Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

We all regularly reflect upon how and why the long race unfolded...who was selected, how long did they last, what were they able to accomplish, the right and wrong of it all, and how do we improve it...

As a result of my reflections, I would suggest that 'good officers' meet a threshold criteria of being 'all-a-rounders' who are mentally & physically tough, smart, deeply driven, and selfless.

Cadet selection processes that i am familiar with place a premium upon a rich and plentiful amount of opportunities to assess and develop a feel for how a variety of systems & processes unfold (from the cadet perspective) while providing valuable insights into the core of the cadet (for those making the selection). The goal is to consistently select and develop balanced individuals able to effectively function across the 'full spectrum'.

Leadership and management skills are required of all officers throughout their careers...the actual balance between the two varies from situation to situation and over the course of various duties assigned...but my observation is that both skill sets are part and parcel of a successful officer's innate makeup.

Perhaps we are having difficulties with respect to our definitions of leadership and management skill sets...I know what they are and are not when i see them.....but i don't have references at hand at the moment that provide clean definitions of what i am trying to share...

It is good that there is a discussion going where we may have to agree to differ.

Yes,much of the problem is the semantics which is why we probably need to be careful to clarify what we mean. After all we have there are a number of people around here who don't have English as their mother tongue (like the Germans, the odd Frenchman... and of course all the Americans )

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Ken White

He was heard. The Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth used to preface their block of instruction with words to this effect:

"What we are going to teach you will work on a mild, clear June day in gently rolling terrain without heavy vegetation against a similarly organized and equipped enemy force provided you have all your personnel, they are adequately trained and properly equipped and all your equipment is functional. If ANY of those parameters are changed, you will have to adapt."

Hopefully, they're still doing that and, more hopefully, the students hear and will heed the message.

Went to look for this to compliment what to you posted:

Battle Drill.--The teaching of battle drill undoubtedly proved to be of the greatest value in instilling dash and determination into troops and junior leaders. The best results have been obtained from battle drills on a platoon level, but training in the drills up to company level proved useful.
It is important, however, that junior leaders should not regard battle drill as a universal panacea to be applied in toto in every situation. Battle drill training aims at teaching the basic "strokes," and thus represents only the first rung in the ladder. The drills must be intelligently applied in accordance with the nature of the ground and the particular tactical situation. There were many occasions when unnecessary casualties resulted from poor leadership because junior leaders blindly followed a set drill and failed to apply it with common sense. - Notes From Theatres of War, No. 16, North Africa November 1942-May 1943; The War Office, October, 1943

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

Leadership uber alles briefs well in some utopian quarters, but it does not reflect the demands of the real world upon soldiers.

...and thinking, as always, hurts...

Seriously, I understand what you're writing and do not totally disagree but I do wonder if "the demands of the real world upon soldiers" is mostly true as seen through the eyes of the US Armed Forces and their products. We Americans have a tendency to over engineer and things and then, modify that to cope with desired form over function concerns and follow that with, in production, a desire to reduce costs. Those latter two 'adjustments' lead to sometimes less than stellar solutions...

That approach has enabled us to cobble together operations from scratch and on the fly, it has enabled us virtually alone in the world to have global reach and power -- but it has also meant that we often flounder and fail operationally and tactically once we get somewhere.

I often wonder if we have not by a practice of lowest common denominators ended up with many 'solutions' that are adequate but little more when more would be better and is achievable. I'm a firm believer in 75% solutions for combat but acknowledge that's not good enough for many logistic, support or engineering tasks. I also believe the old adgae "Best is the enemy of good enough" but for combat forces, I wonder if adequate is good enough?

I don't think so.

"Leadership uber alles" is not the answer but it seems to me 'management trumps leadership' is also not a good idea and my perception is as I wrote above about Officers "selected based on academic ability and not on leadership potential" -- "it is understandable. It is also able to be passed off as 'fair and objective' to legislatures concerned about such things -- it's easier, too than the hard work of assessing leadership potential. More importantly, as you say, it is dangerous"

I think it is, Steve, I think your comment is a reflection of the way we have elected to select and train, to do business. I also think there are better ways, Congress permitting -- they're a big driver of how we do business, perhaps too big...

