare was as outdated as lancers at the Battle of Omdurman. Mine was simply one should never say never. He was pushing for recognition that such warfare was more exception and that we should train for other forms of warfare. Twelve years later we had large armor formations charging north and then we (again) learned there are other ways to fight a war.

In this debate on air forces, we are really talking roles and missions. I believe we are at least 10 years past the due date for another Key West conference. We should have held that conference before we (generic) started crowing about transformation. I attribute the failure to hold such a conference as very much tied to the creation of JFCOM and its own evolution in roles and missions. I still hope that we will hold a come to Jesus meeting on roles and missions because our shortfalls in aging and worn out equipment are increasingly affecting our capabilities to perform them.

Long winded ramble, hopefully of some value

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

In this debate on air forces, we are really talking roles and missions. I believe we are at least 10 years past the due date for another Key West conference. We should have held that conference before we (generic) started crowing about transformation. I attribute the failure to hold such a conference as very much tied to the creation of JFCOM and its own evolution in roles and missions. I still hope that we will hold a come to Jesus meeting on roles and missions because our shortfalls in aging and worn out equipment are increasingly affecting our capabilities to perform them.

Long winded ramble, hopefully of some value

Best

Tom

Somebody say Amen!!! I am more convinced than ever that a lot of people in the Air Force have know idea what the Army does. At the same time I am more convinced than ever that there are a lot of Air Force Officers who would like to learn and have a lot to contribute.....if the Air Force and Army could ever get together and talk to each other...hence Tom's idea of the Key West 2 conference. The nation as a whole would be the winner. And also give the Army back it's Missiles!!!

[Ken White]

Couldn't agree more with all of it (sadly... ). Like the old Pennsylvania Dutch saying; "Ve are too zoon alt und too late schmart."

Good post.

Ken

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Yes the P-3 is for maritime patrol, but of the long range, long loiter type. For immediate fleet tactical ASW support there are LAMPs and S-3 Vikings. If you are just looking to track surface targets there are active and passive sensors used aboard all surface combatants, coupled with aircraft when available.

While a P-3 would probably have no difficulty sinking a "boat," it might have problems with a real surface warship (subs are poor AA platforms, even on the surface).

Tom hits the X ring: "we should not be hasty in surrendering the edge we have in airpower." No truer statement that. We just need to be fiscally responsible in the maintenance of that edge, and not to the detriment of other equally important warfighting capabilities.

Yet the hard corps airpower advocates (oxymoron perhaps) who still adhere to “airpower can win wars” seem to miss the point that they are a tool that is used as required and there are times when they play huge logistics role and a minor combat one. Fortunately we have evolved from the days of “we had to destroy the village in order to save it.” Our military is the most deadly instrument of war ever seen, but we have chosen to try to employ it with rapier dexterity vice a ham-fisted bludgeon.

Not ganging up on the USAF per say (but that is from whence the thread began), this exercise in "saving DoD" could be done with any of the other services (yes even the oft parsimonious Marine Corps could be, witness the Osprey) and no doubt the COCOMs and few selected agencies (DIA, CIA, etc...).

And should I decide to remove my turban and use my handy scimitar to denude my skull of head and androgenic hair, I would eerily look like Tom. But in color.

[Tom Odom]

I would eerily look like Tom.

My wife would tell you, one of me is enough

Besides my hair fell out due to my dirty mind

[Ken White]

. . .
While a P-3 would probably have no difficulty sinking a "boat," it might have problems with a real surface warship (subs are poor AA platforms, even on the surface).

Depends on how many surface warships are out there and how many Harpoons and / or Mavericks the P3 carries for that mission.

... yes even the oft parsimonious Marine Corps could be, witness the Osprey) and no doubt the COCOMs and few selected agencies (DIA, CIA, etc...).

We can again disagree on the Osprey, good and needed bird IMO -- I'd have listed the Commanche, myself.

P.S.

BTW, Umar, not picking on you and I totally agree with your principal point; the quibbles on the specifics are more an attempt to be fair than to surface minor jiggles or just kibitz. ALL the services have their failings in this regard and ALL the services have some justification for the things they do. That the entire process needs to clean up and speed up, I think we can both agree.

Regards,
Ken

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

LawVol: the rest of the Gunny's saying goes: "and if they're not complaining, they're up to something." Most of mine always required considerable watching, but especially so when they weren't pissing and moaning!

[pcmfr]

Yes the P-3 is for maritime patrol, but of the long range, long loiter type. For immediate fleet tactical ASW support there are LAMPs and S-3 Vikings.

