The future with Karzai: a debate (merged thread with new title)

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

I'll keep looking for it.

Zakaria's April 9 interview is on the CNN site.

In his opinion, the US is going the wrong way with Karzai.

In his opinon, Karzai is the only way forward, and, therefore, we must continue to support and praise him.

To me, that is just so much Washington Talking Head foolishness about national pols preening with other national pols (until the next national pol comes in- The King is Dead, Long Live the King).

If, as he argues, the US has become so desperately strapped to Karzai (as is, and with full and glowing US support), we might as well abandon the mission today.It would be pointless if Afghanistan cannot change.

Instead, he overlooks so many fundamental alternatives and strategies, the core of which are the Afghan people themselves. What if they want to do something different, either at the local, regional or national level, or apart from Karzai's way?

One point he makes is that Afghanistan's leader must be Pashtun, and therefore, must be Karzai. Implicit in that statement is, I assume, that force of arms must be used to impose Karzai/Pashtun solutions on the non-Pashtuns.

Taken to reasonable conclusions, there will come a point when the concept of Afghanistan as anation will inevitably be abandoned by non-Pashtuns simply to escape Karzai, and the likelihood of further Pashtun oppression and ineffectiveness. Many parts of Afghanistan are very different, and moving forward on separate trajectories.

The reality is that, to the extent Afghanistan does function, it is by complex systems of competition and consensus at many different levels, and by many different groups, leaders and individuals. This is no different than many other places in the world that combine/recombine, aggregate/disaggregate, affiliate/unaffiliate

If, as Zakaria suggests, it is Karzai or the highway, he negates the possibility of those actual successful processes developing (or muddling through) to an alternative future. This is substantially inconsistent with Afghanistan's political history.

He greatly misunderstands the natural course of history and events.

Sometimes, his comments are insightful. Sometimes, they are just bizarre.

[Sylvan]

Slap:

One point he makes is that Afghanistan's leader must be Pashtun, and therefore, must be Karzai. Implicit in that statement is, I assume, that force of arms must be used to impose Karzai/Pashtun solutions on the non-Pashtuns.

.

His logic is flawed.
In order to win in Afghanistan, we must win the Pashtoon population. This is a fact.
To win the pashtoon population, you don't need (IMHO) a Pashtoon president. You need a government that respects and protects Pashtoon culture and local leaders. A Dostum doesn't work, but a Massoud might. Karzai certainly doesn't do it. His gubenatorial (sp?) appointments have been heavy handed and counter productive. Regardless, Karzai is not a popular leader among the majority of Pashtoons and is especially disliked in Kandahar City. That we focus so much on Helmand and ignore Kandahar (we will see if we are serious about fixing that situation soon) is one of our many blunders.

As noted earlier, we missed our opportunity to start fresh after the elections. Although I believe installing Abdullah ^2 would have worked against us in the South.

However, the bottom line the longer Karzai remains in power the worse the situation is going to become in the South unless he quickly changes course in many areas.
Foremost is reigning in his little brother.
Allowing Governors to be if not popularly elected, at least popular vetted at a Shura or Jirga.
Release control of Provincial Police to Provincial Governors. Maintain control of ANCOP only at MOI level.
Replace Tajik dominated leadership in the ANA in 205 corps to Pashtoon leadership.
Eating a bullet (OK, wishful thinking)

[Firn]

Sorry, I forgot to provide the links. The quotes come all from the Corriere della Sera

Not surprisingly exponents of the left say they are behind Emergency. Il monde é paese, the world is a village, as the Italian saying goes.


Firn

[Steve the Planner]

So, the Lords of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar may be Pashtun, but, by their actions, do not engender support of the Pashtun people under their watch (thumb).

Thus, inside their sphere is oligarchy and fealty, and outside their immediate sphere are their opponents.

We are somewhere in the middle of that mess, fueling the oligarchy while denouncing it, and opposing the opponents without addressing the cause of their opposition.

A bit of a sticky wicket?

I was reading a recent interview with Dr. Abdullah who indicated that he could have, by saying yes to a few phone calls, have brought down Karzai, but, in doing so would have (1) caused huge danger/destabilization, and (2) worked outside the parliamentary process that, in his belief, is the thing that Afghans take pride in having restored---he would not become what he opposed.

That kind of hard-learned humility (maybe much from recent losses) demonstrates that he (and many others) could fairly lead all the people (no loss of face for Pashtuns). Question is how does a transition/trainsformation occur?

