The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[Pattonmat89]

...that this is totally relevant, but the Strategic Studies Institute published a monograph last year about the Lebanon war. Again, like I said, not sure how much of it you can use, but who knows? I haven't read it in about a year. As the great Robert Jordan used to say, "Read and find out."

https://www.strategicstudiesinstitut....cfm?PubID=882

[Zack]

...that this is totally relevant, but the Strategic Studies Institute published a monograph last year about the Lebanon war. Again, like I said, not sure how much of it you can use, but who knows? I haven't read it in about a year. As the great Robert Jordan used to say, "Read and find out."

https://www.strategicstudiesinstitut....cfm?PubID=882

I don't know how I missed that. Thanks I will definitely read it.

[slapout9]

Zack, read The Air Campaign by Colonel John Warden. It is on line and can be downloaded for free. Also read The Enemy as a System by Warden, also, also read everything you can by him.

[Tukhachevskii]

It's good that you've really narrowed the focus of the thesis to what appears to be an operational analysis of the failure of airpower to defeat insurgencies. It might be useful to compare the first Lebanon war with the second one perhaps in Ch. 3. Be thankful that in the North American system you have 60 pages to play with. In the UK the standard MA/MSc thesis is no more than 10,000 words (15-20 if you're lucky!) which means we realy have to narrow down the focus of our thesis. I would recommend that you add the following list to your bibliography;

A. Ibrahim, 'Conceptualisation of Guerrilla Warfare', Small Wars and Insurgecies V15/N3, 2004

Avi Kober, 'From Blitzkrieg to Attrition: Israel's Strategy and Stayiong power', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 16/2, 2005

W. J. Olson, 'War without a Centre of Gravity: Reflections on Terrorism and Post-Modern War', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18/4, 2007

T. A. Marks, 'Counterinsurgency and Operational Art', Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement , 13/3/2005

G. Raudzens, 'War-Winning Weapons: The Measurment of Technological Determinism in Military History', The Journal of Military History, 54/4, 1990

D. P. Dilegge & M. Van Konynenburg, 'View from the Wolves' Den: The Chechens and Urban Operations', Small Wars and Insugencies, 13/2, 2002. Has some useful insights on Chechen operations and their tactical negation of the effects of Russian airpower.

T. A. Marks, 'Urban Insurgency', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 14/3, 2003

C. Jones, 'Israeli counter-insurgency startegy and the war in South Lebanon 1985-97', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 8/3/, 1997

M. M. Mathews, 'The Israeli Defence Forces Reponse to the 2006 War with Hezbollah: Gaza', Military Review, July-August, 2009. Very good short article on lessons learned.

A. Kober, 'The Israeli Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?', Journal of Strategic Studies, 31/3, 2008

S. Catignani, 'The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Gap Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada', Journal of Strategic Studies, 28/1, 2005

A. Bousquet, 'Chaoplexic Warfare or the Future of Military Organisation', International Affairs, 84/5, 2008

D. Rodman, Combined Arms Warfare in the Israeli Defence Forces: An Historical Overview', Defence Studies, 2/1, 2002

J. Stone, 'Air-Power, Land-Power and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict', Civil Wars, 2/3, 1999

I assume that you will make the usual deferential mention of Duhet?

All the best

[Cavguy]

Don't forget:

We Were Caught Unprepared (Combat Studies Institute)
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CSI/GWOTPubs.asp

and

"Learning the Right Lessons from Israel's war with Hizbollah"
Combatting Terrorism Center (USMA) Sentinel

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTC...l-Vol1Iss4.pdf

[Zack]

Wow thanks guys, I will add all of those to my list. Only problem is my university library does not seem to subscribe to Small Wars and Insurgencies, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, defense studies, our subscription to the Journal of Military History only goes back to 1993, and our subscription to Civil Wars only goes back to 2000.

Do you know of any other way I could get those articles? If you have them, I would be immensely grateful.

And yes I will of course mention Douhet, Mitchell, & Trenchard, with deference.

Please PM to establish contact. (Moderator removed email address)

[Cavguy]

Wow thanks guys, I will add all of those to my list. Only problem is my university library does not seem to subscribe to Small Wars and Insurgencies, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, defense studies, our subscription to the Journal of Military History only goes back to 1993, and our subscription to Civil Wars only goes back to 2000.

