Is it time for psuedo operations in A-Stan?...

[William F. Owen]

Pseudo or "Counter-gang" operations have been part of the majority of the UK COIN ops in the 20th century.

The problem is that Counter-gang operations are not just one type of op. They are essentially HUMINT, with a kinetic end-state, but when and where has to be judged very carefully.

[Cavguy]

Pseudo or "Counter-gang" operations have been part of the majority of the UK COIN ops in the 20th century.

The problem is that Counter-gang operations are not just one type of op. They are essentially HUMINT, with a kinetic end-state, but when and where has to be judged very carefully.

Not exactly Kitson's pseudo-gangs, but why haven't we begun an indigenous force consisting of defected/captured former insurgents willing to switch sides? Seems to have a successful track record in the past.

The Awakening/SoI movement was something along these lines, but most SoI's weren't former insurgents.

Is there a legal prohibition in the past years that keeps this from happening?

[jcustis]

Not exactly Kitson's pseudo-gangs, but why haven't we begun an indigenous force consisting of defected/captured former insurgents willing to switch sides? Seems to have a successful track record in the past.

That's just it, they were trmendously successful in the past when applied with the appropriate degree of C2 and the JOC level, in concert with a well-balanced striking arm, and tied in with the paramilitary law enforcement arm.

[jmm99]

and will think about this tomorrow. I think serious thought should be given to Ken's points - PR and OpSec. Should and can we do this (with current TTPs) seems unwise to me also.

Was the Marine operation in Haiti "legal" - and what would be its repercussions today - is a narrow type of discussion that might be useful.

Thoughts by others ?

[jcustis]

I've opened the comm link among the moderators, and I suspect there will be a balanced, prudent discussion shortly which will offer the way ahead.

You come up with some interesting questions. The one about sheep-counting kept my pool team occupied for a while.

And yes, I have a thirst for knowledge about the often odd and curious. The appetite often ends up leaving me with more on my plate than I can realistically consume. But at least I already know to not rely on a life jacket to ward off bullets.

[AmericanPride]

Not exactly Kitson's pseudo-gangs, but why haven't we begun an indigenous force consisting of defected/captured former insurgents willing to switch sides?

I wonder about the practicality of such a force in a country whose instabilities have historically been driven by frictions among clan/ethnic frictions (with a healthy dose of foreign interference). Also --- didn't we, at least indirectly, stand up a similar irregular force in Afghanistan before in order to combat the Soviet Union? The problems I forsee are to which locals is the transference of such skill sets, and what guarantees can we put in place that will alter the basic power relationships in the country in such a way that the our new friends do not become the next in a long line of unpopular central governments wielding power in a closed political system? The Taliban is dominated by Pashtuns, so I imagine that's who'd we need to recruit. From which clan? And -- how will the non-Pashtun factions view the (further) strengthening of Pashtun power?

[jcustis]

For follow-on replies, let's stay clear of discussing TTP that may or may not be ongoing or planned, and focus on the LoW implications. That was the thrust of the question for the most part...

Could we do it? What legal concerns would there potentially be? Is it moral?

[Steve Blair]

Operations of this sort were common during the Civil War, and surfaced to one degree or another on the Frontier both before and after the war. The outcomes from the Civil War are pretty well known, but those on the Frontier less so.

I've seen some stuff that indicates that the major scout recruiting efforts tended to exacerbate any existing tensions and/or hostilities between the groups in question. The Apache might be the most popularly-known, but the Army's use of Tonkawa scouts in Texas certainly stirred up factions of the Comanche and Kiowa who might have been easier to deal with otherwise. There are other examples of misidentification of camps which might have been caused by tribal or clan rivalries.

In most cases Indian auxiliaries didn't operate on their own, but these issues would have surfaced no matter how they operated. At the time no one discussed the moral or legal issues of using them, but the same thing during the Civil War did tend to stir popular passions (both for and against such operations).

[jmm99]

from jc..
But at least I already know to not rely on a life jacket to ward off bullets.

As to the Laws of War, a good place to start is with Wilf's comment:

Pseudo or "Counter-gang" operations have been part of the majority of the UK COIN ops in the 20th century.

The problem is that Counter-gang operations are not just one type of op. They are essentially HUMINT, with a kinetic end-state, but when and where has to be judged very carefully.

Let's take two generic situtions: (1) Individual infiltration of the enemy group (for HUMINT purposes); and (2) Group infiltration of the enemy territory, and perhaps into an enemy group, for HUMINT, ISR, kinetic "disruptions", etc.