Behind that interview, also, was Abdullah's concern about Karzai's continual efforts to dismantle civilian structure (Election Commission, etc.). So the question of timeliness is in play---Can a change take place before even further damage is done?

[Sylvan]

So, the Lords of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar may be Pashtun, but, by their actions, do not engender support of the Pashtun people under their watch (thumb).

Thus, inside their sphere is oligarchy and fealty, and outside their immediate sphere are their opponents.

We are somewhere in the middle of that mess, fueling the oligarchy while denouncing it, and opposing the opponents without addressing the cause of their opposition.

A bit of a sticky wicket?

I was reading a recent interview with Dr. Abdullah who indicated that he could have, by saying yes to a few phone calls, have brought down Karzai, but, in doing so would have (1) caused huge danger/destabilization, and (2) worked outside the parliamentary process that, in his belief, is the thing that Afghans take pride in having restored---he would not become what he opposed.

That kind of hard-learned humility (maybe much from recent losses) demonstrates that he (and many others) could fairly lead all the people (no loss of face for Pashtuns). Question is how does a transition/trainsformation occur?

Behind that interview, also, was Abdullah's concern about Karzai's continual efforts to dismantle civilian structure (Election Commission, etc.). So the question of timeliness is in play---Can a change take place before even further damage is done?

To answer your last question first, Yes. However it will be much more messy now than it could have been immediately following the election fiasco.
Simply put; Karzai has to believe he is expendable to American needs. Doesn't mean he has to leave, but he must think that we will dump him in 30 seconds. Whether this should be done publically or privately is a good debate to have. I believe publically would better serve our purposes, but I doubt the more diplomatic types among us would agree.
Karzai behaves like a spoiled child because he is. Since Daddy pays the bills, daddy should make the rules. Obama's perception as weak in the muslim world is being magnified in Afghanistan. The more he grovels, the more Karzai is going to publically humiliate our country and destablize his own.

Dr. Abdullah failed in one regard in his analysis. The parlimentary process is destroyed in Afghanistan. It is merely a facade in front of a poorly built and neglected foundation.
He should have fought, and we should have supported him. Another foreign policy failure of this adminstration.
Karzai must be brought to heel for the sake of both the United States (and ISAF) and Afghanistan.
We bought a flawed product for the best of reasons, stop throwing good money after bad.

[Steve the Planner]

I suspect the answer is the regular subterfuge.

Public pronouncements of our support, but continued efforts to divert things around him and others, and to those that are supportive (per West's article).

The more noise in support, the less dollars in reality.

I think Dr. Abdullah's comments have to be read in his, and not out context.

His Dad was a Senator, he grew up with a great reverence for the parlimentary institutions, and a deep and long struggle to re-establish it. We get lots of dope and speculation on positions and interests in the South and East, but not much perspective on the other folks (the ones that are not threats).

He is reported to be a US favorite, but I don't think he wants to go in as a US lackey under any circumstance, nor be one. In reality, he may be a lot harder, for example, on civilian deaths than Karzai, and much more directive of US/Int'l Aid, presently running everywhere but in a straight line.

I find his genuine interest to be legit. He does not want to be put in office by the Americans, and especially not in violation of the Constitution. Down the road, his position may be much more important to him and Afghanistan, and that's where his head and heart is.

Personally, I believe that the integrity of the Afghan institutions are supported better if we do not pick, choose and kick-out. But, as you say, we really do control most of the money, and that does give the right to direct how it is spent---even with Abdullah or anyone.

Right now, it looks like a return to the Hall of Mirrors strategy. Lots of whispers and dodges---things said but not followed up with actions, and things done with saying.

Business as usual.

[slapout9]

Link to full CNN Fareed Zarkaria interview of Peter Galbraith on A'stan problem and some options.


http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/pod...cast.04.11.cnn

[Sylvan]

I suspect the answer is the regular subterfuge.

Public pronouncements of our support, but continued efforts to divert things around him and others, and to those that are supportive (per West's article).

The more noise in support, the less dollars in reality.

I think Dr. Abdullah's comments have to be read in his, and not out context.

His Dad was a Senator, he grew up with a great reverence for the parlimentary institutions, and a deep and long struggle to re-establish it. We get lots of dope and speculation on positions and interests in the South and East, but not much perspective on the other folks (the ones that are not threats).