Vikings haven't had ASW capability for a while now and are soon going away altogether. Sadly, with the wings falling off the P3s -- and many of them doing overland ISR anyway -- we have lost most of our airborne ASW assets.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Thanks for the straight scoop pcmfr!

So is there a replacement in the mix for the Viks, or is the burden going to fall on the LAMPS?

[MattC86]

We can again disagree on the Osprey, good and needed bird IMO -- I'd have listed the Commanche, myself.

Another thread for another topic (perhaps on a different forum) but I have yet to hear a good explanation as to how the Osprey is so much better than a CH-47 so as to make the Osprey worth the inherent risks and added costs.

But as I said, that's a whole 'notha story.

As for the Comanche, the Army's issues with the ARH show that while the specific tank-busting role of the Comanche may be outdated, the concept of a fast, nimble, stealthy armed recon helicopter is not.

Matt

[Ken White]

Another thread for another topic (perhaps on a different forum) but I have yet to hear a good explanation as to how the Osprey is so much better than a CH-47 so as to make the Osprey worth the inherent risks and added costs.

was better than the Hook -- different birds for different roles --and nests. In this case, mostly nests. The Hook is a great and capable bird but it isn't at all ship or sea-kindly, the MV22 is (as is the CH53 and as will be the new CH53K). Conversely, the Osprey has sea side cape (and speed) that the Army does not need...

The Marines and SOCOM need that capability and we can afford it so we bought it. Makes sense to me.

As for the Comanche, the Army's issues with the ARH show that while the specific tank-busting role of the Comanche may be outdated, the concept of a fast, nimble, stealthy armed recon helicopter is not.

No, and the Army still doesn't have one. That stealth is over capability for most Army ops and thus was / is a luxury. The best recon bird for the here and now was and is the OH6 and its derivatives -- but parochialism killed that...

As it has so many things.

Probably good that's so -- if it was not, there'd be no need for this thread...

[J Wolfsberger]

We all understand that they also serve who stand (or sit in air conditioned offices sipping latte) and wait.

[MattC86]

was better than the Hook -- different birds for different roles --and nests. In this case, mostly nests. The Hook is a great and capable bird but it isn't at all ship or sea-kindly, the MV22 is (as is the CH53 and as will be the new CH53K). Conversely, the Osprey has sea side cape (and speed) that the Army does not need...

The Marines and SOCOM need that capability and we can afford it so we bought it. Makes sense to me.



No, and the Army still doesn't have one. That stealth is over capability for most Army ops and thus was / is a luxury. The best recon bird for the here and now was and is the OH6 and its derivatives -- but parochialism killed that...

As it has so many things.

Probably good that's so -- if it was not, there'd be no need for this thread...

That's true; if everything was going great, armchair-generals would be out of a job.

I understand current Chinook variants are not optimized for naval use. But the Sea Knight is similar in configuration (and the Super Stallion is in size) to the Chinook, and I don't see why it couldn't be modified for effective from-the-sea capabilities (though I certainly don't know enough to say for sure - that seems to be a permanent caveat of my posts. . .)

My problem with the V-22 is more a general issue with military procurement - they simply don't understand the concept of a sunk cost. Because of Congressional oversight, they fear having to say, "We spent a few hundred million in development of this, but it turned out to be a mediocre or non-optimal idea, so we bagged it," and thus they essentially force the development of a system. In some cases that has worked - the AMRAAM should, in all fairness, have been killed given its difficulties in the late 1980s - and in some cases it doesn't work; the service would be better off swallowing the lost development costs and moving on.

The Marines seem to be growing as bad at this as the other services; both the V-22 and the EFV are troubled systems that have been or are being ramrodded through because (1) the service claims it needs them and can't use anything else (which may not be entirely true) and (2) the service shows all the money its (usually wastefully) spent on the system already, and says we owe it to the taxpayer to finish the development.

But in the V-22's case (and me and all other Osprey naysayers could turn out to be entirely wrong on this), the development history is terrible, the costs have eaten up 70% of the Corps' procurement budget, and there are still huge questions about the aircraft's dependability, survivability, and reliability even as it enters combat. I can't think of any system procured by the military in recent history that has think-tank papers published urging the military to can the program even after it has entered service.

The per-unit cost of even a modified MH-47 would be less than the Osprey, and the reliability and survivability (at least in terms of armament) would be increased.

That's my concern. Sorry to hijack this thread from our beloved "Good Lord do I hate the way the USAF does its business" message, but I wanted to say it. Saying "Osprey" and "good and needed" was waving a red flag to me. . .

Matt