The first situation is easy. The individual is a spy. Being a spy is not a violation of the LoW; but, that status removes the protection afforded regular combatants. The spy is not charged with war crimes, but with violations of the enemy group's domestic law.

The second situation is more complex since the infiltrating group may consist of (pre-infiltration): (1) all regular combatants; (2) some regular combatants, some irregular combatants; and (3) all irregular combatants. The LoW outcome will very much depend on the facts - the "law of strategems". The worst case scenario is that the regular combatant will lose combatant immunity. The bottom line is that the status of a pseudo-irregular is less harsh than that of a spy.

Now, when a client asks me a complicated legal question (requiring a great deal of legal research), I first ask myself if the answer will make a significant difference in the client's particular situation. I then ask the client (if I answered my own question negatively) if he (or she - PC) wants to rack up a large legal bill to answer what is (for him or her) a hypothetical question.

As I understand AQ-Taliban and associated groups (having done some research on them), they do not have much (if any) respect for combatant immunity; and that you are likely to get your head lopped off, regardless of your costume or what you are doing. I've had an open offer going for about 6 months for anyone to tell me (and provide evidence) that AQ-Taliban and associated groups accept and apply the GCs. So far, no takers.

So, as a practical matter in the AQ-Taliban context, I have some agreement with Ken that LoW is not the most pressing question.

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I've left out citations of legal authorities for what I've said above. They are based on a number of authorities (a long list), but the down and dirty can be found in FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956, with Change 1, 1976).

The Law of Land Warfare, in codified form, derives in large measure from the US Lieber Code of 1863. Not a long read; and tells you how the North handled an insurgency in legal terms.

The classic article about irregular combatants is the 1959 JAG Treatise, A TREATISE ON THE JURIDICAL BASIS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAWFUL COMBATANT AND UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENT (JAG School 1959).

Here are a couple of words of wisdom from its introduction:

A noncombatant [3] who fights can be punished with death. [4]

3. A noncombatant is a person whom both sides on the basis of experience can reasonably expect will not actually engage in overt acts of war. The word can only be defined to the satisfaction of both sides when nations of the same cultural heritage are at war. Then, noncombatant is defined by traditional examples which have meaning to both sides. In most western civilizations all persons not in the fighting forces and some, such as physicians are traditionally thought of as noncombatants. This is the sense in which the word is used here.

4. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Jul. 1956, paras. 80, 81, 82.

In current US law (under development - see War Crimes thread), a noncombatant who fights will be treated under Common Article 3 of the GCs, as regulated by the US AUMF which controls the armed conflict.

The 1959 JAG Treatise also defines "irregular combatant", "irregular" and "irregular warfare":

"Irregular combatant" and "irregular" are used hereafter to designate all those combatants who are not an integral, regularly constituted part of the conventional military establishment of a country. This is convenient and avoids the difficulties inherent in varying meanings of the multitude of terms normally used. Thus, "Partisans" in the American Revolutionary War were privately supported, regularly constituted units of the Continental Army, but the word has an entirely different meaning when used in connection with Tito's Yugoslav Partisans in World War II. Any attempt to say that "Partisans" are, or are not, legal combatants is sure to lead to confusion.
.....
Irregular warfare is now a major strategical consideration. The United States Army has shown increased interest in this type of warfare. [citing, i.a., FM 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (1958, rev. 1961) - the FM 3-24 of its time; 259 pp. in its 1961 iteration]. There are many factors which may lead to increased use of irregulars in future wars.

The 1959 JAG Treatise was very much influenced by FM 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (1958, rev. 1961), which is online in its 1961 iteration (also my hardcopy).

So, as I am using the term "irregular", I am using it in the 1959 sense (as defined above) - and not in terms of the current buzzword.

The 1959 JAG Treatise is a great read - more historical and operational than legal. It asks many questions (and provides some answers) that are today relevant to combat soldiers and Marines.

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from jc...
What legal concerns would there potentially be? Is it moral?

I like this question because it was always asked by a good client (an OSS MAJ back in his day) after I told him what the legal options were: "But, are they moral and ethical ?" So, then, on to a philosophical discussion.

I'll refrain from that here, because the ethics and morals that are important are not mine, but those of the serving officers and enlisted who have to make the decisions.

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There are some PR issues that should be discussed. One thought I have is not to make a pseudo-irregular program covert. Simply announce that we are going to do it - obviously in general terms - and see what flak actually develops. Even if the program never got off the ground, the announcement could have a disinformatrion effect on Violent Non-State Actors. Just a thought.