What about actually using and incorporating the legions of contractors operating in Iraq today? They are there, many / most are already on our dime.

- From 20,000+/- around the time Bush donned his flight suit to around or over 100,000 today, security contractors are America's agents in the Iraq project whether we acknowledge it or like it and regardless of what the Under Secretary of the Army might say.

- Incorporating this 100-150k 'private army' is essential and not blue sky unless you haven't been paying attention.

- These men must be 'deputized', in some form or another, and brought inside the mission as direct agents of the United State government. They need to be integrated into the command structure to work with and not 'coincidently near' counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts as a whole.

- Their accountability to the mission, not the law, is essential. Further changing UCMJ and MEJA are unnecessary, but helpful. These firms are there on USG’s dime and command officers and down need to work closely with contract officers to make sure adherence to the mission, not the letter, is understood and monitored. Bad behavior must be clearly punished (techniques used to bring contractors inline include threats of exposing personal information to local IP, not recommended but effective). If the Administration believes it can open mail and listen to phone calls it can cut and enforce smart contracts in Iraq.

- Contractors must adhere to and follow revised ROE that are more expansive than when to shoot but include how to engage and interact with the population. Aegis 'Trophy Video' and alleged shootings of Vice Presidential guards in the IZ must be met with visible and swift punitive action, legal and financial and public, as a demonstration to the Iraqi people and the US public of the resolve and commitment of the United States.

- Flooding Iraq with contractors, security and civil and everything else, who will work with Iraqis is essential to garner Iraqi buy-in, establish their own stake in the venture, and build an Iraqi desire to succeed. This desire cannot be imposed and it cannot be assumed.

Some (all?) is pie in the sky, but not only am I eager to hear input from this board but I'm fascinated how the contractors are largely ignored.

This is step #4 in something I put together over the weekend:
http://mountainrunner.us/2007/01/ele...s_in_iraq.html