[Ulenspiegel]

Originally Posted by JMA

Care to explain this some more?

Try to get Muth's "Command Culture", he starts with the differences in the HKA vs. Westpoint (honor code, i.e. problem and extent of hazing, different reward system for cadets; curricula, e.g. quite different percentage of hard science and basic military stuff, interaction of academy staff with their students) and their impact on the molding of a future officer.

Then he proceeds with a comparison of staff officer training and education and the basic problem of selectively copying procedures without understanding their spirit.
Here he brings opinions of US officers attending (forbidden) staff courses in the Reichswehr and opinions of German officers attending US courses (like v. Schell).

Some of the aspects of staff officer training Muth describes on the basis of letters and memories you can find in Crevelds "Fighting Power" from a more phenomenological point of view in the chapters on doctrin and command principles.

I am really interested in opinions on Muth's book: Did he get the essence of the issue?

[Surferbeetle]

JMA, Ken, Ulenspiegel (Till ),

Bear with me as I start slow, and let's see if i can build from there.

My observation (fm surferbeetle...the five page picture book ) that successful leaders are multifaceted leads me to believe that in very general binary terms there is a a leadership and a, for want of a better word, management component to being a successful leader.

• My simplified mental equation is: leadership skills + management skills = leader

• Leaders are ranked each day, by activity, by all of 'us' and the order of merit list changes continually...no one has ever earned a 100

Recall our days on the playground...various groups of kids, someone in the 'center' of each - attracting others & directing and prioritizing & allocating resources for group activities...proto leadership and management skill sets on display.

We all 'know' by observation that successful leaders have the ability to influence others to accomplish tasks (leadership skills)

• Leaders encounter various levels of opposition/friction from individuals within the group which vary by task, hour, and day.

• Leaders encounter various levels of assistance from individuals from individuals within the group which vary by task, hour, and day.

• There are key individuals within a group, who when influenced positively or negatively can impact the accomplishment of a task by acting as catalysts for subgroups.

• Leaders know and are known to individuals in a variety of different groups

• Groups, and subgroups, can be aggregated into 'mental buckets' or demographics and approximately described and characterized which can help with the 'how to' of how to influence

We all 'know' by observation that leaders have the ability to prioritize efforts and allocate resources (management skills)

• Leaders make it a point to understand what resources are available

• Leaders are themselves skilled at prioritizing and using resources

• Leaders are able to understand (deeper than know) and articulate 'innate' group priorities

• Leaders present credible allocation options that are inline with group priorities

• Leaders help group members gain access to resources

Leader status is not a certainty, it has to be earned for each task, each day. Regular challenges are part of nature...survival of the fittest...however the military provides a hierarchy which can be leveraged to minimize this daily struggle/chaos, and conversely which allows for the continued survival of those not necessarily deemed as fit.

Best is indeed the sworn enemy of good enough, and Americans (and engineers) need to guard against the detrimental application of an innate desire to build a better mousetrap...who gets to decide when the threshold of detrimental has been crossed is an enduring question

Originally Posted by Ken White

...and thinking, as always, hurts...

Yes it does

[Surferbeetle]

Originally Posted by Ken White

...and thinking, as always, hurts...

It also takes time my friend...

Originally Posted by Ken White

Seriously, I understand what you're writing and do not totally disagree but I do wonder if "the demands of the real world upon soldiers" is mostly true as seen through the eyes of the US Armed Forces and their products. We Americans have a tendency to over engineer and things and then, modify that to cope with desired form over function concerns and follow that with, in production, a desire to reduce costs. Those latter two 'adjustments' lead to sometimes less than stellar solutions...

Lot's of folks are doing their level best to meet expectations and trusting in 'the system'...but, to speak plainly, it seems that we are consistently screwing things up as a nation of late. We are collectively forgetting basics, ignoring obligations, taking what we can, fighting amongst ourselves over small things, lapping up shallow 24/7 propaganda of all types, electing questionable folk, and then not bothering to supervise our representatives or their shadowy financial patrons (and when did that last bit become desirable or legal?)...

