Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Cavguy]

Eden,

Excellent question which I won't be able to answer in detail because of my day job, so here's a stab.

I submit for an operational design I'll call option 4. I also drafted a commander’s intent for Afghanistan based on what should be done based on my article. Having been to Afghanistan, you can tell me if it is feasible or not.

1) You must secure your urban centers. I agree with John McCuen that you don't uncover your semi-secure urban base to chase insurgents in the wild. The enemy wants you to do that so he can infiltrate and begin building the political and operational cells in the now-undermanned cities while you chase his bands in the bush, and then look back to find your cities on fire. I think this is what the Taliban is doing now - political organization as a prelude to military organization in Kabul and Kandahar. If your capital(s) aren't secure, then nothing is. Identify the critical symbolic and economically important points and begin to secure them fully.

2) I sometimes relate the operational design used to secure Ramadi (which I think is transferrable) to a maneuver battle. We "fixed" the enemy by building combat outposts in "hot spots" downtown - fighting an attrition battle (reducing his force) but also limiting his ability to maneuver (hence the "fix"). We then "flanked" him in the permissive areas, focusing on securing them using clear, hold, build, and gaining local auxillaries capable of providing security. Once we built enough force, the auxiliaries were able to exert influence to clear the "hot spots".

Also like a maneuver battle, you have to look for the unexpected opportunities. In maneuver battles we would designate NAI's to identify enemy decision points and/or opportunities, and position forces to react accordingly. In COIN it is no different, but instead of terrain based NAI's, you are looking for human terrain based NAI's. Just like a maneuver battle, you have to be positioned to exploit the opening when it is identified, which allows you to truly get inside the enemy's rear and really unhinge him.

3) This brings me to a reserve. I would argue that it is always good to have a reserve, given enough troops to adequately "hold". The key is that you must have some forces able to respond to developing opportunities on short notice. I hate to cop-out, but METT-TC applies to the size and composition of the reserve. However, if not employed the reserve should be employed to tasks such as building local capacity. This could be a combination Airmoble and Cavalry-like striking force.

4) Finally, you need a victory - something to give people - local and international - hope. Tal Afar and Ramadi were those examples. We have to find someplace and make an example out of it. Note also that the Iraq narrative didn’t turn until violence was arrested in *Baghdad*. As long as daylight prision breaks occur in Kabul the population won’t believe in their government’s ability to protect them.


Immediate action: Afghanistan:

Without having been there, something along the following would be my immediate operational plan for Afghanistan given limited forces.

Purpose: Coalition and Afghan forces defeat insurgent political and military networks in major population centers to deny the Taliban access to the urban population.

Key Tasks:
- Implement population control measures to prevent insurgent freedom of movement and deny logistical supply. This includes identity cards, food rationing, biometrics, vehicle licensing, census registration, and possibly rationing of key goods as appropriate.
- Develop host nation institutions to counter enemy political mobilization.
- Develop competent national security forces augmented by local auxiliaries to prevent insurgent infiltration into population centers, backed up by on call coalition force QRF backup. Focus on a neighborhood by neighborhood security zone plan.
- Conduct operations to disrupt rural insurgent forces and organizations to prevent reinforcement of urban organizations.
- Creation of competent local administration and leadership.

Endstate:

Major cities of Afghanistan secured by local forces, capably administered by local leaders, and free of major insurgent activity. Coalition and ANA forces postured to expand into smaller towns and villages, to secure economic infrastructure to expand security. Taliban forces disrupted and unable to influence major population centers.

Once this phase is complete, fight moves to the rural areas.

So in summary:

1) Main Effort: Focus on securing Kabul and Kandahar, and rooting out insurgent political and military cells. Establish population control to deny insurgent freedom of movement. Develop capable military and political organizations to maintain security and free coalition troops (clear, hold, build). Focused IO campaign to show improvement in the key cities.

2) Supporting Effort: Mobile strike force(s) "fix" the enemy in the rural areas, conducting targeted operations to keep them attritted and unable to mass to mobile formation status. Goal (at this point) is not to secure and win the populace, but to keep the enemy from influencing the city effort, and preventing establishment of "base areas" and sanctuary, keeping the enemy off balance and unable to expand effectively while the cities are secured. This may involve strongpoint/outpost operations to act as "fly bait" for insurgent forces. Units work to develop local and tribal security alliances as a secondary effort. (Kitson style intel driven operations)


As with all war-winning plans derived in 30 minutes or less – I stand by for the council to tell me why what I proposed is infeasible and what it is missing.

Niel

[reed11b]

At the risk of sounding flippant, isn't that very simalier to the Soviet plan? Why would it work now?
Reed

[jcustis]

1) Main Effort: Focus on securing Kabul and Kandahar, and rooting out insurgent political and military cells. Establish population control to deny insurgent freedom of movement. Develop capable military and political organizations to maintain security and free coalition troops (clear, hold, build). Focused IO campaign to show improvement in the key cities.

