Two frontline reports

[tequila]

FSO,

What do you think about the USMC concept of the CLIC cell? The way it worked on my reserve unit's deployment in 2008, we just gave shake-and-bake training to some motivated NCOs and lance corporals during workup, mostly focused on site exploitation. I wasn't part of it, so I have no idea what they did for language support in country. Do we need dedicated intel specialists at the batt level, or is this sort of fly-by-night solution workable?

[Abu Suleyman]

Do we need dedicated intel specialists at the batt level, or is this sort of fly-by-night solution workable?

We absolutely need dedicated intel specialists. Intel is an art and a science, and not something that can be taught in a two week course. In fact, part of the reason that our HUMINT is so bad in the force in general is that most of the intel collectors on the ground (outside special units) are less than five years in. It takes years to get to the chops for good interrogation and source cultivation, not to mention legalities.

This discussion is going to turn into a personnel issue, though, because there is a ready supply of experienced intel specialists, although perhaps not enough to fill the need, but they are all civilians(CIA, DIA, NSA, Contractors etc.) many of whom were in the military but got out for better pay and less jerking around. In fact, many of them have only gotten better doing work on the outside related to what they had done on the inside. Unfortunately, there is currently not a mechanism to bring those people into the military, which is, in part, why I think many intel focused people would like to see more civilian support: that is where many of the most talented soldiers of the past now are.

[John T. Fishel]

I was learning how to be an intel officer, one lesson I learned was that the best source of intel information was our own troops. Now, the fact is that ordinary soldiers may not be the BEST source but they are a critical source. In my day, many intel folks didn't bother to do the 2 key things needed to take advantage of that source:
1. Brief the troops on what to look for whenever they went on a patrol or operation. And
2. debrief them on what they observed when they came back.

Cheers

JohnT

PS Also always ask the local civilians what you want to know. they may actually give you useful answeres.

[Greyhawk]

But I've noticed there's a feedback loop that can't be ignored. Even guys downrange are prone to state as fact things they've read in the papers or online (and then there's the scuttlebutt...).

I've never heard/read a single troop quote that didn't make me wish I could ask the source the five obvious questions it brings to mind.

This is not to say any specific statement is wrong or to be dismissed, but from my experience virtually anything short of "the building is on fire" (or under fire) is worthy of a "how do you know this" or "please clarify" response prior to leaping into action.

Another side of that: seemingly innocuous statements are often worth a follow-up question or two also. Experience taught me that "why the hell are you telling me this?" is also usually worth asking - first to yourself and then aloud in a more polite way.

[John T. Fishel]

but back in my day there was nothing like the feedback loop you describe.
That said, I agree with your comments - especially the "how do you know" etc follow up questions.

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Tequila:

The Company Level Intelligence Cells (CLICs) are a good start, but I have heard that at least in some cases the Marines assigned to these positions do not have Intelligence MOSes. Intellectual curiosity and innate intelligence help but I do not think they can fully substitute for formal intelligence training, especially when dealing with military collection and production systems.

More importantly, I think one of the key required skills is the ability to evaluate the credibility of sources. This is not something one can learn from a book or in the school house, rather, it takes some instinctive talent and substantial on-the-job experience. It also obviously requires some cultural and historical knowledge to create a frame of reference about the source. To make it even more complicated, a source can be credible on some issues and not credible on other issues. To explain what I mean on this point - when assigned to a Latin American country earlier in my career, one of my contacts was a Major in the host nation National Police. This Major provided consistently accurate information on human rights and misconduct issues and consistently false/misleading information on the internal politics of the National Police.

In my experience, the two groups that are best at sorting this out are U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers working in Defense Attache Offices and DEA agents. Intelligence analysts at the Headquarters level (which I would define to include in-country FOBs such as BAF and KAF) tend to lack a feel for the country and the people. Some of my fellow FSOs are also good at this, but it is usually a matter of luck rather than any systematic planning or training on the part of the State Department.

Another key variable is what I call a "soft" versus "hard" collection environment. For example, I consider the Dominican Republic and Indonesia to be soft collection environments because these are countries where there is a vast amount of information in circulation with the key problem being a needle in the haystack issue of trying to determine the few truths in the sea of falsehoods. In contrast, the Bolivian Altiplano (high plateau) is a hard environment as this western third of Bolivia has many villages inhabited by indigenous peoples (speaking Aymara or Quecha as a first language) who are extremely suspicious of, and even hostile towards, outsiders.

I would rate Afghanistan as a very hard collection environment. In addition to the security, language, and culture barriers, I believe there is an understandable reluctance on the part of Pashtuns to provide outsiders with truthful information about social, tribal, and political dynamics. The Marines in Helmand have adopted a USAID-designed collection system called TCAPF (Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning and Framework) that can utilize any Marine to develop information about the needs and desires of villagers but I am skeptical about some of the claims of the proponents and think that it can provide only general information at best.

During my year in Kandahar I felt that I only got a few titillating glimpses behind the Pashtun curtain. Opening up the curtain and unlocking the secrets requires a steady and long-term cultivation of personal relationships, indirect elicitation of facts, and a patient piecing together of the information. I think I reached this stage in a few instances in Latin America, but it took a minimum of two years of cultivating contacts while using my fluency in the local language. The "Key Leader Engagement" format that we use in Afghanistan is not likely to provide a lot of the information that we need to really understand how Afghanistan works.

[tequila]

In my very limited experience, the Marines in the CLIC most definitely were not MOS-qualified in intel or counterintel. They were basically the older, more mature, high-GP NCOs and lance corporals --- those who weren't doing staff duties. Most were 03s, and the training from what I understand focused mostly on site exploitation and evidence gathering, rather than interrogation or HUMINT-type collection. The idea was to get intel and evidence to convict possible insurgents in the Iraqi courts system rather than developing genuine intelligence about insurgent networks and the like.

Given the very limited training and experience available, I don't think the CLIC can work at genuine intelligence gathering that can allow commanders in the field to make strategic decisions about how to run their AOs --- whether or not to trust this leader or not, or the level of corruption within the local police force. I think the focus is more on tactical intel of the most basic sort, and that's all it's capable of.

[John T. Fishel]

Don't make it harder than it really is - it is hard enough. Been on the Altiplano and the mountain valleys of Bolivia and Peru and worked fairly extensively with Quechua speakers. From what people I trust tell me, the Aymara speakers are not all that different. My experience with Quechua speakers was that there were various levels of trust - the more you got to know them the deeper that the level of trust (or animosity) could get. Much of it depended on your behavior toward them. From an information collection point of view I could usually get what I needed but not in depth until I had established a relationship. As you suggest, the kind of relationship is largely dependent on time and effort but a decent start could be made in a few hours or a few days although chunka would have been better and huarmey better still.

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Dr. Fishel:

I'll defer to your expertise on Bolivian indigenous rural communities. My interaction with these communities has been limited to supporting Bolivian National Police and DEA counternarcotics investigations. During my time in-country (a decade ago) the BNP and DEA had much less investigative success in the Altiplano than in the Media Luna due to the cultural differences between the two regions.