Do you know of any other way I could get those articles? If you have them, I would be immensely grateful.

And yes I will of course mention Douhet, Mitchell, & Trenchard, with deference.

If your library has access to JSTOR it should have all of that. Also try Web of Knowledge. Ask a librarian to help.

[Zack]

If your library has access to JSTOR it should have all of that. Also try Web of Knowledge. Ask a librarian to help.

I have checked both JSTOR and Web of Knowledge, with no luck. I guess we don't have full access to all of JSTOR. If nobody has them and can send them my way I will go see if the librarian can request them for me. Thanks though.

[slapout9]

I have checked both JSTOR and Web of Knowledge, with no luck. I guess we don't have full access to all of JSTOR. If nobody has them and can send them my way I will go see if the librarian can request them for me. Thanks though.

Send a PM to John T. Fishel he helped start that publication and knows all kinds of stuff about it.


Here is alink to the free version of the Air Campaign by Warden

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/ward-toc.htm

[slapout9]

Zack, pay special attention to the 5 cases of War. The 2006 war was a case 5 War and Israel violated every principle Warden ever spoke about. This is important because he was and is blamed for a lot of the supposed EBO concepts that were used in the war, not a grain of truth in any of it, it fact (the 2006 war) is an excellent example of what will happen if you don't follow his advice on SBW (Systems Based Warfare).

PS: Afghanistan is a current example of a case 5 War and all the problems that go with it.

[Zack]

Zack, pay special attention to the 5 cases of War. The 2006 war was a case 5 War and Israel violated every principle Warden ever spoke about. This is important because he was and is blamed for a lot of the supposed EBO concepts that were used in the war, not a grain of truth in any of it, it fact (the 2006 war) is an excellent example of what will happen if you don't follow his advice on SBW (Systems Based Warfare).

PS: Afghanistan is a current example of a case 5 War and all the problems that go with it.

I definitely will, thanks for the tip.

[William F. Owen]

Zack,

The only advice I would offer about attempting to analysis the 2006 War is be very careful of most Western English language analysis. It almost all contains substantial errors and fallacies.

EG: This from Exum

Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted Israeli communications during the 2006 war, it is worth noting that in cases when encrypted communication failed, IDF soldiers simply used their personal cellular phones to communicate.

Actually in 2006 all the IDFs formation tactical radios were VHF/FM, with no encryption. Any actual knowledge of the IDF would have told him that.
Hezbollah only ever attempted to break one form of IDF encryption and in doing so compromised the attempt, thus it was countered.
This is one minor example.

Some of what has come out of CAC and other similar sources is also of doubtful veracity and usefulness.

Stephen Biddle's analysis (also not great but the best yet) is actually the only one I know that has any credibility because it used first hand sources.

To be constructive, I know a few of the men actually involved in the operational planning of the war in 2006, so if you PM me, I'll happily pass on questions. - so if you really want to know about the IDF using EBO, they can tell you first hand.

The single biggest issue (and the one not written about in English) with the 2006 Lebanon War was a failure to stick to the plan, because the plan kept being micro-managed at the Political level, and that casts doubts on the actually political objectives. IMO, it is an absolute case study of ignoring Clausewitz's observations.

Yes, lots of tactical problems, but again, everyone misses the political and economic dimensions that created the conditions where those became a problem - no time or money to train for proper combat operations - and huge faith in Air Power/EBO.

[Zack]

Ok cool, I will keep an eye out for that. Hopefully what I am reading will be enough that I will be able to pick up on that sort of stuff. Maybe you guys can help me fact check a bit when I get to writing.

[Tukhachevskii]

Zack,


The single biggest issue (and the one not written about in English) with the 2006 Lebanon War was a failure to stick to the plan, because the plan kept being micro-managed at the Political level, and that casts doubts on the actually political objectives. IMO, it is an absolute case study of ignoring Clausewitz's observations.

Yes, lots of tactical problems, but again, everyone misses the political and economic dimensions that created the conditions where those became a problem - no time or money to train for proper combat operations - and huge faith in Air Power/EBO.

