Do We Hate America? The Arab Response

[Steve Blair]

Actually, I don't know if it's a matter of the Brits "doing cultural acuity well" (in fact, I'd say given some of their recent problems with imigrant assimilation I'd say they may have some issues here). To me it's more a matter of them being able to pick out their local surrogates with a high degree of precision and effectiveness. That and it was typically an issue of "using" the local nation for economic purposes...they didn't tend to come in with the same level of missionary/moral baggage that we cart around. Behind the "white man's burden" rehtoric the British always seemed to have an acute sense of the bottom line and got out when the cost started to exceed the benefit. Most other colonial powers didn't follow this example, and we went into it with an excess of spirits left over from the abolition movement (IMO). Once the crusading New England types freed the black man, they moved on to the red man and then the yellow/green/purple/whatever man. So there was always an unspoken (or spoken) sense of moral purpose often disconnected with either the national interest or any sort of bottom line.

But, as always, YMMV with this. And I'm speaking in generalities, of course. We've had our successes, just as the British have had their failures.

[tequila]

My own feeling is that "cultural acuity", while certainly useful, is definitely not a cure-all or even a genuine prerequisite. While absolutely critical for achieving a clear-eyed analytical picture, it does not help at all if shackled to a politically unrealistic target.

Rory Stewart's analysis of Gertrude Bell seems to be relevant here. It's hard to imagine any Westerner with more genuine field experience and "cultural acuity" than Dame Bell and her contemporaries. Yet they still failed utterly to construct a British-allied, stable Iraq.

...

Some suggest today that the US failure in Iraq is due simply to lack of planning; to specific policy errors— debaathification, looting, the abolition of the army, and lack of troops; and to the absence of a trained cadre of Arabists and professional nation-builders. They should consider Bell and her colleagues, such as Colonel Leachman or Bertram Thomas, a political officer on the Euphrates. All three were fluent and highly experienced Arabists, won medals from the Royal Geographical Society for their Arabian journeys, and were greatly admired for their political work. Thomas was driven from his office in Shatra by a tribal mob. Colonel Leachman, who was famed for being able to kill a tribesman dead in his own tent without a hand lifted against him, was shot in the back in Fallujah. Bell's defeat was slower but more comprehensive. Of the kingdom she created, with its Sunni monarch and Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish subjects, there is today no king, no Sunni government, and something close to civil war. Perhaps soon there will be no country.

Bell is thus both the model of a policymaker and an example of the inescapable frailty and ineptitude on the part of Western powers in the face of all that is chaotic and uncertain in the fashion for "nation-building." Despite the prejudices of her culture and the contortions of her bureaucratic environment, she was highly intelligent, articulate, and courageous. Her colleagues were talented, creative, well informed, and determined to succeed. They had an imperial confidence. They were not unduly constrained by the press or by their own bureaucracies. They were dealing with a simpler Iraq: a smaller, more rural population at a time when Arab national-ism and political Islam were yet to develop their modern strength and appeal.

But their task was still impossible. Iraqis refused to permit foreign political officers to play at founding their new nation. T.E. Lawrence was right to demand the withdrawal of every British soldier and no stronger link between Britain and Iraq than existed between Britain and Canada. For the same reason, more language training and contact with the tribes, more troops and better counterinsurgency tactics—in short a more considered imperial approach—are equally unlikely to allow the US today to build a state in Iraq, in southern Afghanistan, or Iran. If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

[Norfolk]

[QUOTE=Ken White;29411For whatever reason, a lot of Brits do this fairly well; few Americans do.[/QUOTE]

Different culture, socially and militarily (people-, not things-oriented).

That said, there is also the issue of pride (not to mention other similar matters), and I suspect that this often tends to be rather worse with certain cultures. I would tentatively submit that while we may have our share of arrogance and ignorance (Western cultures inclusive), Pride, per se, is perhaps rather less of a problem in many ways (at least relating to the conduct of war, diplomacy, etc.) than in other cultures.

I remember in "The General's War" by Gordon and Trainor, that when the Coalition Forces were preparing to breach the Iraqi defensive lines in 1991, a senior Arab general refused the offer of mine-breaching equipment (his Army had none), and preferred his men to make the breach the old-fashioned way. As the American general who made the offer was told, the reason for this was "Pride". And Pride, as well as related emotions and the like, plays no small role in how people feel, and act, particularly in cultures like many of those in the Near East.

[tequila]

That example reminds me more than anything else of Omar Bradley's rejection of Pete Corlett's advice on the value of naval gunnery in the amphibious assault during Operation Overlord, all because Corlett had learned his trade against the Japanese. Bradley had no intention of listening to someone from a "bush league theater." The troops at Omaha got 20 minutes of prep fire from one battleship and suffered three times as many casualties as at Tarawa, which was fought six months earlier. If not for the sheer guts and determination of the American infantryman, the battle might have been lost.

"Pride" is not an exclusively Arab term.

[Norfolk]

My own feeling is that "cultural acuity", while certainly useful, is definitely not a cure-all or even a genuine prerequisite. While absolutely critical for achieving a clear-eyed analytical picture, it does not help at all if shackled to a politically unrealistic target.

Rory Stewart's analysis of Gertrude Bell seems to be relevant here. It's hard to imagine any Westerner with more genuine field experience and "cultural acuity" than Dame Bell and her contemporaries. Yet they still failed utterly to construct a British-allied, stable Iraq.

I would also submit that the indigenous rulers of what is now Iraq have typically had mixed success at best, and at their worst, did far worse than either the British or the US. Sargon the Great may have been the first historically-recognized conqueror of the Fertile Crescent (now to a great extent the "Shia Crescent"), but he spent a good deal of his time re-conquering those whom he had already conquered. This pattern has remained largely the same for whoever has followed over the last 5,000 years (with few exceptions) as rulers over what is now Iraq.