2) Supporting Effort: Mobile strike force(s) "fix" the enemy in the rural areas, conducting targeted operations to keep them attritted and unable to mass to mobile formation status. Goal (at this point) is not to secure and win the populace, but to keep the enemy from influencing the city effort, and preventing establishment of "base areas" and sanctuary, keeping the enemy off balance and unable to expand effectively while the cities are secured. This may involve strongpoint/outpost operations to act as "fly bait" for insurgent forces. Units work to develop local and tribal security alliances as a secondary effort. (Kitson style intel driven operations)

I have to agree with reed11b to some extent. Economy of force out in the bush would have a hard time being successful as a supporting effort, especially since the cities have never been the base of power in that country from what I have read and think I understand.

Folks in a Rhodesia tried something slightly similar, and they had a hard time against the guys "who had all the time".

[Cavguy]

I have to agree with reed11b to some extent. Economy of force out in the bush would have a hard time being successful as a supporting effort, especially since the cities have never been the base of power in that country from what I have read and think I understand.

Folks in a Rhodesia tried something slightly similar, and they had a hard time against the guys "who had all the time".

Two brief responses (sorry short on time) to you and reed.

1) Reed, the Soviets were not beaten militarily, only politically due to cost and popular opinion. The Russians took many more casualties than we have and also had a different operational template. And as I understand it, Kabul and Kandahar were relatively calm until the Taleban drove in and toppled the harsh puppet government left behind.

Our imperative then is to maintain domestic and Afghani political will for the war. To do that, the capitols at a minimum need to be secure, and the government has to provide something worth being loyal to.

Recent news highlights that unlike 1989, the Taleban has created significant political networks in both Kandahar and Kabul over the last year, which are undermining the government through murder/intimidation campaigns and parallel governmental systems. These are festering while BCT's tend to chase insurgents in the wild. The Pakistani border cannot be sealed, and frankly, we can't fix the problem that allows a sanctuary there. So our only option, given we can't eliminate the sanctuary (I don't think we could if we wanted to or had access), is to defeat the Taleban politically by making it in the population's interest to reject the Taleban and support the central and/or government. Those forces must be secure/strong enough to resist Taleban infiltration.

Remember, this is a fight for political will. Reporters live in the major cities. Attacks in major cities, like they did in Baghdad, attract attention. Arresting violence in the capitol changed the all-important political narrative. Now you see articles like Dexter Filkins' NYT article today, stating how much better Baghdad is, which has changed perceptions of the US domestic populace on the war.

[Cavguy]

I have to agree with reed11b to some extent. Economy of force out in the bush would have a hard time being successful as a supporting effort, especially since the cities have never been the base of power in that country from what I have read and think I understand.

As long as the enemy can cause chaos and fear in your capitol unabated, you are losing.

A government that cannot impose order in its own capitol is one not strong enough to stand or attract loyalty.

Look at the effect of the Marriott bombing in Pakistan today. Same principle.

[Ron Humphrey]

First Cav, very well articulated and clear article, my favorite kind

Second As Cav suggested Although on the face of it much may sound familiar about the approaches Ru/Coalition the differences are the key. If we use an example of the laser. A laser is a laser but its uses vary based on how its used, where its used, to what extent its used, and if its used.

IMHO he's dead on with the need for confirmed security in the large cities. Without that it would seem anything anywhere else would amount to very little in so far as the population and the international communities grading of efforts there. Perception matters.

Second, There are not only limits to how much the coalition or the HN can offer in terms of resources and manpower, but maybe just as importantly limits to how much the outer regions can hold out against enemy intimidation campaigns without risking their own established local security and autonomy under the longstanding traditions. If that history is overcome by enemy actions then there will be major changes in the overall countries dynamics as evrything leadership wise will be going topsy-turvy.

There has got to be a tie between the larger govt and those regions which sets the ROE for interactions between the two and some way for the HN to actually be able to fulfill obligated protections within that structure. Therein is the requirement to recognize with whom and where you can create alliances which actually help to forward the larger goal.

As to AQ/TAL/ETC as Ken has mentioned before the military Wack a mole is occasionally a useful tool and in many cases may be the only one available for at least short periods of time. The key there would be to find ways to ensure these periods don't cost you or the HN more on the POL front than you are gaining on the Kinetic side

I think as Operations continue along these lines we would see what has been talked about on other threads in that each commander's intents will have to adjust and adapt to the changing tides which happen. The ultimate endstate is simply we don't give up and they have no choice but to.

[Ken White]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

[Cavguy]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

I highly recommend John McCuen's take on this from his 1963 book, Art of Counterinsurgency War - he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

[Ken White]

Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:

"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.

He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).