Unfortunately i don't see the majority of those in charge - the elites, boomers (my bunch - i am on the tail end), or older folks (present company very much excluded, no disrespect intended) as really being engaged/committed to changing things...

Originally Posted by Ken White

That approach has enabled us to cobble together operations from scratch and on the fly, it has enabled us virtually alone in the world to have global reach and power -- but it has also meant that we often flounder and fail operationally and tactically once we get somewhere.

Outside of our borders 'Little Americas'/Posts/Bases/FOBs/ are perhaps emblematic of our ttp...there is only 'one true system' (and it's ours) so we wall ourselves up from local solutions/what works given local constraints (equilibriums worked out over long periods of time) wherever we are operating and force that square peg into that round hole...'they' will all learn English and American ways eventually, we just have to keep at it that's all....

Daily servings of ice cream, air conditioning, and big screen flat panels, in the field of all places...

Over time we are figuring out that it's not viable or sustainable, but progress is sure slow...

Originally Posted by Ken White

I often wonder if we have not by a practice of lowest common denominators ended up with many 'solutions' that are adequate but little more when more would be better and is achievable. I'm a firm believer in 75% solutions for combat but acknowledge that's not good enough for many logistic, support or engineering tasks. I also believe the old adgae "Best is the enemy of good enough" but for combat forces, I wonder if adequate is good enough?

I don't think so.

You have been more places and seen more than i...the only thing i could possibly add is to echo your observation that we are out of balance...

Originally Posted by Ken White

"Leadership uber alles" is not the answer but it seems to me 'management trumps leadership' is also not a good idea and my perception is as I wrote above about Officers "selected based on academic ability and not on leadership potential" -- "it is understandable. It is also able to be passed off as 'fair and objective' to legislatures concerned about such things -- it's easier, too than the hard work of assessing leadership potential. More importantly, as you say, it is dangerous"

I think it is, Steve, I think your comment is a reflection of the way we have elected to select and train, to do business. I also think there are better ways, Congress permitting -- they're a big driver of how we do business, perhaps too big...

It's taken me a long time to learn what little i know, and i don't presume to fully understood things...but...i am very leary of 'leaders' writ large who claim to have all the answers, especially at this uncertain inflection point in our collective history. For me effective and desirable leaders are multifaceted, involved, and genuinely care....when looking around i don't see very many of them at work at the moment, while constructive democracy appears to be on the wane and the power of the coercive state appears to be on the rise.

It feels like a storm is about to break...and while it is my sense that we will successfully get through it... it is also my hope that some of the nastiness and stupidity prominently on display throughout the world of late will not...

So as usual i guess, we are on our own and we will have to continue to make positive things happen within our small spheres of influence.

My grandparents on both sides of the family made it through the depression and the war...good people, good memories...my take away is that hard times don't last and friends and family make the tough times bearable and the fun times, of course, even better...

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Surferbeetle

We are collectively forgetting basics... then not bothering to supervise our representatives or their shadowy financial patrons (and when did that last bit become desirable or legal?)...

All sadly true.

Unfortunately i don't see the majority of those in charge - the elites, boomers (my bunch - i am on the tail end), or older folks (present company very much excluded, no disrespect intended) as really being engaged/committed to changing things...

I think perhaps a degree of tiredness enters into that. After beating one's head against the wall, stopping feels less bad...

Daily servings of ice cream, air conditioning, and big screen flat panels, in the field of all places...

Superb succinct summary. .

...the only thing i could possibly add is to echo your observation that we are out of balance...

Unbalanced is good. Well, it isn't good but that's an accurate call...

It feels like a storm is about to break...and while it is my sense that we will successfully get through it... it is also my hope that some of the nastiness and stupidity prominently on display throughout the world of late will not...

So as usual i guess, we are on our own and we will have to continue to make positive things happen within our small spheres of influence.