As is, if the locals, who have far greater understanding of the prevailing conditions than we, cannot sort this out themsleves, then we shouldn't be beating ourselves up too much over our inadequacies in the same areas. This does not relieve Western Armies (and Western policy-makers, et al) of their responsibility to understand and adapt as best they can to said circumstances, but it puts our situation in a clearer perspective.

[Norfolk]

"Pride" is not an exclusively Arab term.

No, it's not, but "Pride" does not usually assume at the tactical and operational level in present-day Western Armies the same place that it still does in many Near-Eastern Armies (or insurgent groups). Our troops are rather less inclined to jump out in the middle of a street, spray wildly and ineffectually for the benefit of the locals watching from the sidewalk, and then beat a hasty retreat before the other side responds in kind.

The example at the operational level that I cited from "The General's War" stands.

[tequila]

I believe that leads into the last part of Stewart's article:

If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

The beating up should perhaps commence at the very idea of attempting to impose an externally directed model.

No, it's not, but "Pride" does not usually assume at the tactical and operational level in present-day Western Armies the same place that it still does in many Near-Eastern Armies (or insurgent groups). Our troops are rather less inclined to jump out in the middle of a street, spray wildly and ineffectually for the benefit of the locals watching from the sidewalk, and then beat a hasty retreat before the other side responds in kind.

Actually, their side has been more likely to plant roadside bombs and trigger from safety than indulge in the sort of behavior you are referring to.

The example at the operational level that I cited from "The General's War" stands.

As does my rather more costly example from Operation Overlord.

[Norfolk]

Actually, their side has been more likely to plant roadside bombs and trigger from safety than indulge in the sort of behavior you are referring to.

As does my rather more costly example from Operation Overlord.

As to the first:

Does not change the fact that the Iraqi insurgents still engage in such "tactical" behaviour openly, and with some regularlity, whilst the Western troops there are typically loathe to do so themselves.

As to the second:

The point with the last example is that the senior US commander actually judged that it was tactically and operationally inapplicable, however erroneously that judgement was made; in the case of the Arab general, he knew that the mineclearing equipment was tactically necessary and chose to reject it anyway because it would have demonstrated Arab reliance upon Western military expertise; the two examples are not comparable.

[tequila]

Does not change the fact that the Iraqi insurgents still engage in such "tactical" behaviour openly, and with some regularlity, whilst the Western troops there are typically loathe to do so themselves.

How much of this is due to a cultural reliance on "pride" vs lack of training + watching too many Hollywood films which portray this as effective? For example, does the Egyptian Army do this? The Iranians? How about Hizbullah in 2006 or Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el-Bahred?

The point with the last example is that the senior US commander actually judged that it was tactically and operationally inapplicable, however erroneously that judgement was made; in the case of the Arab general, he knew that the mineclearing equipment was tactically necessary and chose to reject it anyway because it would have demonstrated Arab reliance upon Western military expertise; the two examples are not comparable.

Bradley disregarded Corlett's advice because he believed he had nothing to learn from someone who had only fought the Japanese, despite the fact that Corlett had commanded two major amphibious assaults in the face of opposition and Bradley none. This in addition to Corlett being specifically detached to provide advice on amphibious landings by GEN George Marshall. You don't think an irrational pride had anything to do with that?

[Norfolk]

How much of this is due to a cultural reliance on "pride" vs lack of training + watching too many Hollywood films which portray this as effective? For example, does the Egyptian Army do this? The Iranians? How about Hizbullah in 2006 or Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el-think an irrational pride had anything to do with that?

Remember the Zarqawi video with the Minimi? It's not just restricted to the insurgency. The Iraqi Army has a bit of a problem in that regard as well - and I'll leave aside the Saudis at Khafji in 1991:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200512/iraq-army/4

For Arab Pride try "Arab pride, US prejudice" by Abdel-Moneim Said:

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/640/op111.htm

Corlett was indeed ignored, as were British offers of specialist armoured assault engineers (from Hobart's 79th Div) that made the British/Canadian landing that much easier, but this was in the belief that such were not tactically necessary given the different conditions of North-West Europe as opposed to those in the Pacific, not merely out of pride. In this case, there was no clear recognition that the tactical situation deed indeed require such proffered assistance. Ther senior US general beleived that he already had the means at hand to make the breech successfully, not that he saw that he did not have such means and wilfully went ahead anyway.

On the other hand, with Saudis preparing to make a breach during Desert Storm, this was a case of a clear recognition by the Arab general that mine-clearing equipment was tactically necessary, and he refused to countenance said equipment and training anyway, openly admitting that it was out of quote, "Pride", unquote. The two cases are not directly comparable.

[tequila]

Remember the Zarqawi video with the Minimi?

Zarqawi was a convict and former street thug whose formal weapons handling training approximated zero. The better comparison would be between Zarqawi and your average mid-level Crip leader rather than Zarqawi and an American soldier.

Compare vs. Arab forces which are actually motivated and trained as Western forces are --- i.e. Hizbullah and Amal, both trained by Iranians. Even their village militias showed excellent fire discipline in 2006.

If you want to believe that Omar Bradley made a perfectly reasonable decision based totally on his own military judgment in 1944, I suppose I won't be convincing you otherwise. Corlett himself thought that Bradley was snubbing him out of prideful disdain rather than reasonable disagreement, however. According to Corlett:

"I was pretty well squelched for my question [regarding why Army troops would attack using LCVPs and LCAs instead of LVTs]. I soon got the feeling that American generals in England considered anything that had happened in the Pacific strictly 'Bush League stuff' which didn't merit any consideration. I felt like an expert according to the Naval definition, 'A son-of-a-bitch from out of town.'"