I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.

Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...

[Bob's World]

One of the basic tenants of insurgency (and therefore COIN), is that seizing and holding physical terrain means nothing. The terrain being contested is that of the support of the populace.

Now, the counterinsurgent has the added risk/burden of the negative strategic communications effect of not being able to hold or secure key cities, LOCs, etc, and the wise insurgent will exploit this while at the same time committing to holding nothing.

The bigger issue is not one of city vs country; but rather one of a Afghan governance overly shaped and formed by Americans vice an Afghan governance truly shaped and designed by Afghans for Afghans.

In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).

Excluding Taliban from the government is probably similar to excluding Nazi's from a post WWII government in Germany. Many Afghans support the Taliban position, and for them to not have representation is a problem that is sure to fester, and it appears that it has.

Then there is the catch-22 of our own presence. We need to be there to help this government build adequate capacity to stand alone, yet our very presence breeds a resistance insurgency that is not against the government so much as being against having a foreign power so prominent in their country. This is not insurmountable, but it is that very real baggage everytime you conduct FID; but particularly when you transition from UW to topple the government to FID to support the new government that replaced the old one. Can you say "conflict of interest"?

My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

[Surferbeetle]

My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

Here is a small concrete step in that direction:

Language company first in Army

The company, which officially unfurls its flag Oct. 23, provides uniform-wearing interpreters and translators to units deploying to places like Iraq and Afghanistan. While not yet fully manned, the unit will eventually include more than 140 native speakers of languages like Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, Kurdish and Dari.

Once upon a time the US direct commissioned people with rare and necessary skills, and one could argue that language and cultural skills are in fact just that. If done with an eye for the strategic and pragmatic issues, I would suggest that a 'unconventional' solution can found to the problems that we all share...

[reed11b]

One of the basic tenants of insurgency (and therefore COIN), is that seizing and holding physical terrain means nothing. The terrain being contested is that of the support of the populace.

I agree and disagree, if holding terrain denies freedom of movement or access to the population (i.e. cities) then it has benefit, I still argue that COIN is 66% military (though often by unconventional means, more on that later) 33% Law Enforcement and 1% Social Service/Infrastructure. To state that physical terrain is meaningless in COIN is counter-productive.

In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).

Good points, and ones I will comment on at a later time.

Excluding Taliban from the government is probably similar to excluding Nazi's from a post WWII government in Germany. Many Afghans support the Taliban position, and for them to not have representation is a problem that is sure to fester, and it appears that it has.

I would argue that this is not true; they had support w/i a limited tribal framework and terrorized the rest of the country into deferring to them. They still do not have true popular support w/i the country, hence their base of operations in Pakistan.

Then there is the catch-22 of our own presence. We need to be there to help this government build adequate capacity to stand alone, yet our very presence breeds a resistance insurgency that is not against the government so much as being against having a foreign power so prominent in their country. This is not insurmountable, but it is that very real baggage everytime you conduct FID; but particularly when you transition from UW to topple the government to FID to support the new government that replaced the old one. Can you say "conflict of interest"?

Again, I disagree strongly. If we had removed the Taliban from power and left after Karzai had been elected, The Taliban would have attacked all the same w/ exactly the same base of support, which is limited and ruled through fear again. Our presence does little to attract support to the Taliban except when we choose to act poorly (i.e. Air Strikes). If it was a popular uprising then I would say your points had more merit.

My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

I agree only in that by stepping back we can examine what the LOC that the Taliban and AQ use, as well as there support base and formulate an effective strategy based on this knowledge, instead of our current tendency to "act" even when we are not sure what exactly it is that we are doing. The Taliban could care less about the support of the populace, fear will work just as well for their purposes.
Reed
P.S. Sir, I do want to make clear that I feel that you are a fantastic addition to this forum and that I agree more often then disagree with what you have to say.

[Norfolk]

As with all war-winning plans derived in 30 minutes or less – I stand by for the council to tell me why what I proposed is infeasible and what it is missing.

Niel

Cavguy,

Yours and other's points about having to hold the cities in Afghanistan is utterly correct and utterly crucial. NATO has to clean out and then hold the cities, while the ANA and National Police are given the time to build up their own strength and to assume full control of the major cities themselves first, and then to take the fight out into the countryside. If not to decisively defeat the Taleban and -like groups, then at least to contain them, sort of. Even the best scenario I can think of will still see a campaign season out in the countryside each year for years to come. But that is at least doable. As long as Pakistan keeps treading water, that is.

Edited to Add: The ANA and National Police have no practical hope of securing anything like even a majority of the countryside by themselves; that will come down to making political deals (or more accurately, alliances) with tribal and clan leaders, etc. in return for their joining in a common effort against the Taleban. In short, the National Government has to approach and treat the the tribes as more or less equal allies, not as another outsider imposing their ways.