I'd like to add that the 2006 war also showed up the doctrinal imbroglio (?) of the transition from standard wafighting to Shimon Naveh's rather appropriately entitled concept of SOD. From the commentaries I have read a large number of IDF staff officers were flumoxed by it and operations proceeded on the basis of EBO/RMA/NCW concepts when actually simply killing the enemy and taking his ground would have been more appropraite (i.e., classical warfare). This is, of course, in addition to the civil-military chaos Wilf mentions above. The article in Military Review presents this case rather well IMO (and is free to download).

[William F. Owen]

From the commentaries I have read a large number of IDF staff officers were flumoxed by it and operations proceeded on the basis of EBO/RMA/NCW concepts when actually simply killing the enemy and taking his ground would have been more appropraite (i.e., classical warfare).

This is exactly that 90% of folks have missed. The IDF have been doctrinally crippled by a bunch of avant-garde concepts, either home grown or from the US. The flow down from that was sets of mission verbs which made no sense, and tactical actions that were often irrelevant.

[Gian P Gentile]

Zack:

I didnt see it on your original list and also didnt see it on the posts suggesting other readings (although I may have missed it) but you should have a look at the work and thinking of Shimon Naveh, the Israeli GO, and so-called intellectual father of IDF thinking about war prior to 2006. He is mentioned briefly in the works by Matthews and Kober and others. Many of the critiques of the IDF in Lebanon at one point or another trace their way back to what some analysts see as the pernicious influence of Naveh and his purportedly whack-job ideas about theory and practice in war.

A place to start might be this interview with Naveh in Haaretz.

Wilf might have some things to add in this regard too.

gian

[William F. Owen]

Many of the critiques of the IDF in Lebanon at one point or another trace their way back to what some analysts see as the pernicious influence of Naveh and his purportedly whack-job ideas about theory and practice in war.

Naveh is indeed the father of SOD and very few officers in the IDF do not have a very strong opinion about him, or his teaching. Yes his influence was huge

.... and he is also apparently a driving power behind Operational Design and FM3!- so fear not! The wackiness lives on!

[Tukhachevskii]

The Combat Studies Institute also has an interview with Naveh which was posted at the small wars journal website here

smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mattmatthews.pdf

Regarding SOD and the 2006 war his take on events was that no-one in the IDF was cleverer (!) enough to understand his conceptual schema. His invective against IDF Gen. Dan Halutz (formerly of the IAF) is revealing in this regard. Understandibly when one frames one's ideas in an esoteric vocabulary properly belonging to those who were berets and frequent Parisian Cafes what do you expect?

[Rex Brynen]

Zack,

EG: This from Exum

Actually in 2006 all the IDFs formation tactical radios were VHF/FM, with no encryption. Any actual knowledge of the IDF would have told him that.
Hezbollah only ever attempted to break one form of IDF encryption and in doing so compromised the attempt, thus it was countered.
This is one minor example.

Actually, in the quote in question, Ex isn't saying anything about Hizbullah breaking Israeli military encryption. Rather, he is saying that when communications failures arose, IDF personnel used their cellphones to communicate instead. He's correctly implying that the GSM cellphones in use by the great majority of Israelis (IDF soldiers included) are unencrypted and hence extremely vulnerable to intercept--which is why, on more than one occasion, the IDF has issued warnings to military personnel about this.

/nitpick

[William F. Owen]

Ex isn't saying anything about Hizbullah breaking Israeli military encryption. Rather, he is saying that when communications failures arose, IDF personnel used their cellphones to communicate instead. He's correctly implying that the GSM cellphones in use by the great majority of Israelis (IDF soldiers included) are unencrypted and hence extremely vulnerable to intercept--which is why, on more than one occasion, the IDF has issued warnings to military personnel about this.

Quote.

Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted Israeli communications during the 2006 war, it is worth noting that in cases when encrypted communication failed, IDF soldiers simply used their personal cellular phones to communicate.

OK, but at the below unit level, the normal formations of the IDF did not have any encryption to fail. Some still used PRC-77!! You can listen to it on a commercial scanner. Bear in mind the UK VHF military comms system was totally open until they got that POS Bowman in 2005.

The cellphone conversations intercepted where soldiers civilians cell-phones that were being relayed through cell sites in the Lebanon. My cell phone frequently hops to Jordanian networks, when I'm on the West Bank. This is frequently alleged that the broke IDF encryption. It's simply not true.
The calls concerned were mostly to families and not operational communications (though in extremes some may have been)

The IDF military cell phone network is secure and comes from the US!