Is the current political scene in Russia due largely to Putin's ties to a reminiscense of the good old bad old days of the hard line Soviets? One would seem to think that the end of the era would have indicated an end to that school of thought.
Is the current political scene in Russia due largely to Putin's ties to a reminiscense of the good old bad old days of the hard line Soviets? One would seem to think that the end of the era would have indicated an end to that school of thought.
Hey Tankguy !
I wouldn't go as far as saying 'reminiscence of the good 'ol days'. Putin's nowhere near Soviet mentality, but he maintains Russian perceptions and how their history still dictates current thinking...threat of domination from western powers.
This current row with The Ukraine and Georgia is all about closing up the borders. With NATO and perhaps EU and WTO memberships, Russia's favorite concern with Serbia and (break away) Kosovo will be overcome by events. Imagine Serbia as Russia's only remaining ally, but not able to support them (other than flying or sailing around Europe to get there (hope they're not in a big hurry for resupply !).
Here's a quick and excellent 7-page read from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
Russia's Security Policy Grows "Muscular": Should the West Be Worried?
Expanding demonstrations of the dilapidated strategic arsenal increase the risks of technical failures but fall far short of initiating a new confrontation of the Cold War type.
The most worrisome point in Russia’s ambivalent power policy is Georgia, which has been the target of choice for multiple propaganda attacks, but which now faces the challenge of an external intervention in its domestic crises since Moscow has built up usable military instruments in the North Caucasus.
Russia’s desire to secure higher international status does not amount to malicious revisionism; so over-reaction to its experiments with muscle-flexing could constitute a greater risk to the Western strategy of engagement than underestimating its ambitions.
If you want to blend in, take the bus
I am familiar with the Russian fear of invasion by the West, but I cannot see how a missle defense system is viewed as an offensive threat by the Russians. From Putin's comments, it would seem that the perceived threat stems from the missle defenses neutralizing the Russian nuclear arsenal. That would be a defensive move would it not? I can appreciate that it is on the Russian door step, but can't Russia appreciate the fact that we are bit busy at minute to be planning an invasion of the Motherland?
Tankguy - don't constrain yourself to just thinking about paranoia or fear, there is also opportunity to gain power, or to deny it to others. There is money to be made, and there is political power to be wielded - even if you don't know what's in the tree - you might shake it a little to see what comes loose - if you don't like it, just leave it laying on the ground, or shake it some more.
My point is that these guys are great at figuring out ways to get what they want, and from a cost benefit sort of perspective - raising hell about Missile Defense - something we really want is bound to produce something they would not have gotten by being silent - combine that with their oil wealth and power (in terms of the greater European sense), and you get some pretty good political credibility - we can't just ignore. They don't have much to lose by raining hell, but they do stand to gain.
Best, Rob
Neutralizing the Russian nuclear deterrent could be seen as the first step to allowing offensive moves against Russia, since the U.S. will have removed Russia's strongest shield against conventional invasion. Combined with extending NATO to Russia's borders, it is easy to see how that Russia would feel threatened by this on a grand strategic level.
We would never countenance Mexico joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for instance, especially if China had the beginnings of a way to neutralize our nuclear deterrent.
Missile defense defends the Western from retaliation by a Russian missile attack, should the West elect to start offensive (nuclear or conventional) operations against the Russians. Back in the good old days of Cold War deterrrence via mutually assured destruction (MAD), the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty was a way to prevent the same kind of protection of one's own forces (or territory, since the Sovs were putting their ABMs around Moscow IIRC), which would have made MAD a non-starter. Historically, Russia has tried to protect Mother Russia by putting a belt of client buffer states between its enemies and its heartland. This is arguably the same thing that the US is now trying to do with its forward deployed missile defense system, or at least this may be a russian perception off what is going on. Having client states also has other benefits with regard to economic exploitation; they can serve as both a captive market for one's exports and a potentially cheaper source of raw materials (which also includes labor).
And as Rob pointed out, this posturing may be little more than a ruse to try to extract concessions in other areas that are important to the Russian leadership. It could be as simple as Putin's needing to look tough to the folks at home so they think he is really showing a strong hand leading the country--sort of a Potemkin village to hide other woes.
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