To be a little more even-handed;

This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.

As previously stated, I agree with what you're saying here, and only disagree with a single element of what you said earlier.

To elaborate; U.S. engineers generally seek 'perfect' solutions (however, there are a large minority that don't, but that deserves a seperate thread). A 'perfect tool' is a pain in the rear end because you need a lot of them, because perfection has only one purpose and is hard or impossible to adapt to other applications. A good tool isn't 'perfect' but is adaptable enough to use in other situations. Look at the C-130; not perfect for any one job, too small as a cargo plane, too slow with its props rather than turbines, too much radar signature, not agile, etc. But incredibly adaptable; gun ship, SAR, ELINT, aircraft carrier landings, cargo, artic mods, etc. A good knife can be used for opening mail, food preparation, wood carving, and self-defense. An ideal knife for any of these applications isn't very good at the others.

So a military needs to be a good tool of statecraft rather than a perfect tool of statecraft. The U.S. military was forged into a perfect tool in the mid- to late- 1980s, and after the first Gulf War, felt vindicated (see Steven Metz "Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy" for an excellent discussion of this). Now we find that all the fieldcraft and subtle arts of Small Wars are equally (or more) important than the romantic vision of mechanized brigades rolling through the hills of Germany.

My concern with your vision is that, like the U.S. forces at the American entry into World War I, the soldier thus trained may have a steep and fatal learning curve to enter conventional conflict. Alternately, the price tag for a well rounded professional education that includes the full spectrum of conflict and imposition of national will, will not be considered acceptable by our civilian masters.

playin' stickball with my cane, knock the ball back to someone's court