He is reported to be a US favorite, but I don't think he wants to go in as a US lackey under any circumstance, nor be one. In reality, he may be a lot harder, for example, on civilian deaths than Karzai, and much more directive of US/Int'l Aid, presently running everywhere but in a straight line.

I find his genuine interest to be legit. He does not want to be put in office by the Americans, and especially not in violation of the Constitution. Down the road, his position may be much more important to him and Afghanistan, and that's where his head and heart is.

Personally, I believe that the integrity of the Afghan institutions are supported better if we do not pick, choose and kick-out. But, as you say, we really do control most of the money, and that does give the right to direct how it is spent---even with Abdullah or anyone.

Right now, it looks like a return to the Hall of Mirrors strategy. Lots of whispers and dodges---things said but not followed up with actions, and things done with saying.

Business as usual.

Karzai himself doesn't respect the Afghan institutions, either formal or informal.
If he was conducting himself in a manner that the Afghan people supported (but we did not) I would support him. However, his appointment of governors has not been for the benefit of the provisional populations, but rather his own internal power struggles. The last election turn out was dismal not because of security, but because the Afghan's themselves have no faith in the IGoA. Karzai is undermining everything the US has tried to do and is trying to do there and not for the long-term benefit of the country of Afghanistan.

The facts are the longer karzai has been in power, the worse things have gotten in afghanistan. It is supremely arrogant to think the IGoA has no influence on the security situation in the country.
We have built his Army, we have built his Police we have given him damn near everything he has ever asked for, yet our soldiers are dying in greater numbers while the ANA sit on their FOBs.
Iraq is a convient excuse, but that is all it is. Afghanistan failed because we put the wrong government with the wrong leader in charge and let is fester and rot. And now instead of anti-biotics to fix it, we need to chop the damn leg off and no one is willing to do it. Better hurry up, before the whole damn organism dies.

[Greyhawk]

Not defending Karzai, and claiming no expertise here, just offering up for comment a few things that cross my mind when I see discussions like this one.

One: It's frequently asserted (including this thread) that Afghans no longer view Karzai as legitimate - or some variation on that theme. I'm certain that's true of individuals (no doubt of Abdullah Abdullah, to name one) and results in regions will obviously vary, but while I've seen poll results (BBC/ABC/ARD) that indicate Karzai's support/popularity among Afghans is actually on the rise (post-2009 election, even), and has always been higher than that of NATO forces, I've never seen the opposite claim supported.

Two: After Karzai and Abdullah's fraudulent votes were thrown out of the Afghan election results (only @200k for Abdullah, iirc), Karzai ended up with a hair under 50% of the vote, Abdullah a bit over 30. I believe the result of "round two" would have been a greater gap, with far fewer votes cast. Pure speculation on my part, as Abdullah's withdrawal assured we'll never know. (But see one above - re: Karzai's "popularity".)

Three: No discussion of the wheels within wheels/great game aspects of the situation is complete without a read of Kai Eide's December, 2009 letter, this NY Times report on same, and Peter Galbraith's response to that report. Certainly there are many other "must reads" but I think these give the reader a good feel for some of the behind the scenes fun and games.

From the Times:

“He [Galbraith] told me he would first meet with Vice President Biden,” Mr. Eide wrote. “If the vice president agreed with Galbraith’s proposal they would approach President Obama with the following plan: President Karzai should be forced to resign as president.” Then a new government would be installed led by a former finance minister, Ashraf Ghani, or a former interior minister, Ali A. Jalali, both favorites of American officials.

Galbraith characterizes that a bit differently: "I privately suggested to Kai Eide, the United Nations special representative to Afghanistan, that we consider recommending to the Afghans that they establish an interim government headed by a respected neutral figure..."

I'm not certain in this case that Ghani (2.94% of the vote) or Jalali ("Afghan American and a Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, which is located in Washington, D.C.") would have been welcomed by the Afghan people as "neutral".

In fact, whether he actually said it or not, I imagine I hear Ho Chi Minh repeating his comment on the coup that toppled Diệm: "I can scarcely believe the Americans would be so stupid." A harsh thing sometimes, my imagination.

I do know Kipling said this:

"They do not understand that nobody cares a straw for the internal administration of Native States so long as oppression and crime are kept within decent limits, and the ruler is not drugged, drunk, or diseased from one end of the year to the other."

...and I find it interesting that there's now a push on to portray Karzai as drugged, drunk, or diseased.