There is an exercise on the go somewhere in North America where the concept and various principles are being workshopped to give an understanding as to why certain things were done in a certain way within the context of aircraft, weapons, equipment available and the enemy and terrain considerations. This I believe includes a practical phase and ends with another workshop as to which of their weapons, troops, aircraft are most suited to such an application the the enemy and terrain environment of their current operational theater. The first serious attempt I have heard of.

What is refreshingly different is that these people are saying "help us understand the concept and the principles so we can see how we can apply them within our current circumstances". Refreshing to see some open minds in decision making positions (somewhere at least). I hope it works out for them.
Who is giving this effort a go, and what is the conceptual framework of the experimentation? I'm keen to get dialed in on the process they are following.

As for the question of portability over to current operations in Afghanistan, I have to side with Ken to some degree when it comes to whether FF ops would work. I agree that risk aversion is going to be one of the greatest detractors. A larger issue is the simple fact that the enemy forces are operating in significantly different ways in terms of their mobility, techniques of camouflage, methods of attack, etc.

One example that is a big difference stems from the fact that the current ROE would never support FF tactics, especially since the Taliban are woven into the populace much more so than ZANLA/ZIPRA terrs were with Rhodesian villagers. In most of my reads, the terr gangs were typically on the move, and could be intercepted as such as they crossed the borders and into the op areas. The pattern of life is vastly different, and although modifications could certainly be made to mimic the effects of FF ops, but through different means, it comes down to a discussion of whether the juice is worth the squeeze. We are working a population-centric strategy, not a counterinsurgent strategy. Until that shift is made, the supporting network of assets, conventional forces, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques, etc., cannot be shifted to suit the heliborne maneuver FF ops excelled at.