My grandparents on both sides of the family made it through the depression and the war...good people, good memories...my take away is that hard times don't last and friends and family make the tough times bearable and the fun times, of course, even better...

Yes. Yes...

[Fuchs]

Two more cents;

I like the idea of having specialised NCOs (junior NCOs still learning on the job, senior NCOs expected to be the mainstay of training, motivation and supervision) which are practically bound to their branch and accumulate lots of specialised expertise*.

I also like the idea of having the officer corps divided into staff (planning, management) and combat (leadership, combined arms tactics proficiency, independent of branch) careers.


Many armies are close to this, but it appears to me that they somehow lost focus of it or forgot the purpose of their designs and allowed it to rot away.

It's an indication of 'rottenness' if rank inflation (or trust in junior leaders) has eroded so much that a LtCol leads a platoon-sized checkpoint, if you need to be a NCO to become an AFV driver or if even a company leading-captain isn't trusted in his small unit tactics proficiency (much less in understanding the co-operation of a combined arms formation).


This is not only about the initial selection of officers (or NCOs). It's about how they are being used, about getting rid of discovered duds- it's first and foremost about high expectations and the energy to pursue them.
An army is a bureaucracy and as such by default satisfied with its performance, unsatisfied with its size and budget.
This is what needs to be broken; we cannot cure the basic principal-agent problem of a bureaucracy, but we can make it critical of its own performance and institutionalise dissatisfaction with its own performance.

There's always a reason for being dissatisfied; this reason needs to be exposed and utilised. Free-play adversarial (similar or dissimilar) challenges should be the rule and be used to make shortcomings obvious. Persistent failure in getting rid of problems should not only end careers, but end careers in dishonour, with public exposure.



How could we expect that the bureaucracy correctly identifies the duds in a few days right at the beginning if it allows duds to serve and be promoted to high ranks?



*: Believe it or not, the Bundeswehr is nowadays crazy enough that a navy NCO can serve as tank driver instructor.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Two more cents;

I like the idea of having specialised NCOs (junior NCOs still learning on the job, senior NCOs expected to be the mainstay of training, motivation and supervision) which are practically bound to their branch and accumulate lots of specialised expertise*.

*: Believe it or not, the Bundeswehr is nowadays crazy enough that a navy NCO can serve as tank driver instructor.

In peacetime the incentive to properly prepare for war is soon lost.

Can we please differentiate between individuals on training courses and where units are being exercised.

Here lies the fundamental I believe and that is unless skills (command or otherwise) are exercised in the unit context of the now course qualified individual (be it weapons or tactics) the training is incomplete.

I also like the idea of having the officer corps divided into staff (planning, management) and combat (leadership, combined arms tactics proficiency, independent of branch) careers.

There is a natural shake out process that takes place in the first seven years or so where those with command potential separate from those with staff prospects. This is why I maintain (from my own experience) that the first three years after commissioning must concentrate on active (if there is a war on) platoon commanding. It is a mutual learning experience where the individual learns much about himself and the army and the army learns much about that individual.

[JMA]

In another thread some discussion has taken place which is germane to this thread.

My view remains that the direct entry of young officers halfway up the rank structure can only be justified on the basis that the maximum age of generals in war is within the bracket of 45-50 and as such it would take too long for all soldiers to enter at the ground level.

The practice of producing thousands of young officers most of whom will not progress beyond major appears not only misguided but a massive unnecessary expense. The (only) benefit of maintaining such an officer production line is that in the event of a war requiring national mobilisation the structures are in place to churn out officers by the thousand.

It is obvious that the natural career progression for a platoon sergeant is to the position of platoon commander. Those capable would then progress upward according to their abilities and as limited by their age in later years. With obvious exceptions the natural settling point for those who have ‘risen through the ranks’ will be in training establishments probably at the ranks of captain or major.

This approach is a radical shift from current practice and would require a massive change in NCO staffing and career planning. Perhaps the major change that would be the most difficult to achieve is that of ‘mindset’.

Under such a system the pressure would then be off to continue with a Henry Ford style production line for direct entry officers. The numbers of such direct entry officers required would then be governed by the numbers of generals required some 25-30 into the future rather than filling the ‘black hole’ of junior officer positions with all the current retention concerns. The other officer ‘black hole’ is that of so-called staff officer positions. A delightful spin-off of a radical change in direct entry officer policy I suggest will be that there will be increasingly fewer ‘surplus’ officers where a position for them will have to be found. Many of such largely superfluous staff positions would fall away.

Once the numbers of direct entry officers required has been calculated the selection, training and career path aspect can be covered.

Officer selection in the US military remains controversial through its emphasis on academic ability over leadership and character related attributes. This would need to be redressed as with the current mass production system it appears that sufficient quality people manage to rise within the military despite the flawed system. A system focussed on producing future generals will be forced to alter the emphasis on certain aspects of its selection criteria. Major rectification work will be required in this area in the US military while in militaries with adequate selection systems changes on a lesser scale will be required. The British for example will have records of full career performance from officer cadet to general for the last forty years which should allow them to adjust their OSB (Officer Selection Board) selection criteria to screen for potential generals mainly.

Training will have to be adjusted to provide a more personalised approach. A production run of officers by company lots must give way to a low instructor : student ratio with highly individualised training with an individual focus. A review of when degree education needs to be undertaken. As a significant cost of officer education this should be undertaken only once the initial selection decision has been confirmed after, say, a minimum of four years service (being officer training and three years commissioned service). It is assessed that the Command and Staff Course will be the major mid career selection mechanism. Some will not have produced a service record to allow attendance on the Staff course while others may fail the course. The course itself would allow the military to place the officers in a order of merit with regard to future career prospects. These individual prospects would once again be confirmed or adjusted through the attendance on a Senior Command and Staff Course.

The current US promotion flow for officers of 3:9:16:22 years commissioned service to Captain:Major:Lt Colonel:Colonel appears on the face of it to be adequate with the proviso of the almost obscene haste to captain appears to be driven by the length of the USMA training. With the US system of captains commanding companies there remains the great danger that captains in the early phase of the their service at that rank will be given command of a company while hopelessly under qualified and lacking in the necessary experience.

A quick calculation so as not to interfere with critical military experience building postings and training that any baccalaureate degree study should take place between the 5-11 years of commissioned service. This allows for the officer to experience command of a platoon (or service equivalent), undergo specialised corps/service training and at least one other posting – at staff or training – where he can be assessed as to the officer’s continued suitability before the cost of a baccalaureate degree is incurred.

While the assessment of the officers continued suitability is continuous there would be specific milestones of assessment during a career. Starting with a careful, detailed and arduous initial selection process the one year officer training course (comprising military subjects only) will further screen out those assessed to lack the potential for senior command or displayed some disqualifying personal characteristic under the stress of training.

The next assessment stage will be prior attending baccalaureate degree which would immediately be followed by the main anticipated career opt out time for officers who after the period of study have no enthusiasm for a return to the regimented life in the military. The next two stages are pre and post Staff Courses.

It appears that instead of officers spending enough time in a post to gain the necessary experience the ‘more is better’ approach, where quantity trumps quality, has been adopted where officers, like butterflies, flit from on post to the next without gaining sufficient experience and through the lack of continuity in these posts reducing the stability of the military as a whole.

Can anything be changed? Will anything be changed? Will it even be discussed? Nah.

If the military were a business it would fail and have to be redesigned. A pity it is not.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by JMA

So this brings us full circle back to leadership.

Got a delightful book the other day (available through the US Marine Corps Association) called 'Battle Leadership' by Captain Adolf Von Schell. A German officer who served during WW1 and then attended US Staff College in 1930-31 the nine short chapters are based on lectures he gave to the US military over that period (so appears not to be a translation).

He says this on leadership:

Came across this USMC Discussion Guide on von Schell's book. Good to see some Marines are wide awake to the value of von Shell's small book.

The book is available from Amazon I note:

Battle Leadership by Adolf Von Schell